


DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

BASE CLOSURE



AND

REALIGNMENT

REPORT

19950731 190

March 1995

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Preface

This information has been assembled to support the 1995 Department of Defense recommendations for base closures and realignments inside the United States.

The Secretary of Defense transmitted his recommended closures and realignments to the 1995 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission and to the Congress on February 28, 1995. The recommendations were also published in the Federal Register.

Chapter Five of this report contains the statutory recommendations, justifications and process summaries the Secretary of Defense transmitted to the Commission, the Congress, and the Federal Register pursuant to Public Law 101-510, as amended.

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

February 28, 1995

Honorable Alan J. Dixon
Chairman
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore Street, Suite 1425
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Under the procedures of Public Law 101-510, as amended, I hereby transmit for your review my recommendations to close or realign 146 installations. Attached to this letter is a summary of the selection process and the description of and justification for each recommendation.

These recommendations were not arrived at easily. We were forced to consider and choose among many excellent facilities. But there is no alternative: if we fail to bring our infrastructure in line with our force structure and budget, we will lack the funds to maintain our readiness and modernization in years to come.

Being Objective and Fair

The base closure process was designed by the Congress to be objective, open and fair. Each potential recommendation is measured by published criteria, which gives priority first to military value, then to cost savings and to the economic and other impacts upon local communities. The data employed have been certified and our procedures have been overseen by the DoD Inspector General and the General Accounting Office. Both, of course, will be reviewed in detail by the public and your Commission.

That process has worked well so far, and we have followed it to the letter.

Within the Department, recommendations were made first by each Military Department and certain Defense Agencies (hereafter, "the Services"). Each Service made its best judgment about the facilities it has and the capacities it needs, applying the published force structure and criteria required by the law. They operated under the guidance of a BRAC Review Group chaired by the Deputy Secretary.

At the beginning of February, the Services made their recommendations to me. Since that time, my staff and the Joint Staff have reviewed the recommendations and underlying analyses to ensure that the law and DoD policies were followed. We particularly looked for concerns or

effects that the Military Departments might not fully have taken into account, such as the war fighting requirements of the Unified and Specified Commanders, treaty obligations of the United States, and possible economic impacts from independent actions of several Services on a particular locale.

Preserving Military Capabilities

My recommendations are consistent with the force structure plan for the Armed Forces for the six-year period of the Future Years Defense Plan. In Fiscal year 1999, the active Army will have 10 divisions; we will have room to station all of them. The active Navy will have 11 carriers; we will have room to berth them. The active Air Force will have 936 fighters; we will have room to beddown all of them. The active Marine Corps will contain 3 divisions; we will be able to base them. In exercising military judgment, the Services have retained domestic capacity to accommodate their forward deployed forces if need be. I am confident, therefore, that the remaining base structure can accommodate any foreseeable force resizing -- even a significant degree of reconstitution.

The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff concurs in this view and supports these recommendations fully.

Based upon the 1993 BRAC Commission's recommendation and my own view that the support structure of the Department needed to be reduced just as the combat force had been, I designated common support functions as areas of special attention in BRAC 95. Joint Cross Service Groups analyzed the Department's depot, medical, pilot training, laboratory, and test and evaluation facilities. These groups assessed both the functional value and the capacity of these facilities. They compared this to projected needs and suggested to the Services both reduction goals and possible alternatives to meet them. The Services then considered these alternatives in their own review process. In some cases they adopted these suggestions as recommended or in modified form; in other cases they declined to do so because the bases had unique military value to the Services, or for other reasons. Overall, the cross service effort did assist in reducing excess capacity and determining where joint or collocated functions made functional and economic sense. Further, this DoD-wide review of support functions provides a road map for cross-servicing in the future.

In the logistics area, in particular, savings were achieved using several strategies. The Army, Navy, and Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) all proposed closing major depots and/or shipyards. The Air Force, however, proposes to achieve significant savings by consolidating and reducing activity at its five air logistics centers in place, as well as providing consolidation sites for DLA storage activities. Because of the Air Force's unique logistics complexes, this approach proved significantly more cost effective than closures.

These Recommendations Will Save Billions

My recommendations, if approved, will provide very substantial savings to the taxpayers and the Department. Initially, implementing these closures and realignments will require expenditures estimated at \$3.8 billion (excepting certain environmental costs). However, even within the 6 year planning period for which we program a budget, this round will provide approximately \$4 billion in savings (FY96\$) in excess of the costs required for base closure. These savings will continue at the rate of approximately \$1.8 billion per year, and over the twenty year period for which we forecast should total some \$18 billion (measured on a present value basis in today's dollars).

Net savings, FY 1996-2001	\$ 4.0 billion
Annual savings thereafter	\$ 1.8 billion
Total (over 20 years, present value)	\$18.4 billion.

The 1995 program, coupled with the previously approved closures, will reduce the domestic base structure by about 21 percent (measured by replacement value). All four rounds of closures together, when complete in 2001, will produce about \$6.0 billion in annual recurring savings (FY96\$) and a total savings over 20 years in present value of almost \$57 billion.

Assisting Community Recovery

As we implement these closures, we recognize a special obligation to those men and women -- military and civilian -- who won the Cold War. We will meet that obligation.

In addition to transition programs for DoD personnel, the Department is determined to carry out the President's promise to help base closure communities reshape their economic future. This assistance comes in many forms: technical assistance and planning grants; on site base transition coordinators to provide a focal point for Federal assistance; accelerated property disposal to make surplus property available for civilian reuse; and fast track environmental clean-up in coordination with Federal and State regulators and community reuse authorities.

In some cases, reused bases are now home to more civilian jobs than there were before closure. Many communities have found that base property can be the bedrock for a healthier and more diverse economy. What it requires is strong local leadership and a lot of hard work. We at the Department stand ready to help.

I have sent identical letters, with enclosures, to the Chairmen of the House National Security and Appropriations Committees and the Senate Armed Services and Appropriations Committees, and published this letter, with its enclosures, in the Federal Register.

In closing, I would like to note the critical role that your Commission plays. Your review is an essential confirmation of the integrity of our procedures and the soundness of our judgments. We know that your review of our recommendations will be as searching, thorough and careful as the process by which we made them. We stand ready to provide any information you require and to discuss any judgment we have made. In the end, we hope you endorse our recommendations in this process that is so critical to our Nation's security.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "William J. Perry". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned to the right of the word "Sincerely,".

Enclosures

Chapter 1

A Base Closure Overview

Why Close Bases?

With the end of the Cold War, the Department of Defense has undertaken a restructuring of its military forces. During the past decade, the number of servicemen and women has been reduced one-third. The Department's budget has also shrunk. From fiscal 1985 to 1997, in real terms overall Defense spending has declined by 40 percent.

The Department's physical infrastructure, too, must be reduced. Within the United States, the Department has over 400 major bases. Unless the infrastructure is downsized commensurately with the force structure and budget, funds will be spent on buildings instead of readiness and modernization. Outside the United States, we have reduced our presence dramatically, withdrawing from over half our facilities.

For many years, however, the Department found the opposition to closing domestic bases to be too powerful. In the decade before the first BRAC Commission, only 4 could be closed.

An Independent Process

In the late 1980's, members of Congress concluded that the only way to overcome the opposition of its members to individual closings was to entrust the process to an independent commission. The first Base Closure and Realignment Commission was created by statute in 1988. Under the terms of its creation, the BRAC Commission would develop and recommend an entire slate of closings. Once made, that slate could not be modified by the President or the Congress, merely approved or disapproved.

The 1988 BRAC Commission recommended the closure of 16 major facilities. Once fully implemented in 1996, its recommendations will save the taxpayers some \$700 million per year.

Recognizing how useful the first BRAC Commission had been, Congress enacted the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (P.L. 101-510). The Act continued the use of an independent commission, but specified that the role of the newly established Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission would be one of review. Henceforth, responsibility for developing closure and realignment recommendations would be the responsibility of the Department of Defense.

In accordance with the 1990 Act, the Department develops base closure and realignment recommendations based upon two public documents:

- long-term force structure plan, which is the basis of determining installation requirements, and
- selection criteria that are applied to rank bases in categories where there is excess capacity.

The selection criteria used since BRAC 91 give priority consideration to military value, but also take into account costs and savings, as well as economic and environmental impacts. The data used in these analyses are certified and audited by the Services' audit agencies and the DoD Inspector General. The internal Department process is also monitored by the General Accounting Office.

The BRAC recommendations of the Service Secretaries are reviewed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense before the Secretary of Defense forwards his recommendations to the Commission. This final review takes into account factors that the Services may not have considered (e.g., impacts on other Federal agencies, U.S. treaty obligations, or the combined economic effects of actions by more than one service).

The Commission is composed of eight individuals who are nominated for this task by the President and confirmed by the Senate. Six of the eight commissioners are nominated in consultation with the Congressional leadership from both major parties.

The Commission's responsibility is to review the Department's recommendations using the same force structure plan and selection criteria. Where the Commission finds that the Department has substantially deviated from either of these two foundations, it has the authority to alter the recommendation, but it must justify such actions on the same basis as did the Department.

The Commission must submit its recommendations to the President by July 1, 1995. If the recommendations are not rejected or returned for further consideration, the President must forward them to the Congress by July 15th. Unless disapproved by resolution of both houses of Congress within 45 legislative days, the recommendations thereafter have the force of law.

Results

Most observers believe that the BRAC process has fulfilled its objectives well. In each round, the Commission's recommendations have been approved by the President and the Congress.

The decisions in the three previous BRAC rounds -- covering 70 major bases and several hundred smaller facilities -- are now being implemented by DoD.

Despite significant up-front costs, BRAC actions save money for the Department and the taxpayers. Overall, the first three rounds of BRAC should result in recurring yearly savings of more than \$4 billion, and total savings in excess of \$30 billion. The following table summarizes the estimated costs and net savings for the previous three BRAC rounds, as well as the actions recommended in 1995 (in billions of FY96\$):

BRAC Costs & Savings (Billions of FY 96\$)

	BRAC Actions	Closure Costs ¹	6 Year Net Savings ²	Recurring Annual Savings ³	Total Savings ⁴
BRAC 88	145	\$2.2	\$0.3	\$0.7	\$6.8
BRAC 91	82	4.0	2.4	1.6	15.8
BRAC 93	<u>175</u>	<u>6.9</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>1.9</u>	<u>15.7</u>
Subtotal	402	13.1	3.1	4.2	38.3
BRAC 95	<u>146</u>	<u>3.8</u>	<u>4.0</u>	<u>1.8</u>	<u>18.4</u>
Total	548	\$16.9	\$7.1	\$6.0	\$56.7

¹ Excludes environmental cleanup costs and projected revenues from land sales.

² Net savings within the six-year statutory implementation period.

³ Projected recurring annual savings after the six-year implementation period.

⁴ Net savings after closure costs, measured over 20 years and discounted to present value at 4.2%.

Chapter 2

The Force Structure Plan

Background

Public Law 101-510 requires the Secretary of Defense to submit to the Congress and the Commission a force structure plan for fiscal years 1995 through 2001. The force structure plan which follows incorporates an assessment by the Secretary of the probable threats to the national security during the fiscal year 1995 through 2001 period, and takes into account the anticipated levels of funding for this period. The plan comprises three sections:

- The military threat assessment,
- The need for overseas basing, and
- The force structure, including the implementation plan.

The force structure plan is classified SECRET. What follows is the UNCLASSIFIED version of the plan.

Section I: Military Threat Assessment

The vital interests of the United States will be threatened by regional crises between historic antagonists, such as North and South Korea, India and Pakistan, and the Middle East/Persian Gulf states. Also the collapse of political order as a result of ethnic enmities in areas such as Somalia and the former Yugoslavia will prompt international efforts to contain violence, halt the loss of life and the destruction of property, and re-establish civil society. The future world military situation will be characterized by regional actors with modern destructive weaponry, including chemical and biological weapons, modern ballistic missiles, and, in some cases, nuclear weapons. The acceleration of regional strife caused by frustrated ethnic and nationalistic aspirations will increase the pressure on the United States to contribute military forces to international peacekeeping/enforcement and humanitarian relief efforts.

The United States faces three types of conflict in the coming years: deliberate attacks on U.S. allies or vital interests; the escalation of regional conflicts that eventually threaten U.S. allies or vital interests; and conflicts that do not directly threaten vital interests, but whose costs in the lives of innocents demand an international response in which the United States will play a leading role.

Across the Atlantic

The Balkans and parts of the former Soviet Union will be a source of major crises in the coming years as political-ethnic-religious antagonisms weaken fragile post-Cold War institutions. These countries may resort to arms to protect narrow political-ethnic interests or maximize their power vis-à-vis their rivals. The presence of vast stores of conventional weapons and ammunition greatly increases the potential for these local conflicts to spread. Attempts by former Soviet republics to transform into democratic states with market economies and stable national boundaries may prove too difficult or too costly, and could result in a reassertion of authoritarianism, economic collapse, and civil war.

In the Middle East, competition for political influence and natural resources (i.e., water and oil), along with weak economies, Islamic fundamentalism, and demographic pressures will contribute to deteriorating living standards and encourage social unrest.

The major threat of military aggression or subversion in the Persian Gulf region may well emanate from Iran. Iran will find its principal leverage in subversion, propaganda, and in threats and military posturing below the threshold that would precipitate U.S. intervention.

Iraq will continue to be a major concern for the region and the world. By the turn of the century, Iraq could pose a renewed regional threat depending on what sanctions remain in place and what success Iraq has in circumventing them. Iraq continues to constitute a residual threat to some Gulf states, particularly Kuwait.

Across the Pacific

The security environment in most of Asia risks becoming unstable as nations reorient their defense policies to adapt to the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet empire, the breakup of the former Soviet Union, and the lessons of the Persian Gulf War. Political and economic pressures upon Communist or authoritarian regimes may lead to greater instability and violence.

Our most active regional security concern in Asia remains the military threat posed by North Korea to our treaty ally, the Republic of Korea. Our concerns are intensified by North Korea's efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction and the associated delivery systems.

China's military modernization efforts of the last two decades will produce a smaller but more capable military with modern combat aircraft, including the Su-27 FLANKER. By the end of the decade China will also have improved strategic nuclear forces.

Japan's major security concerns will focus primarily on the potential emergence of a reunified Korea armed with nuclear weapons, on the expanding Chinese naval threat, and on the possibility of a nationalistic Russia.

In South Asia, the principal threat to U.S. security will remain the potential of renewed conflict between India and Pakistan. The conventional capabilities of both countries probably will be eroded by severe budget pressures, internal security obligations, and the loss of Superpower benefactors.

The Rest of the World

This broad characterization covers regions not addressed above and is not intended to either diminish or denigrate the importance of U.S. interests, friends, and allies in areas beyond Europe and the Pacific.

In Latin America, democratic foundations remain unstable and the democratization process will remain vulnerable to a wide variety of influences and factors that could easily derail it. Virtually every country in the region will be victimized by drug-associated violence and crime.

In Africa, chronic instability, insurgency, and civil war will continue throughout the continent. Two major kinds of security issues will dominate U.S. relations with the region: noncombatant evacuation and conflict resolution. Operations most likely to draw the U.S. military into the continent include disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, international peacekeeping, and logistic support for allied military operations. Further, conflict resolution efforts will test the growing reputation of the United States for negotiation and mediation.

Direct threats to U.S. allies or vital interests that would require a significant military response in the near-future are those posed by North Korea, Iran, and Iraq. More numerous, however, are those regional conflicts that would quickly escalate to threaten vital U.S. interests in southeastern Europe, Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. These conflicts would pose unique demands on the ability of U.S. Armed Forces to maintain stability and provide the environment for political solutions. Finally, there will be a large number of contingencies in which the sheer magnitude of human suffering and moral outrage demands a U.S. response, probably in concert with the United Nations.

Section II: Justification for Overseas Basing

Although we have reduced overseas presence forces, we nevertheless will continue to emphasize the fundamental role of mobile, combat-ready forces in deterring aggression by demonstrating our commitment to democratic allies and friends, and promoting regional

stability through cooperation and constructive interaction. This is achieved through peacetime engagement, conflict prevention, and fighting to win. Overseas presence activities such as combined exercises, port visits, military-to-military contacts, security assistance, combating terrorism and drug trafficking, and protecting American citizens in crisis areas will remain central to our strategy. U.S. influence will be promoted through continuing these overseas operations.

Over the past 50 years, the day-to-day presence of U.S. forces in regions of geostrategic importance to U.S. national interests has been key to averting crises and preventing war. Our forces throughout the world show our commitment, lend credibility to our alliances, enhance regional stability, and provide crises response capability while promoting U.S. influence and access. Although the number of U.S. forces stationed overseas has been significantly reduced, the credibility of our capability and intent to respond to any crisis will continue to depend on judicious overseas presence. Overseas presence is also vital to the maintenance of the collective defense system by which the U.S. works with its friends and allies to protect our mutual security interests while reducing the burdens of defense spending and unnecessary arms competition.

Europe, Middle East, Southwest Asia

U.S. interests in Europe, the Mediterranean, the Middle East, Africa, and Southwest Asia, require continuing commitment. We must maintain forces, forward stationed and rotational, with the capability for rapid reinforcement from within the Atlantic region and from the United States when needed.

The end of the Cold War significantly reduced the requirement to station U.S. forces in Europe. Yet, the security of the United States and of Europe remain linked, and continued support of the evolving Atlantic Alliance is crucial. Our long-term stake in European security and stability, as well as enduring economic, cultural, and geopolitical interests require a continued commitment of U.S. military strength.

Our overseas presence forces in Europe must be sized, designed, and postured to preserve U.S. influence and leadership in the Atlantic Alliance and in the future security framework on the continent. The remaining force is a direct response to the uncertainty and instability that remains in this region. Forward-deployed forces provide an explicit and visible commitment to the security and stability of Europe. Pre-positioned and afloat equipment supports rapid reintroduction of CONUS-based forces should the need arise in Europe or elsewhere.

Persistent Iraqi challenges to Persian Gulf security provide a solid grounding for continued U.S. presence in the region. Air, ground, and maritime deployments, coupled with

pre-positioning, combined exercises, security assistance, and infrastructure, supported by a European and regional enroute strategic airlift infrastructure, greatly enhanced our recent crisis-response force buildup. Our future commitment will include rotational deployments of battalion-sized maneuver forces, land-based tactical aviation units, and five surface combatants, reinforced by pre-positioned and afloat equipment, access agreements, bilateral planning, periodic exercises, deployments of Carrier Battle Groups (CVBGs), Amphibious Ready Groups (ARGs), and Marine Expeditionary Units (Special Operations Capable) (MEUs(SOC)), visits by senior officials, and security assistance.

Pacific Forces

U.S. interests in the Pacific, including Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean, also require a continuing commitment. As Asia continues its economic and political development, U.S. overseas presence will continue to serve as a stabilizing influence and a restraint on potential regional aggression and rearmament.

A strong U.S. naval and land-based presence is designed to buttress our interests in the region. A carrier and amphibious force, including 1(+) CVBG and one Marine Expeditionary Force with one MEU(SOC) will be forward-based in this region. One Army division, less one brigade, with supporting Combat Support (CS)/Combat Service Support (CSS) elements, and one Air Force Fighter Wing Equivalent (FWE) in South Korea and 1(+) FWE in Japan are forward-based in this region. In addition, presence in both Alaska and Hawaii will be maintained.

Elsewhere in the World

In the less-predictable yet increasingly important other regions of the globe, the United States seeks to preserve its access to foreign markets and resources, mediate the traumas of economic and social strife, deter regional aggressors, and promote the regional stability necessary for progress and prosperity. From Latin America to sub-Saharan Africa to the far-flung islands of the world's oceans, American military men and women contribute daily to the unsung tasks of nation-building, security assistance, and quiet diplomacy that protect and extend our political goodwill and access to foreign markets. Such access becomes increasingly critical in an era of reduced overseas presence, when forces deploying from the United States are more than ever dependent on enroute and host-nation support to ensure timely response to distant crises. In the future, maintaining overseas presence through combined planning exercises, pre-positioning and service agreements, combined warfighting doctrine, and interoperability could spell the difference between success and failure in defending important regional interests.

Contingency Forces

U.S. strategy for the come-as-you-are arena of spontaneous, often unpredictable crises requires fully trained, highly ready forces that are rapidly deliverable and initially self-sufficient. In regions where no U.S. overseas presence exists, these contingency forces are the tip of the spear, first into action, and followed if necessary by heavier forces and long-term sustainment. Therefore, such forces must be drawn primarily from the active force structure and tailored into highly effective joint task forces that capitalize on the unique capabilities of each Service and in the special operations forces. In this regard, the CINCs must have the opportunity to select from a broad spectrum of capabilities such as: airborne, air assault, light infantry, and rapidly deliverable armor and mechanized infantry forces from the Army; the entire range of fighter, fighter-bomber, and long-range conventional bomber forces provided by the Air Force; carrier-based naval air power, the striking capability of surface combatants, and the covert capabilities of attack submarines from the Navy; the amphibious combat power and rapid response Maritime Prepositioning Forces of the Marine Corps, which includes on-station MEU(SOC)s; and the unique capabilities of special operations forces. Additionally, certain reserve units must be maintained at high readiness to assist and augment responding active units. Reserve forces perform much of the lift and other vital missions from the outset of any contingency operation.

Section III: The Force Structure and Implementation Plan

	<u>FY 94</u>	<u>FY 97</u>	<u>FY 99</u>
ARMY DIVISIONS			
Active	13	10	10
Reserve	8	8	8
MARINE CORPS DIVISIONS			
Active	3	3	3
Reserve	1	1	1
AIRCRAFT CARRIERS	12	11	11
RESERVE CARRIERS	-	1	1
CARRIER AIR WINGS			
Active	11	10	10
Reserve	2	1	1
BATTLE FORCE SHIPS	387	363	344
AIR FORCE FIGHTERS			
Active	978	936	936
Reserve	795	504	504
AIR FORCE BOMBERS			
Active	139	104	103
Reserve	12	22	26

DoD Personnel (End Strength in thousands)

	<u>FY 94</u>	<u>FY 97</u>	<u>FY 99</u>
ACTIVE DUTY			
Army	543	495	495
Navy	468	408	394
Marine Corps	174	174	174
Air Force	<u>426</u>	<u>385</u>	<u>382</u>
TOTAL	1,611	1,462	1,445
RESERVES AND NATIONAL GUARD	997	904	893
CIVILIANS	913	799	759

Chapter 3

The Selection Criteria

Public Law 101-510 requires the Secretary of Defense to develop and report to the Congress the criteria to be used in selecting bases for closure and realignment. In BRAC 95, the Department used the same criteria as in BRAC 91 and 93. As described below, those criteria give priority to military value, followed by return on investment and economic and other impacts on base communities.

This chapter presents the BRAC 95 criteria and important events and decisions from both past and present BRAC rounds that contributed to their development. On December 9, 1994, the Department of Defense published a notice in the Federal Register that identified the selection criteria to be used in BRAC 95.

Maintaining the Prior Selection Criteria for BRAC 95

The Department of Defense decided not to change the criteria for BRAC 95 after careful consideration of suggestions made over the past two rounds of closures by the public, Congress, General Accounting Office, the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, and from within DoD. The Department's decision was based on two factors: 1) the criteria were broadly defined, which permitted adaptation through policy guidance to changing circumstances and differing types of activities; and 2) the criteria served well in the 1991 and 1993 efforts.

For BRAC 95, the Department reviewed and improved its process for considering economic impact, including the cumulative economic impact of prior BRAC actions. These improvements in procedures respond to issues raised by the 1993 Defense Base Closure Realignment Commission and the General Accounting Office. For BRAC 95, the Department considered cumulative economic impact as part of the sixth criterion, i.e., "the economic impact on communities." DoD considered economic impact and cumulative economic impact as relative measures when comparing alternatives. This process is discussed in detail in Chapter 4.

In deciding to use the previous selection criteria in BRAC 95, the Department also evaluated the issue of non-DoD costs. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 directed DoD to consider whether the costs of BRAC actions to other Federal departments and agencies should be included in the selection criteria for the 1995 BRAC process. After conducting a thorough review of the issue, the Department decided against such a change. First, it would be impossible to obtain accurate estimates for such costs within the controlled procedures of the BRAC process. Furthermore, even where BRAC

actions could result in cost increases to other Federal departments and agencies, DoD found that these costs in most cases analyzed would amount to a small fraction of BRAC savings -- less than 2 percent -- and therefore would not be likely to alter BRAC decisions.

BRAC 95 Selection Criteria

In selecting military installations for closure or realignment, the Department of Defense, giving priority consideration to military value (the first four criteria below), will consider:

Military Value

1. The current and future mission requirements and the impact on operational readiness of the Department of Defense's total force.
2. The availability and condition of land, facilities and associated airspace at both the existing and potential receiving locations.
3. The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, and future total force requirements at both the existing and potential receiving locations.
4. The cost and manpower implications.

Return on Investment

5. The extent and timing of potential costs and savings, including the number of years, beginning with the date of completion of the closure or realignment, for the savings to exceed the costs.

Impacts

6. The economic impact on communities.
7. The ability of both the existing and potential receiving communities' infrastructure to support forces, missions and personnel.
8. The environmental impact.

Selection Criteria for Prior BRAC Rounds

The BRAC 88 selection criteria were developed jointly by the Department of Defense and the Congress, and were incorporated by reference into Public Law 100-526 (the Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act). This law was a precursor to the current BRAC authority.

In BRAC 91, the Department proposed criteria, solicited public comments, transmitted the final selection criteria to the Congressional Defense Committees and subcommittees, and notified the public in the Federal Register of all these activities. DoD published the proposed selection criteria and request for comments in the November 30, 1990, issue of the Federal Register (55 FR 49678). The proposed criteria closely mirrored the criteria established by the 1988 Defense Secretary's Commission on Base Realignment and Closure (see Appendix E for a history of base closures). However, the proposed criteria differed in two ways from the 1988 criteria: 1) DoD would give priority consideration to military value, and 2) the return on investment "payback" period would not be limited to six years.

In BRAC 93, DoD published a notice in the December 15, 1992, issue of the Federal Register (57 FR 59334), stating that the selection criteria used in BRAC 91 would be used again, unchanged. DoD made this decision because the BRAC 91 final criteria were appropriately amended based on public comments, were accepted by Congress, and served well in the 1991 effort.

Chapter 4

The 1995 Selection Process

In developing the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-510), as amended, Congress provided mechanisms to ensure that the process would be fair, objective, and open. The Act requires that closures and realignments of military installations in the United States must be recommended on the basis of a six-year force structure plan and public selection criteria.

The procedures are continually subject to review by the DoD Inspector General, the General Accounting Office, as well as by the BRAC Commission and the public. This section describes them in detail.

Policy Guidance

The Deputy Secretary established the policy, procedures, authorities and responsibilities for selecting bases for realignment or closure (BRAC) by memorandum dated January 7, 1994. This policy guidance provided the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Directors of the Defense Agencies with the responsibility to provide the Secretary of Defense with recommendations for closures and realignments. This policy also required the Secretaries of the Military Departments and Defense Agencies to develop recommendations based exclusively upon the force structure plan and final selection criteria; consider all military installations inside the United States (as defined in the law) equally; analyze their base structure using like categories of bases; use objective measures for the selection criteria wherever possible; and allow for the exercise of military judgement in selecting bases for closure and realignment.

The Deputy Secretary also established the BRAC 95 Review Group and the BRAC 95 Steering Group to oversee the entire BRAC process. The BRAC 95 Review Group was composed of senior level representatives from each of the Military Departments, Chairpersons of the BRAC 95 Steering Group and each Joint Cross-Service Group, and other senior officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff and Defense Logistics Agency. It provided oversight and policy for the entire BRAC process. The BRAC 95 Steering Group assisted the Review Group in exercising its authorities.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Economic Security was given the responsibility to oversee the 1995 process, and was delegated authority to issue additional instructions. All policy memoranda applicable to the BRAC 95 process are provided at Appendix C.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs issued the interim force structure plan, as directed by the Deputy Secretary's January 7, 1994 memorandum, on February 7, 1994. The Deputy Secretary issued the final selection criteria on November 2, 1994. The Deputy Secretary provided the final force structure plan on January 11, 1995. This Plan was updated on February 22, 1995, by the Deputy Secretary to reflect budget decisions, and was provided to Congress and the Commission on the same day.

Joint Cross-Service Functions

The 1993 BRAC Commission recommended that the Department develop procedures for considering potential joint or common activities among the Military Departments. For BRAC 95, the Deputy Secretary directed the creation of Joint Cross-Service Groups (JCSGs) to consider these issues in conjunction with the Military Departments.

As announced in the Deputy Secretary's January 7, 1994, BRAC policy guidance, and further addressed in BRAC Policy Memorandum Number Two, issued on November 2, 1994, a process, involving both Joint Cross-Service Groups (JCSGs) and the individual Military Departments, was established to develop closure and realignment alternatives in situations involving common support functions for five functional areas. The five functional areas were: Depot Maintenance, Military Medical Treatment Facilities, Test and Evaluation, Undergraduate Pilot Training and Laboratories.

Each of the Joint Cross-Service Groups developed excess capacity reduction goals; established data collection procedures and milestone schedules for cross-service analysis of common support functions; and presented alternatives to the Military Departments for their consideration in developing recommendations. The JCSGs issued their alternatives to the Military Departments in November of 1994, and they considered them as part of their ongoing BRAC analysis.

In some instances, the Departments adopted the alternatives and recommended them, as made or modified, to the Secretary of Defense. In other instances, the Services declined to endorse them, because the particular alternative was considered to not be cost effective or for other reasons.

A summary of each of the joint cross-service functional reviews follows:

Depot Maintenance

In depot maintenance, the overall capacity reduction goals were attained, and data has been collected which will facilitate cross-service workload transfers after BRAC. Major cross-service recommendations include the realignment of missile guidance work to

Tobyhanna Army Depot, the plating of Naval guns at Watervliet Army Arsenal, and the collocation of DLA storage functions in excess facilities at Air Force logistics centers. The groundwork for at least one future joint depot has also been established. While there was limited cross-servicing directly attributable to JCSG recommendations, the services considered the alternatives presented and have developed what they believe to be more cost effective in-house solutions. Overall results achieved a cost effective reduction in excess capacity, even if cross-servicing was not maximized. The process laid the foundation for further cross-servicing downstream, outside the BRAC process.

Laboratories

There were some significant cross-service actions taken as a result of the JCSG alternatives. The package includes some C4I cross-service consolidation at Fort Monmouth, NJ, as well as medical research consolidation in Washington, DC. Excess capacity was reduced; however, capacity reduction was less than desired by the JCSG. Many of the workload transfers proposed by the JCSG were too small to influence installation decisions and were therefore not considered cost effective by the Military Departments. Since lab consolidations often appear most attractive on installations devoted to testing, lack of joint consolidation in the T&E area affected laboratory recommendations. As with Depots, potential workload consolidation opportunities were identified which may occur in the future outside of BRAC.

Test and Evaluation

Cross-servicing and downsizing of the test and evaluation infrastructure proved to be a considerable challenge. In general, the Military Departments concluded that preservation of core test facilities, which have irreplaceable land, air and water ranges, precluded closures of major facilities and that cross-servicing of T&E functions would not be cost effective. However, there was some success in the closure of a number of small test functions, and consolidations within each Service's technical infrastructure.

Medical Facilities

The Military Medical Treatment Facilities group established and generally achieved its overall cross-service and excess capacity reduction goals. This was in large measure due to the cross-servicing policies already in affect in this function. Since location of military medical facilities is largely dependent on the major military installations which provide their patient load, they generally followed the realignment and closure actions of the Military Departments. As with several of the other groups, the medical JCSG group identified and is planning for future actions for consolidation and downsizing of medical facilities through programmatic actions. BRAC 95 did provide an opportunity to close one major teaching

hospital, while rationalizing other graduate medical training. It also provided an avenue to down-size many large, full service hospitals to smaller hospitals or clinics. Cross-servicing will continue in this vital field.

Undergraduate Pilot Training

The JCSG alternatives were incorporated in the work of the Military Departments and provided a basis for carrying out the Department's policies for cross-service flight training. The Air Force and Navy's earlier agreement to consolidate primary fixed-wing training through a joint syllabus was critical to this group's success. The recommendations developed reduce excess capacity and maintain a capacity buffer to ensure meeting projected requirements during the turmoil associated with multiple base closures and fielding the new JPATS trainers. However, there was no agreement on the collocation or consolidation of helicopter training. Like other core activities, this issue needs to be resolved before BRAC real estate alternatives are addressed. Overall, the Military Departments reduced this training infrastructure by three bases.

OSD/JCS Review

Using certified data, the Secretaries of the Military Departments and Directors of the Defense Agencies developed their recommendations based on the approved final criteria and force structure plan, and submitted their base closure and realignment recommendations to the Secretary of Defense for review and approval. As part of the Secretary's review, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Economic Security provided for Joint Staff and OSD review of the recommendations received from the Military Departments and Defense Agencies.

The Joint Staff reviewed the recommendations from a warfighting perspective to ensure they would not adversely affect the military readiness capabilities of the armed services. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed all the Military Department and Defense Agency recommendations without objection.

Key staff elements of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff also reviewed the recommendations to ensure they would not sacrifice necessary capabilities and resources. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Economic Security reviewed the recommendations to ensure all eight selection criteria were considered and the recommendations were consistent with the force structure plan. This review also assured that DoD policies and procedures were followed and that the analyses were objective and rigorous.

The Secretary approved the recommendations of the Military Departments and Defense Agencies and the list of military installations approved by the Secretary of Defense for closure or realignment is herein forwarded, as required, to the 1995 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission.

Summaries of the Military Department and Defense Agency selection processes precede their recommendations and justifications. Additionally, a summary of the processes used by the Joint Cross-Service Groups is in the policy memoranda in Appendix C.

Economic Impact in the BRAC Process

The Department recognizes that base closure imposes severe strains on local communities. These economic impacts are recognized and considered in the BRAC process.

For BRAC 95, the Department created the Joint Cross-Service Group on Economic Impact to ensure more consistent application of the economic impact criterion in BRAC 95. This Group included representatives from the Military Departments and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. For a year the Group reviewed methods for analyzing economic impact, established common measures and approaches, and developed a computer-based system to facilitate the analysis of economic impact, including cumulative economic impact.

Under the law, the Department developed its BRAC recommendations based on consistent application of eight final selection criteria and the force structure plan. Under the approved selection criteria, the first four selection criteria pertain to military value and are accorded priority consideration. "The economic impact on communities" is the sixth criterion.

The Department considered cumulative economic impact as part of the economic impact criterion. In response to concerns raised by the 1993 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission and the General Accounting Office, DoD analyzed economic impact and cumulative economic impact as relative measures for comparing alternatives. DoD did not establish threshold values above which, for example, it would remove bases from consideration.

Economic impact was considered at two stages in the process. The Military Departments, in developing their recommendations, developed and analyzed data reflecting the economic impacts of prior BRAC rounds as well as that particular Department's actions in BRAC 1995. Once the Service recommendations were made to the Secretary of Defense, the economic impacts were reviewed again, to determine whether there were instances in which separate Service actions might have affected the same locality.

The Department sponsored an independent review of its plans for BRAC 95 economic analysis in May 1994. Six experts from government, academia, and the private sector participated in the review. The reviewers agreed that our proposed measures of economic impact were reasonable and supported our approach to defining economic impact areas. They emphasized that DoD's estimates tend to overstate economic impact, and that the Department should stress this in its presentations to the Defense Base Realignment and Closure Commission, the Congress, and the public. In addition, the Department asked the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the Department of Commerce to review our methodology for estimating indirect jobs. They responded that the method was of "good, sound quality, consistent with good regional economic impact estimation practices."

**1995 List of Military Installations
Inside the United States for Closure or Realignment**

Part I: Major Base Closures

Army

Fort McClellan, Alabama
Fort Chaffee, Arkansas
Fitzsimons Army Medical Center, Colorado
Price Support Center, Illinois
Savanna Army Depot Activity, Illinois
Fort Ritchie, Maryland
Selfridge Army Garrison, Michigan
Bayonne Military Ocean Terminal, New Jersey
Seneca Army Depot, New York
Fort Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania
Red River Army Depot, Texas
Fort Pickett, Virginia

Navy

Naval Air Facility, Adak, Alaska
Naval Shipyard, Long Beach, California
Ship Repair Facility, Guam
Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, Indianapolis, Indiana
Naval Surface Warfare Center, Crane Division Detachment, Louisville, Kentucky
Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division Detachment, White Oak, Maryland
Naval Air Station, South Weymouth, Massachusetts
Naval Air Station, Meridian, Mississippi
Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, Lakehurst, New Jersey
Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, Warminster, Pennsylvania

Air Force

North Highlands Air Guard Station, California
Ontario IAP Air Guard Station, California
Rome Laboratory, Rome, New York
Roslyn Air Guard Station, New York

Springfield-Beckley MAP, Air Guard Station, Ohio
Greater Pittsburgh IAP Air Reserve Station, Pennsylvania
Bergstrom Air Reserve Base, Texas
Brooks Air Force Base, Texas
Reese Air Force Base, Texas

Defense Logistics Agency

Defense Distribution Depot Memphis, Tennessee
Defense Distribution Depot Ogden, Utah

Part II: Major Base Realignments

Army

Fort Greely, Alaska
Fort Hunter Liggett, California
Sierra Army Depot, California
Fort Meade, Maryland
Detroit Arsenal, Michigan
Fort Dix, New Jersey
Fort Hamilton, New York
Charles E. Kelly Support Center, Pennsylvania
Letterkenny Army Depot, Pennsylvania
Fort Buchanan, Puerto Rico
Dugway Proving Ground, Utah
Fort Lee, Virginia

Navy

Naval Air Station, Key West, Florida
Naval Activities, Guam
Naval Air Station, Corpus Christi, Texas
Naval Undersea Warfare Center, Keyport, Washington

Air Force

McClellan Air Force Base, California
Onizuka Air Station, California

Eglin Air Force Base, Florida
Robins Air Force Base, Georgia
Malmstrom Air Force Base, Montana
Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico
Grand Forks Air Force Base, North Dakota
Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma
Kelly Air Force Base, Texas
Hill Air Force Base, Utah

***Part III: Smaller Base or Activity Closures, Realignments,
Disestablishments or Relocations***

Army

Branch U.S. Disciplinary Barracks, California
East Fort Baker, California
Rio Vista Army Reserve Center, California
Stratford Army Engine Plant, Connecticut
Big Coppett Key, Florida
Concepts Analysis Agency, Maryland
Publications Distribution Center Baltimore, Maryland
Hingham Cohasset, Massachusetts
Sudbury Training Annex, Massachusetts
Aviation-Troop Command (ATCOM), Missouri
Fort Missoula, Montana
Camp Kilmer, New Jersey
Caven Point Reserve Center, New Jersey
Camp Pedricktown, New Jersey
Bellmore Logistics Activity, New York
Fort Totten, New York
Recreation Center #2, Fayetteville, North Carolina
Information Systems Software Command (ISSC), Virginia
Camp Bonneville, Washington
Valley Grove Area Maintenance Support Activity (AMSA), West Virginia

Navy

Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance Center, In-Service Engineering West
Coast Division, San Diego, California
Naval Health Research Center, San Diego, California

Naval Personnel Research and Development Center, San Diego, California
Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion and Repair, USN, Long Beach, California
Naval Undersea Warfare Center-Newport Division, New London Detachment, New London, Connecticut
Naval Research Laboratory, Underwater Sound Reference Detachment, Orlando, Florida
Fleet and Industrial Supply Center, Guam
Naval Biodynamics Laboratory, New Orleans, Louisiana
Naval Medical Research Institute, Bethesda, Maryland
Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division Detachment, Annapolis, Maryland
Naval Technical Training Center, Meridian, Mississippi
Naval Aviation Engineering Support Unit, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Naval Air Technical Services Facility, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, Open Water Test Facility, Oreland, Pennsylvania
Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance Center, RDT&E Division Detachment, Warminster, Pennsylvania
Fleet and Industrial Supply Center, Charleston, South Carolina
Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance Center, In-Service Engineering East Coast Detachment, Norfolk, Virginia
Naval Information Systems Management Center, Arlington, Virginia
Naval Management Systems Support Office, Chesapeake, Virginia

Navy/Marine Reserve Activities

Naval Reserve Centers at:

Huntsville, Alabama
Stockton, California
Santa Ana, Irvine, California
Pomona, California
Cadillac, Michigan
Staten Island, New York
Laredo, Texas
Sheboygan, Wisconsin

Naval Air Reserve Center at:

Olathe, Kansas

Naval Reserve Readiness Commands at:

New Orleans, Louisiana (Region 10)
Charleston, South Carolina (Region 7)

Air Force

Moffett Federal Airfield AGS, California
Real-Time Digitally Controlled Analyzer Processor Activity, Buffalo, New York
Air Force Electronic Warfare Evaluation Simulator Activity, Fort Worth, Texas

Defense Logistics Agency

Defense Contract Management District South, Marietta, Georgia
Defense Contract Management Command International, Dayton, Ohio
Defense Distribution Depot Columbus, Ohio
Defense Distribution Depot Letterkenny, Pennsylvania
Defense Industrial Supply Center Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Defense Distribution Depot Red River, Texas

Defense Investigative Service

Investigations Control and Automation Directorate, Fort Holabird, Maryland

Part IV: Changes to Previously Approved BRAC Recommendations

Army

Army Bio-Medical Research Laboratory, Fort Detrick, Maryland

Navy

Marine Corps Air Station, El Toro, California
Marine Corps Air Station, Tustin, California
Naval Air Station Alameda, California
Naval Recruiting District, San Diego, California
Naval Training Center, San Diego, California
Naval Air Station, Cecil Field, Florida
Naval Aviation Depot, Pensacola, Florida

Navy Nuclear Power Propulsion Training Center, Naval Training Center, Orlando, Florida
Naval Training Center Orlando, Florida
Naval Air Station, Agana, Guam
Naval Air Station, Barbers Point, Hawaii
Naval Air Facility, Detroit, Michigan
Naval Shipyard, Norfolk Detachment, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Naval Sea Systems Command, Arlington, Virginia
Office of Naval Research, Arlington, Virginia
Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command, Arlington, Virginia
Naval Recruiting Command, Washington, D.C.
Naval Security Group Command Detachment Potomac, Washington, D.C.

Air Force

Williams AFB, Arizona
Lowry AFB, Colorado
Homestead AFB, Florida (301st Rescue Squadron)
Homestead AFB, Florida (726th Air Control Squadron)
MacDill AFB, Florida
Griffiss AFB, New York (Airfield Support for 10th Infantry (Light) Division)
Griffiss AFB, New York (485th Engineering Installation Group)

Defense Logistics Agency

Defense Contract Management District West, El Segundo, California

Chapter 5

Recommendations

The Secretary of Defense's closure and realignment recommendations and justifications follow. These are preceded by summaries of the Military Department and Defense Agency selection processes.

These recommendations result from the detailed analytical processes used by the DoD Components and were based upon certified data, the force structure plan and the selection criteria. The recommendations also reflect consideration of the evaluation conducted by the Joint Cross-Service Groups and the resulting alternatives they issued.

Summary of Selection Process

Introduction

The Army's efforts to reduce unnecessary infrastructure began with the Defense Secretary's Commission on Base Realignments and Closures in 1988. Since that Commission, the Army has reduced its force of 770,000 active duty soldiers to 540,000 and active divisions from 18 to 12. The Army has closed 77 installations in the U.S. and is in the process of closing six others. Over 500 sites overseas, mostly in Europe, have been returned to their host nation. The Army is planning to return about 150 more. Last December, the Army announced further reductions in end strength to 495,000 personnel and a further restructuring of the active Army to 10 divisions by the end of fiscal year 1996. Available resources have declined with the \$90 billion budget of the 1980s dropping to approximately \$60 billion, necessitating major reductions in base operating costs. While these latest recommendations were difficult, the Army has kept its sights focused on the future in order to lay a foundation for a smaller, more capable Army, one that is able to project power and support national strategy into the 21st century.

The Selection Process

To provide an operational context for planning and analysis, the Army developed a stationing strategy. Derived from the National Military Strategy, the Army developed guidelines to govern the stationing of forces and influence the types of installations needed for the future. This operational blueprint described parameters for reducing infrastructure without jeopardizing future requirements.

As in previous studies, the Army conducted a comprehensive review of all installations. To facilitate a fair comparison, the Army grouped installations into categories with similar missions, capabilities and characteristics. After developing a set of measurable attributes related to DoD's four selection criteria for military value, the Army then assigned weights to reflect the relative importance of each measure. Next, the Army collected data on its installations and estimated their relative importance, using established quantitative techniques to assemble installation assessments.

Using both the installation assessments and the stationing strategy, the Army determined the military value of each installation. These appraisals represented the Army's best judgment on the relative merit of each installation and were the basis for selecting installations that were studied further for closure or realignment.

Once the list of final study candidates received approval by the Secretary of the Army, a variety of alternatives were examined in an effort to identify the most feasible and cost-effective way to close or realign. Subsequently, the Army reviewed alternatives recommended by DoD's Joint Cross Service Groups and incorporated those that made sense and saved money. The Army applied DoD's remaining four selection criteria by analyzing the financial, economic, community and environmental impacts of each alternative, using DoD's standard models. The Army's senior leaders reviewed the results of these analyses and discontinued studies of alternatives that were financially or operationally infeasible.

During the course of the study effort, the Army Audit Agency performed independent tests and evaluations to check mathematical computations and ensure the accuracy of data and reasonableness of assumptions throughout every step of analysis. The General Accounting Office monitored the Army's process from the very beginning and met regularly with the Army's auditors as well as officials from The Army Basing Study (TABS).

The Secretary of the Army, with advice from the Chief of Staff, recommended installations for closure or realignment to the Secretary of Defense based upon the DoD Force Structure Plan and the selection criteria established under Public Law 101-510, as amended.

Recommendations and Justifications

Fort McClellan, Alabama

Recommendation: Close Fort McClellan, except minimum essential land and facilities for a Reserve Component enclave and minimum essential facilities, as necessary, to provide auxiliary support to the chemical demilitarization operation at Anniston Army Depot. Relocate the U. S. Army Chemical and Military Police Schools to Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, upon receipt of the required permits. Relocate the Defense Polygraph Institute (DODPI) to Fort Jackson, South Carolina. License Pelham Range and current Guard facilities to the Alabama Army National Guard.

Justification: This closure recommendation is based upon the assumption that requisite permits can be granted to allow operation of the Chemical Defense Training Facility at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. The Governor of the State of Missouri has indicated that an expeditious review of the permit application can be accomplished.

Collocation allows the Army to focus on the doctrinal and force development requirements of Engineers, Military Police, and the Chemical Corps. The synergistic advantages of training and development programs are: coordination, employment, and removal of obstacles; conduct of river crossing operations; operations in rear areas or along main supply routes; and counter-drug operations. The missions of the three branches will be more effectively integrated.

This recommendation differs from the Army's prior closure recommendations submitted to the 1991 and 1993 Commissions. The Army will relocate the Chemical Defense Training Facility (CDTF) to Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. By relocating the CDTF, the Army can continue providing live-agent training to all levels of command. The Army is the only Service that conducts live agent training, and it will continue this training at Fort Leonard Wood.

The Army has considered the use of some Fort McClellan assets for support of the chemical demilitarization mission at Anniston Army Depot. The Army will use the best available assets to provide the necessary support to Anniston's demilitarization mission.

Return on Investment: The total one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$259 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a cost of

\$122 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$45 million with a return on investment expected in six years. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$316 million.

Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 10,720 jobs (8,536 direct jobs and 2,184 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Anniston, AL Metropolitan Statistical Area, which represents 17.3 percent of the area's employment.

The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in this area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential decrease equal to 14.7 percent of employment in the area. There are no known environmental impediments at the closing or receiving installations.

Fort Chaffee, Arkansas

Recommendation: Close Fort Chaffee, except minimum essential buildings, and ranges for Reserve Component (RC) training as an enclave.

Justification: In the past ten years, the Army has significantly reduced its active and reserve forces. The Army must reduce excess infrastructure to meet future requirements.

Fort Chaffee is the former home of the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC). In 1991, the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission approved the JRTC's relocation to Fort Polk, LA. The transfer was completed in 1992. The post is managed by an Active Component/civilian staff, although it possesses virtually no Active Component tenants.

Fort Chaffee ranked last in military value when compared to other major training area installations. The Army will retain some ranges for use by the RC units stationed in the area. Annual training for Reserve Component units which now use Fort Chaffee can be conducted at other installations in the region, including Fort Polk, Fort Riley and Fort Sill. The Army intends to license required land and facilities to the Army National Guard.

Return on Investment: The total one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$10 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$39 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$13 million with a return on investment expected in one year. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$167 million.

Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 352 jobs (247 direct jobs and 105 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Fort Smith, AR-OK Metropolitan Statistical Area, which represents 0.3 percent of the area's employment.

The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in this area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential decrease equal to 0.4 percent of employment in the area. There are no known environmental impediments at the closing or receiving installation.

Fitzsimons Army Medical Center, Colorado

Recommendation: Close Fitzsimons Army Medical Center (FAMC), except for Edgar J. McWhethy Army Reserve Center. Relocate the Medical Equipment and Optical School and Optical Fabrication Laboratory to Fort Sam Houston, TX. Relocate Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS) activities to Denver leased space. Relocate other tenants to other installations.

Justification: FAMC is low in military value compared to other medical centers. This recommendation avoids anticipated need for estimated \$245 million construction to replace FAMC while preserving health care services through other more cost-effective means. This action will offset any loss of medical services through: phased-in CHAMPUS and Managed Care Support contracts; increased services at Fort Carson and US Air Force Academy; and redistribution of Medical Center patient load from Region Eight to other Medical Centers. FAMC is not collocated with a sizable active component population. Its elimination does not jeopardize the Army's capability to surge to support two near-simultaneous major regional contingencies, or limit the Army's capability to provide wartime medical support in the theater of operations. Closure of this medical center allows redistribution of medical military personnel to other medical centers to absorb the diverted medical center patient load. These realignments avoid a significant cost of continuing to operate and maintain facilities at this stand-alone medical center. DoD's Joint Cross-Service Group for Military Treatment Facilities supports the closure of Fitzsimons.

Return on Investment: The total one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$142 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a cost of \$39 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$34 million with a return on investment expected in three years. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$299 million.

Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 4,489 jobs (2,903 direct jobs and 1,586 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Denver, CO Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area, which represents 0.4 percent of the area's employment.

The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior round BRAC actions in this area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential decrease equal to 0.8 percent of employment in the area. There are no known environmental impediments at the closing or receiving installations.

Price Support Center, Illinois

Recommendation: Close Charles Melvin Price Support Center, except a small reserve enclave and a storage area.

Justification: Charles Melvin Price Support Center provides area support and military housing to the Army and other Federal activities in the St. Louis, MO, area. It is low in military value compared to similar installations. Its tenants, including a recruiting company and a criminal investigative unit, can easily relocate.

This recommendation is related to the Army's recommendation to relocate Aviation-Troop Command (ATCOM) from St. Louis, MO, to other locations. A reduction in the Army's presence in the area warrants a corresponding reduction in Charles Melvin Price Support Center.

Return on Investment: The total one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$4 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$35 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$9 million with an immediate return on investment. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$116 million.

Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 363 jobs (225 direct jobs and 138 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the St. Louis, MO-IL Metropolitan Statistical Area, which represents less than 0.1 percent of the area's employment.

The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in this area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential decrease equal to 0.6 percent of employment in the area. There are no known environmental impediments at the closing or receiving installations.

Savanna Army Depot Activity, Illinois

Recommendation: Close Savanna Army Depot Activity (ADA). Relocate the United States Army Defense Ammunition Center and School (USADACS) to McAlester Army Ammunition Plant, Oklahoma.

Justification: This recommendation is supported by the Army's long range operational assessment. The Army has adopted a "tiered" ammunition depot concept to reduce infrastructure, eliminate static non-required ammunition stocks, decrease manpower requirements, increase efficiencies and permit the Army to manage a smaller stockpile. The tiered depot concept reduces the number of active storage sites and makes efficiencies possible:

(1) Tier 1 - Active Core Depots. These installations will support a normal/full-up activity level with a stockage configuration of primarily required stocks and minimal non-required stocks requiring demilitarization. Normal activity includes daily receipts/issues of training stocks, storage of war reserve stocks required in contingency operations and additional war reserve stocks to augment lower level tier installation power projection capabilities. Installations at this activity level will receive requisite levels of storage support, surveillance, inventory, maintenance and demilitarization.

(2) Tier 2 - Cadre Depots. These installations normally will perform static storage of follow-on war reserve requirements. Daily activity will be minimal for receipts/issues. Workload will focus on maintenance, surveillance, inventory and demilitarization operations. These installations will have minimal staffs unless a contingency arises.

(3) Tier 3 - Caretaker Depots. Installations designated as Tier 3 will have minimal staffs and store stocks no longer required until demilitarized or relocated. The Army plans to eliminate its stocks at these sites no later than year 2001. Savanna Army Depot Activity is a Tier 3 depot.

USADACS performs the following basic functions: munitions training, logistics engineering, explosive safety, demilitarization research and development, technical assistance, and career management. Relocation of USADACS to McAlester Army Ammunition Plant (AAP) allows it to collocate with an active ammunition storage and production operation. McAlester AAP, a Tier 1 depot, is the best for providing the needed capabilities.

Return on Investment: The total one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$38 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a cost of \$12 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$13 million with a return on

investment expected in two years. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$112 million.

Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 627 jobs (450 direct jobs and 177 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Carroll County, IL, area, which represents 8.2 percent of the area's employment. There are no known environmental impediments at the closing or receiving installations.

Fort Ritchie, Maryland

Recommendation: Close Fort Ritchie. Relocate the 1111th Signal Battalion and 1108th Signal Brigade to Fort Detrick, MD. Relocate Information Systems Engineering Command elements to Fort Huachuca, AZ.

Justification: This recommendation assumes that base support for Defense Intelligence Agency and other National Military Command Center support elements will be provided by nearby Fort Detrick. Closing Fort Ritchie and transferring support elements of the National Military Command Center to Fort Detrick will: (a) maintain operational mission support to geographically unique Sites R and C (National Military Command Center) for the Joint Chiefs of Staff; (b) capitalize on existing facilities at Site R and C to minimize construction; (c) maintain an active use and continuous surveillance of Site R and Site C facilities to maintain readiness; (d) collocate signal units that were previously separated at two different garrisons; (e) consolidate major portion of Information Systems Engineering Command-CONUS with main headquarters of Information Systems Engineering Command to improve synergy of information system operations; and (f) provide a direct support East Coast Information Systems Engineering Command field element to respond to regional requirements. These relocations, collocations and consolidations allow the elimination of Fort Ritchie's garrison and avoids significant costs associated with the continued operation and maintenance of support facilities at a small installation.

Return on Investment: The total one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$93 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$83 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$65 million with a return on investment expected in one year. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$712 million.

Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 3,210 jobs (2,344 direct jobs and 866 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Hagerstown, MD Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area, which represents 4.8 percent of the area's employment. There are no known environmental impediments at the closing or receiving installations.

responded with comments and cost analyses of the alternatives, and engaged in a dialogue with the joint groups regarding potential closure and realignment actions, consistent with the internal analytical processes of each Military Department.

The Air Reserve Component (ARC) category, comprised of Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve bases, warrants further explanation. First, these bases do not readily compete against each other, as ARC units enjoy a special relationship with their respective states and local communities. Under federal law, relocating Guard units across State boundaries is not a practical alternative. In addition, careful consideration must be given to the recruiting needs of these units. However, realignment of ARC units onto active or civilian, or other ARC installations could prove cost effective. Therefore, the ARC category was examined for cost effective relocations to other bases.

Information, base groupings, excess capacity, and options resulting from the Executive Group analysis were presented to the Secretary of the Air Force and Chief of Staff of the Air Force by the Executive Group. Based on the force structure plan and the eight selection criteria, with consideration given to excess capacity, efficiencies in base utilization, and concepts of force structure organization and basing, the Secretary of the Air Force, in consultation with the Air Force Chief of Staff, and using the analysis of the Executive Group, selected the bases recommended for closure and realignment.

East and Gulf Coasts to support power projection requirements with a minimal loss to operational capability. Bayonne provides the Army with few military capabilities that cannot be accomplished at commercial ports.

Return on Investment: The total one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$44 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a cost of \$8 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$10 million with a return on investment expected in five years. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$90 million.

Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 2,105 jobs (1,367 direct jobs and 738 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Jersey City, NJ Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area, which represents 0.8 percent of the area's employment.

The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in this area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential decrease equal to 0.8 percent of employment in the area. There are no known environmental impediments at the closing or receiving installations.

Seneca Army Depot, New York

Recommendation: Close Seneca Army Depot, except an enclave to store hazardous material and ores.

Justification: This recommendation is supported by the Army's long range operational assessment. The Army has adopted a "tiered" ammunition depot concept to reduce infrastructure, eliminate static non-required ammunition stocks, decrease manpower requirements, increase efficiencies and permit the Army to manage a smaller stockpile. The tiered depot concept reduces the number of active storage sites and makes efficiencies possible:

(1) Tier 1 - Active Core Depots. These installations will support a normal/full-up activity level with a stockage configuration of primarily required stocks and minimal non-required stocks requiring demilitarization. Normal activity includes daily receipts/issues of training stocks, storage of war reserve stocks required in contingency operations and additional war reserve stocks to augment lower level tier installation power projection capabilities. Installations at this activity level will receive requisite levels of storage support, surveillance, inventory, maintenance and demilitarization.

(2) Tier 2 - Cadre Depots. These installations normally will perform static storage of follow-on war reserve requirements. Daily activity will be minimal for receipts/issues. Workload will focus on maintenance, surveillance, inventory and demilitarization operations. These installations will have minimal staffs unless a contingency arises.

(3) Tier 3 - Caretaker Depots. Installations designated as Tier 3 will have minimal staffs and store stocks no longer required until demilitarized or relocated. The Army plans to eliminate stocks at these sites no later than year 2001. Seneca Army Depot is a Tier 3 depot.

Return on Investment: The total one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$15 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$34 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$21 million with an immediate return on investment. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$242 million.

Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 463 jobs (325 direct jobs and 138 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Seneca County, NY, economic area, which represents 3.2 percent of the area's employment. There are no known environmental impediments at the closing or receiving installations.

Fort Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania

Recommendation: Close Fort Indiantown Gap, except minimum essential facilities as a Reserve Component enclave.

Justification: In the past ten years, the Army significantly reduced its active and reserve forces. The Army must reduce excess infrastructure to meet future requirements.

Fort Indiantown Gap is low in military value compared to other major training area installations. Although managed by an Active Component garrison, it has virtually no Active Component tenants. Annual training for Reserve Component units which now use Fort Indiantown Gap can be conducted at other installations in the region, including Fort Dix, Fort A.P. Hill and Fort Drum.

Fort Indiantown Gap is owned by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and leased by the U.S. Army through 2049 for \$1. The government can terminate the lease with one year's written notice. Facilities erected during the duration of the lease are the property of the U.S. and may be disposed of, provided the premises are restored to their natural condition.

Return on Investment: The total one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$13 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$67 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$23 million with a return on investment expected in one year. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$285 million.

Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 789 jobs (521 direct jobs and 268 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Harrisburg-Lebanon-Carlisle, PA Metropolitan Statistical Area, which represents 0.2 percent of the area's employment.

The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in this area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential increase equal to 0.2 percent of employment in the area. There are no known environmental impediments at the closing or receiving installations.

Red River Army Depot, Texas

Recommendation: Close Red River Army Depot. Transfer the ammunition storage mission, intern training center, and civilian training education to Lone Star Army Ammunition Plant. Transfer the light combat vehicle maintenance mission to Anniston Army Depot. Transfer the Rubber Production Facility to Lone Star.

Justification: Red River Army Depot is one of the Army's five maintenance depots and one of three ground vehicle maintenance depots. Over time, each of the ground maintenance depots has become increasingly specialized. Anniston performs heavy combat vehicle maintenance and repair. Red River performs similar work on infantry fighting vehicles. Letterkenny Army Depot is responsible for towed and self-propelled artillery as well as DoD tactical missile repair. Like a number of other Army depots, Red River receives, stores, and ships all types of ammunition items. A review of long range operational requirements supports a reduction of Army depots, specifically the consolidation of ground combat workload at a single depot.

The ground maintenance capacity of the three depots currently exceeds programmed work requirements by the equivalent of one to two depots. Without considerable and costly modifications, Red River cannot assume the heavy combat vehicle mission from Anniston. Red River cannot assume the DoD Tactical Missile Consolidation program from Letterkenny without major construction. Available maintenance capacity at Anniston and Tobyhanna makes the realignment of Red River into Anniston the most logical in terms of military value and cost effectiveness. Closure of Red River is consistent with the recommendations of the Joint Cross-Service Group for Depot Maintenance.

Return on Investment: The total one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$60 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$313 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$123 million with an immediate return on investment. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$1,497 million.

Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 5,654 jobs (2,901 direct jobs and 2,753 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Texarkana, TX-Texarkana, AR Metropolitan Statistical Area, which represents 9.5 percent of the area's employment.

The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in this area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential decrease equal to 7.7 percent of employment in the area. There are no known environmental impediments at the closing or receiving installations.

Fort Pickett, Virginia

Recommendation: Close Fort Pickett, except minimum essential training areas and facilities as an enclave for the Reserve Components. Relocate the Petroleum Training Facility to Fort Dix, NJ.

Justification: In the past ten years, the Army has reduced its active and reserve forces considerably. The Army must reduce excess infrastructure to meet the needs of the future.

Fort Pickett is very low in military value compared to other major training area installations. It has virtually no Active Component tenants. Annual training for reserve units that now use Fort Pickett can be conducted easily at other installations in the region, including Fort Bragg, Fort A.P. Hill and Camp Dawson. The Army intends to license required facilities and training areas to the Army National Guard.

Return on Investment: The total one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$25 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$41 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$21 million with an immediate return on investment. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$241 million.

Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 362 jobs (254 direct jobs and 108 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Nottoway & Dinwiddie Counties, VA area, which represents 0.8 percent of the area's employment. There are no known environmental impediments at the closing or receiving installations.

Fort Greely, Alaska

Recommendation: Realign Fort Greely by relocating the Cold Region Test Activity (CRTA) and Northern Warfare Training Center (NWTC) to Fort Wainwright, Alaska.

Justification: Fort Greely currently supports two tenant activities (CRTA and NWTC) and manages training areas for maneuver and range firing. Over 662,000 acres of range and training areas are used by both the Army and the Air Force. These valuable training lands will be retained.

The Army has recently reduced the NWTC by over half its original size and transferred oversight responsibilities to the U.S. Army, Pacific. The garrison staff will reduce in size and continue to support the important testing and training missions. The Army intends to use Fort Wainwright as the base of operations (107 miles away) for these activities, and "safari" them to Fort Greely, as necessary. This allows the Army to reduce its presence at Fort Greely, reduce excess capacity and perform essential missions at a much lower cost. The Army intends to retain facilities at Bolio Lake (for CRTA), Black Rapids (for NWTC), Allen Army Airfield, and minimal necessary garrison facilities to maintain the installation for contingency missions.

Return on Investment: The total one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$23 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$43 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$19 million with a return on investment expected in one year. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$225 million.

Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 969 jobs (724 direct jobs and 245 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Southeast Fairbanks Census Area, AK, which represents 36.3 percent of the area's employment. There are no known environmental impediments at the realigning or receiving installations.

Fort Hunter Liggett, California

Recommendation: Realign Fort Hunter Liggett by relocating the U.S. Army Test and Experimentation Center (TEC) missions and functions to Fort Bliss, Texas. Eliminate the Active Component mission. Retain minimum essential facilities and training area as an enclave to support the Reserve Components (RC).

Justification: Fort Hunter Liggett is low in military value compared to other major training area installations and has few Active Component tenants. Relocation of the Test and

Experimentation Center optimizes the unique test capabilities afforded by Fort Bliss and White Sands Missile Range.

Fort Hunter Liggett's maneuver space is key to Reserve Component training requirements. Since it is a primary maneuver area for mechanized units in the western United States, retention of its unique training lands is essential.

Return on Investment: The total one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$6 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$12 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$5 million with a return on investment expected in one year. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$64 million.

Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 686 jobs (478 direct jobs and 208 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Salinas, CA Metropolitan Statistical Area, which represents 0.3 percent of the area's employment.

The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in this area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential increase equal to 0.32 percent of employment in the area. There are no known environmental impediments at the closing or receiving installations.

Sierra Army Depot, California

Recommendation: Realign Sierra Army Depot by eliminating the conventional ammunition mission and reducing it to a depot activity. Retain an enclave for the Operational Project Stock mission and the static storage of ores.

Justification: This recommendation is supported by the Army's long range operational assessment. The Army has adopted a "tiered" ammunition depot concept to reduce infrastructure, eliminate static non-required ammunition stocks, decrease manpower requirements, increase efficiencies and permit the Army to manage a smaller stockpile. The tiered depot concept reduces the number of active storage sites and makes efficiencies possible:

(1) Tier 1 - Active Core Depots. These installations will support a normal/full-up activity level with a stockage configuration of primarily required stocks and minimal non-required stocks requiring demilitarization. Normal activity includes daily receipts/issues of training stocks, storage of war reserve stocks required in contingency operations and additional war reserve stocks to augment lower level tier installation power projection

capabilities. Installations at this activity level will receive requisite levels of storage support, surveillance, inventory, maintenance and demilitarization.

(2) Tier 2 - Cadre Depots. These installations normally will perform static storage of follow-on war reserve requirements. Daily activity will be minimal for receipts/issues. Workload will focus on maintenance, surveillance, inventory and demilitarization operations. These installations will have minimal staffs unless a contingency arises.

(3) Tier 3 - Caretaker Depots. Installations designated as Tier 3 will have minimal staffs and store stocks no longer required until demilitarized or relocated. The Army plans to eliminate stocks at these sites no later than year 2001. Sierra Army Depot is a Tier 3 Depot.

Complete closure is not possible, since Sierra is the Center of Technical Excellence for Operational Project Stocks. This mission entails the management, processing and maintenance of: Force Provider (550-man tent city), Inland Petroleum Distribution System; and Water Support System. It also stores such stocks as Clam Shelters (mobile maintenance tents), bridging, and landing mats for helicopters. The cost of relocating the Operational Project Stocks is prohibitively expensive. Therefore, the Army will retain minimum essential facilities for storage.

Return on Investment: The total one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$14 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$55 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$29 million with an immediate return on investment. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$333 million.

Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 839 jobs (592 direct jobs and 247 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Lassen County, CA economic area, which represents 7.4 percent of the area's employment. There are no known environmental impediments at the realigning or receiving installations.

Fort Meade, Maryland

Recommendation: Realign Fort Meade by reducing Kimbrough Army Community Hospital to a clinic. Eliminate inpatient services.

Justification: This recommendation, suggested by the Joint Cross-Service Group on Medical Treatment, eliminates excess medical treatment capacity at Fort Meade, MD by eliminating inpatient services at Kimbrough Army Community Hospital. Inpatient care would be provided by other military medical activities and private facilities through Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS).

Return on Investment: The total one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$2 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$16 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$4 million with a return on investment expected in one year. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$50 million.

Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 203 jobs (129 direct jobs and 74 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Baltimore, MD Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area, which represents less than 0.1 percent of the area's employment.

The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior round BRAC actions in this area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential decrease equal to less than 0.1 percent of employment in the area. There are no known environmental impediments at the closing or receiving installations.

Detroit Arsenal, Michigan

Recommendation: Realign Detroit Arsenal by closing and disposing of the Detroit Army Tank Plant.

Justification: Detroit Tank Plant, located on Detroit Arsenal, is one of two Army Government-Owned, Contractor-Operated tank production facilities. A second facility is located at Lima, Ohio, (Lima Army Tank Plant). The Detroit plant is not as technologically advanced as the Lima facility and is not configured for the latest tank production. Moreover, retaining the plant as a "rebuild" facility is not practical since Anniston Army Depot is capable of rebuilding and repairing the M1 Tank and its principal components. Accordingly, the Detroit Tank Plant is excess to Army requirements.

Return on Investment: The total one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$1 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$8 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$3 million with an immediate return on investment. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$38 million.

Impacts: This recommendation will not affect any jobs in the Detroit, MI Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area. There are no known environmental impediments at the realigning site.

Fort Dix, New Jersey

Recommendation: Realign Fort Dix by replacing the Active Component garrison with a U.S. Army Reserve garrison. Retain minimum essential ranges, facilities, and training areas required for Reserve Component (RC) training as an enclave.

Justification: In the past ten years, the Army has significantly reduced its active and reserve forces. The Army must reduce excess infrastructure to meet the needs of the future.

This proposal retains facilities and training areas essential to support Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve units in the Mid-Atlantic states. However, it reduces base operations and real property maintenance costs by eliminating excess facilities. Additionally, this reshaping will truly move Fort Dix into a preferred role of RC support. It retains an Army Reserve garrison to manage Fort Dix and provides a base to support RC logistical requirements. The Army intends to continue the Army National Guard's current license of buildings.

Various U.S. Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve activities regularly train at Fort Dix. The post houses the National Guard High Technology Training Center, a unique facility providing state-of-the-art training devices for guardsmen and reservists in a 12-state area. Fort Dix's geographic proximity to a large portion of the nation's RC forces and the air and seaports of embarkation make it one of the most suitable RC Major Training Areas in the United States. This recommendation is consistent with the decision of the 1991 Commission, but better aligns the operation of the installation with its users.

Return on Investment: The total one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$19 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$112 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$38 million with a return on investment expected in one year. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$478 million.

Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 1,164 jobs (739 direct jobs and 425 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Philadelphia, PA-NJ Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area, which represents less than 0.1 percent of the area's employment.

The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in this area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential decrease equal to 1.2 percent of employment in the area. There are no known environmental impediments at the realigning or receiving installations.

Fort Hamilton, New York

Recommendation: Realign Fort Hamilton. Dispose of all family housing. Retain minimum essential land and facilities for existing Army units and activities. Relocate all Army Reserve units from Caven Point, New Jersey, to Fort Hamilton.

Justification: Fort Hamilton is low in military value compared to the other command and control/administrative support installations. The post has limited capacity for additional growth or military development. No new or additional missions are planned.

This proposal reduces the size of Fort Hamilton by about one-third to support necessary military missions in the most cost effective manner. The New York Area Command, which includes protocol support to the United Nations, will remain at Fort Hamilton. Another installation will assume the area support currently provided to the New York area.

The Armed Forces Reserve Center at Caven Point was built in 1941. Its sole mission is to support reserve component units. The buildings on the 35-acre parcel are in poor condition. Relocating to Fort Hamilton will allow the Army Reserve to eliminate operating expenses in excess of \$100 thousand per year.

Return on Investment: The total one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$2 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$3 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$7 million with an immediate return on investment. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$74 million.

Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 85 jobs (52 direct jobs and 33 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the New York, NY, Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area, which represents less than 0.1 percent of the area's employment.

The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in this area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential decrease equal to 0.1 percent of employment in the area. There are no known environmental impediments at the realigning or receiving installations.

Kelly Support Center, Pennsylvania

Recommendation: Realign the Kelly Support Center by consolidating Army Reserve units onto three of its five parcels. Dispose of the remaining two parcels. Relocate the Army Reserve's leased maintenance activity in Valley Grove, WV, to the Kelly Support Center.

Justification: Kelly Support Center, a sub-installation of Fort Drum, NY, provides administrative and logistical support to Army Reserve units in western Pennsylvania. It comprises five separate parcels of property.

The Kelly Support Center is last in military value compared to other command and control/administrative support installations. Reserve usage is limited to monthly weekend drills. It possesses no permanent facilities or mobilization capability.

This proposal eliminates two parcels of property, approximately 232 acres and 500,000 square feet of semi-permanent structures, from the Army's inventory. Since there are no other feasible alternatives, the Army is retaining three small parcels for Army Reserve functions and Readiness Group Pittsburgh.

Relocating the Army's Reserve activity from Valley Grove Area Maintenance Support Activity, WV, to the Kelly Support Center consolidates it with its parent unit and saves \$28,000 per year in lease costs.

Return on Investment: The total one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$36 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a cost of \$22 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$5 million with a return on investment expected in six years. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$28 million.

Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 209 jobs (128 direct jobs and 81 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Allegheny, Fayette, Washington, & Westmoreland Counties, PA, area which represents less than 0.1 percent of the area's employment.

The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in this area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential decrease equal to 0.1 percent of employment in the area. There are no known environmental impediments at the realigning or receiving installations.

Letterkenny Army Depot, Pennsylvania

Recommendation: Realign Letterkenny Army Depot by transferring the towed and self-propelled combat vehicle mission to Anniston Army Depot. Retain an enclave for conventional ammunition storage and tactical missile disassembly and storage. Change the 1993 Commission's decision regarding the consolidating of tactical missile maintenance at Letterkenny by transferring missile guidance system workload to Tobyhanna Army Depot.

Justification: Letterkenny Army Depot is one of the Army's five maintenance depots and one of three ground vehicle maintenance depots. Over time, each of the ground maintenance depots has become increasingly specialized. Anniston performs heavy combat vehicle maintenance and repair. Red River performs similar work on infantry fighting vehicles. Letterkenny Army Depot is responsible for towed and self-propelled artillery as well as DoD tactical missile repair. Like a number of other Army depots, Letterkenny receives, stores, and ships all types of ammunition items. A review of long range operational requirements supports a reduction of Army depots, specifically the consolidation of ground combat workload at a single depot.

The ground maintenance capacity of the three depots currently exceeds programmed work requirements by the equivalent of one to two depots. The heavy combat vehicle mission from Anniston cannot be absorbed at Letterkenny without major construction and facility renovations. Available maintenance capacity at Anniston and Tobyhanna makes the realigning Letterkenny to the two depots the most logical in terms of military value and cost effectiveness. Closure of Letterkenny is supported by the Joint Cross-Service Group for Depot Maintenance.

The Army's recommendation to transfer missile workload to Tobyhanna Army Depot preserves Letterkenny's missile disassembly and storage mission. It capitalizes on Tobyhanna's electronics focus and retains DoD missile system repair at a single Army depot.

Return on Investment: The total one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$50 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$207 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$78 million with an immediate return on investment. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$952 million.

Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 4,126 jobs (2,090 direct jobs and 2,036 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Franklin County, PA area, which represents 6.6 percent of the area's employment.

The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in this area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential decrease equal to 8.5 percent of employment in the area. There are no known environmental impediments at the realigning or receiving installations.

Fort Buchanan, Puerto Rico

Recommendation: Realign Fort Buchanan by reducing garrison management functions and disposing of family housing. Retain an enclave for the reserve components, Army and Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES) and the Antilles Consolidated School.

Justification: Fort Buchanan, a sub-installation of Fort McPherson, provides administrative, logistical and mobilization support to Army units and activities in Puerto Rico and the Caribbean region. Tenants include a U.S. Army Reserve headquarters, AAFES and a DoD-operated school complex. Although the post is managed by an active component garrison, it supports relatively few active component tenants. The family housing will close. The activities providing area support will relocate to Roosevelt Roads Navy Base and other sites. The Army intends to license buildings to the Army National Guard, that they currently occupy.

Return on Investment: The total one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$74 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a cost of \$50 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$10 million with a return on investment expected in seven years. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$45 million.

Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 289 jobs (182 direct jobs and 107 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the San Juan, PR economic area which represents 0.1 percent of the area's employment. There are no known environmental impediments at the realigning or receiving installations.

Dugway Proving Ground, Utah

Recommendation: Realign Dugway Proving Ground by relocating the smoke and obscurant mission to Yuma Proving Ground, AZ, and some elements of chemical/biological research to Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD. Dispose of English Village and retain test and experimentation facilities necessary to support Army and DoD missions.

Justification: Dugway is low in military value compared to other proving grounds. Its test facilities conduct both open air and laboratory chemical/biological testing in support of various Army and DoD missions. The testing is important as are associated security and safety requirements. However, this recommendation enables the Army to continue these important missions and also reduce costly overhead at Dugway.

Yuma can assume Dugway's programmed smoke and obscurant testing. Aberdeen Proving Ground can accept the laboratory research and development portion of the chemical/biological mission from Dugway, since it is currently performing chemical and biological research in facilities that carry equivalent bio/safety levels. Open air and simulant testing missions will remain at Dugway.

The State of Utah has expressed an interest in using English Village and associated firing and training ranges at Dugway for the National Guard, including the establishment of an artillery training facility.

Return on Investment: The total one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$25 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$61 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$26 million with an immediate return on investment. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$307 million.

Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 1,715 jobs (1,096 direct jobs and 619 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Tooele County, UT economic area, which represents 13.0 percent of the area's employment.

The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in this area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential decrease equal to 36.6 percent of employment in the area. There are no known environmental impediments at the realigning or receiving installations.

Fort Lee, Virginia

Recommendation: Realign Fort Lee, by reducing Kenner Army Community Hospital to a clinic. Eliminate inpatient services.

Justification: This recommendation, suggested by the Joint Cross-Service Group on Medical Treatment, eliminates excess medical treatment capacity at Fort Lee, VA by eliminating inpatient services at Kenner Army Community Hospital. Inpatient care would be provided by other nearby military medical activities and private facilities through Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS).

Return on Investment: The total one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$2 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$16 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$4 million with a return on investment expected in one year. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$51 million.

Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 321 jobs (205 direct jobs and 116 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Richmond-Petersburg, VA Metropolitan Statistical Area, which represents 0.1 percent of the area's employment.

The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior round BRAC actions in this area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential increase equal to 0.1 percent of employment in the area. There are no known environmental impediments at the closing or receiving installations.

Branch U.S. Disciplinary Barracks, Lompoc, California

Recommendation: Close Branch U.S. Disciplinary Barracks (USDB), Lompoc, CA.

Justification: Branch USDB, Lompoc consists of approximately 4,000 acres and 812,000 square feet of detention facilities. It is permitted to and operated by the Federal Bureau of Prisons. There are no Army activities on USDB, Lompoc. Accordingly, it is excess to the Army's requirements.

Return on Investment: There is no one-time cost to implement this recommendation. There are no costs and savings during the implementation period. There are no annual recurring savings after implementation. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$0 million.

Impacts: This recommendation will not affect any jobs in the Santa Barbara-Santa Maria-Lompoc, CA economic area. There are no known environmental impediments at the closing site.

East Fort Baker, California

Recommendation: Close East Fort Baker. Relocate all tenants to other installations that meet mission requirements. Return all real property to the Golden Gate National Recreation Area.

Justification: East Fort Baker is at the north end of the Golden Gate Bridge in Marin County, CA. The post consists of approximately 347 acres and 390,000 square feet of facilities. It provides facilities and housing for the Headquarters, 91st Training Division (U.S. Army Reserve) and the 6th Recruiting Brigade, Army Recruiting Command. The 91st Training Division has a requirement to remain in the San Francisco Bay area, while the 6th Recruiting Brigade has a regional mission associated with the western United States. Both the 6th Recruiting Brigade and the 91st Training Division can easily relocate to other installations. The 91st Training Division will relocate to Parks Reserve Forces Training Area, where it better aligns with its training mission. Closing East Fort Baker saves

operations and support costs by consolidating tenants to other military installations without major construction.

Return on Investment: The total one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$8 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a cost of \$1 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$2 million with a return on investment expected in five years. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$15 million.

Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 152 jobs (97 direct jobs and 55 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the San Francisco, CA Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area, which represents less than 0.1 percent of the area's employment.

The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in this area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential decrease equal to 0.5 percent of employment in the area. There are no known environmental impediments at the closing or receiving installations.

Rio Vista Army Reserve Center, California

Recommendation: Close Rio Vista Army Reserve Center.

Justification: Rio Vista Army Reserve Center consists of approximately 28 acres. It formerly supported an Army Reserve watercraft unit. Since Reserve Components no longer use Rio Vista Reserve Center, it is excess to the Army's requirements. Closing Rio Vista will save base operations and maintenance funds and provide reuse opportunities for approximately 28 acres.

Return on Investment: There is no one-time cost to implement this recommendation. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$1 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$0.1 million with an immediate return on investment. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$2 million.

Impacts: This recommendation will not affect any jobs in the Vallejo-Fairfield-NAPA, CA Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area. There are no known environmental impediments at the closing or receiving sites.

Stratford Army Engine Plant, Connecticut

Recommendation: Close Stratford Army Engine Plant.

Justification: The Stratford facility has produced engines for heavy armor vehicles and rotary wing aircraft. Reduced production requirements and the Army's increased capability for rebuild and repair have eliminated the need for the Stratford Army Engine Plant. There is no requirement for use of the installation by either the Active or Reserve Components.

The Army has an extensive capability to repair engines at Anniston and Corpus Christi Army Depots. The current inventory for these engines meets projected operational requirements. During mobilization, the capability to rebuild engines can be increased at both depots. In the event of an extended national emergency that would deplete stocks, the depots could reconfigure to assemble new engines from parts provided by the manufacturer until mothballed facilities become operational. Prior to closing the facility, the contractor will complete all existing contracts.

Return on Investment: The total one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$2 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$24 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$6 million with an immediate return on investment. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$80 million.

Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 3 jobs (2 direct jobs and 1 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Fairfield County, CT economic area, which represents 0 percent of the area's employment. There are no known environmental impediments at the closing site.

Big Coppett Key, Florida

Recommendation: Close Big Coppett Key.

Justification: Big Coppett Key, an island near Key West, consists of approximately five acres and 3,000 square feet of facilities. Big Coppett Key formerly provided communications support to United States Army. Since the Army no longer uses Big Coppett Key, it is excess and to Army requirements. Closing Big Coppett Key will save base operations and maintenance funds and provide reuse opportunities.

Return on Investment: There is no one-time cost to implement this recommendation. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$0.05 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$0.01 million with an immediate return

on investment. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$0.1 million.

Impacts: This recommendation will not affect any jobs in the Monroe County, FL economic area. There are no known environmental impediments at the closing site.

Concepts Analysis Agency, Maryland

Recommendation: Close by relocating Concepts Analysis Agency to Fort Belvoir, VA.

Justification: In 1993, the Commission suggested that DoD direct the Services to include a separate category for leased facilities to ensure a bottom-up review of leased space. The Army has conducted a review of activities in leased space to identify opportunities for relocation onto military installations. Because of the cost of leasing, the Army's goal is to minimize leased space when feasible, and maximize the use of government-owned space.

Since Army studies indicate that space is available at Fort Belvoir, the Concepts Analysis Agency can easily relocate with limited renovation. The annual cost of the current lease is \$1.5 million.

Return on Investment: The total one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$3.7 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a cost of \$0.4 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$0.8 million with a return on investment expected in five years. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$7 million.

Impacts: This recommendation will not result in a change in employment in the Washington, DC-MD-VA-WV Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area because all affected jobs will remain in that area. There are no known environmental impediments at the closing site or receiving installation.

Publications Distribution Center Baltimore, Maryland

Recommendation: Close by relocating the U.S. Army Publications Distribution Center, Baltimore to the U.S. Army Publications Center St. Louis, Missouri.

Justification: Consolidation of the U.S. Army Publications Distribution Center, Baltimore with the U.S. Army Publications Center, St. Louis, combines the wholesale and retail distribution functions of publication distribution into one location. The consolidation eliminates a manual operation at Baltimore in favor of an automated facility at St. Louis and creates efficiencies in the overall distribution process. This move consolidates two leases into one less costly lease.

Return on Investment: The total one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$6 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$3 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$3 million with a return on investment expected in two years. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$35 million.

Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 213 jobs (131 direct jobs and 82 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Baltimore, MD Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area, which represents less than 0.1 percent of the area's employment.

The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior round BRAC actions in this area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential decrease equal to less than 0.1 percent of employment in the area. There are no known environmental impediments at the closing or receiving installations.

Hingham Cohasset, Massachusetts

Recommendation: Close Hingham Cohasset.

Justification: Hingham Cohasset, formerly a U.S. Army Reserve Center, is essentially vacant and is excess to the Army's requirements. The site consists of approximately 125 acres and 150,000 square feet of facilities. Closing Hingham Cohasset will save base operations and maintenance funds and provide reuse opportunities.

Return on Investment: There is no one-time cost to implement this recommendation. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$1 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$0.2 million with an immediate return on investment. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$2 million.

Impacts: This recommendation will not affect any jobs in the Boston-Worcester-Lawrence-Lowell-Brockton, MA-NH New England County Metropolitan Area. There are no known environmental impediments at the closing site.

Sudbury Training Annex, Massachusetts

Recommendation: Close Sudbury Training Annex.

Justification: Sudbury Training Annex, outside Boston, consists of approximately 2,000 acres and 200,000 square feet of facilities. The primary mission of Sudbury Training Annex

is to provide storage facilities for various Department of Defense activities. Sudbury Training Annex is excess to the Army's requirements. Closing the annex will save base operations and maintenance funds and provide reuse opportunities for approximately 2,000 acres.

Return on Investment: The total one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$1 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a cost of \$0.1 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$0.1 million with a return on investment expected in five years. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$1 million.

Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 21 jobs (13 direct jobs and 8 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Essex-Middlesex-Suffolk-Plymouth and Norfolk Counties, MA, which represents less than 0.1 percent of the area's employment.

The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in this area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential decrease equal to 0.1 percent of employment in the area. There are no known environmental impediments at the closing or receiving sites.

Aviation-Troop Command, Missouri

Recommendation: Disestablish Aviation-Troop Command (ATCOM), and close by relocating its missions/functions as follows:

- Relocate Aviation Research, Development & Engineering Center; Aviation Management; and Aviation Program Executive Offices to Redstone Arsenal, Huntsville, AL, to form the Aviation & Missile Command.
- Relocate functions related to soldier systems to Natick Research, Development, Engineering Center, MA, to align with the Soldier Systems Command.
- Relocate functions related to materiel management of communications-electronics to Fort Monmouth, NJ, to align with Communications-Electronics Command.
- Relocate automotive materiel management functions to Detroit Arsenal, MI, to align with Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command.

Justification: In 1993, the Commission suggested that DoD direct the Services to include a separate category for leased facilities to ensure a bottom-up review of leased space. The Army has conducted a review of activities in leased space to identify opportunities for

relocation onto military installations. Because of the cost of leasing, the Army's goal is to minimize leased space, when feasible, and maximize the use of government-owned facilities.

In 1991, the Commission approved the merger of Aviation Systems Command and Troop Systems Command (ATCOM). It also recommended that the Army evaluate the relocation of these activities from leased space to government-owned facilities and provide appropriate recommendations to a subsequent Commission. In 1993, the Army studied the possibility of relocating ATCOM to a military installation and concluded it would be too costly. It is evident that restructuring ATCOM now provides a financially attractive opportunity to relocate.

Significant functional efficiencies are also possible by separating aviation and troop support commodities and relocating these functions to military installations. The aviation support functions realign to Redstone Arsenal to form a new Aviation & Missiles Command. The troop support functions realign to Natick, MA to align with the new Soldier Systems Command.

This recommendation preserves crucial research and development functions while optimizing operational efficiencies. Moving elements of ATCOM to Natick and Redstone Arsenal improves the synergistic effect of research, development and engineering, by facilitating the interaction between the medical, academic, and industrial communities already present in these regions. Vacating the St. Louis lease will collocate/consolidate similar life cycle functions at military installations for improved efficiencies and effectiveness.

Return on Investment: The total one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$146 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$9 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$46 million with a return on investment expected in three years. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$453 million.

Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 7,679 jobs (4,731 direct jobs and 2,948 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the St. Louis, MO-IL Metropolitan Statistical Area, which represents 0.5 percent of the area's employment.

The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in this area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential decrease equal to 0.6 percent of employment in the area. There are no known environmental impediments at the closing site or receiving installations.

Fort Missoula, Montana

Recommendation: Close Fort Missoula, except an enclave for minimum essential land and facilities to support the Reserve Component units.

Justification: Fort Missoula consists of approximately 35 acres and 180,000 square feet of facilities. It provides administration, supply, training, maintenance, logistics support to Reserve Component forces. The post also provides facilities for the United States Forest Service. Fort Missoula has land and facilities excess to the Army's requirements. Closing Fort Missoula will save base operations and maintenance funds and provide reuse opportunities for approximately 25 acres. The Army intends to continue to license buildings and land currently occupied by the Army National Guard.

Return on Investment: The total one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$0.4 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$0.5 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$0.2 million with a return on investment expected in two years. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$2 million.

Impacts: This recommendation will not affect any jobs in the Missoula County, MT economic area. There are no known environmental impediments at the closing or receiving installations.

Camp Kilmer, New Jersey

Recommendation: Close Camp Kilmer, except an enclave for minimum necessary facilities to support the Reserve Components.

Justification: Camp Kilmer consists of approximately 75 acres and 331,000 square feet of facilities. The camp provides administration, supply, training, maintenance, and logistics support to Reserve Component forces. The vast majority of the site is excess to the Army's requirements. Closing Camp Kilmer will save base operations and maintenance funds and provide reuse opportunities for approximately 56 acres.

Return on Investment: The total one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$0.1 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$1 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$0.2 million with a return on investment expected in one year. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$3 million.

Impacts: This recommendation will not affect any jobs in the Middlesex-Somerset-Hunterdon, NY Metropolitan Statistical Area. There are no known environmental impediments at the closing or receiving installations.

Caven Point Army Reserve Center, New Jersey

Recommendation: Close Caven Point U. S. Army Reserve Center. Relocate its reserve activities to the Fort Hamilton, NY, provided the recommendation to realign Fort Hamilton is approved.

Justification: Caven Point U.S. Army Reserve Center (USARC) is located near Jersey City, NJ, and consists of approximately 45,000 square feet of administrative and maintenance facilities on 35 acres. It is overcrowded and in generally poor condition. The primary mission of Caven Point USARC is to provide administrative, logistics and maintenance support to the Army Reserve. The consolidation of tenants from Caven Point USARC with Reserve Component activities remaining on Fort Hamilton will achieve savings in operations costs.

Return on Investment: The cost and savings information for the closure of Caven Point U.S. Army Reserve Center is included in the recommendation for Fort Hamilton, NY.

Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 4 jobs (3 direct jobs and 1 indirect job) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Jersey City, NJ, Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area which represents less than 0.1 percent of the area's employment.

The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in this area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential decrease equal to 0.8 percent of employment in the area. There are no known environmental impediments at the closing or receiving installations.

Camp Pedricktown, New Jersey

Recommendation: Close Camp Pedricktown, except the Sievers-Sandberg Reserve Center.

Justification: Camp Pedricktown consists of approximately 82 acres and 260,000 square feet of facilities. Its primary mission is to provide administration, supply, training, maintenance, and logistics support to Reserve Component forces. The vast majority of Camp Pedricktown's land and facilities are excess to Army requirements. Closing it will save base operations and maintenance funds and provide reuse opportunities for approximately 60 acres.

Return on Investment: The total one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$0.1 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$2 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$0.4 million with an immediate return on investment. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$5 million.

Impacts: This recommendation will not affect any jobs in the Philadelphia, PA-NJ Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area. There are no known environmental impediments at the closing or receiving installations.

Bellmore Logistics Activity, New York

Recommendation: Close Bellmore Logistics Activity.

Justification: Bellmore Logistics Activity, located on Long Island, consists of approximately 17 acres and 180,000 square feet of facilities. It formerly provided maintenance and logistical support to Reserve Component units. Since Reserve Components no longer use Bellmore Logistics Activity, it is excess to the Army's requirements. Closing Bellmore Logistics Activity will save base operations and maintenance funds and provide reuse opportunities.

Return on Investment: There is no one-time cost to implement this recommendation. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$2 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$0.3 million with an immediate return on investment. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$5 million.

Impacts: This recommendation will not affect any jobs in the Nassau-Suffolk, NY Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area. There are no known environmental impediments at the closing site.

Fort Totten, New York

Recommendation: Close Fort Totten, except an enclave for the U. S. Army Reserve. Dispose of family housing.

Justification: Fort Totten, a sub-installation of Fort Hamilton, provides administrative and logistical support to Army Reserve units in the New York City metropolitan area.

Fort Totten is low in military value compared to other command and control/administrative support installations. The post has limited capacity for growth or further military development.

Fort Totten is home to the Ernie Pyle U.S. Army Reserve Center, the largest in the country. Realignment of the Center to nearby Fort Hamilton is not possible since Fort Hamilton has little available space. Therefore, the Army decided to retain this facility as a reserve enclave.

Return on Investment: The total one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$4 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$0.1 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$2 million with a return on investment expected in one year. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$17 million.

Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 69 jobs (43 direct jobs and 26 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the New York, NY Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area, which represents less than 0.1 percent of the area's employment.

The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in this area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential decrease equal to 0.1 percent of employment in the area. There are no known environmental impediments at the closing or receiving installations.

Recreation Center #2, North Carolina

Recommendation: Close Recreation Center #2, Fayetteville, NC.

Justification: Recreation Center #2 consists of approximately four acres and 17,000 square feet of community facilities. Recreation Center #2 is currently being leased to the city of Fayetteville, NC, and is excess to the Army's requirements. Closing Recreation Center #2 will provide reuse opportunities.

Return on Investment: There are no costs associated with this recommendation.

Impacts: This recommendation will not affect any jobs in the Fayetteville, NC Metropolitan Statistical Area. There are no known environmental impediments at the closing site.

Information Systems Software Command (ISSC), Virginia

Recommendation: Close by relocating Information Systems Software Command to Fort Meade, MD.

Justification: In 1993, the Commission suggested DoD direct the Services to include a separate category for leased facilities to ensure a bottom-up review of leased space. The Army has conducted a review of activities in leased space to identify opportunities for relocation onto military installations. Because of the cost of leasing, the Army's goal is to minimize leased space, when feasible, and maximize the use of government-owned facilities.

This activity can relocate easily for a minor cost. The annual cost of the current lease is \$2 million.

Return on Investment: The total one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$6 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a cost of \$2 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$1 million with a return on investment expected in six years. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$8 million.

Impacts: This recommendation will not result in a change in employment in the Washington, DC-MD-VA-WV Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area because all affected jobs will remain in that area. There are no known environmental impediments at the closing site or receiving installation.

Camp Bonneville, Washington

Recommendation: Close Camp Bonneville.

Justification: Camp Bonneville consists of approximately 4,000 acres and 178,000 square feet of facilities. The primary mission of Camp Bonneville is to provide training facilities for Active and Reserve units. Training currently conducted at Camp Bonneville will be shifted to Fort Lewis, Washington. Accordingly, Camp Bonneville is excess to the Army's requirements. Closing the camp will save base operations and maintenance funds and provide reuse opportunities.

Return on Investment: The total one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$0.04 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$0.8 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$0.2 million with an immediate return on investment. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$2 million.

Impacts: This recommendation will not affect any jobs in the Portland-Vancouver, OR-WA economic area. There are no known environmental impediments at the closing site.

Valley Grove Area Maintenance Support Activity, West Virginia

Recommendation: Close Valley Grove Area Maintenance Support Activity (AMSA). Relocate reserve activity to the Kelly Support Center, PA, provided the recommendation to realign Kelly Support Center is approved.

Justification: Valley Grove AMSA, located in Valley Grove, WV, consists of approximately 10,000 square feet of leased maintenance facilities. Its primary mission is to provide maintenance support to Army Reserve activities. Consolidating tenants from Valley Grove AMSA with the Reserve Component activities remaining on Kelly Support Center will reduce the cost of operation.

Return on Investment: The cost and savings information for the closure of Valley Grove AMSA is included in the recommendation for Charles E. Kelly Support Center.

Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 10 jobs (7 direct jobs and 3 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Wheeling, WV-OH, Metropolitan Statistical Area, which is less than 0.1 percent of the areas employment. There are no known environmental impediments at the closing or receiving installations.

Tri-Service Project Reliance

Recommendation: Change the recommendation of the 1991 Commission regarding Tri-Service Project Reliance. Upon disestablishment of the U.S. Army Biomedical Research Development Laboratory (USABRDL) at Fort Detrick, MD, do not collocate environmental and occupational toxicology research with the Armstrong Laboratory at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH. Instead relocate the health advisories environmental fate research and military criteria research functions of the Environmental Quality Research Branch to the U.S. Army Environmental Hygiene Agency (AEHA), Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, and maintain the remaining functions of conducting non-mammalian toxicity assessment models and on-site biomonitoring research of the Research Methods Branch at Fort Detrick as part of Headquarters, U.S. Army Medical Research and Materiel Command.

Justification: There are no operational advantages that accrue by relocating this activity to Wright-Patterson AFB. Substantial resources were expended over the last 15 years to develop this unique laboratory currently used by researchers from across the DoD, other federal agencies and the academic community. No facilities are available at Wright-

Patterson to accommodate this unique aquatic research activity, which supports environmental quality R&D initiatives developing cost effective alternatives to the use of mammalian species in toxicity testing. Significant new construction is required at Wright Patterson to duplicate facilities at Fort Detrick to continue this critical research. No construction is required at Aberdeen Proving Ground. Furthermore, the quality of water required for the culture of aquatic animals used in this research is not adequate at Wright-Patterson. This would necessitate additional construction and result in either several years of costly overlapping research in Maryland and Ohio, or the loss of over 10 years experience with the unique lab colonies used at Fort Detrick. The Navy and the Air Force agree that true research synergy is possible without executing the planned relocation.

Return on Investment: The total one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$0.3 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$4 million. There are no annual recurring savings after implementation. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$4 million.

Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 15 jobs (9 direct jobs and 6 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Washington, DC-MD-VA-WV Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area, which is less than 0.1 percent of the areas employment.

The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior round BRAC actions in this area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential decrease equal to 0.6 percent of employment in the area. There are no known environmental impediments at the closing or receiving installations.

Summary of Selection Process

Introduction

Building upon the experience gained during BRAC 93, the Secretary of the Navy established policies, procedures, organizations, and internal controls that ensured that the process in the Department of the Navy (DON) for making base closure and realignment recommendations to the Secretary of the Defense was sound and in compliance with the Base Closure Act. The Secretary of the Navy established a Base Structure Evaluation Committee (BSEC) for the analyses and deliberations required to satisfy the Base Closure Act, and a Base Structure Analysis Team (BSAT) to provide staff support to the BSEC.

The Selection Process

Under the oversight and guidance of the Under Secretary of the Navy, the BSEC had eight members, consisting of senior DON career civilians and Navy flag and Marine Corps general officers who were responsible for developing recommendations for closure and realignment of DON military installations for approval by the Secretary of the Navy. The BSEC was required to evaluate Navy and Marine Corps installations in accordance with the Base Closure Act, to comply with appropriate guidance from higher levels, to ensure audibility by the Comptroller General, and to ensure operational factors were considered. In conducting its evaluation, the BSEC applied the final selection criteria for selecting bases for closure or realignment and based its recommendations on the FY 2001 force structure plan.

The BSAT was composed of military and civilian analysts who were tasked to collect data and to perform analysis for the BSEC. Additionally, the Naval Audit Service and the Office of General Counsel were integrally involved in the process. The Naval Audit Service reviewed the activities of the BSEC and the BSAT to ensure compliance with the approved Internal Control Plan and audited the accuracy and reliability of data provided by DON activities. The Office of the General Counsel provided senior-level legal advice and counsel.

In compliance with the Internal Control Plan, a Base Structure Data Base (BSDB) was developed and contained relevant information on all DON military installations subject to the Base Closure Act. The BSEC used the data base as the baseline for its evaluation of DON military installations, leading to development of recommendations for closure and realignment. Pursuant to the certification policy promulgated by the Secretary of the Navy to comply with the provisions of the Base Closure Act, data which was included in the Base Structure Data Base had to be certified as accurate and complete by the officer or civilian employee who initially generated data in response to the BSEC request for information, and

then at each succeeding level of the chain of command. In conjunction with the requirement to keep records of all meetings that were part of the decision making process, the Base Structure Data Base and the certification policy were designed to ensure the accuracy, completeness, and integrity of the information upon which the DON recommendations were based.

The senior leadership of the Navy and Marine Corps was substantially involved in the process. Policy issues and basic principles that affect basing and infrastructure requirements were articulated, and comments were solicited from the major "owner/operators" of Navy and Marine Corps installations on Fleet operations, support, and readiness impacts. Additionally, the relationship between the Military Departments and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) for BRAC 95 was more formalized and more robust than in prior rounds. The DON was significantly represented on every OSD BRAC 95 group.

In order to comply with the requirements of the Base Closure Act relating to evaluation using the force structure plan and the selection criteria, the first step in the process was to categorize and aggregate installations for analysis. Based on a review of the Secretary of the Navy's responsibilities under Title 10 of the U.S. Code to operate, maintain, train, and support the operating forces within the DON, the BSEC developed five major categories for organizing its military installations for analysis and evaluation: Operational Support, Industrial Support, Technical Centers/Laboratories, Educational/Training, and Personnel Support/Other. These categories were then further divided into 27 subcategories to ensure that like installations were compared to one another and to allow identification of total capacity and military value for an entire category of installations. Within these 27 subcategories were 830 individual Navy or Marine Corps installations or activities, each of which was reviewed during the BRAC 95 process.

Data calls were issued to these installations, tailored to the subcategory in which the activity was grouped, to obtain the relevant certified information relating to capacity and military value. "Conglomerate" activities having more than one significant mission received multiple military value and capacity data calls relating to those missions. The certified responses to these data calls were entered into the Base Structure Data Base and formed the sole basis for BSEC determinations.

Capacity analysis compared the present base structure to the future force structure requirement for each subcategory of installations to determine whether excess base structure capacity existed. The capacity measures were the appropriate "throughput" for each type of installation. If total capacity was greater than the future required capacity, excess capacity was determined to exist, and the military value of each installation in a subcategory was

evaluated. If there was no meaningful excess capacity, no further closure or realignment analysis was conducted. Of the 27 subcategories, eight of them demonstrated either little or no excess capacity.

The remaining 19 subcategories underwent military value analysis to assess the relative military value of installations within a subcategory, using a quantitative methodology that was as objective as possible. The foundation of the analysis was the military value criteria, which are the first four of the eight selection criteria issued by the Secretary of Defense. Information from the military value data call responses was displayed in a matrix, scored by the BSEC according to relative importance for a particular subcategory. A military value score for a particular installation is a relative measure of military value only within the context of the subcategory in which that installation was analyzed, in order to compare one installation in a subcategory against another installation in that category.

The results of the capacity analyses and military value analyses were then combined in that stage of the process called configuration analysis. The purpose of configuration analysis was to identify, for each subcategory of installations, sets of installations that best meet the needs of the Navy and Marine Corps, in light of future requirements, while eliminating the most excess capacity. Multiple solutions were generated that would satisfy capacity requirements for the future force structure while maintaining the average military value of the retained installations at a level equal to or greater than the average military value for all of the installations in the subcategory.

The configuration analysis solutions were then used by the BSEC as the starting point for the application of military judgment in the development of potential closure and realignment scenarios to undergo return on investment analysis. Scenario development was an iterative process in which results of COBRA analyses and inputs from the senior Defense leadership were used to generate additional options. The input received from the Fleet CINC's, the major claimants (including the SYSCOM Commanders), and the DON civilian leadership was an integral part of scenario development. The CINCs and major claimants provided input both directly, during meetings, and indirectly, through COBRA scenario data call responses. Additionally, the Joint Cross-Service Groups generated numerous alternatives derived from their analysis of data and information provided by the Military Departments. From alternatives proposing closure or realignment of DON activities, all but one of the Depot Maintenance alternatives, all of the significant Laboratory alternatives, all of the Military Treatment Facilities alternatives, all of the significant Test and Evaluation alternatives, and all of the Undergraduate Pilot Training alternatives resulted in COBRA scenario data calls. As a result of the scenario development portion of the process, the BSEC developed 174 scenarios involving 119 activities.

COBRA analyses were conducted on all of these scenarios, using certified responses to COBRA scenario data calls from the chains of command of affected installations and their tenants. In analyzing these responses, the BSEC aggressively challenged cost estimates to ensure both their consistency with standing policies and procedures and their reasonableness. With reductions in budgets, numbers of programs, and numbers of systems being produced, the BSEC reviewed the data call responses to ensure that outyear requirements were appropriately reduced in terms of personnel, facilities, and capacities of remaining facilities. The BSEC used the COBRA algorithms as a tool to ensure that its recommendations were cost effective. As a result, the estimated upfront costs are the lowest of any round of base closure, and the longest period for return on investment of any recommendation is four years. Most recommendations will obtain an immediate return on investment, with savings offsetting costs of closure within the closure period.

The impact on the local economic area for each DON installation considered for closure or realignment was calculated using the DoD BRAC 95 Economic Impact Data Base. The DON is very concerned about economic impact and has made every effort to fully understand all of the economic impacts its recommendations might have on local communities. The BSEC also evaluated the ability of the existing local community infrastructure at potential receiving installations to support additional missions and personnel. The impact of increases in base personnel on such infrastructure items as off-base housing availability, public and private schools, public transportation, fire and police protection, health care facilities, and public utilities was assessed. No significant community infrastructure impacts were identified for any of the DON proposed closure or realignment actions.

Once the BSEC had determined the serious candidates for closure or realignment, an environmental summary was prepared which compared the environmental management efforts at losing and gaining sites. Differences in environmental management effort were presented as they relate to such programs as threatened/endangered species, wetlands, cultural resources, land use, air quality, environmental facilities, and installation restoration sites. The environmental impact analysis permitted the BSEC to obtain a comprehensive picture of the potential environmental impacts arising from the recommendations for closure and realignment. No significant environmental impacts were identified for any scenario which would support reconsideration of any recommendation.

Recommendations and Justifications

Naval Air Facility, Adak, Alaska

Recommendation: Close Naval Air Facility, Adak, Alaska.

Justification: Despite the large reduction in operational infrastructure accomplished during the 1993 round of base closure and realignment, since DON force structure experiences a reduction of over 10 percent by the year 2001, there continues to be additional excess capacity that must be eliminated. In evaluating operational bases, the goal was to retain only that infrastructure necessary to support the future force structure without impeding operational flexibility for deployment of that force. In the case of Naval Air Facility, Adak, Alaska, the Navy's anti-submarine warfare surveillance mission no longer requires these facilities to base or support its aircraft. Closure of this activity reduces excess capacity by eliminating unnecessary capabilities and can be accomplished with no loss in mission effectiveness.

Return on Investment: The total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$9.4 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$108 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$26 million with an immediate return on investment expected. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$354.8 million.

Impacts:

Economic Impact on Communities: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 894 jobs (678 direct jobs and 216 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Aleutians West Census Area economic area, which is 10.4 percent of economic area employment. However, the geography of the Aleutian Islands localizes economic effects, and no loss is anticipated from the closure of NAF Adak beyond the direct job loss.

Community Infrastructure Impact: There is no community infrastructure impact since there are no receiving installations for this recommendation.

Environmental Impact: The closure of Naval Air Facility, Adak will have a positive effect on the environment in that, even though NAF Adak is in an attainment area for carbon monoxide, ozone, and PM-10, a source of ozone will be removed, further improving already favorable air quality. In an area with few air emission sources present, cessation of

air emissions from this facility will enhance the natural state of the western Alaska region. Also, there is no adverse impact on threatened/endangered species, sensitive habitats and wetlands, or cultural/historical resources occasioned by this recommendation.

Naval Shipyard, Long Beach, California

Recommendation: Close the Naval Shipyard Long Beach, California, except retain the sonar dome government-owned, contractor-operated facility and those family housing units needed to fulfill Department of the Navy requirements, particularly those at Naval Weapons Station, Seal Beach, California. Relocate necessary personnel to other naval activities as appropriate, primarily Naval Weapons Station, Seal Beach and naval activities in the San Diego, California, area.

Justification: Despite substantial reductions in depot maintenance capability accomplished in prior base closure evolutions, as force levels continue to decline, there is additional excess capacity that needs to be eliminated. Force structure reductions by the year 2001 eliminate the requirement for the Department of the Navy to retain this facility, including its large-deck drydocking capability. As a result of BRAC 91, the adjoining Naval Station Long Beach was closed, and some of its assets were transferred to the naval shipyard for "ship support functions." Of those transferred assets, only those housing units required to fulfill Department of the Navy requirements in the local commuting area will be retained after closure of the naval shipyard.

Return on Investment: The total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$74.5 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$725.6 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$130.6 million with an immediate return on investment expected. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$1,948.6 million.

Impacts:

Economic Impact on Communities: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 13,261 jobs (4,029 direct jobs and 9,232 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Los Angeles-Long Beach, California PMSA economic area, which is 0.3 percent of economic area employment. The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in the economic area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential decrease equal to 0.4 percent of employment in the economic area.

Community Infrastructure Impact: There is no known community infrastructure impact at any receiving installation.

Environmental Impact: The closure of Long Beach Naval Shipyard will have a positive impact on the local environment. The removal of a major industrial activity from an area that is in non-attainment for carbon monoxide, ozone, and PM-10 will be of substantial benefit to the air quality of this area. Similarly, the workload and small numbers of personnel being relocated to other activities are not expected to adversely impact the environment of geographic areas in which those activities are located. There are no adverse impacts to threatened/endangered species, sensitive habitats and wetlands, or cultural/historical resources occasioned by this recommendation.

Ship Repair Facility, Guam

Recommendation: Close the Naval Ship Repair Facility (SRF), Guam, except transfer appropriate assets, including the piers, the floating drydock, its typhoon basin anchorage, the recompression chamber, and the floating crane, to Naval Activities, Guam.

Justification: Despite substantial reductions in depot maintenance capability accomplished in prior base closure evolutions, as force levels continue to decline, there is additional excess capacity that needs to be eliminated. While operational and forward basing considerations require access to Guam, a fully functional ship repair facility is not required. The workload of SRF Guam can be entirely met by other Department of the Navy facilities. However, retention of the waterfront assets provides the DON with the ability to meet voyage repair and emergent requirements that may arise in the Western Pacific.

Return on Investment: The total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$8.4 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$171.9 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$37.8 million with an immediate return on investment expected. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$529 million.

Impacts:

Economic Impact on Communities: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 1,321 jobs (663 direct jobs and 658 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Agana, Guam economic area, which is 2.0 percent of economic area employment. The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in the economic area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential decrease equal to 10.6 percent of employment in the economic area. However, much of this impact involves the inclusion of Military Sealift Command mariners in the job loss statement, which does not reflect the temporary nature of their presence on Guam.

Community Infrastructure Impact: There is no known community infrastructure impact at any receiving installation.

Environmental Impact: The closure of the Ship Repair Facility Guam will have a generally positive impact on the environment because a significant industrial operation will be closed, including the removal of stationary emission sources associated with this operation. This will be a benefit to an already positive air quality situation on Guam. Further, this closure will not have an adverse impact on threatened/endangered species, sensitive habitats and wetlands, or cultural/historical resources.

Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, Indianapolis, Indiana

Recommendation: Close the Naval Air Warfare Center (NAWC), Aircraft Division, Indianapolis, Indiana. Relocate necessary functions along with associated personnel, equipment and support to other naval technical activities, primarily Naval Surface Warfare Center, Crane, Indiana; Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, Patuxent River, Maryland; and Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division, China Lake, California.

Justification: There is an overall reduction in operational forces and a sharp decline of the DON budget through FY 2001. Specific reductions for technical centers are difficult to determine, because these activities are supported through customer orders. However, the level of forces and the budget are reliable indicators of sharp declines in technical center workload through FY 2001, which leads to a recognition of excess capacity in these activities. This excess and the imbalance in force and resource levels dictate closure/realignment or consolidation of activities wherever practicable. This recommended closure results in the closure of a major technical center and the relocation of its principal functions to three other technical centers, realizing both a reduction in excess capacity and significant economies while raising aggregate military value.

Return on Investment: The return on investment data below applies to the closure of Naval Surface Warfare Center Louisville and the closure of NAWC Indianapolis. The total estimated one-time cost to implement these recommendations is \$180 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a cost of \$26.8 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$67.8 million with a return on investment expected in two years. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$639.9 million.

Impacts:

Economic Impact on Communities: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 7,659 jobs (2,841 direct jobs and 4,818 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Boone-Hamilton-Hancock-Hendricks-Johnson-Marion-Morgan-Shelby Counties, Indiana, economic area, which is 0.9 percent of economic area employment. The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in the economic area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential decrease equal to 2.2 percent of employment in the economic area.

Community Infrastructure Impact: There is no known community infrastructure impact at any receiving installation.

Environmental Impact: The closure of NAWC Indianapolis will have a positive effect on the environment because of the movement out of a region that is in marginal non-attainment for ozone. All three of the receiving sites (NSWC Crane, NAWC China Lake, and NAWC Patuxent River) are in areas that are in attainment for carbon monoxide, and the relocation of personnel from Indianapolis is not expected to have a significant effect on base operations at these sites. The utility infrastructure at each of these receiving bases is sufficient to handle these additional personnel, and this closure will not adversely impact threatened/endangered species, sensitive habitats and wetlands, or cultural/historical resources.

Naval Surface Warfare Center, Crane Division Detachment, Louisville, Kentucky

Recommendation: Close the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Crane Division Detachment, Louisville, Kentucky. Relocate appropriate functions, personnel, equipment, and support to other naval activities, primarily the Naval Shipyard, Norfolk, Virginia; the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Port Hueneme, California; and the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Crane, Indiana.

Justification: There is an overall reduction in operational forces and a sharp decline of the DON budget through FY 2001. Specific reductions for technical centers are difficult to determine, because these activities are supported through customer orders. However, the level of forces and the budget are reliable indicators of sharp declines in technical center workload through FY 2001, which leads to a recognition of excess capacity in these activities. This excess and the imbalance in force and resource levels dictate closure/realignment or consolidation of activities wherever practicable. Consistent with the Department of the Navy's efforts to remove depot level maintenance workload from technical

centers and return it to depot industrial activities, this action consolidates ships' systems (guns) depot and general industrial workload at NSYD Norfolk, which has many of the required facilities in place. The functional distribution of workload in this manner offers an opportunity for cross-servicing part of the gun plating workload to the Watervliet Arsenal in New York. System integration engineering will relocate to NSWC Port Hueneme, with the remainder of the engineering workload and Close-in-Weapons System (CIWS) depot maintenance functions relocating to NSWC Crane. The closure of this activity not only reduces excess capacity, but relocation of functional workload to activities performing similar work will result in additional efficiencies and economies in the management of those functions.

Return on Investment: The return on investment data below applies to the closure of NSWC Louisville and the closure of NAWC Indianapolis. The total estimated one-time cost to implement these recommendations is \$180 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a cost of \$26.8 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$67.8 million with a return on investment expected in two years. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$639.9 million.

Impacts:

Economic Impact on Communities: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 3,791 jobs (1,464 direct jobs and 2,327 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Louisville, Kentucky-Indiana MSA economic area, which is 0.7 percent of economic area employment.

Community Infrastructure Impact: There is no known community infrastructure impact at any receiving installation.

Environmental Impact: The closure of NSWC Louisville will have a generally positive impact on the environment because a major industrial operation will be closing in an area that is in moderate non-attainment for ozone. To the extent the relocations from this recommendation trigger the requirement for a conformity determination to assess the impact on the air quality of the areas in which each of the receiving sites are located, such determinations will be prepared. One of the most significant environmental benefits resulting from this recommendation is the transfer of workload from NSWC Louisville to the Watervliet Arsenal, New York, to accomplish plating operations which the Norfolk Naval Shipyard currently cannot perform. This transfer reduces the DoD-wide facilities required to perform the programmed plating work. There are no impacts on threatened/endangered species, sensitive habitats and wetlands, or cultural resources occasioned by this recommendation.

Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division Detachment, White Oak, Maryland

Recommendation: Close the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division Detachment, White Oak, Maryland. Relocate the functions, personnel and equipment associated with Ship Magnetic Signature Control R&D Complex to the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock, Maryland, and the functions and personnel associated with reentry body dynamics research and development to the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren, Virginia.

Justification: There is an overall reduction in operational forces and a sharp decline of the DON budget through FY 2001. Specific reductions for technical centers are difficult to determine, because these activities are supported through customer orders. However, the level of forces and the budget are reliable indicators of sharp declines in technical center workload through FY 2001, which leads to a recognition of excess capacity in these activities. This excess and the imbalance in force and resource levels dictate closure/realignment or consolidation of activities wherever practicable. Closure of the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division Detachment, White Oak, Maryland, reduces this excess capacity, and its consolidation with two other major technical centers that already have capability will result in further economies and efficiencies. This closure also eliminates unnecessary capabilities, since a few Navy facilities were left at NSWC White Oak only because Naval Sea Systems Command was relocating there as a result of BRAC 93. However, those facilities can be excessed, and the Naval Sea Systems Command can be easily accommodated at the Washington Navy Yard.

Return on Investment: The total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$2.9 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$28.7 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$6 million with an immediate return on investment expected. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$85.9 million.

Impacts:

Economic Impact on Communities: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 646 jobs (202 direct jobs and 444 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Washington, DC-Maryland-Virginia-West Virginia PMSA economic area, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment. The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in the economic area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential decrease equal to 0.6 percent of employment in the economic area.

Community Infrastructure Impact: There is no known community infrastructure impact at any receiving installation.

Environmental Impact: The closure of NSWC White Oak Detachment will have a generally positive impact on the environment. A portion of the personnel being relocated will transfer to NSWC Dahlgren, which is in an area that is in attainment for carbon monoxide. As regards personnel movements to NSWC Carderock, a conformity determination may be required to assess any air quality impacts. In each case, however, the personnel relocating, when compared to expected force structure reductions by FY 2001, represent a net decrease in base personnel. There is adequate capacity in the utility infrastructure at the receiving sites to handle additional personnel loading. Likewise, there is sufficient space for rehabilitation or acreage of unrestricted land for expansion for new facilities. There is no adverse impact to threatened/endangered species, sensitive habitats and wetlands, or cultural/historical resources occasioned by this recommendation.

Naval Air Station, South Weymouth, Massachusetts

Recommendation: Close Naval Air Station, South Weymouth, Massachusetts. Relocate its aircraft and necessary personnel, equipment and support to Naval Air Station, Brunswick, Maine. Relocate the Marine Corps Reserve support squadrons to another facility in the local area or to NAS Brunswick. Reestablish Naval Reserve Center, Quincy, Massachusetts, and change the receiving site specified by the 1993 Commission (1993 Commission Report, at page 1-64) for consolidation of Navy and Marine Corps Reserve Center, Lawrence, Massachusetts; Naval Reserve Center, Chicopee, Massachusetts; and Naval Reserve Center, Quincy, Massachusetts, from "NAS South Weymouth, Massachusetts" to "Naval Reserve Center, Quincy, Massachusetts."

Justification: As a result of the Base Closure and Realignment Commission's actions in BRAC 93, the Department of the Navy retained several naval air stations north of the major fleet concentration in Norfolk. Despite the large reduction in operational infrastructure accomplished during BRAC 93, the current Force Structure Plan shows a continuing decline in force levels from that governing BRAC 93, and thus there is additional excess capacity that must be eliminated. The major thrust of the evaluation of operational bases was to retain only that infrastructure necessary to support future force levels while, at the same time, not impeding operational flexibility for the deployment of that force. In that latter context, the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet (CINCLANTFLT), expressed an operational desire to have as fully-capable an air station as possible north of Norfolk with the closest geographic proximity to support operational deployments. Satisfaction of these needs both to further reduce excess capacity and to honor CINCLANTFLT's operational imperative can be accomplished best by the retention of the most fully capable air station in this geographic area, Naval Air Station, Brunswick, Maine, in lieu of the reserve air station at South

Weymouth. Unlike BRAC 93, where assets from Naval Air Station, South Weymouth were proposed to be relocated to three receiving sites, two of which were geographically quite remote, and where the perceived adverse impact on reserve demographics was considered unacceptable by the Commission, this BRAC 95 recommendation moves all of the assets and supporting personnel and equipment less than 150 miles away, thus providing most acceptable reserve demographics. Further, the consolidation of several reserve centers at the Naval Reserve Center, Quincy, Massachusetts, provides demographics consideration for surface reserve assets. In addition, this recommendation furthers the Departmental preference to collocate active and reserve assets and personnel wherever possible to enhance the readiness of both.

Return on Investment: The total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$17.3 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$50.8 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$27.4 million with a return on investment expected in one year. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$315.2 million.

Impacts:

Economic Impact on Communities: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 1,443 jobs (936 direct jobs and 507 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Essex-Middlesex-Suffolk-Plymouth-Norfolk Counties, Massachusetts economic area, which is 0.1 percent of economic area employment. The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in the economic area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential decrease equal to 0.1 percent of employment in the economic area.

Community Infrastructure Impact: There is no known community infrastructure impact at any receiving installation.

Environmental Impact: The closure of NAS South Weymouth will have a positive effect on local air quality in that a source of VOC and NOX emissions will be removed from an area that is in severe non-attainment for ozone. NAS Brunswick is in an area that is in attainment for carbon monoxide and PM-10 but is in moderate non-attainment for ozone, which may require a conformity determination to evaluate air quality impacts. However, it is expected that the additional functions, personnel, and equipment from this closure recommendation will have no significant impact on air quality and airfield operations at NAS Brunswick. Water supply and wastewater treatment services are provided to NAS Brunswick from off-base and are not limited by capacity. Also, there is no adverse impact on threatened/endangered species, sensitive habitats and wetlands, or cultural/historical resources occasioned by this recommendation.

Naval Air Station, Meridian, Mississippi

Recommendation: Close Naval Air Station, Meridian, Mississippi, except retain the Regional Counterdrug Training Academy facilities which are transferred to the Academy. Relocate the undergraduate strike pilot training function and associated personnel, equipment and support to Naval Air Station, Kingsville, Texas. Its major tenant, the Naval Technical Training Center, will close, and its training functions will be relocated to other training activities, primarily the Navy Supply Corps School, Athens, Georgia, and Naval Education and Training Center, Newport, Rhode Island.

Justification: The 1993 Commission recommended that Naval Air Station, Meridian remain open because it found that the then-current and future pilot training rate (PTR) required that there be two full-strike training bases, Naval Air Station, Kingsville, Texas, and Naval Air Station, Meridian. In the period between 1993 and the present, two factors emerged that required the Department of the Navy again to review the requirement for two such installations. First, the current Force Structure Plan shows a continuing decline in the PTR (particularly in the decline from 11 to 10 carrier air wings) so that Navy strike training could be handled by a single full-strike training base. Second, the consolidation of strike training that follows the closure of NAS Meridian is in the spirit of the policy of the Secretary of Defense that functional pilot training be consolidated. The training conducted at Naval Air Station, Meridian is similar to that conducted at Naval Air Station, Kingsville, which has a higher military value, presently houses T-45 assets (the Department of the Navy's new primary strike training aircraft) and its supporting infrastructure, and has ready access to larger amounts of air space, including over-water air space if such is required. Also, the Undergraduate Pilot Training Joint Cross-Service Group included the closure of Naval Air Station, Meridian in each of its closure/realignment alternatives. The separate recommendation for the consolidation of the Naval Technical Training Center functions at two other major training activities provides improved and more efficient management of these training functions and aligns certain enlisted personnel training to sites where similar training is being provided to officers.

Return on Investment: The return on investment data below applies to the closure of NAS Meridian, the closure of NTTC Meridian, the realignment of NAS Corpus Christi to an NAF, and the NAS Alameda redirect. The total estimated one-time cost to implement these recommendations is \$83.4 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$158.8 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$33.4 million with an immediate return on investment expected. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$471.2 million.

Impacts:

Economic Impact on Communities: The economic data below applies to the closure of NAS Meridian and the closure of NTTC Meridian. Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 3,324 jobs (2,581 direct jobs and 743 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Lauderdale County, Mississippi economic area, which is 8.0 percent of economic area employment.

Community Infrastructure Impact: There is no known community infrastructure impact at any receiving installation.

Environmental Impact: The closure of NAS Meridian will have a generally positive effect on the environment. Undergraduate Pilot Training will be relocated to NAS Kingsville, which is in an air quality control district that is in attainment for carbon monoxide, ozone, and PM-10. Cleanup of the six IR sites at NAS Meridian will continue. No impact was identified for threatened/endangered species, sensitive habitats and wetlands, cultural/historical resources, land/air space use, pollution control, and hazardous material waste requirements. Adequate capacity exists for all utilities at the gaining base, and there is sufficient space for rehabilitation or unrestricted acres available for expansion.

**Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division,
Lakehurst, New Jersey**

Recommendation: Close Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, Lakehurst, New Jersey, except transfer in place certain facilities and equipment to the Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, Patuxent River, Maryland. Relocate other functions and associated personnel and equipment to the Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, Patuxent River, Maryland, and the Naval Aviation Depot, Jacksonville, Florida. Relocate the Naval Air Technical Training Center Detachment, Lakehurst, to Naval Air Station, Pensacola, Florida. Relocate Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 21, the U.S. Army CECOM Airborne Engineering Evaluation Support Activity, and the Defense Reutilization and Marketing Office to other government-owned spaces.

Justification: There is an overall reduction in operational forces and a sharp decline of the DON budget through FY 2001. Specific reductions for technical centers are difficult to determine, because these activities are supported through customer orders. However, the level of forces and the budget are reliable indicators of sharp declines in technical center workload through FY 2001, which leads to a recognition of excess capacity in these activities. This excess and the imbalance in force and resource levels dictate closure/realignment or consolidation of activities wherever practicable. The closure and realignment of this activity permits the elimination of the command and support structure of

this activity and the consolidation of its most critical functions at a major technical center, allowing synergism with its parent command and more fully utilizing available capabilities at major depot activities. This recommendation retains at Lakehurst only those facilities and personnel essential to conducting catapult and arresting gear testing and fleet support.

Return on Investment: The total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$96.9 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a cost of \$5 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$37.2 million with a return on investment expected in three years. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$358.7 million.

Impacts:

Economic Impact on Communities: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 4,126 jobs (1,763 direct jobs and 2,363 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Monmouth-Ocean, New Jersey PMSA economic area, which is 1.0 percent of economic area employment. The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in the economic area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential increase equal to 1.1 percent of employment in the economic area.

Community Infrastructure Impact: There is no known community infrastructure impact at any receiving installation.

Environmental Impact: The closure of NAWC Lakehurst will have a generally positive impact on the environment because of the relocation of appropriate functions and personnel out of an area that is in severe non-attainment for ozone. NAWC Patuxent River is currently in an attainment area for carbon monoxide, and the additional functions and personnel are not expected to significantly affect this status. While NAS Jacksonville is in an attainment area for carbon monoxide, it is in a transitional area for ozone. The relocation of functions and personnel to NAS Jacksonville are not expected to significantly affect this status. Each of the gaining sites has sufficient capacity in its respective utility infrastructure to handle the additional personnel. There is no adverse impact on threatened/endangered species, sensitive habitats and wetlands, or cultural/historical resources occasioned by this recommendation.

Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, Warminster, Pennsylvania

Recommendation: Close the Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, Warminster, Pennsylvania. Relocate appropriate functions, personnel, equipment, and support to other technical activities, primarily the Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, Patuxent River, Maryland.

Justification: There is an overall reduction in operational forces and a sharp decline of the DON budget through FY 2001. Specific reductions for technical centers are difficult to determine, because these activities are supported through customer orders. However, the level of forces and the budget are reliable indicators of sharp declines in technical center workload through FY 2001, which leads to a recognition of excess capacity in these activities. This excess and the imbalance in force and resource levels dictate closure/realignment or consolidation of activities wherever practicable. The closure of this activity reduces excess capacity with the resultant efficiencies and economies in the consolidation of the relocated functions with its parent command at the new receiving site. Additionally, it completes the process of realignment initiated in BRAC 91, based on a clearer understanding of what is now required to be retained in-house. Closure and excessing of the Human Centrifuge/Dynamic Flight Simulator Facility further reduces excess capacity and provides the opportunity for the transfer of this facility to the public educational or commercial sectors, thus maintaining access on an as-needed basis.

Return on Investment: The return on investment data below applies to the closure of NAWC Warminster and the closure of Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance Center (NCCOSC), RDT&E Division Detachment, Warminster. The total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$8.4 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$33.1 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$7.6 million with an immediate return on investment expected. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$104.6 million.

Impacts:

Economic Impact on Communities: The economic data below applies to the closure of NAWC Warminster and the closure of NCCOSC Det Warminster. Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 1,080 jobs (348 direct jobs and 732 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania-New Jersey PMSA economic area, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment. The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in the economic area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential decrease equal to 1.2 percent of employment in the economic area.

Community Infrastructure Impact: There is no known community infrastructure impact at any receiving installation.

Environmental Impact: The closure of both NAWC Warminster and NCCOSC Det Warminster will have a positive effect on the environment because their appropriate functions and personnel will be relocated out of an area that is in severe non-attainment for ozone and from an activity that is included on the National Priorities List. The personnel being relocated to NAWC Patuxent River represent an increase in personnel of less than 1 percent, which is not considered of sufficient size to adversely impact the environment at that site. However, a conformity determination may be required to determine this impact. The utility infrastructure capacity at NAWC Patuxent River is sufficient to handle the additional loading. There is no adverse impact on threatened/endangered species, sensitive habitats and wetlands, or cultural/historical resources occasioned by this recommendation.

Naval Air Station, Key West, Florida

Recommendation: Realign Naval Air Station, Key West, Florida, to a Naval Air Facility and dispose of certain portions of Truman Annex and Trumbo Point (including piers, wharfs and buildings).

Justification: Despite the large reduction in operational infrastructure accomplished during the 1993 round of base closure and realignment, since DON force structure experiences a reduction of over 10 percent by the year 2001, there continues to be additional excess capacity that must be eliminated. In evaluating operational bases, the goal was to retain only that infrastructure necessary to support the future force structure without impeding operational flexibility for deployment of that force. In the case of NAS Key West, its key importance derives from its airspace and training ranges, particularly in view of other aviation consolidations. Full access to those can be accomplished by retaining a downsized Naval Air Facility rather than a large naval air station. This realignment disposes of the waterfront assets of this facility and retains both the airspace and the ranges under its control for continued use by the Fleet for operations and training.

Return on Investment: The total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$0.4 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$8.2 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$1.8 million with an immediate return on investment expected. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$25.5 million.

Impacts:

Economic Impact on Communities: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 26 jobs (20 direct jobs and 6 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Monroe County, Florida economic area, which is 0.1 percent of economic area employment.

Community Infrastructure Impact: There is no community infrastructure impact since there are no receiving installations for this recommendation.

Environmental Impact: The realignment of NAS Key West to a Naval Air Facility has a minimal impact on the air quality of the local area, which is in attainment for carbon monoxide, ozone, and PM-10. Since no aviation assets are being moved into or out of this facility, the reduction in personnel and the resultant commuter carbon monoxide emissions will have a positive impact on the environment. Also, there is no adverse impact on threatened/endangered species, sensitive habitats and wetlands, or cultural/historical resources occasioned by this recommendation.

Naval Activities, Guam

Recommendation: Realign Naval Activities Guam. Relocate all ammunition vessels and associated personnel and support to Naval Magazine, Lualualei, Hawaii. Relocate all other combat logistics force ships and associated personnel and support to Naval Station, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. Relocate Military Sealift Command personnel and Diego Garcia support functions to Naval Station, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. Disestablish the Naval Pacific Meteorology and Oceanographic Center-WESTPAC, except for the Joint Typhoon Warning Center, which relocates to the Naval Pacific Meteorology and Oceanographic Center, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. Disestablish the Afloat Training Group-WESTPAC. All other Department of Defense activities that are presently on Guam may remain either as a tenant of Naval Activities, Guam or other appropriate naval activity. Retain waterfront assets for support, mobilization, and contingencies and to support the afloat tender.

Justification: Despite the large reduction in operational infrastructure accomplished during the 1993 round of base closure and realignment, since DON force structure experiences a reduction of over 10 percent by the year 2001, there continues to be additional excess capacity that must be eliminated. In evaluating operational bases, the goal was to retain only that infrastructure necessary to support the future force structure without impeding operational flexibility for deployment of that force. Shifting deployment patterns in the Pacific Fleet reduce the need for a fully functional naval station. Operational and forward basing considerations require access to Guam. However, since no combatant ships are

homeported there, elimination of the naval station facilities which are not required to support mobilization and/or contingency operations allows removal of excess capacity while retaining this necessary access.

Return on Investment: The total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$93.1 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$66.3 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$42.5 million with a return on investment expected in one year. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$474.3 million.

Impacts:

Economic Impact on Communities: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 3,359 jobs (2,421 direct jobs and 938 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Agana, Guam economic area, which is 5.0 percent of economic area employment. The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in the economic area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential decrease equal to 10.6 percent of employment in the economic area. It should be recognized, however, that a major segment of these jobs is attributable to crews of the Military Sealift Command ships, whose presence on the island is sporadic in any given year.

Community Infrastructure Impact: There is no known community infrastructure impact at any receiving installation.

Environmental Impact: The closure of a portion of Naval Activities, Guam will have a generally positive effect on the environment because of the elimination of permitted stationary sources of air emissions associated with naval operations. In addition, the removal of military activity in areas occupied by threatened/endangered species and wetlands contributes positively to the environment. Sufficient unrestricted land is available for expansion at each of the receiving sites, and adequate capacity exists in their environmental facilities (such as water treatment and wastewater treatment plants) to handle the increases in personnel attendant to this closure.

Naval Air Station, Corpus Christi, Texas

Recommendation: Realign Naval Air Station, Corpus Christi, Texas, as a Naval Air Facility, and relocate the undergraduate pilot training function and associated personnel, equipment and support to Naval Air Station, Pensacola, Florida, and Naval Air Station, Whiting Field, Florida.

Justification: Reductions in force structure have led to decreases in pilot training rates. This reduction has allowed the Navy to consolidate maritime and primary fixed wing training in the Pensacola-Whiting complex while retaining the airfield and airspace at Corpus Christi to support the consolidation of strike training at the Kingsville-Corpus Christi complex. The Corpus Christi Naval Air Facility is also being retained to accept mine warfare helicopter assets in support of the Mine Warfare Center of Excellence at Naval Station, Ingleside, and to provide the opportunity for the movement of additional aviation assets to the NAF as operational considerations dictate. This NAF will continue to support its current group of DoD and Federal agency tenants and their aviation-intensive needs, as well as other regional Navy air operations as needed.

Return on Investment: The return on investment data below applies to the closure of NAS Meridian, the closure of NTTC Meridian, the realignment of NAS Corpus Christi to an NAF, and the NAS Alameda redirect. The total estimated one-time cost to implement these recommendations is \$83.4 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$158.8 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$33.4 million with an immediate return on investment expected. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$471.2 million.

Impacts:

Economic Impact on Communities: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 152 jobs (142 direct jobs and 10 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Corpus Christi, Texas MSA economic area, which is 0.1 percent of economic area employment. The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in the economic area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential increase equal to 0.2 percent of employment in the economic area.

Community Infrastructure Impact: There is no known community infrastructure impact at any receiving installation.

Environmental Impact: The realignment of NAS Corpus Christi will have a generally positive effect on the environment. Undergraduate Pilot Training will be relocated to NAS Pensacola and NAS Whiting Field, which are in air quality control districts that are in attainment for carbon monoxide, ozone, and PM-10. A conformity determination for certain air quality areas may be required to assess the impact this realignment (in combination with the closure of NAS Meridian) will have on the air quality status of these areas. Each receiving base was reviewed for the realignment impact on threatened/endangered species, sensitive habitats and wetlands, cultural/historical resources, land/air space use, pollution control, and hazardous material waste requirements, and no such impact was found.

Adequate capacity exists for all utilities at each gaining base. The gaining sites have sufficient space for rehabilitation or unrestricted acres available for expansion.

Naval Undersea Warfare Center, Keyport, Washington

Recommendation: Realign Naval Undersea Warfare Center, Keyport, Washington, by moving its ships' combat systems console refurbishment depot maintenance and general industrial workload to Naval Shipyard, Puget Sound, Bremerton, Washington.

Justification: There is an overall reduction in operational forces and a sharp decline of the DON budget through FY 2001. Specific reductions for technical centers are difficult to determine, because these activities are supported through customer orders. However, the level of forces and the budget are reliable indicators of sharp declines in technical center workload through FY 2001, which leads to a recognition of excess capacity in these activities. This excess and the imbalance in force and resource levels dictate closure/realignment or consolidation of activities wherever practicable. Consistent with the Department of the Navy's efforts to remove depot level maintenance workload from technical centers and return it to depot industrial activities, this action consolidates ship combat systems workload at NSYD Puget Sound, but retains electronic test and repair equipments at NUWC Keyport, as well as torpedo depot maintenance, thereby removing the need to replicate facilities. The workload redistribution also furthers the Pacific Northwest Regional Maintenance Center initiatives, more fully utilizes the capacity at the shipyard, and will achieve greater productivity efficiencies within the shipyard.

Return on Investment: The total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$2.1 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$9.8 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$2.1 million with a return on investment expected in one year. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$29.7 million.

Impacts:

Economic Impact on Communities: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 58 jobs (28 direct jobs and 30 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Bremerton, Washington PMSA economic area, which is 0.1 percent of economic area employment. The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in the economic area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential increase equal to 7.3 percent of employment in the economic area.

Community Infrastructure Impact: There is no known community infrastructure impact at any receiving installation.

Environmental Impact: This recommendation involves the transfer of functions and associated personnel between NUWC Keyport and the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, both of which are in the same air quality region. The reduction of personnel resulting from this transfer will have a generally positive impact on the environment. There are no impacts on threatened/endangered species, sensitive habitats and wetlands, or cultural/historical resources occasioned by this recommendation.

Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance Center, In-Service Engineering West Coast Division, San Diego, California

Recommendation: Disestablish the In-Service Engineering West Coast Division (NISE West), San Diego, California, of the Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance Center (NCCOSC), including the Taylor Street Special Use Area, and consolidate necessary functions and personnel with the Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance Center, RDT&E Division, either in the NCCOSC RDT&E Division spaces at Point Loma, California, or in current NISE West spaces in San Diego, California.

Justification: There is an overall reduction in operational forces and a sharp decline of the DON budget through FY 2001. Specific reductions for technical centers are difficult to determine, because these activities are supported through customer orders. However, the level of forces and the budget are reliable indicators of sharp declines in technical center workload through FY 2001, which leads to a recognition of excess capacity in these activities. This excess and the imbalance in force and resource levels dictate closure/realignment or consolidation of activities wherever practicable. This action permits the elimination of the command and support structure of the closing activity resulting in improved efficiency, reduced costs, and reduced excess capacity.

Return on Investment: The total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$1.8 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$19.3 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$4.3 million with an immediate return on investment expected. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$60 million.

Impacts:

Economic Impact on Communities: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 168 jobs (58 direct jobs and 110 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the San Diego, California MSA

economic area, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment. The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in the economic area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential increase equal to 1.2 percent of employment in the economic area.

Community Infrastructure Impact: There is no known community infrastructure impact at any receiving installation.

Environmental Impact: The closure of NISE West San Diego will have no appreciable impact on the environment since all relocation of personnel will be within the local area and within the same air quality district. The gaining sites have sufficient space for rehabilitation and adequate capacity in the utility infrastructure to handle this additional load. There is no impact on threatened/endangered species, sensitive habitats and wetlands, or cultural/historical resources occasioned by this recommendation.

Naval Health Research Center, San Diego, California

Recommendation: Disestablish the Naval Health Research Center (NHRC), San Diego, California, and relocate necessary functions, personnel and equipment to the Bureau of Naval Personnel (BUPERS) at Memphis, Tennessee.

Justification: There is an overall reduction in operational forces and a sharp decline of the DON budget through FY 2001. Specific reductions for technical centers are difficult to determine, because these activities are supported through customer orders. However, the level of forces and the budget are reliable indicators of sharp declines in technical center workload through FY 2001, which leads to a recognition of excess capacity in these activities. This excess and the imbalance in force and resource levels dictate closure/realignment or consolidation of activities wherever practicable. This activity performs research and modelling and maintains databases in a number of personnel health and performance areas, and its consolidation with the Bureau of Naval Personnel not only reduces excess capacity but also aligns this activity with the DON's principal organization responsible for military personnel and the primary user of its products. The resulting synergy enhances the discharge of this responsibility while achieving necessary economies.

Return on Investment: The total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$6.2 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a cost of \$2 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$1.4 million with a return on investment expected in four years. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$11.4 million.

Impacts:

Economic Impact on Communities: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 423 jobs (154 direct jobs and 269 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the San Diego, California MSA economic area, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment. The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in the economic area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential increase equal to 1.2 percent of employment in the economic area.

Community Infrastructure Impact: There is no known community infrastructure impact at any receiving installation.

Environmental Impact: The disestablishment of NHRC San Diego will have a positive impact on the environment in that this activity will be leaving an area that is in moderate non-attainment for carbon monoxide. The additional personnel being relocated to BUPERS Memphis represent a net decrease in personnel by FY 2001, and, accordingly, will not impact the environment at the receiving site, although a conformity determination may be required to assess this impact. There is adequate capacity in the utility infrastructure at the receiving site to handle these relocating personnel. There is no adverse impact on threatened/endangered species, sensitive habitats and wetlands, or cultural/historical resources occasioned by this recommendation.

**Naval Personnel Research and Development Center,
San Diego, California**

Recommendation: Disestablish Naval Personnel Research and Development Center, San Diego, California, and relocate its functions, and appropriate personnel, equipment, and support to the Bureau of Naval Personnel, Memphis, Tennessee, and Naval Air Warfare Center, Training Systems Division, Orlando, Florida.

Justification: There is an overall reduction in operational forces and a sharp decline of the DON budget through FY 2001. Specific reductions for technical centers are difficult to determine, because these activities are supported through customer orders. However, the level of forces and the budget are reliable indicators of sharp declines in technical center workload through FY 2001, which leads to a recognition of excess capacity in these activities. This excess and the imbalance in force and resource levels dictate closure/realignment or consolidation of activities wherever practicable. Disestablishment of this technical center not only eliminates excess capacity but also collocates its functions with the primary user of its products. This recommendation permits the consolidation of appropriate functions at the new headquarters concentration for the Bureau of Naval

Personnel in Memphis, Tennessee, and at the technical concentration for training systems and devices in Orlando, producing economies and efficiencies in the management of these functions.

Return on Investment: The total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$7.9 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a cost of \$4.3 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$1.9 million with a return on investment expected in four years. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$14.9 million.

Impacts:

Economic Impact on Communities: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 611 jobs (219 direct jobs and 392 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the San Diego, California MSA economic area, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment. The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in the economic area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential increase equal to 1.2 percent of employment in the economic area.

Community Infrastructure Impact: There is no known community infrastructure impact at any receiving installation.

Environmental Impact: Disestablishing NPRDC San Diego will have a generally positive effect on the environment because it will be relocating personnel out of an area currently in severe non-attainment for ozone. These personnel represent less than a 2 percent increase in the personnel at BUPERS Memphis, an area in moderate non-attainment for carbon monoxide, and thus will have a minimal impact on that region, although a conformity determination may be required to assess the impact on air quality from this action. Those personnel that are relocating to NAWCTSD Orlando, an area that is in attainment for carbon monoxide, represent less than a four percent increase in personnel and will not adversely affect that area. There will be no adverse impact on threatened/endangered species, sensitive habitats and wetlands, or cultural/historical resources occasioned by this recommendation.

**Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion and Repair, USN,
Long Beach, California**

Recommendation: Disestablish the Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion and Repair, USN, Long Beach, California. Relocate certain functions, personnel and equipment to Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion and Repair, USN, San Diego, California.

Justification: Because of reductions in the FY 2001 Force Structure Plan and resource levels, naval requirements for private sector shipbuilding, conversion, modernization and repair are expected to decrease significantly. The combined capacity of the current thirteen SUPSHIP activities meaningfully exceeds the DON requirement over that Force Structure Plan. Additionally, with the closure of the Long Beach Naval Shipyard, the future requirement for this work in this region is anticipated to be quite nominal. The predicted workload can be efficiently absorbed by SUPSHIP San Diego.

Return on Investment: The total estimated one-time cost to implement this action is \$0.3 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$0.8 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$0.3 million with a return on investment expected in one year. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$3.3 million.

Impacts:

Economic Impact on Communities: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 30 jobs (19 direct jobs and 11 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Los Angeles-Long Beach, California PMSA economic area, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment. The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in the economic area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential decrease equal to 0.4 percent of employment in the economic area.

Community Infrastructure Impact: There is no known community infrastructure impact at any receiving installation.

Environmental Impact: SUPSHIP Long Beach is a tenant activity and as such does not control or manage real property. Its complete closure will have no appreciable environmental impacts, including impacts on threatened/endangered species, sensitive habitats and wetlands, or cultural/historical resources. Despite the classification of San Diego, California, as a non-attainment area for ozone, the transfer of a small number of personnel from SUPSHIP Long Beach to San Diego will not adversely impact the air quality of that area.

**Naval Undersea Warfare Center, Newport Division, New London
Detachment, New London, Connecticut**

Recommendation: Disestablish the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, Newport Division, New London Detachment, New London, Connecticut, and relocate necessary functions with associated personnel, equipment, and support to Naval Undersea Warfare Center, Newport

Division, Newport, Rhode Island. Close the NUWC New London facility, except retain Pier 7 which is transferred to the Navy Submarine Base New London. The site presently occupied by the U.S. Coast Guard Station, New London, will be transferred to the U.S. Coast Guard. The Navy Submarine Base, New London, Magnetic Silencing Facility will remain in its present location as a tenant of the U.S. Coast Guard. Naval reserve units will relocate to other naval activities, primarily NUWC Newport, Rhode Island, and Navy Submarine Base, New London, Connecticut.

Justification: There is an overall reduction in operational forces and a sharp decline of the DON budget through FY 2001. Specific reductions for technical centers are difficult to determine, because these activities are supported through customer orders. However, the level of forces and the budget are reliable indicators of sharp declines in technical center workload through FY 2001, which leads to a recognition of excess capacity in these activities. This excess and the imbalance in force and resource levels dictate closure/realignment or consolidation of activities wherever practicable. The closure of this activity completes the undersea warfare center consolidation begun in BRAC 91. It not only reduces excess capacity, but, by consolidating certain functions at NUWC Newport Rhode Island, achieves efficiencies and economies in management, thus reducing costs.

Return on Investment: The total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$23.4 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$14.3 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$8.1 million with a return on investment expected in three years. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$91.2 million.

Impacts:

Economic Impact on Communities: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 1,365 jobs (627 direct jobs and 738 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the New London-Norwich, Connecticut NECMA economic area, which is 1.0 percent of economic area employment. The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in the economic area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential decrease equal to 3.2 percent of employment in the economic area.

Community Infrastructure Impact: There is no known community infrastructure impact at any receiving installation.

Environmental Impact: The closure of NUWC New London will have a generally beneficial impact on the environment. New London is in a non-attainment area for ozone, and, accordingly, the closure of this site will have a positive effect on the environment. The

movement of personnel to Newport will not impact that area's status of being in attainment for carbon monoxide and PM-10. Adequate capacity exists in NUWC's utility infrastructure to handle these relocating personnel without impact. There is no adverse impact on threatened/endangered species, sensitive habitats and wetlands, or cultural/historical resources at either the losing or gaining sites occasioned by this recommendation.

Naval Research Laboratory, Underwater Sound Reference Detachment, Orlando, Florida

Recommendation: Disestablish the Naval Research Laboratory, Underwater Sound Reference Detachment (NRL UWSRD), Orlando, Florida. Relocate the calibration and standards function with associated personnel, equipment, and support to the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, Newport Division, Newport, Rhode Island, except for the Anechoic Tank Facility I, which will be excessed.

Justification: There is an overall reduction in operational forces and a sharp decline of the DON budget through FY 2001. Specific reductions for technical centers are difficult to determine, because these activities are supported through customer orders. However, the level of forces and of the budget are reliable indicators of sharp declines in technical center workload through FY 2001, which leads to a recognition of excess capacity in these activities. This excess and the imbalance in force and resource levels dictate closure/realignment or consolidation of activities wherever practicable. The disestablishment of this laboratory reduces excess capacity by eliminating unnecessarily redundant capability, since requirements can be met by reliance on alternative lakes that exist in the DON inventory. By consolidating necessary functions at NUWC Newport, Rhode Island, this recommendation achieves efficiencies and economies.

Return on Investment: The total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$8.4 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$3.7 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$2.8 million with a return on investment expected in three years. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$30.1 million.

Impacts:

Economic Impact on Communities: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 292 jobs (109 direct jobs and 183 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Orange-Osceola-Seminole Counties, Florida economic area, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area

employment. The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in the economic area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential decrease equal to 1.9 percent of employment in the economic area.

Community Infrastructure Impact: There is no known community infrastructure impact at any receiving installation.

Environmental Impact: The closure of NRL UWSRD Orlando generally will have a minor positive impact on the environment. Both Orlando and NUWC Newport are in areas of attainment for carbon monoxide, and the additional personnel relocating to Newport, when compared to force structure reductions by FY 2001, still represent a net decrease in personnel at the Newport site. The utility infrastructure at the receiving site is sufficient to handle the relocating personnel. There is no adverse impact to threatened/endangered species, sensitive habitats and wetlands, and cultural/historical resources occasioned by this recommendation.

Fleet and Industrial Supply Center, Guam

Recommendation: Disestablish the Fleet and Industrial Supply Center, Guam.

Justification: Fleet and Industrial Supply Centers (FISC) are follower activities whose existence depends upon active fleet units in their homeport area. Prior and current BRAC actions closing both Naval Air Station, Guam and a portion of Naval Activities, Guam have significantly reduced this activity's customer base. The remaining workload can efficiently be handled by other activities on Guam or by other FISCs.

Return on Investment: The total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$18.4 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$143 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$31.1 million with an immediate return on investment expected. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$437.3 million.

Impacts:

Economic Impact on Communities: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 580 jobs (413 direct jobs and 167 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Agana, Guam economic area, which is 0.9 percent of economic area employment. The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in the economic area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential decrease equal to 10.6 percent of

employment in the economic area. However, much of this impact involves the inclusion of MSC mariners in the job loss statement, which does not reflect the temporary nature of their presence on Guam.

Community Infrastructure Impact: There is no known community infrastructure impact at any receiving installation.

Environmental Impact: The Guam Air Pollution Control District is in attainment for carbon monoxide, ozone, and PM-10. Closure of this activity will remove POV sources of air emissions, thus enhancing the air quality of Guam. A significant factor further contributing to an overall positive impact on the environment in Guam is the shutdown of fueling facilities at Guam, specifically at Sasa Valley and Tenjo. Not only does this action eliminate the need for continuous monitoring of fuel tanks but it also removes the potential for a fuel spill in an area that has been designated as part of the Guam National Wildlife Refuge. The elimination of military actions in areas occupied by the indigenous endangered species, the Common Moorhen, and in and near wetlands also will contribute positively to the environment in Guam.

Naval Biodynamics Laboratory, New Orleans, Louisiana

Recommendation: Close the Naval Biodynamics Laboratory, New Orleans, Louisiana, and relocate necessary personnel to Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Dayton, Ohio, and Naval Aeromedical Research Laboratory, Pensacola, Florida.

Justification: There is an overall reduction in operational forces and a sharp decline of the DON budget through FY 2001. Specific reductions for technical centers are difficult to determine, because these activities are supported through customer orders. However, the level of forces and the budget are reliable indicators of sharp declines in technical center workload through FY 2001, which leads to a recognition of excess capacity in these activities. This excess and the imbalance in force and resource levels dictate closure/realignment or consolidation of activities wherever practicable. Closure of this laboratory reduces this excess capacity and fosters joint synergism. It also provides the opportunity for the transfer of its equipment and facilities to the public educational or commercial sector, thus maintaining access to its capabilities on an as-needed basis.

Return on Investment: The total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$.6 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$14.1 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$2.9 million with an immediate return on investment expected. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$41.8 million.

Impacts:

Economic Impact on Communities: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 126 jobs (54 direct jobs and 72 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the New Orleans, Louisiana MSA economic area, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment. The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in the economic area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential decrease equal to less than 0.1 percent of employment in the economic area.

Community Infrastructure Impact: There is no known community infrastructure impact at any receiving installation.

Environmental Impact: The closure of the Biodynamics Lab, New Orleans, will not have an effect on the environment. This closure recommendation only relocates two personnel to Wright-Patterson AFB and one to Pensacola, but leaves all facilities and equipment in place. There is no adverse impact on threatened/endangered species, sensitive habitats and wetlands, and cultural/historical resources occasioned by this recommendation.

Naval Medical Research Institute, Bethesda, Maryland

Recommendation: Close the Naval Medical Research Institute (NMRI), Bethesda, Maryland. Consolidate the personnel of the Diving Medicine Program with the Experimental Diving Unit, Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division, Coastal Systems Station, Panama City, Florida. Relocate the Infectious Diseases, Combat Casualty Care and Operational Medicine programs along with necessary personnel and equipment to the Walter Reed Army Institute for Research at Forest Glen, Maryland.

Justification: There is an overall reduction in operational forces and a sharp decline of the DON budget through FY 2001. Specific reductions for technical centers are difficult to determine, because these activities are supported through customer orders. However, the level of forces and of the budget are reliable indicators of sharp declines in technical center workload through FY 2001, which leads to a recognition of excess capacity in these activities. This excess and the imbalance in force and resource levels dictate closure/realignment or consolidation of activities wherever practicable. This closure and realignment achieves a principal objective of the DoD by cross-servicing part of this laboratory's workload and furthers the BRAC 91 Tri-Service Project Reliance Study decision by collocating medical research with the Army. Other portions of that workload can be assumed by another Navy installation with only a transfer of certain personnel, achieving both a reduction in excess capacity and a cost savings by eliminating a redundant capability in the area of diving research.

Return on Investment: The total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$3.4 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$19 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$9.5 million with a return on investment expected in one year. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$111 million.

Impacts:

Economic Impact on Communities: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 226 jobs (146 direct jobs and 80 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Washington, DC-Maryland-Virginia-West Virginia PMSA economic area, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment. The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in the economic area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential decrease equal to 0.6 percent of employment in the economic area.

Community Infrastructure Impact: There is no known community infrastructure impact at any receiving installation.

Environmental Impact: The closure of NMRI Bethesda will have a minimal impact on the environment. The relocation of personnel to Panama City, Florida, represents a net reduction in FY 2001 compared to current personnel loading. Therefore, these additional personnel will have no significant impact on the environment at that receiving site. The addition of personnel transferring to the Walter Reed Army Institute for Research represents less than a one percent increase in personnel, with insignificant impacts on the environment. There is no adverse impact on threatened/endangered species, sensitive habitats and wetlands, and cultural/historical resources occasioned by this recommendation.

**Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division Detachment,
Annapolis, Maryland**

Recommendation: Close the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division Detachment, Annapolis, Maryland, including the NIKE Site, Bayhead Road, Annapolis, except transfer the fuel storage/refueling sites and the water treatment facilities to Naval Station, Annapolis to support the U.S. Naval Academy and Navy housing. Relocate appropriate functions, personnel, equipment and support to other technical activities, primarily Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division Detachment, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Naval Surface Weapons Center, Carderock Division, Carderock, Maryland; and the Naval Research Laboratory, Washington, D.C. The Joint Spectrum Center, a DoD cross-service tenant, will be relocated with other components of the Center in the local area as appropriate.

Justification: There is an overall reduction in operational forces and a sharp decline of the Department of the Navy budget through 2001. Specific reductions for technical centers are difficult to determine because these activities are supported through customer orders. However, the level of forces and the budget are reliable indicators of sharp declines in technical center workload through 2001, which leads to a recognition of excess capacity in these activities. This excess and the imbalance in force and resource levels dictate closure/realignment or consolidation of activities wherever practicable. The total closure of this technical center reduces overall excess capacity in this category of installations, as well as excess capacity specific to this particular installation. It results in synergistic efficiencies by eliminating a major site and collocating technical personnel at the two primary remaining sites involved in hull, machinery, and equipment associated with naval vessels. It allows the movement of work to other Navy, DoD, academic and private industry facilities, and the excessing of some facilities not in continuous use. It also collocates RDT&E efforts with the In-Service Engineering work and facilities, to incorporate lessons learned from fleet operations and to increase the technical response pool to solve immediate problems.

Return on Investment: The total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$25 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$36.7 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$14.5 million with a return on investment expected in one year. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$175.1 million.

Impacts:

Economic Impact on Communities: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 1,512 jobs (522 direct jobs and 990 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Baltimore, Maryland PMSA economic area, which is 0.1 percent of economic area employment. The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in the economic area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential decrease equal to less than 0.1 percent of employment in the economic area.

Community Infrastructure Impact: There is no known community infrastructure impact at any receiving installation.

Environmental Impact: The closure of NSWC Annapolis does not involve the transfer of any industrial-type activities. NSWC Carderock and NRL are currently in moderate non-attainment for carbon monoxide and attainment for PM-10; however, the movement of personnel into those areas will not adversely impact the environment in those areas. NSWC Philadelphia is in a non-attainment area for carbon monoxide. In the case of each receiving site, a conformity determination may be required to assess the impact of this

action. At all receiving sites, the utility infrastructure is adequate to handle the additional personnel. Also, there is no adverse impact on threatened/endangered species, sensitive habitats and wetlands, cultural/historical resources as a result of this recommendation.

Naval Technical Training Center, Meridian, Mississippi

Recommendation: Close the Naval Technical Training Center, Meridian, Mississippi, and relocate the training functions to other training activities, primarily the Navy Supply Corps School, Athens, Georgia, and Naval Education and Training Center, Newport, Rhode Island.

Justification: Projected manpower reductions contained in the DoD Force Structure Plan require a substantial decrease in training-related infrastructure consistent with the policy of collocating training functions at fleet concentration centers when feasible. Consolidation of the Naval Technical Training Center functions at two other major training activities provides improved and more efficient management of these training functions and aligns certain enlisted personnel training to sites where similar training is being provided to officers.

Return on Investment: The return on investment data below applies to the closure of NAS Meridian, the closure of NTTC Meridian, the realignment of NAS Corpus Christi to an NAF, and the NAS Alameda redirect. The total estimated one-time cost to implement these recommendations is \$83.4 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$158.8 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$33.4 million with an immediate return on investment expected. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$471.2 million.

Impacts:

Economic Impact on Communities: The economic data below applies to the closure of NAS Meridian and the closure of NTTC Meridian. Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 3,324 jobs (2,581 direct jobs and 743 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Lauderdale County, Mississippi economic area, which is 8.0 percent of economic area employment.

Community Infrastructure Impact: There is no known community infrastructure impact at any receiving installation.

Environmental Impact: The closure of NAS Meridian, the host of this activity, will have a generally positive effect on the environment. Undergraduate Pilot Training will be relocated to NAS Kingsville, which is in an air quality control district that is in attainment for Carbon monoxide, ozone, and PM-10. Cleanup of the six IR sites at NAS Meridian will continue. No impact was identified for threatened/endangered species, sensitive habitats and

wetlands, cultural/historical resources, land/air space use, pollution control, and hazardous material waste requirements. Adequate capacity exists for all utilities at the gaining base, and there is sufficient space for rehabilitation or unrestricted acres available for expansion.

Naval Aviation Engineering Service Unit, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

Recommendation: Close the Naval Aviation Engineering Service Unit (NAESU), Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and consolidate necessary functions, personnel, and equipment with the Naval Aviation Depot (NADEP), North Island, California.

Justification: There is an overall reduction in operational forces and a sharp decline of the DON budget through FY 2001. Specific reductions for technical centers are difficult to determine, because these activities are supported through customer orders. However, the level of forces and the budget are reliable indicators of sharp declines in technical center workload through FY 2001, which leads to a recognition of excess capacity in these activities. This excess and the imbalance in force and resource levels dictate closure/realignment or consolidation of activities wherever practicable. Closure of this facility eliminates excess capacity within the technical center subcategory by using available capacity at NADEP North Island. Additionally, it enables the consolidation of necessary functions with a depot activity performing similar work and results in a reduction of costs.

Return on Investment: The total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$2.5 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$5.9 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$2.5 million with a return on investment expected in one year. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$29.5 million.

Impacts:

Economic Impact on Communities: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 145 jobs (90 direct jobs and 55 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania-New Jersey PMSA economic area, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment. The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in the economic area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential decrease equal to 1.2 percent of employment in the economic area.

Community Infrastructure Impact: There is no known community infrastructure impact at any receiving installation.

Environmental Impact: The closure of NAESU Philadelphia will have a generally positive impact on the environment because it removes POV air emission sources from an area that is in non-attainment for carbon monoxide. The additional personnel relocating to NADEP North Island represent less than a one percent increase in current base personnel loading, which will not affect the environment. Further, the utility infrastructure capacity at the receiving site is sufficient to handle these additional personnel. There is no adverse impact on threatened/endangered species, sensitive habitats and wetlands, or cultural/historical resources occasioned by this recommendation.

Naval Air Technical Services Facility, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

Recommendation: Close the Naval Air Technical Services Facility (NATSF), Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and consolidate necessary functions, personnel, and equipment with the Naval Aviation Depot, North Island, California.

Justification: There is an overall reduction in operational forces and a sharp decline of the DON budget through FY 2001. Specific reductions for technical centers are difficult to determine, because these activities are supported through customer orders. However, the level of forces and the budget are reliable indicators of sharp declines in technical center workload through FY 2001, which leads to a recognition of excess capacity in these activities. This excess and the imbalance in force and resource levels dictate closure/realignment or consolidation of activities wherever practicable. Closure of this facility eliminates excess capacity within the technical center subcategory by using available capacity at NADEP North Island and achieves the synergy from having the drawings and manuals collocated with an in-service maintenance activity at a major fleet concentration. Additionally, it enables the elimination of the NATSF detachment already at North Island and results in a reduction of costs.

Return on Investment: The total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$5.7 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$1.5 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$2.2 million with a return on investment expected in three years. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$22.7 million.

Impacts:

Economic Impact on Communities: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 715 jobs (227 direct jobs and 488 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania-New Jersey PMSA economic area, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment.

The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in the economic area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential decrease equal to 1.2 percent of employment in the economic area.

Community Infrastructure Impact: There is no known community infrastructure impact at any receiving installation.

Environmental Impact: The closure of NATSF Philadelphia will have a generally positive effect on the environment because this activity will be vacating leased space in an area that is in non-attainment for carbon monoxide. The additional personnel being relocated represent less than a one percent increase in base personnel at North Island, and adequate capacity exists in the utility infrastructure to handle this additional personnel loading. There will be no adverse impact on threatened/endangered species, sensitive habitats and wetlands, or cultural/historical resources occasioned by this recommendation.

Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, Open Water Test Facility, Oreland, Pennsylvania

Recommendation: Close the Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, Open Water Test Facility, Oreland, Pennsylvania.

Justification: There is an overall reduction in operational forces and a sharp decline of the DON budget through FY 2001. Specific reductions for technical centers are difficult to determine, because these activities are supported through customer orders. However, the level of forces and the budget are reliable indicators of sharp declines in technical center workload through FY 2001, which leads to a recognition of excess capacity in these activities. This excess and the imbalance in force and resource levels dictate closure/realignment or consolidation of activities wherever practicable. Closure of this facility reduces excess capacity by eliminating unnecessarily redundant capability, since requirements can be met by reliance on other lakes that exist in the DON inventory.

Return on Investment: The total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$50 thousand. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$33 thousand. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$15 thousand with a return on investment expected in three years. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$.2 million.

Impacts:

Economic Impact on Communities: This recommendation will not affect any jobs in the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania-New Jersey PMSA economic area.

Community Infrastructure Impact: There is no community infrastructure impact since there are no receiving installations for this recommendation.

Environmental Impact: The closure of the NAWC OWTF Oreland will have a beneficial effect on the environment since any impact of military activities on jurisdictional wetlands will be eliminated. Because this closure has no accompanying transfer of functions or personnel, there are no other environmental impacts associated with this closure. There will be no adverse impact on threatened/endangered species, sensitive habitats, or cultural/historical resources occasioned by this recommendation.

Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance Center, RDT&E Division Detachment, Warminster, Pennsylvania

Recommendation: Close the Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance Center, RDT&E Division Detachment, Warminster, Pennsylvania. Relocate appropriate functions, personnel, equipment, and support to other technical activities, primarily the Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance Center, RDT&E Division, San Diego, California; and the Naval Oceanographic Office, Bay St. Louis, Mississippi.

Justification: There is an overall reduction in operational forces and a sharp decline of the DON budget through FY 2001. Specific reductions for technical centers are difficult to determine, because these activities are supported through customer orders. However, the level of forces and the budget are reliable indicators of sharp declines in technical center workload through FY 2001, which leads to a recognition of excess capacity in these activities. This excess and the imbalance in force and resource levels dictate closure/realignment or consolidation of activities wherever practicable. The closure of this activity reduces excess capacity with the resultant efficiencies and economies in the management of the relocated functions at the new receiving sites. Additionally, it completes the process of realignment initiated in BRAC 91, based on a clearer understanding of what is now required to be retained in-house. Closure and excessing of the Inertial Navigational Facility further reduces excess capacity and provides the opportunity for the transfer of these facilities to the public educational or commercial sectors, thus maintaining access on an as-needed basis.

Return on Investment: The return on investment data below applies to the closure of NAWC Warminster and the closure of NCCOSC Det Warminster. The total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$8.4 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$33.1 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$7.6 million with an immediate return on investment expected. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$104.6 million.

Impacts:

Economic Impact on Communities: The economic data below applies to the closure of NAWC Warminster and the closure of NCCOSC Det Warminster. Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 1,080 jobs (348 direct jobs and 732 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania-New Jersey PMSA economic area, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment. The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in the economic area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential decrease equal to 1.0 percent of employment in the economic area.

Community Infrastructure Impact: There is no known community infrastructure impact at any receiving installation.

Environmental Impact: The closure of both NAWC Warminster and NCCOSC Det Warminster will have a positive effect on the environment because their appropriate functions and personnel will be relocated out of an area that is in severe non-attainment for ozone and from an activity that is included on the National Priorities List. The personnel being relocated to NCCOSC San Diego represent an increase in personnel of less than six percent, which is not considered of sufficient size to adversely impact the environment at that sites. However, a conformity determination may be required to determine this impact. At both receiving sites, the utility infrastructure capacity is sufficient to handle the additional loading. There is no adverse impact on threatened/endangered species, sensitive habitats and wetlands, or cultural/historical resources occasioned by this recommendation.

Fleet and Industrial Supply Center, Charleston, South Carolina

Recommendation: Close the Fleet and Industrial Supply Center, Charleston, South Carolina.

Justification: Fleet and Industrial Supply Centers are follower activities whose existence depends upon active fleet units in their homeport area. Prior BRAC actions closed or realigned most of this activity's customer base, and most of its personnel have already transferred to the Naval Command, Control, and Ocean Surveillance Center, In-Service Engineering, East Coast Division, Charleston, South Carolina. Further, in accordance with the FY 2001 Force Structure Plan, force structure reductions through the year 2001 erode the requirement for support of active forces even further. This remaining workload can efficiently be handled by other FISCs or other naval activities.

Return on Investment: The total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$2.3 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$2.3 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$0.9 million with a return on investment expected in two years. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$10.8 million.

Impacts:

Economic Impact on Communities: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 12 jobs (8 direct jobs and 4 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Charleston-North Charleston, South Carolina MSA economic area, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment. The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in the economic area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential decrease equal to 8.4 percent of employment in the economic area.

Community Infrastructure Impact: There is no community infrastructure impact since there are no receiving installations for this recommendation.

Environmental Impact: This activity is located in an area that is in attainment for carbon monoxide, ozone and PM-10. This closure will support the maintenance of this air quality status and will have a further positive impact on the environment in that it eliminates barge movements in and out of the pier area as part of the fueling operations in the FISC complex. An additional positive impact is the elimination of military activities in an area occupied by the Least Tern, an endangered species, and its designated habitat aboard the present FISC Charleston complex. There will be no adverse impact on cultural/historical resources occasioned by this recommendation.

**Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance Center, In-Service
Engineering East Coast Detachment, Norfolk, Virginia**

Recommendation: Close the In-Service Engineering East Coast Detachment, St. Juliens Creek Annex, Norfolk, Virginia, of the Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance Center, except retain in place the transmit and receive equipment and antennas currently at the St. Juliens Creek Annex. Relocate functions, necessary personnel and equipment to Norfolk Naval Shipyard, Norfolk, Virginia.

Justification: There is an overall reduction in operational forces and a sharp decline of the DON budget through FY 2001. Specific reductions for technical centers are difficult to determine, because these activities are supported through customer orders. However, the level of forces and the budget are reliable indicators of sharp declines in technical center

workload through FY 2001, which leads to a recognition of excess capacity in these activities. This excess and the imbalance in force and resource levels dictate closure/realignment or consolidation of activities wherever practicable. The closure of this activity and the relocation of its principal functions achieves improved efficiencies and a reduction of excess capacity by aligning its functions with other fleet support provided by the shipyard.

Return on Investment: The total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$4.6 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$0.06 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$2.1 million with a return on investment expected in three years. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$20.4 million.

Impacts:

Economic Impact on Communities: This recommendation will not result in a change in employment in the Norfolk-Virginia Beach-Newport News, Virginia-North Carolina MSA economic area because all affected jobs will remain in that economic area.

Community Infrastructure Impact: There is no known community infrastructure impact at any receiving installation.

Environmental Impact: The closure of NCCOSC ISE East Det Norfolk, St. Juliens Creek Annex, will have no appreciable impact on the environment since all relocation of personnel will be within the local area and within the same air quality region. There is no adverse impact on threatened/endangered species, sensitive habitats and wetlands, or cultural/historical resources occasioned by this recommendation.

Naval Information Systems Management Center, Arlington, Virginia

Recommendation: Relocate the Naval Information Systems Management Center from leased space in Arlington, Virginia, to the Washington Navy Yard, Washington, D.C.

Justification: The resource levels of administrative activities are dependent upon the level of forces they support. The continuing decline in force levels shown in the FY 2001 Force Structure Plan coupled with the effects of the National Performance Review result in further reductions of personnel in administrative activities. This relocation reduces excess capacity and achieves savings by the movement from leased space to government-owned space, and furthers the Department's policy decision to merge this activity with the Information Technology Acquisition Center which is already housed in the Navy Yard.

Return on Investment: The total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$0.1 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$0.3 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$0.1 million with a return on investment expected in two years. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$1.7 million.

Impacts:

Economic Impact on Communities: This recommendation will not result in a change in employment in the Washington, DC-Maryland-Virginia-West Virginia PMSA economic area because all affected jobs will remain in that economic area.

Community Infrastructure Impact: There is no known community infrastructure impact at any receiving installation.

Environmental Impact: The relocation of this activity from leased space in the NCR to the Washington Navy Yard will not adversely impact the environment because it is an administrative activity and the relocation concerns only a small number of personnel and office support equipment. There is no adverse impact on threatened/endangered species, sensitive habitat and wetlands, or cultural/historical resources occasioned by this recommendation.

Naval Management Systems Support Office, Chesapeake, Virginia

Recommendation: Disestablish the Naval Management Systems Support Office (NAVMASSO), Chesapeake, Virginia, and relocate its functions and necessary personnel and equipment as a detachment of Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance Center, San Diego, California, in government-owned spaces in Norfolk, Virginia.

Justification: There is an overall reduction in operational forces and a sharp decline of the DON budget through FY 2001. Specific reductions for technical centers are difficult to determine, because these activities are supported through customer orders. However, the level of forces and the budget are reliable indicators of sharp declines in technical center workload through FY 2001, which leads to a recognition of excess capacity in these activities. This excess and the imbalance in force and resource levels dictate closure/realignment or consolidation of activities wherever practicable. The disestablishment of this activity permits the elimination of the command and support structure of this activity and the consolidation of certain functions with a major technical center. This recommendation also provides for the movement out of leased space into government-owned

space, a move which had been intended to occur as part of the DON BRAC 93 recommended consolidation of the Naval Electronic Systems Engineering Centers in Portsmouth, which the 1993 Commission disapproved.

Return on Investment: The total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$2.2 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$9 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$2.7 million with a return on investment expected in one year. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$34.9 million.

Impacts:

Economic Impact on Communities: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 50 jobs (21 direct jobs and 29 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Norfolk-Virginia Beach-Newport News, Virginia-North Carolina MSA economic area, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment. The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in the economic area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential increase equal to 1.0 percent of employment in the economic area.

Community Infrastructure Impact: There is no known community infrastructure impact at any receiving installation.

Environmental Impact: The disestablishment of NAVMASSO will not impact the environment. NAVMASSO is an administrative activity that is currently located in leased space only 18 miles from its gaining site, the Norfolk Naval Station. These additional personnel readily can be handled by the utility infrastructure at the gaining site. Also, there is no adverse impact on threatened/endangered species, sensitive habitats and wetlands, or cultural/historical resources occasioned by this recommendation.

Reserve Centers/Commands

Recommendation:

Close the following Naval Reserve Centers:

Stockton, California
Pomona, California
Santa Ana, Irvine, California
Laredo, Texas
Sheboygan, Wisconsin
Cadillac, Michigan

Staten Island, New York
Huntsville, Alabama

Close the following Naval Air Reserve Center:

Olathe, Kansas

Close the following Naval Reserve Readiness Commands:

Region Seven - Charleston, South Carolina
Region Ten - New Orleans, Louisiana

Justification: Existing capacity in support of the Reserve component continues to be in excess of the force structure requirements for the year 2001. These Reserve Centers scored low in military value, among other things, because there were a fewer number of drilling reservists than the number of billets available (suggesting a lesser demographic pool from which to recruit sailors), or because there was a poor use of facilities (for instance, only one drill weekend per month). Readiness Command (REDCOM) 7 has management responsibility for the fewest number of Reserve Centers of the thirteen REDCOMs, while REDCOM 10 has management responsibility for the fewest number of Selected Reservists. In 1994, nearly three-fourths of the authorized SELRES billets at REDCOM 10 were unfilled, suggesting a demographic shortfall. In addition, both REDCOMs have high ratios of active duty personnel when compared to SELRES supported. The declining Reserve force structure necessitates more effective utilization of resources and therefore justifies closing these two REDCOMs. In arriving at the recommendation to close these Reserve Centers/Commands, specific analysis was conducted to ensure that there was either an alternate location available to accommodate the affected Reserve population or demographic support for purpose of force recruiting in the areas to which units were being relocated. This specific analysis, verified by the COBRA analysis, supports these closures.

Return on Investment: The total estimated one-time cost to implement the closure of NRC Stockton is \$45 thousand. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$2 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$0.4 million with an immediate return on investment expected. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$5.4 million.

The total estimated one-time cost to implement the closure of NRC Pomona is \$48 thousand. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$1.9 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$0.3 million with an immediate return on investment expected. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$5.1 million.

The total estimated one-time cost to implement the closure of NRC Santa Ana is \$41 thousand. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$3 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$0.5 million with an immediate return on investment expected. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$8.1 million.

The total estimated one-time cost to implement the closure of NRF Laredo is \$27 thousand. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$1.4 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$0.3 million with an immediate return on investment expected. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$3.8 million.

The total estimated one-time cost to implement the closure of NRC Sheboygan is \$31 thousand. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$1.5 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$0.3 million with an immediate return on investment expected. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$4.1 million.

The total estimated one-time cost to implement the closure of NRC Cadillac is \$46 thousand. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$1.8 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$0.3 million with an immediate return on investment expected. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$5 million.

The total estimated one-time cost to implement the closure of NRC Staten Island is \$43 thousand. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$4.5 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$0.6 million with an immediate return on investment expected. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$9.8 million.

The total estimated one-time cost to implement the closure of NRC Huntsville is \$51 thousand. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$2.6 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$0.5 million with an immediate return on investment expected. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$7.2 million.

The total estimated one-time cost to implement the closure of NARCEN Olathe is \$0.2 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$3.9 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$0.7 million with an immediate return on investment expected. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$10.9 million.

The total estimated one-time cost to implement the closure of NRRC Charleston is \$0.5 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$14.4 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$2.7 million with an immediate return on investment expected. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$39.9 million.

The total estimated one-time cost to implement the closure of NRRC New Orleans is \$0.6 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$6 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$1.9 million with an immediate return on investment expected. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$23.8 million.

Impacts:

Economic Impact on Communities: Assuming no economic recovery, the closure of NRC Stockton could result in a maximum potential reduction of 10 jobs (7 direct jobs and 3 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Stockton-Lodi, California MSA economic area, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment. The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in the economic area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential increase equal to 0.6 percent of employment in the economic area.

Assuming no economic recovery, the closure of NRC Pomona could result in a maximum potential reduction of 15 jobs (10 direct jobs and 5 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Los Angeles-Long Beach, California PMSA economic area, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment. The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in the economic area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential decrease equal to 0.4 percent of employment in the economic area.

Assuming no economic recovery, the closure of NRC Santa Ana could result in a maximum potential reduction of 21 jobs (14 direct jobs and 7 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Orange County, California PMSA economic area, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment. The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in the economic area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential decrease equal to 1.1 percent of employment in the economic area.

Assuming no economic recovery, the closure of NRF Laredo could result in a maximum potential reduction of 8 jobs (6 direct jobs and 2 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Laredo, Texas MSA economic area, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment.

Assuming no economic recovery, the closure of NRC Sheboygan could result in a maximum potential reduction of 8 jobs (6 direct jobs and 2 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Sheboygan, Wisconsin MSA economic area, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment.

Assuming no economic recovery, the closure of NRC Cadillac could result in a maximum potential reduction of 10 jobs (8 direct jobs and 2 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Wexford County, Michigan economic area, which is 0.1 percent of economic area employment.

Assuming no economic recovery, the closure of NRC Staten Island could result in a maximum potential reduction of 21 jobs (14 direct jobs and 7 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the New York, New York PMSA economic area, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment. The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in the economic area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential decrease equal to 0.1 percent of employment in the economic area.

Assuming no economic recovery, the closure of NRC Huntsville could result in a maximum potential reduction of 26 jobs (19 direct jobs and 7 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Madison County, Alabama economic area, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment. The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in the economic area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential increase equal to 2.7 percent of employment in the economic area.

Assuming no economic recovery, the closure of NARCEN Olathe could result in a maximum potential reduction of 22 jobs (14 direct jobs and 8 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Kansas City, Missouri-Kansas MSA economic area, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment. The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in the economic area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential decrease equal to 0.1 percent of employment in the economic area.

Assuming no economic recovery, the closure of NRRC Charleston could result in a maximum potential reduction of 67 jobs (46 direct jobs and 21 indirect jobs) over the 1996-

to-2001 period in the Charleston-North Charleston, South Carolina MSA economic area, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment. The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in the economic area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential decrease equal to 8.4 percent of employment in the economic area.

Assuming no economic recovery, the closure of NRRC New Orleans could result in a maximum potential reduction of 73 jobs (47 direct jobs and 26 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the New Orleans, Louisiana MSA economic area, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment. The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in the economic area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential decrease equal to less than 0.1 percent of employment in the economic area.

Community Infrastructure Impact: There is no known community infrastructure impact at any receiving installation.

Environmental Impact: The closure of these Reserve Centers and Readiness Commands generally will have a positive impact on the environment since, with the exception of REDCOM 10, they concern closures with no attendant realignments of personnel or functions. In the case of REDCOM 10, the movement of less than 10 military personnel to REDCOM 11, Dallas, Texas, is not of such a size as to impact the environment. Further, there is no adverse impact on threatened/endangered species, sensitive habitats and wetlands, or cultural/historical resources occasioned by this recommendation.

Marine Corps Air Station, El Toro, California, and Marine Corps Air Station, Tustin, California

Recommendation: Change the receiving sites for "squadrons and related activities at NAS Miramar" specified by the 1993 Commission (1993 Commission Report, at page 1-18) from "NAS Lemoore and NAS Fallon" to "other naval air stations, primarily NAS Oceana, Virginia, NAS North Island, California, and NAS Fallon, Nevada." Change the receiving sites for MCAS Tustin, California, specified by the 1993 Commission from "NAS North Island, NAS Miramar, or MCAS Camp Pendleton" to "other naval air stations, primarily MCAS New River, North Carolina; MCB Hawaii (MCAF Kaneohe Bay); MCAS Camp Pendleton, California; and NAS Miramar, California."

Justification: This recommendation furthers the restructuring initiatives of operational bases commenced in BRAC 93 and also recognizes that the FY 2001 Force Structure Plan further reduced force levels from those in the FY 1999 Force Structure Plan applicable to BRAC 93. These force level reductions required the Department of the Navy not only to eliminate

additional excess capacity but to do so in a way that retained only the infrastructure necessary to support future force levels and did not impede operational flexibility for the deployment of that force. Full implementation of the BRAC 93 recommendations relating to operational air stations would require the construction of substantial new capacity at installations on both coasts, which only exacerbates the level of excess capacity in this subcategory of installations. Revising the receiving sites for assets from these installations in this and other air station recommendations eliminates the need for this construction of new capacity, such that the total savings are equivalent to the replacement plant value of an existing tactical aviation naval air station. Further, within the context of the FY 2001 Force Structure Plan, the mix of operational air stations and the assets they support resulting from these recommendations provides substantial operational flexibility. For instance, the single siting of F-14s at Naval Air Station, Oceana, Virginia, fully utilizes that installation's capacity and avoids the need to provide support on both coasts for this aircraft series which is scheduled to leave the active inventory. This recommendation also permits the relocation of Marine Corps helicopter squadrons in the manner best able to meet operational imperatives.

Return on Investment: The total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$90.2 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$293 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$6.9 million with an immediate return on investment expected. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$346.8 million.

Impacts:

Economic Impact on Communities: Since this action affects unexecuted relocations resulting from prior BRAC recommendations, it causes no net change in current employment in either the San Diego MSA or the Kings County, California economic areas. However, the anticipated 10.9% increase in the Kings County employment base and the anticipated 0.1% increase in the San Diego employment base will not occur.

Community Infrastructure Impact: There is no known community infrastructure impact at any receiving installation.

Environmental Impact: The relocation of Navy and Marine Corps aviation assets in this recommendation generally will have a positive impact on the environment, particularly on the air quality in the areas in which NAS Lemoore and MCAS Miramar are located. The introduction of additional aircraft and personnel to the Norfolk, Virginia, area is not expected to have an adverse impact on the air quality of this area in that the net effect of adding these aircraft and personnel, when compared to force structure reductions by FY 2001, is a reduction from FY 1990 levels. However, a conformity determination will be required that takes into account any impact these actions may have on the air quality of these areas.

Further, the utility infrastructure at each receiving site has sufficient capacity to handle these additional personnel. There is no adverse impact on threatened/endangered species, sensitive habitats and wetlands, or cultural/historical resources occasioned by this recommendation.

Naval Air Station, Alameda, California

Recommendation: Change the receiving sites specified by the 1993 Commission for the closure of Naval Air Station, Alameda, California (1993 Commission Report, at page 1-35) for "aircraft along with the dedicated personnel, equipment and support" and "reserve aviation assets" from "NAS North Island" and "NASA Ames/Moffett Field," respectively, to "other naval air stations, primarily the Naval Air Facility, Corpus Christi, Texas, to support the Mine Warfare Center of Excellence, Naval Station, Ingleside, Texas."

Justification: The decision to collocate all mine warfare assets, including air assets, at the Mine Warfare Center of Excellence at Naval Station, Ingleside, Texas, coupled with the lack of existing facilities at Naval Air Station, North Island, support this movement of mine warfare helicopter assets to Texas. With this collocation of assets, the Navy can conduct training and operations with the full spectrum of mine warfare assets from one location, significantly enhancing its mine warfare countermeasures capability. This action is also consistent with the Department's approach for other naval air stations of eliminating capacity by not building new capacity.

Return on Investment: The return on investment data below applies to the closure of NAS Meridian, the closure of NTTC Meridian, the realignment of NAS Corpus Christi to a NAF, and the NAS Alameda redirect. The total estimated one-time cost to implement these recommendations is \$83.4 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$158.8 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$33.4 million with an immediate return on investment expected. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$471.2 million.

Impacts:

Economic Impact on Communities: Since this action affects unexecuted relocations resulting from prior BRAC recommendations, it causes no net change in employment in the San Diego, California MSA economic area. However, the anticipated small increase in the employment base in this economic area will not occur.

Community Infrastructure Impact: There is no known community infrastructure impact at any receiving installation.

Environmental Impact: This redirection involves only the relocation of the mine warfare helicopter assets (both active and reserve aircraft) to the Naval Air Facility, Corpus Christi, Texas, in support of the Mine Warfare Center of Excellence at Naval Station, Ingleside, Texas, instead of to Naval Air Station, North Island, California. Therefore, this relocation will have a positive impact on the environment. The Corpus Christi area is in attainment for all of the major air pollutants, while the San Diego area is in severe non-attainment for ozone. The addition of these assets to the Corpus Christi area is not expected to have an impact on the environment. However, if a conformity determination is required to assess the impact of this move on the local air quality, one will be performed. There are no adverse impacts on threatened/endangered species, sensitive habitats and wetlands, or cultural/historic resources occasioned by this recommendation.

Naval Recruiting District, San Diego, California

Recommendation: Change the receiving site for the Naval Recruiting District, San Diego, California, specified by the 1993 Commission (1993 Commission Report, at page 1-39) from "Naval Air Station North Island" to "other government-owned space in San Diego, California."

Justification: The North Island site is somewhat isolated and not necessarily conducive to the discharge of a recruiting mission. Moving this activity to government-owned space in a more central and accessible location enhances its operations. Additionally, with the additional assets being placed in NAS North Island in this round of closures and realignments, there is a need for the space previously allocated to this activity.

Return on Investment: The total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$0.3 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$0.1 million. There are no annual recurring savings after implementation, and a return on investment is expected in one year. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$89 thousand.

Impacts:

Economic Impact on Communities: This recommendation will not result in a change in employment in the San Diego, California MSA economic area because all affected jobs will remain in that economic area.

Community Infrastructure Impact: There is no known community infrastructure impact at any receiving installation.

Environmental Impact: The relocation of this activity within its local area generally will have a positive impact on the environment because new facilities will not have to be constructed at NAS North Island. Also, there is no adverse impact on threatened/endangered species, sensitive habitats and wetlands, or cultural/historical resources occasioned by this recommendation.

Naval Training Centers

Recommendation: Change the recommendation of the 1993 Commission (1993 Commission Report, at page 1-38) concerning the closure of Naval Training Center, Orlando, Florida, by deleting all references to Service School Command from the list of major tenants. Change the recommendation of the 1993 Commission (1993 Commission Report, at page 1-39) concerning the closure of Naval Training Center, San Diego, California, by deleting all references to Service School Command, including Service School Command (Electronic Warfare) and Service School Command (Surface), from the list of major tenants.

Justification: Service School Command is a major component command reporting directly to the Commanding Officer, Naval Training Center, and, as such, is not a tenant of the Naval Training Center. Its relocation and that of its component courses can and should be accomplished in a manner "consistent with training requirements," as specified by the 1993 Commission recommendation language for the major elements of the Naval Training Centers. For instance, while the command structure of the Service School Command at Naval Training Center, Orlando Florida, is relocating to the Naval Training Center, Great Lakes, Illinois, the Torpedoman "C" School can be relocated to available facilities at the Naval Underwater Weapons Center, Keyport, Washington, and thus be adjacent to the facility that supports the type of weapon that is the subject of the training. Similarly, since the Integrated Voice Communication School at the Naval Training Center, San Diego, California, uses contract instructors, placing it at Fleet Training Center, San Diego, necessitates only the local movement of equipment at a savings in the cost otherwise to be incurred to move such equipment to the Naval Training Center, Great Lakes, Illinois. Likewise, the relocation of the Messman "A" School at Naval Training Center, San Diego, to Lackland Air Force Base results in consolidation of the same type of training for all services at one location, consistent with Department goals, and avoids military construction costs at Naval Air Station, Pensacola.

Return on Investment: The total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$5.9 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$24.8 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$0.2 million with an immediate return on investment expected. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$25.8 million.

Impacts:

Economic Impact on Communities: Since this action affects unexecuted relocations resulting from prior BRAC recommendations, it causes no net change in employment in either the Lake County, Illinois, or the Pensacola, Florida MSA economic areas. However, the anticipated 0.1 percent increase in the Lake County employment base and the anticipated 0.1 percent increase in Pensacola, Florida the employment base will not occur.

Community Infrastructure Impact: There is no known community infrastructure impact at any receiving installation.

Environmental Impact: The relocation of individual schools will have a minimal impact on the environment. Each is a tenant command and not a property owner. Each of the receiving sites was reviewed for impact on threatened/endangered species, sensitive habitats and wetlands, and cultural/historic resources, and no adverse impact was found. None of these schools are expected to have an adverse impact on the air quality of the areas to which it is relocating. The receiving sites have adequate capacity in their utility infrastructure to handle the additional personnel relocated by this recommendation.

Naval Air Station, Cecil Field, Florida

Recommendation: Change the receiving sites specified by the 1993 Commission (1993 Commission Report, at page 1-20) from "Marine Corps Air Station, Cherry Point, North Carolina; Naval Air Station, Oceana, Virginia; and Marine Corps Air Station, Beaufort, South Carolina" to "other naval air stations, primarily Naval Air Station, Oceana, Virginia; Marine Corps Air Station, Beaufort, South Carolina; Naval Air Station, Jacksonville, Florida; and Naval Air Station, Atlanta, Georgia; or other Navy or Marine Corps Air Stations with the necessary capacity and support infrastructure." In addition, add the following: "To support Naval Air Station, Jacksonville, retain OLF Whitehouse, the Pinecastle target complex, and the Yellow Water family housing area."

Justification: Despite the large reduction in operational infrastructure accomplished during the 1993 round of base closure and realignment, since DON force structure experiences a reduction of over 10 percent by the year 2001, there continues to be additional excess capacity that must be eliminated. In evaluating operational bases, the goal was to retain only that infrastructure necessary to support the future force structure without impeding operational flexibility for deployment of that force. This recommended redirect achieves several important aims in furtherance of current Departmental policy and operational needs. First, it avoids the substantial new construction at MCAS Cherry Point that would be required if the F/A-18s from NAS Cecil Field were relocated there, which would add to

existing excess capacity, and utilizes existing capacity at NAS Oceana. This avoidance and similar actions taken regarding other air stations are equivalent to the replacement plant value of an existing tactical aviation naval air station. Second, it permits collocation of all fixed wing carrier-based anti-submarine warfare (ASW) air assets in the Atlantic Fleet with the other aviation ASW assets at NAS Jacksonville and NAVSTA Mayport and support for those assets. Third, it permits recognition of the superior demographics for the Navy and Marine Corps reserves by relocation of reserve assets to Atlanta, Georgia.

Return on Investment: The total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$66.6 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$335.1 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$11.5 million with an immediate return on investment expected. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$437.8 million.

Impacts:

Economic Impact on Communities: Since this action affects unexecuted relocations resulting from prior BRAC recommendations, it causes no net change in current employment in the Craven and Carteret Counties, North Carolina economic area. However, the anticipated 7.5 percent increase in the employment base in this economic area will not occur.

Community Infrastructure Impact: There is no known community infrastructure impact at any receiving installation.

Environmental Impact: The reallocation of Navy and Marine Corps aviation assets in this recommendation will have a generally positive impact on the environment, particularly on the air quality at Cherry Point, North Carolina, and Jacksonville, Florida. The introduction of additional aircraft and personnel to the Norfolk, Virginia, area is not expected to have an adverse impact on the air quality of that area since the net effect of moving these particular assets, when compared to the force structure reductions by FY 2001, is a reduction of personnel and aircraft from FY 1990 levels at this receiving activity. However, it is expected that conformity determinations will be required for the movements to NAS Oceana and NAS Atlanta. The utility infrastructure at each of the receiving sites is sufficient to handle the additional personnel. At none of the receiving sites will there be an adverse impact on threatened/endangered species, sensitive habitats and wetlands, or cultural/historical resources occasioned by this recommendation.

Naval Aviation Depot, Pensacola, Florida

Recommendation: Change the recommendation of the 1993 Commission (1993 Commission Report, at pages 1-42/43) by striking the following: "In addition, the Commission recommends that the whirl tower and dynamic components facility be moved to Cherry Point Navy or Corpus Christi Army Depots or the private sector, in lieu of the Navy's plan to retain these operations in a stand-alone facility at NADEP Pensacola."

Justification: Despite substantial reductions in depot maintenance capability accomplished in prior base closure evolutions, as force levels continue to decline, there is additional excess capacity that needs to be eliminated. Naval Aviation Depot, Pensacola, was closed in BRAC 93, except for the whirl tower and dynamic components facility. Subsequent to that decision, no requirement for the facility has been identified within either the Army or the Navy, and insufficient private sector interest in that facility has been expressed. Additionally, the Depot Maintenance Joint Cross-Service Group (JCSG-DM) examined these functions in response to Congressional interest in reexamining the BRAC 93 action. The JCSG-DM determined that the Pensacola facilities could not independently fulfill the entire future DoD requirement, but that the Army facilities at Corpus Christi Army Depot, combined with the Navy facilities at NADEP Cherry Point, could. This recommendation will allow the disposal of the whirl tower and the rehabilitation of the dynamic components facility buildings for use by the Naval Air Technical Training Center.

Return on Investment: The total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$1.5 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$2.4 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$0.2 million with an immediate return on investment expected. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$3.8 million.

Impacts:

Economic Impact on Communities: This recommendation will not affect any jobs in the Pensacola, Florida MSA economic area.

Community Infrastructure Impact: There is no community infrastructure impact since there are no receiving installations for this recommendation.

Environmental Impact: There are no known environmental impacts attendant to the disposal of these assets in place required by this recommendation, including impacts on air quality, threatened/endangered species, sensitive habitats and wetlands, or cultural/historical resources.

Navy Nuclear Power Propulsion Training Center, Naval Training Center, Orlando, Florida

Recommendation: Change the receiving site specified by the 1993 Commission (1993 Commission Report, at page 1-38) for the "Nuclear Power School" (or the Navy Nuclear Power Propulsion Training Center) from "the Submarine School at the Naval Submarine Base (NSB), New London" to "Naval Weapons Station, Charleston, South Carolina."

Justification: The decision of the 1993 Commission to retain the submarine piers at Naval Submarine Base New London, Connecticut, meant that some of the facilities designated for occupancy by the Navy Nuclear Power Propulsion Training Center were no longer available. Locating this school with the Nuclear Propulsion Training Unit of the Naval Weapons Station, Charleston achieves an enhanced training capability, provides ready access to the moored training ships now at the Weapons Station, and avoids the significant costs of building and/or renovating facilities at New London.

Return on Investment: The total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$147.9 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$19.5 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$5.3 million with a return on investment expected in one year. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$71.1 million.

Impacts:

Economic Impact on Communities: Since this action affects unexecuted relocations resulting from prior BRAC recommendations, it causes no net change in employment in the New London-Norwich, Connecticut NECMA economic area. However, the anticipated 2.3 percent increase in the employment base in this economic area will not occur.

Community Infrastructure Impact: There is no known community infrastructure impact at any receiving installation.

Environmental Impact: The relocation of the Navy Nuclear Power Propulsion Training Center generally will have a positive impact on the environment. The receiving site is in an air quality district that is in attainment for carbon monoxide, ozone and PM-10, and this relocation is not expected to have an adverse impact on that air quality status. Also, the utility infrastructure of the receiving site is sufficient to handle the additional personnel. There is no adverse impact on threatened/endangered species, sensitive habitats and wetlands, or cultural/historic resources occasioned by this recommendation.

Naval Air Station, Agana, Guam

Recommendation: Change the receiving site specified by the 1993 Commission (1993 Commission Report, at page 1-21) for "the aircraft, personnel, and associated equipment" from the closing Naval Air Station, Agana, Guam from "Andersen AFB, Guam" to "other naval or DoD air stations in the Continental United States and Hawaii."

Justification: Other BRAC 95 actions recommended the partial closure of Naval Activities, Guam, with retention of the waterfront assets, and the relocation of all of the vessels currently homeported at Naval Activities, Guam to Hawaii. Among the aircraft at Naval Activities, Guam is a squadron of helicopters performing logistics functions in support of these vessels. This redirect would collocate these helicopters with the vessels they support. Similarly, regarding the other aircraft at the closing Naval Air Station, the Fleet Commander-in-Chief desires operational synergies for his surveillance aircraft, which results in movement away from Guam. This redirect more centrally collocates those aircraft with similar assets in Hawaii and on the West Coast, while avoiding the new construction costs required in order to house these aircraft at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, consistent with the Department's approach of eliminating capacity by not building new capacity.

Return on Investment: The total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$43.8 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$213.8 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$21.7 million with an immediate return on investment expected. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$418 million.

Impacts:

Economic Impact on Communities: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 1,641 jobs (1,272 direct jobs and 369 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Agana, Guam economic area, which is 2.5 percent of economic area employment. The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in the economic area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential decrease equal to 10.6 percent of employment in the economic area. However, much of this impact involves the inclusion of MSC mariners in the job loss statement, which does not reflect the temporary nature of their presence on Guam.

Community Infrastructure Impact: There is no known community infrastructure impact at any receiving installation.

Environmental Impact: The Guam Air Pollution Control District is in attainment for carbon monoxide, ozone, and PM-10. Relocation of these aviation assets will remove a source of air emissions thus enhancing the air quality of Guam. Both NAS Whidbey Island and MCB/MCAF Hawaii are in an attainment area for carbon monoxide, ozone, and PM-10, and thus this relocation will not require a conformity determination. NAS North Island, on the other hand, is in an area which is in moderate non-attainment for carbon monoxide and severe non-attainment for ozone. Thus, a conformity determination may be required to evaluate the impact on air quality. Plans to disestablish current active squadrons support the ability to obtain a conformity determination. Adequate utility support and undeveloped property for expansion exist at NAS North Island. Similarly, at NAS Whidbey Island, force downsizing over the next six years will be in excess of the additional personnel and aircraft from this action. There will be no adverse impact to threatened/endangered species, sensitive habitats and wetlands, or cultural/historical resources occasioned by this recommendation.

Naval Air Station, Barbers Point, Hawaii

Recommendation: Change the recommendation of the 1993 Commission regarding items excepted from the closure of Naval Air Station, Barbers Point, Hawaii (1993 Commission, at page 1-19) from "Retain the family housing as needed for multi-service use" to "Retain the family housing as needed for multi-service use, including the following family housing support facilities: commissary facilities, Public Works Center compound with its sanitary landfill, and beach recreational areas, known as Nimitz Beach and White Plains Beach."

Justification: While specific mention was made of retention of family housing in the BRAC 93 recommendation relating to NAS Barbers Point, certain aspects conducive to supporting personnel in family housing were not specifically mentioned, which is required for their retention. Quality of life interests require either that these facilities be retained or that new ones be built to provide these services. Another advantage of retaining these facilities to support multi-service use is the avoidance of the costs of closing the existing landfill and either developing another one on other property on the island of Oahu or incurring the costs of shipping waste to a site off-island.

Return on Investment: The total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$37 thousand. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$17.6 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$0.1 million with an immediate return on investment expected. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$18.4 million.

Impacts:

Economic Impact on Communities: This recommendation will not affect any jobs in the Honolulu, Hawaii MSA economic area.

Community Infrastructure Impact: There is no community infrastructure impact since there are no receiving installations for this recommendation.

Environmental Impact: The importance of this recommendation from the perspective of environmental impact is the retention of the existing landfill. Without this recommendation, the landfill would have to be closed and capped, and, until a replacement site is established, waste water treatment sludge, for instance, would have to be exported off-island for disposal. Further, by avoiding the need for new construction of facilities for the public works center compound and the commissary, this recommendation will eliminate any air emissions occasioned by such new construction and the need to use scarce real property resources to replace these facilities. Also, there is no adverse impact on threatened/endangered species, sensitive habitats and wetlands, or cultural/historical resources occasioned by this recommendation.

Naval Air Facility, Detroit, Michigan

Recommendation: Change the receiving site specified by the 1993 Commission (1993 Commission Report, at page 1-25) for the Mt. Clemons, Michigan Marine Corps Reserve Center, including MWSG-47 and supporting units, from "Marine Corps Reserve Center, Twin Cities, Minnesota" to "Air National Guard Base, Selfridge, Michigan."

Justification: In addition to avoiding the costs of relocating the reserve unit from this reserve center to Minnesota, this redirect maintains a Marine Corps recruiting presence in the Detroit area, which is a demographically rich recruiting area, and realizes a principal objective of the Department of Defense to effect multi-service use of facilities.

Return on Investment: There are no one-time costs to implement this recommendation. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$9.4 million. There are no annual recurring savings, and an immediate return on investment is obtained. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$9.3 million.

Impacts:

Economic Impact on Communities: Since this action affects unexecuted relocations resulting from prior BRAC recommendations, it causes no net change in current

employment in the Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minnesota-Wisconsin MSA economic area. However, the anticipated small increase in the employment base in this economic area will not occur.

Community Infrastructure Impact: There is no known community infrastructure impact at any receiving installation.

Environmental Impact: The collocation of MWSG-47 and supporting units to National Guard facilities permits this activity to remain in its present location. Both the Air National Guard Base, Selfridge and the closing Naval Air Facility Detroit are in the same Air Quality Control District. Therefore, there will be no air quality changes on account of this recommendation. The elimination of the transfer of this Reserve Center to NARCEN Twin Cities will have a positive effect on the air quality of the Minneapolis/St. Paul Air Quality Control District.

Naval Shipyard, Norfolk Detachment, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

Recommendations: Change the recommendation of the 1991 Commission relating to the closure of the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard (1991 Commission Report, at page 5-28) to delete "and preservation" (line 5) and "for emergent requirements"(lines 6-7).

Justification: Despite substantial reductions in depot maintenance capability accomplished in prior base closure evolutions, as force levels continue to decline, there is additional excess capacity that needs to be eliminated. The contingency seen in 1991 for which the facilities at this closed shipyard were being retained no longer exists, and their continued retention is neither necessary nor consistent with the DON objective to divest itself of unnecessary infrastructure.

Return on Investment: The total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$32 thousand. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$51.9 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$8.8 million with an immediate return on investment expected. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$134.7 million.

Impacts:

Economic Impact on Communities: This recommendation will not affect any jobs in the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania-New Jersey PMSA economic area.

Community Infrastructure Impact: There is no community infrastructure impact since there are no receiving installations for this recommendation.

Environmental Impact: This recommendation completes the closure of the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard which began with BRAC 91. Since this is a closure with no realignment of functions, personnel or workload, there is no impact to threatened/endangered species, sensitive habitats and wetlands, or cultural/historical resources occasioned by this recommendation.

Naval Sea Systems Command, Arlington, Virginia

Recommendation: Change the receiving sites specified by the 1993 Commission (1993 Commission Report, at page 1-59) for the relocation of the Naval Sea Systems Command, including the Nuclear Propulsion Directorate (SEA 08), the Human Resources Office supporting the Naval Sea Systems Command, and associated PEOs and DRPMs, from "the Navy Annex, Arlington, Virginia; Washington Navy Yard, Washington, D.C.; 3801 Nebraska Avenue, Washington, D.C.; Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, Virginia; or the White Oak facility, Silver Spring, Maryland" to "the Washington Navy Yard, Washington, D.C. or other government-owned property in the metropolitan Washington, D.C. area."

Justification: The resource levels of administrative activities are dependent upon the level of forces they support. The continuing decline in force levels shown in the FY 2001 Force Structure Plan coupled with the effects of the National Performance Review result in further reductions of personnel in administrative activities. As a result, the capacity at the White Oak facility in Silver Spring, Maryland, or at the Navy Annex, Arlington, Virginia is no longer required to meet DON administrative space needs. This change in receiving sites eliminates substantial expenditures otherwise required to rehabilitate both White Oak and the Navy Annex. The net effect of this and the White Oak recommendation is a decrease of excess administrative space by more than 1,000,000 square feet.

Return on Investment: The total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$159.7 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$47.6 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$9.4 million with an immediate return on investment expected. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$144 million.

Impacts:

Economic Impact on Communities: This recommendation will not result in a change in employment in the Washington, DC-Maryland-Virginia-West Virginia PMSA economic area because all affected jobs will remain in that economic area.

Community Infrastructure Impact: There is no known community infrastructure impact at any receiving installation.

Environmental Impact: The relocation of NAVSEA from leased space in the NCR to the Washington Navy Yard generally will have a positive impact on the environment, principally due to the avoidance of the construction of new facilities and the rehabilitation of existing facilities at NSWC White Oak, Maryland, which is closing in its entirety. The Washington Navy Yard has sufficient facilities which can be rehabilitated to house these activities, and the utility infrastructure capacity is sufficient to handle the additional personnel. There is no adverse impact on threatened/endangered species, sensitive habitat and wetlands, or cultural/historical resources occasioned by this recommendation.

Office of Naval Research, Arlington, Virginia

Recommendation: Change the recommendation of the 1993 Commission (1993 Commission Report, at pages 1-59/60) by deleting the Office of Naval Research from the list of National Capital Region activities to relocate from leased space to Government-owned space within the NCR.

Justification: Because of other BRAC 95 actions, space designated for this activity pursuant to the BRAC 93 decision is no longer available. Other Navy-owned space in the NCR would require substantial new construction in order to house this activity. Permitting the Office of Naval Research to remain in its present location not only avoids this new construction, but also realizes the synergy obtained by having the activity located in proximity to the Advanced Research Projects Agency and the National Science Foundation. Further, this action provides the opportunity for future collocation of like activities from the other Military Departments, with the attendant joint synergies which could be realized. While this action results in a recurring cost, the cost is minimal in light of the importance of these two significant opportunities.

Return on Investment: While the annual costs for this activity to remain in leased space are higher than operating costs paid for government-owned space, relocation to government-owned space would require new construction. The cost of that new construction is more than would be saved by this move over a twenty-year period. COBRA analysis of the BRAC 93 recommendation in view of the changed circumstances regarding availability of space in the National Capital Region reveals that relocation of this activity would not result in a reasonable return on investment.

Impacts:

Economic Impact on Communities: This recommendation will not result in a change in employment in the Washington, DC-Maryland-Virginia-West Virginia PMSA economic area because all affected jobs will remain in that economic area.

Community Infrastructure Impact: There is no known community infrastructure impact at any receiving installation.

Environmental Impact: Locating this activity in Arlington, Virginia, instead of at either the Washington Navy Yard or Nebraska Avenue generally will have a positive impact on the environment because new facilities will not have to be constructed. Both the current site and the sites considered as receivers are in the same air quality district; thus, there will be no impact on air quality. There is no adverse impact on threatened/endangered species, sensitive habitat and wetlands, or cultural/historical resources occasioned by this recommendation.

Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command, Arlington, Virginia

Recommendation: Change the recommendation for the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command, Arlington, Virginia, specified by the 1993 Commission (Commission Report, at page 1-59) from "[r]elocate...from leased space to Government-owned space within the NCR, to include the Navy Annex, Arlington, Virginia; Washington Navy Yard, Washington, D.C.; 3801 Nebraska Avenue, Washington, D.C.; Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, Virginia; or the White Oak facility, Silver Spring, Maryland" to "Relocate...from leased space to Government-owned space in San Diego, California, to allow consolidation of the Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance Center, with the Space and Naval Warfare Command headquarters. This relocation does not include SPAWAR Code 40, which is located at NRL, or the Program Executive Officer for Space Communication Sensors and his immediate staff who will remain in Navy-owned space in the National Capital Region."

Justification: The resource levels of administrative activities are dependent upon the level of forces they support. The continuing decline in force levels shown in the FY 2001 Force Structure Plan coupled with the effects of the National Performance Review result in further reductions in administrative activities. Space available in San Diego resulting from personnel changes and work consolidation permits further consolidation of the SPAWAR command structure and the elimination of levels of command structure. This consolidation will achieve not only significant savings from elimination of unnecessary command structure

but also efficiencies and economies of operation. In addition, by relocating to San Diego instead of the NCR, there will be sufficient readily available space in the Washington Navy Yard for the Naval Sea Systems Command.

Return on Investment: The total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$24 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$120 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$25.3 million with an immediate return on investment expected. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$360 million.

Impacts:

Economic Impact on Communities: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 1,821 jobs (1,133 direct jobs and 681 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Washington, DC-Maryland-Virginia-West Virginia PMSA economic area, which is 0.1 percent of economic area employment. The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in the economic area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential decrease equal to 0.6 percent of employment in the economic area.

Community Infrastructure Impact: There is no known community infrastructure impact at any receiving installation.

Environmental Impact: The relocation of this activity from leased space in the NCR to San Diego, California, likely will not have an adverse impact on the environment. Because San Diego is in a moderate non-attainment area for carbon monoxide, a conformity determination may be required to evaluate air quality impacts. There is no adverse impact on threatened/endangered species, sensitive habitats and wetlands, or cultural/historical resources occasioned by this recommendation.

Naval Recruiting Command, Washington, D.C.

Recommendation: Change the receiving site for the Naval Recruiting Command, Washington, D.C., specified by the 1993 Commission (1993 Commission Report, at page 1-59) from "Naval Training Center, Great Lakes, Illinois" to "Naval Support Activity, Memphis, Tennessee."

Justification: This relocation permits the single-siting of the Department's personnel recruiting and personnel management headquarters-level activities, enhancing their close

coordination, and supporting the Department's policy of maximizing the use of government-owned space. It also reduces the requirement to effect new construction, and reduces resulting potential building congestion, at NTC Great Lakes.

Return on Investment: The total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$6.5 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$1.1 million. There are no annual recurring savings after implementation, and an immediate return on investment is expected. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$1.2 million.

Impacts:

Economic Impact on Communities: Since this action affects unexecuted relocations resulting from prior BRAC recommendations, it causes no net change in employment in the Lake County, Illinois economic area. However, the anticipated 0.2 percent increase in the employment base in this economic area will not occur.

Community Infrastructure Impact: There is no known community infrastructure impact at any receiving installation.

Environmental Impact: The movement of this activity to Naval Support Activity, Memphis generally will have a positive impact on the environment because new facilities will not have to be constructed at NTC Great Lakes, Illinois. The additional personnel are not expected to have an adverse impact on the environment in that the utility infrastructure capacity at the receiving site is sufficient to handle this additional loading. There is no adverse impact on threatened/endangered species, sensitive habitats and wetlands, or cultural/historical resources occasioned by this recommendation.

**Naval Security Group Command Detachment Potomac,
Washington, D.C.**

Recommendation: Change the receiving site for the Naval Security Group Command Detachment Potomac, Washington, D.C., from "National Security Agency, Ft. Meade, Maryland" specified by the 1993 Commission (1993 Commission Report, at page 1-59) to "Naval Research Laboratory, Washington, D.C."

Justification: The mission of this activity requires that it be collocated with space surveillance hardware. This can most effectively be accomplished by housing this activity at the Naval Research Laboratory. By this redirect, the cost of moving this activity to Fort Meade can be avoided.

Return on Investment: There are no estimated one-time costs to implement this recommendation. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$4 thousand. There are no annual recurring savings after implementation, and an immediate return on investment is expected. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$4 thousand.

Impacts:

Economic Impact on Communities: Since this action affects unexecuted relocations resulting from prior BRAC recommendations, it causes no net change in current employment in the Baltimore, Maryland PMSA economic area. However, the anticipated small increase in the employment base in this economic area will not occur.

Community Infrastructure Impact: There is no known community infrastructure impact at any receiving installation.

Environmental Impact: The relocation of this activity from Ft. Meade, Maryland, to the Naval Research Laboratory, Washington, D.C., generally will have a positive impact on the environment. Both the losing site and the gaining site are in the same air quality district; thus, movement of this activity within that district will no impact on air quality. There is no adverse impact on threatened/endangered species, sensitive habitat and wetlands, or cultural/historical resources occasioned by this recommendation.

Chapter 5

Recommendations -- Department of the Navy

Department of the Air Force

Summary of Selection Process

Introduction

The Air Force 1995 selection process shares the fundamental approach used in the 1991 and 1993 Air Force base realignment and closure (BRAC) processes.

The basis for selection of closure and realignment recommendations was the DoD force structure and the final selection criteria. The Secretary of the Air Force appointed a Base Closure Executive Group of six general officers and seven comparable (Senior Executive Service) civilians. Areas of expertise included environment; facilities and construction; finance; law; logistics; programs; operations; personnel and training; reserve components; plus research, development and acquisition. Additionally, an Air Staff-level Base Closure Working Group was formed to provide staff support and additional detailed expertise for the Executive Group. Plans and Programs General Officers from the Major Commands (MAJCOM) met on several occasions with the Executive Group to provide mission specific expertise and greater base-level information. Also, potential sister-service impacts were coordinated by a special inter-service working group.

The Executive Group developed a Base Closure Internal Control Plan that was approved by the Secretary of the Air Force. This plan provides structure and guidance for all participants in the base closure process, including procedures for data gathering and certification.

The Selection Process

The Executive Group reviewed all Active and Air Reserve Component (ARC) installations in the United States that met or exceeded the Section 2687, Title 10 U.S.C. threshold of 300 direct-hire civilians authorized to be employed. Data on all applicable bases was collected via a comprehensive and detailed questionnaire answered at base level with validation by the Major Commands and Air Staff. All data was evaluated and certified in accordance with the Air Force Internal Control Plan. As an additional control measure, the Air Force Audit Agency was tasked to continuously review the Air Force process for consistency with the law and DoD policy and to ensure that the data collection and validation process was adequate. A baseline capacity analysis was also performed that evaluated the physical capability of a base to accommodate additional force structure and other activities (excess capacity) beyond that programmed to be stationed at the base.

The Executive Group occasionally questioned the data, where appropriate, when the information was revised or more detailed data provided. Data determined to be inaccurate was corrected. All data used in the preparation and submission of information and recommendations concerning the closure or realignment of military installations was certified as to its accuracy and completeness by appropriate officials at base, MAJCOM, and headquarters level. In addition, the Executive Group and the Secretary of the Air Force certified that all information contained in the Air Force Detailed Analysis and all supporting data were accurate and complete to the best of their knowledge and belief.

The Executive Group placed all bases in categories, based on the installation's predominant mission. When considered by category, the results of the baseline capacity analysis represented the maximum potential base closures that could be achieved within each category. The results of the baseline excess capacity analysis were then used in conjunction with the approved DoD force structure plan in determining base structure requirements. Other factors were also considered to determine actual capabilities for base reductions. The capacity analysis was also used to identify cost effective opportunities for the beddown of activities and aircraft dislocated from bases recommended for closure and realignment.

Bases deemed militarily or geographically unique or mission-essential were approved by the Secretary of the Air Force for exclusion from further closure consideration. Capacity was analyzed by category, based on a study of current base capacity and the future requirements imposed by the force structure plan. Categories and subcategories having no excess capacity were recommended to and approved by the Secretary of the Air Force for exclusion from further study.

All non-excluded Active Component bases in the remaining categories were individually examined on the basis of all eight selection criteria established by the Secretary of Defense, with over 250 subelements to the grading criteria. These subelements were developed by the Air Force to provide specific data points for each criterion.

Under Deputy Secretary of Defense direction, the Executive Group and the Secretary of the Air Force considered and analyzed the results of the efforts of Joint Cross-Service Groups in the areas of Depot Maintenance, Laboratories, Test and Evaluation, Undergraduate Pilot Training, and Military Treatment Facilities including Graduate Medical Education. The Joint Cross-Service Groups established data elements, measures of merit, and methods of analysis for their functional areas. The Air Force collected data as requested by the joint groups, following the Air Force's Internal Control Plan. After receiving data provided by each of the Services, the joint groups developed functional values and alternatives for the activities under their consideration. These alternatives were reported to the Military Departments for consideration in their processes. In turn, the Military Departments

responded with comments and cost analyses of the alternatives, and engaged in a dialogue with the joint groups regarding potential closure and realignment actions, consistent with the internal analytical processes of each Military Department.

The Air Reserve Component (ARC) category, comprised of Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve bases, warrants further explanation. First, these bases do not readily compete against each other, as ARC units enjoy a special relationship with their respective states and local communities. Under federal law, relocating Guard units across State boundaries is not a practical alternative. In addition, careful consideration must be given to the recruiting needs of these units. However, realignment of ARC units onto active or civilian, or other ARC installations could prove cost effective. Therefore, the ARC category was examined for cost effective relocations to other bases.

Information, base groupings, excess capacity, and options resulting from the Executive Group analysis were presented to the Secretary of the Air Force and Chief of Staff of the Air Force by the Executive Group. Based on the force structure plan and the eight selection criteria, with consideration given to excess capacity, efficiencies in base utilization, and concepts of force structure organization and basing, the Secretary of the Air Force, in consultation with the Air Force Chief of Staff, and using the analysis of the Executive Group, selected the bases recommended for closure and realignment.

Chapter 5

Recommendations -- Department of the Air Force

Department of the Air Force

Recommendations and Justifications

North Highlands Air Guard Station, California

Recommendation: Close North Highlands Air Guard Station (AGS) and relocate the 162nd Combat Communications Group (CCG) and the 149th Combat Communications Squadron (CCS) to McClellan AFB, California.

Justification: Relocation of the 162nd CCG and 149th CCS onto McClellan AFB will provide a more cost-effective basing arrangement than presently exists by avoiding some of the costs associated with maintaining the installation. Because of the very short distance from the unit's present location in North Highlands to McClellan AFB, most of the personnel will remain with the unit.

Return on Investment: The total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$1.3 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a cost of \$0.5 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$0.2 million with a return on investment expected in eight years. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$1.5 million.

Impacts: This recommendation will not result in a change in the employment in the Sacramento, California Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area because all affected jobs will remain in that economic area. Review of demographic data projects no negative impact on recruiting. This action will have minimal environmental impact.

Ontario International Airport Air Guard Station, California

Recommendation: Close Ontario International Airport Air Guard Station (AGS) and relocate the 148th Combat Communications Squadron (CCS) and the 210th Weather Flight to March ARB, California.

Justification: Relocation of the 148th CCS and the 210th Weather Flight onto March ARB will provide a more cost-effective basing arrangement by avoiding some of the costs associated with maintaining the installation. Because of the short distance from the unit's present location on Ontario International Airport AGS, most of the personnel will remain with the unit.

Return on Investment: The total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$0.8 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a cost of \$0.3 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$0.1 million with a return on investment expected in eight years. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$0.9 million.

Impacts: This recommendation will not result in a change in the employment in the Riverside-San Bernardino, California Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area because all affected jobs will remain in the economic area. Review of demographic data projects no negative impact on recruiting. Environmental impact from this action is minimal.

Rome Laboratory, New York

Recommendation: Close Rome Laboratory, Rome, New York. Rome Laboratory activities will relocate to Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, and Hanscom AFB, Massachusetts. Specifically, the Photonics, Electromagnetic & Reliability (except Test Site O&M operations), Computer Systems, Radio Communications and Communications Network activities, with their share of the Rome Lab staff activities, will relocate to Fort Monmouth. The Surveillance, Intelligence & Reconnaissance Software Technology, Advanced C2 Concepts, and Space Communications activities, with their share of the Rome Laboratory staff activities, will relocate to Hanscom AFB. The Test Site (e.g., Stockbridge and Newport) O&M operations will remain at its present location but will report to Hanscom AFB.

Justification: The Air Force has more laboratory capacity than necessary to support current and projected Air Force research requirements. The Laboratory Joint Cross-Service Group analysis recommended the Air Force consider the closure of Rome Laboratory. Collocation of part of the Rome Laboratory with the Army's Communications Electronics Research Development Evaluation Command at Fort Monmouth will reduce excess laboratory capacity and increase inter-Service cooperation and common C3 research. In addition, Fort Monmouth's location near unique civilian research activities offers potential for shared research activities. Those activities relocated to Hanscom AFB will strengthen Air Force C3I RDT&E activities by collocating common research efforts. This action will result in substantial savings and furthers the DoD goal of cross-service utilization of common support assets.

Return on Investment: The total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$52.8 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a cost of \$15.1 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$11.5 million with a return on investment expected in four years. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$98.4 million.

Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 2,345 jobs (1,067 direct jobs and 1,278 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Utica-Rome, New York Metropolitan Statistical Area, which is 1.5 percent of the economic area's employment. The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in the economic area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential decrease equal to 6.2 percent of employment in the economic area. Environmental impact from this action is minimal and ongoing restoration of Rome Laboratory and Griffiss AFB will continue.

Roslyn Air Guard Station, New York

Recommendation: Close Roslyn Air Guard Station (AGS) and relocate the 213th Electronic Installation Squadron (ANG) and the 274th Combat Communications Group (ANG) to Stewart International Airport AGS, Newburg, New York. The 722nd Aeromedical Staging Squadron (AFRES) will relocate to suitable leased space within the current recruiting area.

Justification: Relocation of the 213th Electronic Installation Squadron and 274th Combat Communications Group to Stewart International Airport AGS will produce a more efficient and cost-effective basing structure by avoiding some of the costs associated with maintaining the installation.

Return on Investment: The total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$2.4 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$0.7 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$0.7 million with a return on investment expected in four years. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$7.6 million.

Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 71 jobs (44 direct jobs and 27 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Nassau-Suffolk, New York Metropolitan Statistical Area, which is less than 0.1 percent of the area's employment. The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in the economic area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential increase equal to less than 0.1 percent of employment in the Nassau-Suffolk, New York Metropolitan Statistical Area. Review of demographic data projects no negative impact on recruiting. Environmental impact from this action is minimal and ongoing restoration will continue.

Springfield-Beckley Municipal Airport Air Guard Station, Ohio

Recommendation: Close Springfield-Beckley Municipal Airport Air Guard Station (AGS) and relocate the 178th Fighter Group (ANG), the 251st Combat Communications Group (ANG), and the 269th Combat Communications Squadron (ANG) to Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio.

Justification: The 178th Fighter Group provides crash, fire and rescue, security police, and other base operating support services for ANG activities at Springfield-Beckley Municipal Airport. By relocating to Wright-Patterson AFB, significant manpower and other savings will be realized by avoiding some of the costs associated with the installation.

Return on Investment: The total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$23.4 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a cost of \$5.6 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$4.2 million with a return on investment expected in six years. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$35.1 million.

Impacts: This recommendation will not result in a change in the employment in the Riverside-Dayton-Springfield, Ohio Metropolitan Statistical Area because all affected jobs will remain in that economic area. Review of demographic data projects no negative impact on recruiting. Environmental impact from this action is minimal.

Greater Pittsburgh IAP Air Reserve Station, Pennsylvania

Recommendation: Close Greater Pittsburgh IAP Air Reserve Station (ARS). The 911th Airlift Wing will inactivate and its C-130 aircraft will be distributed to Air Force Reserve C-130 units at Dobbins ARB, Georgia, and Peterson AFB, Colorado.

Justification: The Air Force Reserve has more C-130 operating locations than necessary to effectively support the Reserve C-130 aircraft in the Department of Defense (DoD) Force Structure Plan. Although Greater Pittsburgh ARS is effective at supporting its mission, its evaluation overall under the eight criteria supports its closure. Its operating costs are the greatest among Air Force Reserve C-130 operations at civilian airfields. In addition, its location near a number of AFRES and Air National Guard units provides opportunities for its personnel to transfer and continue their service without extended travel.

Return On Investment: The total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$22.3 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$36.3 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are

\$13.1 million with a return on investment expected in two years. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$161.1 million.

Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 631 jobs (387 direct jobs and 244 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Allegheny, Fayette, Washington, and Westmoreland, Pennsylvania, counties economic area, which is 0.1 percent of economic area employment. Review of demographic data projects no negative impact on recruiting. The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in the economic area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential decrease equal to 0.1 percent of employment in the economic area. Environmental impact from this action is minimal, and restoration of the Greater Pittsburgh IAP ARS will continue.

Bergstrom Air Reserve Base, Texas

Recommendation: Close Bergstrom ARB. The 924th Fighter Wing (AFRES) will inactivate. The Wing's F-16 aircraft will be redistributed or retire. Headquarters, 10th Air Force (AFRES), will relocate to Naval Air Station Fort Worth, Joint Reserve Base, Texas.

Justification: Due to Air Force Reserve fighter force drawdown, the Air Force Reserve has an excess of F-16 fighter locations. The closure of Bergstrom ARB is the most cost effective option for the Air Force Reserve. The relocation of Headquarters, 10th Air Force to NAS Fort Worth will also collocate the unit with one of its major subordinate units.

Return on Investment: The total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$13.3 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$93.4 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$20.9 million with an immediate return on investment. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$291.4 million.

Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 954 jobs (585 direct jobs and 369 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Austin, Texas Metropolitan Statistical Area, which is 0.2 percent of the area's employment. The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in the economic area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential decrease equal to 0.2 percent of employment in the Austin, Texas Metropolitan Statistical Area. Review of demographic data projects no negative impact on recruiting. Environmental impact from this action is minimal and ongoing restoration of Bergstrom ARB will continue.

Brooks Air Force Base, Texas

Recommendation: Close Brooks AFB. The Human Systems Center, including the School of Aerospace Medicine and Armstrong Laboratory, will relocate to Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, however, some portion of the Manpower and Personnel function, and the Air Force Drug Test laboratory, may relocate to other locations. The 68th Intelligence Squadron will relocate to Kelly AFB, Texas. The Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence will relocate to Tyndall AFB, Florida. The 710th Intelligence Flight (AFRES) will relocate to Lackland AFB, Texas. The hyperbaric chamber operation, including associated personnel, will relocate to Lackland AFB, Texas. All activities and facilities at the base including family housing and the medical facility will close.

Justification: The Air Force has more laboratory capacity than necessary to support current and projected Air Force research requirements. When compared to the attributes desirable in laboratory activities, the Armstrong Lab and Human Systems Center operations at Brooks AFB contributed less to Air Force needs as measured by such areas as workload requirements, facilities, and personnel. As an installation, Brooks AFB ranked lower than the other bases in the Laboratory and Product Center subcategory.

Return on Investment: The total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$185.5 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a cost of \$138.7 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$27.4 million with a return on investment expected in seven years. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$142.1 million.

Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 7,879 jobs (3,759 direct jobs and 4,120 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the San Antonio, Texas Metropolitan Statistical Area, which is 1.1 percent of the economic area's employment. The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations, including the relocation of some Air Force activities into the San Antonio area, and all prior-round BRAC actions in the economic area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential decrease equal to 0.9 percent of employment in the economic area. Environmental impact from this action is minimal and ongoing restoration of Brooks AFB will continue.

Reese Air Force Base, Texas

Recommendation: Close Reese AFB. The 64th Flying Training Wing will inactivate and its assigned aircraft will be redistributed or retired. All activities and facilities at the base including family housing and the hospital will close.

Justification: The Air Force has more Undergraduate Flying Training (UFT) bases than necessary to support Air Force pilot training requirements consistent with the Department of Defense (DoD) Force Structure Plan. When all eight criteria are applied to the bases in the UFT category, Reese AFB ranks low relative to the other bases in the category. Reese AFB ranked lower when compared to other UFT bases when evaluated on such factors as weather (e.g., crosswinds, density altitude) and airspace availability (e.g., amount of airspace available for training, distance to training areas). Reese AFB was also recommended for closure in each alternative recommended by the DoD Joint Cross-Service Group for Undergraduate Pilot Training.

Return on Investment: The total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$37.3 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$51.9 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$21.5 million with a return on investment expected in two years. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$256.8 million.

Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 2,891 jobs (2,083 direct jobs and 808 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Lubbock, Texas Metropolitan Statistical Area, which is 2.2 percent of the economic area's employment. Environmental impact from this action is minimal and ongoing restoration of Reese AFB will continue.

Onizuka Air Station, California

Recommendation: Realign Onizuka AS. The 750th Space Group will inactivate and its functions will relocate to Falcon AFB, Colorado. Detachment 2, Space and Missile Systems Center (AFMC) will relocate to Falcon AFB, Colorado. Some tenants will remain in existing facilities. All activities and facilities associated with the 750th Space Group including family housing and the clinic will close.

Justification: The Air Force has one more satellite control installation than is needed to support projected future Air Force satellite control requirements consistent with the Department of Defense (DoD) Force Structure Plan. When all eight criteria are applied to the bases in the Satellite Control subcategory, Onizuka AS ranked lower than the other base in the subcategory. Among other factors, Falcon AFB has superior protection against current and future electronic encroachment, reduced risks associated with security and mission-disrupting contingencies, and significantly higher closure costs.

Return on Investment: The total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$124.2 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a cost of \$125.7 million. Annual recurring savings after

implementation are \$30.3 million with a return on investment expected in eight years. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$181.6 million.

Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 2,969 jobs (1,875 direct jobs and 1,094 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the San Jose, California, Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area, which is 0.3 percent of the economic area's employment. The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in the economic area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential decrease equal to 0.5 percent of employment in the economic area. Environmental impact from this action is minimal and ongoing restoration of Onizuka AS will continue.

Eglin Air Force Base, Florida

Recommendation: Realign Eglin AFB, Florida. The Electromagnetic Test Environment (EMTE), consisting of eight Electronic Combat (EC) threat simulator systems and two EC pod systems will relocate to the Nellis AFB Complex, Nevada. Those emitter-only systems at the Air Force Development Test Center (AFDTC) at Eglin AFB necessary to support Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC), the USAF Air Warfare Center, and Air Force Materiel Command Armaments/Weapons Test and Evaluation activities will be retained. All other activities and facilities associated with Eglin will remain open.

Justification: Air Force EC open air range workload requirements can be satisfied by one range. Available capacity exists at the Nellis AFB Complex to absorb EMTE's projected EC workload. To ensure the Air Force retains the capability to effectively test and realistically train in the Armaments/Weapons functional category, necessary emitter-only threat systems will remain at Eglin AFB. This action is consistent with Air Force and DoD efforts to consolidate workload where possible to achieve cost and mission efficiencies.

Return on Investment: The total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$2.2 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$6.3 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$2.6 million with a return on investment expected in one year. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$31.4 million.

Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 85 jobs (52 direct jobs and 33 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Fort Walton Beach, Florida Metropolitan Statistical Area, which is 0.1 percent of economic area employment. The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations, including the relocation of some Air Force activities into the Fort Walton Beach, Florida Metropolitan Statistical Area, and all prior-round BRAC actions in the

economic area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential increase equal to 1.3 percent of employment in the economic area. Environmental impact from this action is minimal, and ongoing restoration of Eglin AFB will continue.

Malmstrom Air Force Base, Montana

Recommendation: Realign Malmstrom AFB. The 43rd Air Refueling Group and its KC-135 aircraft will relocate to MacDill AFB, Florida. All fixed-wing aircraft flying operations at Malmstrom AFB will cease and the airfield will be closed. A small airfield operational area will continue to be available to support the helicopter operations of the 40th Rescue Flight which will remain to support missile wing operations. All base activities and facilities associated with the 341st Missile Wing will remain.

Justification: Although the missile field at Malmstrom AFB ranked very high, its airfield resources can efficiently support only a small number of tanker aircraft. Its ability to support other large aircraft missions (bomber and airlift) is limited and closure of the airfield will generate substantial savings.

During the 1995 process, the Air Force analysis highlighted a shortage of refueling aircraft in the southeastern United States. The OSD direction to support the Unified Commands located at MacDill AFB creates an opportunity to relocate a tanker unit from the greater tanker resources of the northwestern United States to the southeast. Movement of the refueling unit from Malmstrom AFB to MacDill AFB will also maximize the cost-effectiveness of that airfield.

Return on Investment: The total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$17.4 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$5.2 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$5.1 million with a return on investment expected in four years. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$54.3 million.

Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 1,013 jobs (779 direct jobs and 234 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Great Falls, Montana Metropolitan Statistical Area, which is 2.3 percent of the economic area's employment. The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in the economic area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential decrease equal to 2.3 percent of employment in the economic area. Environmental impact from this action is minimal and ongoing restoration of Malmstrom AFB will continue.

Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico

Recommendation: Realign Kirtland AFB. The 58th Special Operations Wing will relocate to Holloman AFB, New Mexico. The AF Operational Test and Evaluation Center (AFOTEC) will relocate to Eglin AFB, Florida. The AF Office of Security Police (AFOSP) will relocate to Lackland AFB, Texas. The AF Inspection Agency and the AF Safety Agency will relocate to Kelly AFB, Texas. The Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA) will relocate to Kelly AFB, Texas (Field Command) and Nellis AFB, Nevada (High Explosive Testing). Some DNA personnel (Radiation Simulator operations) will remain in place. The Phillips Laboratory and the 898th Munitions Squadron will remain in cantonment. The AFRES and ANG activities will remain in existing facilities. The 377th ABW inactivates and all other activities and facilities at Kirtland AFB, including family housing will close. Air Force medical activities located in the Veterans Administration Hospital will terminate.

Justification: As an installation, Kirtland AFB rated low relative to other bases in the Laboratory and Product Center subcategory when all eight selection criteria were considered. The Laboratory Joint Cross-Service Group, however, gave the Phillips Laboratory operation a high functional value. This realignment will close most of the base, but retain the Phillips Laboratory, which has a high functional value and the 898th Munitions Squadron, which is not practical to relocate. Both of these activities are capable of operating with minimal military support. Also, the Sandia National Laboratory can be cantoned in its present location. This approach reduces infrastructure and produces significant annual savings, while maintaining those activities essential to the Air Force and the Department of Defense.

Return on Investment: The total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$277.5 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a cost of \$158.8 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$62 million with a return on investment expected in three years. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$464.5 million.

Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 11,916 jobs (6,850 direct jobs and 5,066 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Bernalillo County, New Mexico economic area, which is 3.6 percent of the economic area's employment. Environmental impact from this action is minimal and ongoing restoration of Kirtland AFB will continue.

Grand Forks Air Force Base, North Dakota

Recommendation: Realign Grand Forks AFB. The 321st Missile Group will inactivate, unless prior to December 1996, the Secretary of Defense determines that the need to retain

ballistic missile defense (BMD) options effectively precludes this action. If the Secretary of Defense makes such a determination, Minot AFB, North Dakota, will be realigned and the 91st Missile Group will inactivate.

If Grand Forks AFB is realigned, the 321st Missile Group will inactivate. Minuteman III missiles will relocate to Malmstrom AFB, Montana, be maintained at depot facilities, or be retired. A small number of silo launchers at Grand Forks may be retained if required. The 319th Air Refueling Wing will remain in place. All activities and facilities at the base associated with the 319th Air Refueling Wing, including family housing, the hospital, commissary, and base exchange will remain open.

If Minot AFB is realigned, the 91st Missile Group will inactivate. Minuteman III missiles will relocate to Malmstrom AFB, Montana, be maintained at depot facilities, or be retired. The 5th Bomb Wing will remain in place. All activities and facilities at the base associated with the 5th Bomb Wing, including family housing, the hospital, commissary, and base exchange will remain open.

Justification: A reduction in ICBM force structure requires the inactivation of one missile group within the Air Force. The missile field at Grand Forks AFB ranked lowest due to operational concerns resulting from local geographic, geologic, and facility characteristics. Grand Forks AFB also ranked low when all eight criteria are applied to bases in the large aircraft subcategory. The airfield will be retained to satisfy operational requirements and maintain consolidated tanker resources.

If the Secretary of Defense determines that the need to retain BMD options effectively precludes realigning Grand Forks, then Minot AFB will be realigned. The missile field at Minot AFB ranked next lowest due to operational concerns resulting from spacing, ranging and geological characteristics. Minot AFB ranked in the middle tier when all eight criteria are applied to bases in the large aircraft subcategory. The airfield will be retained to satisfy operational requirements.

Return on Investment: For Grand Forks, the total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$11.9 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$111.8 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$35.2 million with an immediate return on investment. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$447.0 million. Savings associated with the inactivation of a missile field were previously programmed in the Air Force budget.

Return on Investment: If Minot AFB is selected, the total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$12.0 million. The net of all costs and savings during the

implementation period is a savings of \$114.8 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$36.1 million with an immediate return on investment. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$458.6 million. Savings associated with the closure of a missile field were previously programmed in the Air Force budget.

Impacts: For Grand Forks AFB, assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 2,113 jobs (1,625 direct jobs and 488 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Grand Forks County, North Dakota economic area, which is 4.7 percent of the economic area's employment. Environmental impact from this action is minimal and ongoing restoration at Grand Forks AFB will continue.

Impacts: If Minot is selected, assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 2,172 jobs (1,666 direct jobs and 506 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Minot County, North Dakota economic area, which is 6.1 percent of the economic area's employment. Environmental impact from this action is minimal and ongoing restoration at Minot AFB will continue.

Hill Air Force Base, Utah

Recommendation: Realign Hill AFB, Utah. The permanent Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) test range activity at Utah Test and Training Range (UTTR) will be disestablished. Management responsibility for operation of the UTTR will transfer from AFMC to Air Combat Command (ACC). Personnel, equipment and systems required for use by ACC to support the training range will be transferred to ACC. Additional AFMC manpower associated with operation of the range will be eliminated. Some armament/weapons Test and Evaluation (T&E) workload will transfer to the Air Force Development Test Center (AFDTC), Eglin AFB, Florida, and the Air Force Flight Test Center (AFFTC), Edwards AFB, California.

Justification: Most of the current T&E activities can be accomplished at other T&E activities (AFFTC and AFDTC). Disestablishing the AFMC test range activities and transferring the range to ACC will reduce excess T&E capacity within the Air Force. Retaining the range as a training range will preserve the considerable training value offered by the range and is consistent with the current 82 percent training use of the range. Retention of the range as a training facility will also allow large footprint weapons to undergo test and evaluation using mobile equipment.

Return on Investment: The total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$3.2 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$62.4 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are

\$12.4 million with an immediate return on investment. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$179.9 million.

Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 168 jobs (104 direct jobs and 64 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Tooele County, Utah economic area, which is 1.3 percent of the economic area's employment. The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in the economic area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential decrease equal to 36.6 percent of employment in the economic area. Environmental impact from this action is minimal and ongoing restoration of the UTTR will continue.

Air Logistics Centers

Recommendation: Realign the Air Logistics Centers (ALC) at Hill AFB, Utah; Kelly AFB, Texas; McClellan AFB, California; Robins AFB, Georgia; and Tinker AFB, Oklahoma. Consolidate the followings workloads at the designated receiver locations:

<u>Commodity/Workload</u>	<u>Receiving Locations</u>
Composites and plastics	SM-ALC, McClellan AFB
Hydraulics	SM-ALC, McClellan AFB
Tubing manufacturing	WR-ALC, Robins AFB
Airborne electronic automatic equipment software	WR-ALC, Robins AFB, OC- ALC, Tinker AFB, OO-ALC, Hill AFB
Sheet metal repair and manufacturing	OO-ALC, Hill AFB, WR- ALC, Robins AFB
Machining manufacturing	OC-ALC, Tinker AFB, WR- ALC, Robins AFB
Foundry operations	SA-ALC, Kelly AFB, OO- ALC, Hill AFB
Instruments/displays	SM-ALC, McClellan AFB (some unique work remains at OO-ALC, Hill AFB and WR-ALC, Robins AFB)
Airborne electronics	WR-ALC, Robins AFB, OC- ALC, Tinker AFB, OO-ALC, Hill AFB
Electronic manufacturing (printed wire boards)	WR-ALC, Robins AFB

Electrical/mechanical support equipment	SM-ALC, McClellan AFB
Injection molding	SM-ALC, McClellan AFB
Industrial plant equipment software	SA-ALC, Kelly AFB
Plating	OC-ALC, Tinker AFB, OO- ALC, Hill AFB, SA-ALC, Kelly AFB, WR-ALC, Robins AFB

Move the required equipment and any required personnel to the receiving location. These actions will create or strengthen Technical Repair Centers at the receiving locations in the respective commodities. Minimal workload in each of the commodities may continue to be performed at the other ALCs as required.

Justification: Reductions in force structure have resulted in excess depot maintenance capacity across Air Force depots. The recommended realignments will consolidate production lines and move workload to a minimum number of locations, allowing the reduction of personnel, infrastructure, and other costs. The net effect of the realignments is to transfer approximately 3.5 million direct labor hours and to eliminate 37 product lines across the five depots. These actions will allow the Air Force to demolish or mothball facilities, or to make them available for use by other agencies. These consolidations will reduce excess capacity, enhance efficiencies, and produce substantial cost savings without the extraordinary one-time costs associated with closing a single depot.

This action is part of a broader Air Force effort to downsize, reduce depot capacity and infrastructure, and achieve cost savings in a financially prudent manner consistent with mission requirements. Programmed work reductions, downsizing through contracting or transfer to other Service depots, and the consolidation of workloads recommended above result in the reduction of real property infrastructure equal to 1.5 depots, and a reduction in manhour capacity equivalent to about two depots. The proposed moves also make available over 25 million cubic feet of space to the Defense Logistics Agency for storage and other purposes, plus space to accept part of the Defense Nuclear Agency and other displaced Air Force missions. This approach enhances the cost effectiveness of the overall Department of Defense's closure and realignment recommendations. The downsizing of all depots is consistent with DoD efforts to reduce excess maintenance capacity, reduce cost, improve efficiency of depot management, and increase contractor support for DoD requirements.

Return on Investment: The total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$183 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$138.7 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$89 million with a return on investment expected in two years. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$991.2 million.

TINKER

Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 3,040 jobs (1,180 direct jobs and 1,860 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Oklahoma City, Oklahoma Metropolitan Statistical Area, which is 0.5 percent of the economic area's employment. The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in the economic area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential decrease equal to 0.3 percent of employment in the economic area. Environmental impact from this action is minimal and ongoing restoration of Tinker AFB will continue.

ROBINS

Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 1,168 jobs (534 direct jobs and 634 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Macon, Georgia Metropolitan Statistical Area, which is 0.7 percent of the economic area's employment. The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in the economic area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential decrease equal to 0.7 percent of employment in the economic area. Environmental impact from this action is minimal and ongoing restoration of Robins AFB will continue.

KELLY

Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 1,446 jobs (555 direct jobs and 891 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the San Antonio, Texas Metropolitan Statistical Area, which is 0.2 percent of the economic area's employment. The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations, including the relocation of some Air Force activities into the San Antonio area, and all prior-round BRAC actions in the economic area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential decrease equal to 0.9 percent of employment in the economic area. Environmental impact from this action is minimal and ongoing restoration will continue.

McCLELLAN and HILL

Impacts: The recommendations pertaining to consolidations of workloads at these two centers are not anticipated to result in employment losses or significant environmental impact.

Moffett Federal Airfield Air Guard Station, California

Recommendation: Close Moffett Federal Airfield Air Guard Station. Relocate the 129th Rescue Group and associated aircraft to McClellan AFB, California.

Justification: At Moffett Federal Airfield, the 129th Rescue Group (RQG) provides manpower for the airfield's crash, fire and rescue, air traffic control, and security police services, and pays a portion of the total associated costs. The ANG also pays a share of other base operating support costs. These costs to the ANG have risen significantly since NAS Moffett realigned to Moffett Federal Airfield, and can be avoided if the unit is moved to an active duty airfield.

Return on Investment: The total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$15.2 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$4.4 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$4.8 million with a return on investment expected in four years. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$50.1 million.

Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 507 jobs (318 direct jobs and 189 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the San Jose, California Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area, which is 0.1 percent of the economic area's employment. The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in the economic area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential decrease equal to 0.5 percent of employment in the economic area. Review of demographic data projects no negative impact on recruiting. This action will have minimal environmental impact.

Real-Time Digitally Controlled Analyzer Processor Activity, Buffalo, New York

Recommendation: Disestablish the Real-Time Digitally Controlled Analyzer Processor activity (REDCAP) at Buffalo, New York. Required test activities and necessary support equipment will be relocated to the Air Force Flight Test Center (AFFTC) at Edwards AFB, California. Any remaining equipment will be disposed of.

Justification: The Test and Evaluation Joint Cross-Service Group (JCSG) recommended that REDCAP's capabilities be relocated to an existing facility at an installation with a Major Range and Test Facility Base (MRTFB) open air range. Projected workload for REDCAP is only 10 percent of its available capacity. AFFTC has capacity sufficient to absorb

REDCAP's workload. REDCAP's basic hardware-in-the-loop infrastructure is duplicated at other Air Force T&E facilities. This action achieves significant cost savings and workload consolidation.

Return on Investment: The total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$1.7 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$1.9 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$0.9 million with a return on investment expected in one year. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$11.0 million.

Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 5 jobs (3 direct jobs and 2 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Erie County, New York economic area, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment. This action will have minimal environmental impact.

Air Force Electronic Warfare Evaluation Simulator Activity, Fort Worth, Texas

Recommendation: Disestablish the Air Force Electronic Warfare Evaluation Simulator (AFEWES) activity in Fort Worth. Essential AFEWES capabilities and the required test activities will relocate to the Air Force Flight Test Center (AFFTC), Edwards AFB, California. Workload and selected equipment from AFEWES will be transferred to AFFTC. AFEWES will be disestablished and any remaining equipment will be disposed of.

Justification: The Test and Evaluation Joint Cross-Service Group (JCSG) recommended that AFEWES's capabilities be relocated to an existing facility at an installation possessing a Major Range and Test Facility Base (MRTFB) open air range. Projected workload for AFEWES was only 28 percent of its available capacity. Available capacity at AFFTC is sufficient to absorb AFEWES's workload. AFEWES's basic hardware-in-the-loop infrastructure is duplicated at other Air Force Test and Evaluation facilities. This action achieves significant cost savings and workload consolidation.

Return on Investment: The total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$5.8 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a cost of \$2.6 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$0.8 million with a return on investment expected in seven years. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$5.8 million.

Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 9 jobs (5 direct jobs and 4 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Fort Worth-Arlington, Texas Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area, which is less than 0.1 percent of the economic area's employment. This action will have minimal environmental impact.

Williams Air Force Base, Arizona

Recommendation: Change the recommendation of the 1991 Commission regarding the relocation of Williams AFB's Armstrong Laboratory Aircrew Training Research Facility to Orlando, Florida, as follows: The Armstrong Laboratory Aircrew Training Research Facility at Mesa, Arizona, will remain at its present location as a stand-alone activity.

Justification: The 1991 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission recommended that the Armstrong Laboratory Aircrew Training Research Facility located at Williams AFB, Arizona, be relocated to Orlando, Florida. This recommendation, was based on assumptions regarding Navy training activities and the availability of facilities. Subsequent to that Commission's report, it was discovered that the facilities were not available at the estimated cost. In addition, Navy actions in the 1993 BRAC reduced the pilot resources necessary for this facility's work.

In light of these changes, the Air Force recommends the activity remain at its current location. First, it is largely a civilian operation that is well-suited to remain in a stand-alone configuration. It has operated in that capacity since the closure of the rest of Williams AFB in September 1993. Second, its proximity to Luke AFB provides a ready source of fighter aircraft pilots who can support the research activities as consultants and subjects. Third, the present facilities are consolidated and well-suited to the research activities, including a large secure facility. Finally, the activities are consistent with the community's plans for redevelopment of the Williams AFB property, including a university and research park.

Return on Investment: The total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is zero. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$18.4 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$0.3 million with an immediate return on investment. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$21.0 million.

Impacts: Since this action affects unexecuted relocations resulting from prior BRAC recommendations, it causes no net change in employment in the Orange, Osceola, and Seminole, Florida counties economic area. As a result of Armstrong Laboratory being retained at Mesa, Arizona, this action results in the retention of 38 direct jobs the Phoenix-Mesa, Arizona Metropolitan Statistical Area.

Lowry Air Force Base, Colorado

Recommendation: Change the recommendation of the 1991 Commission regarding the cantonment of the 1001st Space Support Squadron at the Lowry Support Center as follows: Inactivate the 1001st Space Systems Squadron, now designated Detachment 1, Space Systems Support Group (SSSG). Some Detachment 1 personnel and equipment will relocate to Peterson AFB, Colorado, under the Space Systems Support Group while the remainder of the positions will be eliminated.

Justification: The 1991 Commission recommended that the 1001st Space Systems Squadron, now designated Detachment 1, SSSG, be retained in a cantonment area at the Lowry Support Center. Air Force Materiel Command is consolidating space and warning systems software support at the SSSG at Peterson AFB. The inactivation of Detachment 1, SSSG, and movement of its functions will further consolidate software support at Peterson AFB, and result in the elimination of some personnel positions and cost savings.

Return on Investment: The total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$1.7 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$10.9 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$3.0 million with a return on investment expected in one year. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$39.0 million.

Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a potential reduction of 135 jobs (89 direct jobs and 46 indirect jobs) over the 1996 to 2001 in the Denver, Colorado Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area's employment. The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in the Denver, Colorado Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area in the 1994 to 2001 period could result in a potential decrease equal to 0.8 percent of employment in the economic area. Environmental impact from this action is minimal and ongoing restoration of Lowry AFB will continue.

Homestead Air Force Base , Florida 301st Rescue Squadron (AFRES)

Recommendation: Change the recommendation of the 1993 Commission regarding Homestead AFB as follows: Redirect the 301st Rescue Squadron (AFRES) with its associated aircraft to relocate to Patrick AFB, Florida.

Justification: The 301st Rescue Squadron (RQS) is temporarily located at Patrick AFB, pending reconstruction of its facilities at Homestead AFB which were destroyed by Hurricane Andrew. As part of the initiative to have reserve forces assume a greater role in DoD

peacetime missions, the 301st RQS has assumed primary responsibility for Space Shuttle support and range clearing operations at Patrick AFB. This reduces mission load on the active duty force structure. Although the 301st RQS could perform this duty from the Homestead Air Reserve Station, doing so would require expensive temporary duty arrangements, extensive scheduling difficulties, and the dislocation of the unit's mission from its beddown site. The redirect will enable the Air Force to perform this mission more efficiently and at less cost, with less disruption to the unit and mission.

Return on Investment: The total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$4.6 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$1.5 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$1.5 million with a return on investment expected in four years. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$15.4 million.

Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 341 jobs (214 direct jobs and 127 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Miami, Florida Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment. Review of demographic data projects no negative impact on recruiting. There will be minimal environmental impact from this action at Homestead or Patrick Air Force Bases.

Homestead Air Force Base , Florida 726th Air Control Squadron

Recommendation: Change the recommendation of the 1993 Commission regarding the relocation of the 726th Air Control Squadron (ACS) from Homestead AFB to Shaw AFB, South Carolina, as follows: Redirect the 726th ACS to Mountain Home AFB, Idaho.

Justification: The 726th ACS was permanently assigned to Homestead AFB. In the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew, the 726th ACS was temporarily moved to Shaw AFB, as the first available site for that unit. In March 1993, the Secretary of Defense recommended the closure of Homestead AFB and the permanent beddown of the 726th ACS at Shaw AFB. Since the 1993 Commission agreed with that recommendation, experience has shown that Shaw AFB does not provide adequate radar coverage of training airspace needed to support the training mission and sustained combat readiness.

Return on Investment: The total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$7.4 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$2.3 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$0.23 million with an immediate return on investment. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$4.6 million.

Impacts: This action affects temporary relocations resulting from prior BRAC recommendations. Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a potential reduction of 163 jobs (126 direct jobs and 37 indirect jobs) over the 1996 to 2001 period in the Sumter, South Carolina Metropolitan Statistical Area which is 0.3 percent of the economic area's employment. Environmental impact from this action is minimal and ongoing restoration will continue.

MacDill Air Force Base, Florida

Recommendation: Change the recommendations of the 1991 and 1993 Commissions regarding the closure and transfer of the MacDill AFB airfield to the Department of Commerce (DoC) as follows: Redirect the retention of the MacDill airfield as part of MacDill AFB. The Air Force will continue to operate the runway and its associated activities. DoC will remain as a tenant.

Justification: Since the 1993 Commission, the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have validated airfield requirements of the two Unified Commands at MacDill AFB and the Air Force has the responsibility to support those requirements. Studies indicate that Tampa International Airport cannot support the Unified Commands' airfield needs. These validated DoD requirements will constitute approximately 95 percent of the planned airfield operations and associated costs. Given the requirement to support the vast majority of airfield operations, it is more efficient for the Air Force to operate the airfield from the existing active duty support base. Additional cost savings will be achieved when the KC-135 aircraft and associated personnel are relocated from Malmstrom AFB in an associated action.

Return on Investment: The cost and savings data associated with this redirect are reflected in the Malmstrom AFB realignment recommendation. There will be no costs to implement this action, even if the Malmstrom AFB action does not occur, compared to Air Force support of a DoC-owned airfield.

Impacts: There is no economic or environmental impact associated with this action.

Griffiss Air Force Base, New York Airfield Support for 10th Infantry (Light) Division

Recommendation: Change the recommendation of the 1993 Commission regarding support of the 10th Infantry (Light) Division, Fort Drum, New York, at Griffiss AFB, as follows: Close the minimum essential airfield that was to be maintained by a contractor at Griffiss

AFB and provide the mobility/contingency/training support to the 10th Infantry (Light) Division from the Fort Drum airfield. Mission essential equipment from the minimum essential airfield at Griffiss AFB will transfer to Fort Drum.

Justification: Operation of the minimum essential airfield to support Fort Drum operations after the closure of Griffiss AFB has proven to far exceed earlier cost estimates. Significant recurring operations and maintenance savings can be achieved by moving the mobility/contingency/training support for the 10th Infantry (Light) Division to Fort Drum and closing the minimum essential airfield operation at Griffiss. This redirect will permit the Air Force to meet the mobility/contingency/training support requirements of the 10th Infantry (Light) Division at a reduced cost to the Air Force. Having airfield support at its home location will improve 10th Infantry (Light) Division's response capabilities, and will avoid the necessity of traveling significant distances, sometimes during winter weather, to its mobility support location. Support at Fort Drum can be accomplished by improvement of the existing Fort Drum airfield and facilities

Return on Investment: The total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$51.3 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a cost of \$12.9 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$12.7 million with a return on investment expected in five years. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$110.8 million.

Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 216 jobs (150 direct jobs and 66 indirect jobs) over the 1996 to 2001 period in the Utica-Rome, New York Metropolitan Statistical Area, which is 0.1 percent of economic area employment. The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in the economic area over the 1994 to 2001 period could result in a maximum potential increase equal to 6.2 percent of the employment in the economic area. Environmental impact will be minimal; ongoing restoration will continue.

Griffiss Air Force Base, New York 485th Engineering Installation Group

Recommendation: Change the recommendation of the 1993 Commission regarding the transfer of the 485th Engineering Installation Group (EIG) from Griffiss AFB, New York, to Hill AFB, Utah, as follows: Inactivate the 485th EIG. Transfer its engineering functions to the 38th EIG at Tinker AFB, Oklahoma. Transfer its installation function to the 838th Electronic Installation Squadron (EIS) at Kelly AFB, Texas, and to the 938th EIS, McClellan AFB, California.

Justification: Reorganization of the installation and engineering functions will achieve additional personnel overhead savings by inactivating the 485th EIG and redistributing the remaining activities to other units. The originally planned receiver site for the 485th EIG at Hill AFB has proven to require costly renovation. This redirect avoids these additional, unforeseen costs while providing a more efficient allocation of work.

Return on Investment: The total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$0.5 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$26.8 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$2.9 million with an immediate return on investment. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$53.6 million.

Impacts: Since this action affects unexecuted relocations resulting from prior BRAC recommendations, it causes no net change in employment in the Salt Lake City-Ogden, Utah, Metropolitan Statistical Area. However, the anticipated 0.2 percent increase in the employment base in this economic area will not occur. There will be no environmental impact from this action at Hill Air Force Base, and minimal environmental impact at Kelly AFB, Tinker AFB, and McClellan AFB.

Chapter 5

Recommendations -- Department of the Air Force

Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)

Summary of Selection Process

Introduction

The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) 1995 Base Realignment and Closure study process was guided by existing legislation, the DoD Force Structure Plan and by Department of Defense policy. As DLA is not directly identified in the DoD Force Structure Plan, Concepts of Operations were developed to translate the effects of the Force Structure Plan within the Agency's mission planning.

The Director, DLA established a Base Realignment and Closure Executive Group comprised of appropriate senior executives from the Agency's business and staff areas. The Group included both senior level civilian and military personnel, and was chaired by the Principal Deputy Director.

The Executive Group served as senior advisors to direct the 1995 study effort and present activity realignment and closure candidates for the Director's final recommendation to the Secretary of Defense. A BRAC Working Group was also established under the direction of the Executive Group. The Working Group developed analytical tools, collected and analyzed certified data, developed and evaluated alternative scenarios for Executive Group consideration, conducted sensitivity analyses, and compiled documentation to support the final recommendations.

The DLA BRAC analysis process ensured that all of the Agency's activities were evaluated fairly and equitably. Formal charters were developed for the Executive Group and the Working Group, and audit and internal control plans were developed to document the collection and use of accurate certified data.

The Selection Process

The Executive Group aggregated activities into categories and subcategories based on similarity of mission, capabilities, and attributes. From these, the following categories were defined: Distribution Depots, Inventory Control Points, Service/Support, and Command and Control Activities. Subcategories were defined within the categories to ensure that the activities were evaluated in a fair and consistent manner. Where possible, activities were compared to peers of similar function and size. Also, activities identified for closure as a result of previous BRAC decisions were not evaluated.

Collect Data

Comprehensive data calls were designed to support analysis of excess capacity, military value, and economic, environmental and community impacts with certified data. The data call questionnaires were carefully designed to ensure uniform interpretation of questions, level of detail, and documentation requirements. Sources for the data were specified to the greatest extent practical.

Evaluate Excess Capacity

DLA conducted an excess capacity analysis for each of the BRAC activity categories and subcategories. Where significant amounts of excess capacity were found, these sites could be considered as possible receiver sites in potential realignment recommendations.

Analyze Military Value

The purpose of the military value analysis was to determine the relative ranking of each activity with respect to other activities in the same category or subcategory. OSD provided the Military Departments and the Defense Agencies with a list of selection criteria to be used as part of the military value analysis. The Executive Group determined that more distinctive measures should be developed to assess the military value of DLA activities and developed the Measures of Merit shown below:

Mission Scope (DoD Selection Criteria 1 and 3). The mission assigned to the installation/activity plays an essential role within DoD and additionally benefits non-DoD customers. The functions performed in accomplishing the missions(s) may be unique. The strategic location of the facility and span of control are important to effective mission accomplishment.

Mission Suitability (DoD Selection Criteria 1, 2, 3). The installation/activity supports assigned missions. Suitability includes the age and condition of facilities, quality of life, location, and proximity to transportation links.

Operational Efficiencies (DoD Selection Criteria 2 and 4). The installation/activity's mission is performed economically. Installation/activity operation costs include: transportation, mechanical system, (mechanized material handling equipment, etc.), space utilization, and personnel costs, and facility operating costs.

Expandability (DoD Selection Criteria 1, 2, 3). The installation/activity can accommodate new missions and increased workload, including sustained contingencies. Expandability considerations included requirements for space and infrastructure, community encroachment, and increased workload.

Develop Alternatives

The next step in the analysis sequence was to identify potential realignment or closure candidates and eliminate the remaining activities from further consideration. Military value, in conjunction with military judgment, was the primary consideration in determining prospective realignment or closure candidates. Once an alternative was conceived, it was evaluated for reasonableness and then either refined or abandoned. DLA worked closely with each Military Department during this process to identify and consider potential excess space for joint use, to evaluate the impact of Military Department recommendations on its activities and to ensure that the impact of Military Department recommendations was appropriately factored into the Agency's recommendations.

Analyze Return on Investment

The DLA BRAC Working Group evaluated potential realignment and closure scenarios using the Cost of Base Realignment Actions (COBRA) model. Data for the model consists of DoD standard factors, DLA standard factors, static base data, and scenario-specific data which describes the actions and costs involved in a realignment or closure scenario. DoD standard factors used in the model were developed by a DoD Joint Process Action Team. Agency-wide standard factors were developed from field-certified data and data collected and certified by Headquarters organizations. Activity static information was gathered from field-certified data and OSD policy memo guidance.

Develop Recommendations

After base realignment and closure scenarios were evaluated with the COBRA model, the analysis results were reviewed by the BRAC Working Group and presented to the Executive Group for further consideration.

Each scenario was considered in terms of its overall risk, benefit, and cost to the strategic direction of DLA and the interests of DoD. Based on its review and best military judgment, the Executive Group made individual recommendations to the Director. After the approval of the Director, the recommendations were then returned to the Working Group for economic, community infrastructure, and environmental impact assessments. The Working Group reported its findings to the Executive Group for further consideration as appropriate.

Role of Internal Controls and External Audits

An Internal Control Plan for the collection and analysis of data was developed for the BRAC 95 process. The plan, issued 23 May 1994, was reviewed and approved by the DoD Inspector General (IG) and the General Accounting Office (GAO).

DoDIG personnel were responsible for data validation, and fully participated in the Executive and Working Group meetings and observed the Working Group analysis process.

GAO representatives also participated in the DLA BRAC 95 process and attended Executive Group meetings, observed the Working Group analysis process, and visited selected field activities to observe the data collection and data validation process.

Finalize Recommendations

Upon completion of the impact assessments, recommendations were returned to the Executive Group. The Working Group presented the results of the impact analyses and supported additional Executive Group deliberations. The Executive Group discussed the impact assessments, conducted an extensive review of each recommendation, and approved selected recommendations.

The final approved recommendations were then prepared for inclusion in this report. Preparation included gathering supporting documentation, writing narrative descriptions of the analysis process, and submission to OSD.

Recommendations and Justifications

Defense Distribution Depot Memphis, Tennessee (DDMT)

Recommendation: Close Defense Distribution Depot Memphis, Tennessee. Material remaining at DDMT at the time of closure will be relocated to optimum storage space within the DoD Distribution System. As a result of the closure of DDMT, all DLA activity will cease at this location and DDMT will be excess to DLA needs.

Justification: Defense Distribution Depot Memphis, is a Stand-Alone Depot that supports the two large east and west coast depots and is used primarily for storage capability and local area demand. It is also the host for the Memphis complex. The decision to close the Memphis depot was based on declining storage requirements and capacity estimates for FY 01 and on the need to reduce infrastructure within the Agency.

Memphis tied for third place out of the six Stand-Alone Depots in the military value analysis. The higher scores for the Susquehanna and San Joaquin distribution depots in this analysis removed them from further consideration for closure. The variance of only 37 points out of a possible 1,000 between the third and sixth place depots in the military value analysis for this category reinforced the importance of military judgment and compliance with the DLA BRAC 95 Decision Rules in the decision-making process.

A further consideration was the Agency's desire to minimize distribution infrastructure costs. Closure of an entire installation will allow DLA to reduce infrastructure significantly more than disestablishment of a tenant depot (DDCO at Columbus, OH, and DDRV at Richmond, VA). Memphis was rated six out of six in the Installation Military Value analysis. The Columbus installation ranked the highest. The facilities at Richmond are the best maintained of any in DLA. Both Columbus and Richmond take advantage of the synergy of a collocated Inventory Control Point. This closure action conforms to the Decision Rules to maximize the use of shared overhead and make optimum use of retained DLA-operated facilities, while closing an installation.

In addition, the Strategic Analysis of Integrated Logistics Systems (SAILS) model optimized system-wide costs for distribution when the Ogden and Memphis depots were the two Stand-Alone Depots chosen for closure. Sufficient throughput and storage capacity are available in the remaining depots to accommodate projected workload and storage requirements. Closing DDMT is consistent with the DLA BRAC 95 Decision Rules and the Distribution Concept of Operations. Therefore, military judgment determined that it is in the best interest of DLA and DoD to close DDMT.

Return on Investment: The total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$85.7 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$14.8 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$23.8 million with a return on investment expected in three years. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$244.3 million.

Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 3,349 jobs (1,300 direct jobs and 2,049 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Memphis, Tennessee-Arkansas-Mississippi Metropolitan Statistical Area, which is 0.6 percent of the area's employment. The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in the area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential decrease equal to 1.5 percent of employment in the area.

The Executive Group determined that receiving communities could absorb the additional forces, missions, and personnel proposed, and concluded that environmental considerations do not prohibit this recommendation from being implemented.

Defense Distribution Depot Ogden, Utah (DDOU)

Recommendation: Close Defense Distribution Depot Ogden, Utah, except for a 36,000 square foot cantonment for Army Reserve personnel. Material remaining at DDOU at the time of closure will be relocated to optimum storage space within the DoD Distribution System. As a result of the closure of DDOU, all DLA activity will cease at this location and DDOU will be excess to DLA needs.

Justification: The Defense Distribution Depot Ogden is a Stand-Alone Depot that supports the two large east and west coast depots and is used primarily for storage capability and local area demand. It is also the host for the Ogden complex. The decision to close the Ogden depot was based on declining storage requirements and capacity estimates for FY 01 and on the need to reduce infrastructure within the Agency.

Ogden tied for third place out of the six Stand-Alone Depots in the military value analysis. The higher scores for the Susquehanna and San Joaquin distribution depots in this analysis removed them from further consideration for closure. The variance of only 37 points out of a possible 1,000 between the third and sixth place depots in military value ranking for this category reinforced the importance of compliance with the DLA BRAC 95 Decision Rules and military judgment in the decision-making process.

A further consideration was DLA's desire to minimize distribution infrastructure costs. Closure of an entire installation will allow DLA to reduce infrastructure significantly

more than disestablishment of a tenant depot (DDCO at Columbus, OH, and DDRV at Richmond, VA). The Ogden depot was rated five of six in the Military Value Installation analysis. The Columbus installation ranked the highest. The facilities at Richmond are the best maintained of any in DLA. Both Columbus and Richmond take advantage of the synergy of a collocated Inventory Control Point. This action conforms to the DLA Decision Rules to maximize the use of shared overhead and make optimum use of retained DLA-operated facilities while closing an installation.

In addition, the Strategic Analysis of Integrated Logistics Systems (SAILS) model optimized system-wide costs for Distribution when Ogden and Memphis were the two Stand-Alone Depots chosen for closure. Sufficient throughput and storage capacity are available in the remaining depots to accommodate projected workload. Closing the Ogden depot is consistent with the DLA BRAC 95 Decision Rules and the Distribution Concept of Operations. Military judgment determined that it is in the best interest of DLA and DoD to close DDOU.

Return on Investment: The total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$110.8 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a cost of \$27.8 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$21.3 million with a return on investment expected in four years. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$180.9 million.

Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 2,947 jobs (1,113 direct jobs and 1,834 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Salt Lake City-Ogden, Utah Metropolitan Statistical Area, which is 0.4 percent of the area's employment. The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in the area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential decrease equal to 0.3 percent of the employment in the area.

The Executive Group determined that the receiving community could absorb the additional forces, missions, and personnel proposed and that environmental considerations do not prohibit this recommendation from being implemented.

Defense Contract Management District South (DCMDS) Marietta, Georgia

Recommendation: Disestablish DCMD South and relocate missions to DCMD Northeast and DCMD West.

Justification: The Contract Management Districts provide command and control, operational support, and management oversight for 90 Defense Contract Management Area Operations (DCMAOs) and Defense Plant Representative Offices (DPROs) located throughout the continental United States. Due to the impact of the DoD Force Structure drawdown, budget cuts and the resulting decline in acquisition workload, a number of Area Operations Offices and Plant Representative Offices have been disestablished thereby reducing the span of control responsibility at the Districts. As the drawdown continues, the number of Area Operations Offices and Plant Representative Offices is expected to decline even further. Based on the above, the closure of a district and realignment of assigned Area Operations Offices and Plant Representative Offices to the remaining two districts is feasible with only a moderate risk. Although the difference between second and third place was not sufficiently broad to dictate a clear decision by itself, DCMD South received the lowest military value score.

Military judgment determined that a single contract management district presence on each coast is necessary. A west coast district is required because of the high dollar value of contracts and the significant weapon-systems related workload located on the west coast.

There is a higher concentration of workload in the northeast, in terms of span of control, field personnel provided support services, numbers of contractors, and value of contract dollars obligated, than in the south. In addition, the northeast district supports its Area Operations Offices and Plant Representative Offices with a lower ratio of headquarters to field personnel than DCMD South. On the east coast, due to the higher concentration of workload in DCMD Northeast, as well as its significantly higher military value score, there is a clear indication that DCMD South is the disestablishment candidate. As a result, the BRAC Executive Group recommended to the DLA Director, and he approved, the disestablishment of DCMD South.

Return on Investment: The total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$3.8 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$17.9 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$6.1 million with a return on investment expected immediately. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$75.8 million.

Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 275 jobs (169 direct jobs and 106 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Atlanta, Georgia Metropolitan Statistical Area, which is less than 0.1 percent of the area's employment. The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in the area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential increase equal to less than 0.1 percent of employment in the area.

The Executive Group concluded that the data did not present any evidence or indication that would preclude the recommended receiving communities from absorbing the additional forces, missions, and personnel proposed in the recommended realignment scenarios. The environmental considerations present at these installations do not prohibit this recommendation from being implemented.

Defense Contract Management Command International (DCMCI) Dayton, Ohio

Recommendation: Realign the DCMCI (Gentile AFS), Dayton, Ohio, and merge its mission into the Defense Contract Management Command Headquarters (DCMC HQ), Ft. Belvoir, Virginia.

Justification: The mission of the DCMCI is to provide command and control, including operational and management control and oversight, for 13 overseas Defense Contract Management Area Operations (DCMAO) offices located outside of the continental United States. The Command's mission could be performed from any locality. Military judgment concluded that merging the mission with the headquarters affords the opportunity to capitalize on operational and management oversight and to maximize use of shared overhead with DCMC. It also affords the opportunity to take advantage of the close proximity to the State Department and the international support infrastructure in Washington, DC, and surrounding areas. This decision is consistent with DLA BRAC 95 Decision Rules, the DCMC Concept of Operations and the Force Structure Plan.

Return on Investment: The total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$3.1 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$8.7 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$3.1 million with a return on investment expected in one year. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$38.7 million.

Impacts: Since this action affects unexecuted relocations resulting from prior BRAC recommendations, it causes no net change in employment in the Columbus, Ohio Metropolitan Statistical Area. However, the anticipated employment increase of less than 0.1 percent in the employment base in this area will not occur.

The Executive Group concluded that the data did not present any evidence or indication that would preclude the recommended receiving community from absorbing the additional forces, missions, and personnel proposed in the recommended realignment scenarios. The environmental considerations present at the receiving installations do not prohibit this recommendation from being implemented.

Defense Distribution Depot Columbus, Ohio (DDCO)

Recommendation: Realign the Defense Distribution Depot Columbus, Ohio, and designate it as a storage site for slow moving/war reserve material. Active material remaining at DDCO at the time of realignment will be attrited. Stock replenishment will be stored in optimum space within the distribution system.

Justification: Defense Distribution Distribution Depot Columbus, is a Stand-Alone Depot that supports the two large east/west coast depots and is used primarily for storage capability and local area demand. The decision to realign the Columbus depot was based on storage requirements and capacity estimates for FY 01 and the need to comply with BRAC 95 Decision Rules. Columbus ranked sixth of six depots in military value for the Stand-Alone Depot category.

The other Stand-Alone Depots were not considered for realignment for the following reasons. The higher military value of both the Susquehanna (DDSC) and San Joaquin (DDJC) depots removed them from consideration for closure or realignment. The Richmond Depot (DDRV) was not selected for realignment because of the large amount of conforming hazardous material storage space, new construction and mechanization, and collocation with supply center, which has the best maintained facilities of any in DLA. Both the Ogden and Memphis distribution depots were selected for closure.

The decision to realign rather than close the Columbus depot was based on the need for inactive storage capacity in the overall system and with the long-range intent of minimizing use of this site as storage requirements decline. Moving highly active stock to San Joaquin and Susquehanna will allow DLA to take advantage of economies of scale from large distribution operations. The decision was also based on the further consideration that Columbus, the highest ranking DLA location in the Installation Military Value analysis, will remain open and most likely expand its operations, thereby allowing DLA to maximize the use of shared overhead and optimize the use of retained DLA-operated facilities. In addition,

the Strategic Analysis of Integrated Logistics Systems (SAILS) model favored the retention of Columbus over either Ogden or Memphis. Realigning the Columbus depot is consistent with the DLA BRAC 95 Decision Rules and the Distribution Concept of Operations. Military judgment determined that it is in the best interest of DLA and DoD to realign DDCO.

Return on Investment: The total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$7.9 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$51.2 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$11.6 million with a return on investment expected in the first year. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$161.0 million.

Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 997 jobs (365 direct jobs and 632 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Columbus, Ohio Metropolitan Statistical Area, which is 0.1 percent of the area's employment. The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in the area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential decrease equal to 0.1 percent of employment in the area.

The Executive Group determined that the receiving community could absorb the additional forces, missions, and personnel proposed, and concluded that environmental considerations do not prohibit this recommendation from being implemented.

Defense Distribution Depot Letterkenny, Pennsylvania (DDLDP)

Recommendation: Disestablish the Defense Distribution Depot Letterkenny, Pennsylvania. Material remaining at DDLDP at the time of disestablishment will be relocated to the Defense Distribution Depot Anniston, Alabama (DDAA) and to optimum storage space within the DoD Distribution System.

Justification: The Defense Distribution Depot Letterkenny is collocated with an Army maintenance depot, its largest customer. While Collocated Depots may support other nearby customers and provide limited world-wide distribution support, Letterkenny's primary function is to provide rapid response in support of the maintenance operation. The Distribution Concept of Operations states that DLA's distribution system will support the size and configuration of the Defense Depot Maintenance System. Thus, if depot maintenance activities are disestablished, Collocated Depots will also be disestablished.

The recommendation to disestablish the Letterkenny depot was driven by the Army recommendation to realign Letterkenny Army Depot, Letterkenny's primary customer, and the Agency's need to reduce infrastructure. The Letterkenny depot was rated 3 of 17 in the

Collocated Depot military value matrix. However, that military value ranking was based on support to the maintenance missions. With the realignment of the Army's maintenance mission to the Anniston Army Depot that value decreases significantly. Other customers within the Letterkenny area can be supported from nearby distribution depots. Production and physical space requirements can also be met by fully utilizing other depots in the distribution system.

Disestablishing DDLP is consistent with both the DLA BRAC 95 Decision Rules and the Distribution Concept of Operations. Military judgment determined that it is in the best interest of DLA and DoD to disestablish DDLP.

Return on Investment: The total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$44.9 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a cost of \$21.2 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$12.4 million with a return on investment expected in three years. The net present value of costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$102.1 million.

Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 748 jobs (378 direct jobs and 370 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Franklin County, Pennsylvania economic area, which is 1.2 percent of the area's employment. The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in the area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential decrease equal to 8.5 percent of employment in the area.

The DLA Executive Group determined that receiving communities could absorb the additional forces, missions, and personnel proposed, and concluded that environmental considerations do not prohibit this recommendation from being implemented.

Defense Industrial Supply Center (DISC) Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

Recommendation: The Defense Industrial Supply Center is disestablished. Distribute the management of Federal Supply Classes (FSC) within the remaining DLA Inventory Control Points (ICP). Create one ICP for the management of troop and general support items at the Defense Personnel Support Center (DPSC) in Philadelphia, PA. Create two ICPs for the management of weapon system-related FSCs at the Defense Construction Supply Center (DCSC), Columbus, OH and the Defense General Supply Center (DGSC), Richmond, VA.

Justification: Four of the five Inventory Control Points manage differing mixes of weapon system, troop support, and general support items. Troop and general support items largely have different industry and customer bases than weapon system items. They are also more

conducive to commercial support, and are thus managed differently than weapon system items. Consolidating management of items by the method of management required will improve oversight, streamline the supply management process, increase internal efficiency, and reduce overhead.

DLA manages nearly five times as many weapon system items as troop and general support items. A single troop and general support ICP is adequate, but two weapon system ICPs are necessary. DPSC is almost entirely a troop support ICP. No other ICP currently manages troop support items. The percentage of general support items at other ICPs is relatively small. Singling-up troop and general support items under DPSC management is the most logical course of action.

DISC had the lowest military value of the three hardware ICPs. The Columbus and Richmond centers are host activities of compounds which house a number of DLA and non-DLA activities, conforming to the DLA decision rules concerning maximizing the use of shared overhead and making optimum use of retained DLA-operated facilities. Both the Richmond and Columbus sites have high installation military value, and take advantage of the synergy of a Collocated Depot. Both also have considerable expansion capability. The facilities at Columbus are the best maintained of any in DLA, and Richmond has several new buildings completed or in progress. DISC is a tenant on a Navy compound. Disestablishing DISC allows the Agency to achieve a substantial cost avoidance by back-filling the space already occupied by DISC and substantially reducing the amount of conversion required to existing warehouse space. Based on the above, military judgment concluded that disestablishing DISC is in the best interest of DLA and DoD.

Return on Investment: The total estimated one-time costs to implement the recommendation is \$16.9 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$59.3 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$18.4 million, with a return on investment expected immediately. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$236.5 million.

Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 1,198 jobs (385 direct jobs and 813 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania-New Jersey Metropolitan Statistical Area, which is less than 0.1 percent of the area's employment. The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in the area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential decrease equal to 1.2 percent of employment in the area.

Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could also result in a maximum potential reduction of 981 jobs (358 direct jobs and 623 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Columbus, Ohio Metropolitan Statistical Area, which is 0.1 percent of the area's employment. The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in the area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential decrease equal to 0.1 percent of employment in the area.

The Executive Group concluded that the data did not present any evidence or indication that would preclude the recommended receiving community from absorbing the additional forces, missions, and personnel proposed in the recommended realignment scenario. The environmental considerations present at the receiving installations do not prohibit this recommendation from being implemented.

Defense Distribution Depot Red River, Texas (DDRT)

Recommendation: Disestablish the Defense Distribution Depot Red River, Texas. Material remaining at DDRT at the time of disestablishment will be relocated to the Defense Distribution Depot Anniston, Alabama, (DDAA) and to optimum storage space within the DoD Distribution System.

Justification: The Defense Distribution Depot Red River is collocated with an Army maintenance depot, its largest customer. While Collocated Depots may support other nearby customers and provide limited world-wide distribution support, Red River's primary function is to provide rapid response in support of the maintenance operation. The Distribution Concept of Operations states that DLA's distribution system will support the size and configuration of the Defense Depot Maintenance System. Thus, if depot maintenance activities are disestablished, Collocated Depots will also be disestablished.

The recommendation to disestablish the Red River depot was driven by the Army recommendation to realign its Red River Army Depot, Red River's primary customer, and the Agency's need to reduce infrastructure. DDRT was rated 5 of 17 in the Collocated Depot military value matrix. However, that military value ranking was based on support to the maintenance missions. With the realignment of the Army's maintenance mission to Anniston, Alabama, that value decreases significantly. Other customers within the DDRT area can be supported from nearby distribution depots. Production and physical space requirements can also be met by fully utilizing other depots in the distribution system.

Disestablishing DDRT is consistent with both the DLA BRAC 95 Decision Rules and the Distribution Concept of Operations. Military judgment determined that it is in the best interest of DLA and DoD to disestablish DDRT.

Return on Investment: The total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$58.9 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a cost of \$0.8 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$18.9 million with a return on investment expected in two years. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$186.1 million.

Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 1,602 jobs (821 direct jobs and 781 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Texarkana, Texas-Arkansas Metropolitan Statistical Area, which is 2.7 percent of the area's employment. The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in the area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential decrease equal to 7.7 percent of the employment in the area.

The DLA Executive Group determined that receiving communities could absorb the additional forces, missions, and personnel proposed, and concluded that environmental considerations do not prohibit this recommendation from being implemented.

Defense Contract Management District West (DCMDW) El Segundo, California

Recommendation: This is a redirect of the following BRAC 93 Commission recommendation: "Relocate the Defense Contract Management District, El Segundo, California, to Long Beach Naval Shipyard, Los Angeles, California, or space obtained from exchange of land for space between the Navy and the Port Authority/City of Long Beach." The current recommendation is expanded to read: Relocate the DCMD, El Segundo, CA, (a) to Government property in the Los Angeles/Long Beach area, or, (b) to space obtained from exchange of land between the Navy and Port Authority/City of Long Beach, or (c) to a purchased office building, whichever is the most cost-effective for DoD.

Justification: The Defense Contract Management District West is currently located in GSA-leased administrative space in El Segundo, CA. The BRAC 93 Commission found it was cost effective for DCMD West to move from leased space to DoD-owned property. The Navy has been involved in exploratory discussions on behalf of DLA. However, the President's Five-Point Revitalization Plan, which affords communities the opportunity to obtain installations without substantial compensation, has significantly impacted the Navy's ability to consummate a land exchange at Long Beach with the Port Authority/City of Long Beach. The Long Beach Naval Shipyard, another option, has been placed on the BRAC 95 list for closure.

In order to attain the significant savings which will result by moving the organization into DoD space, the BRAC 93 recommendation is revised/expanded. This redirect eliminates the cost of a warehouse and reflects the requirement for reduced administrative space. This recommendation is consistent with the DCMC Concept of Operations and the DLA BRAC 95 Decision Rules.

Return on Investment: This is a redirect of a BRAC 93 recommendation. The total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$10.3 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$10.9 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$4.2 million with a return on investment expected immediately. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$51.2 million.

Impacts: This recommendation will not result in a change in employment in the Los Angeles-Long Beach, California Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area because all affected jobs will remain in that area. The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in this area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential decrease equal to 0.4 percent of employment in the area.

Defense Investigative Service (DIS)

Summary of Selection Process

Introduction

The 1995 DIS Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) study process was guided by existing BRAC legislation and guidance provided by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD).

The Director, DIS, established a Base Realignment and Closure Executive Group comprised of appropriate heads of headquarters Principal Staff Elements (PSE), and chaired by the Deputy Director, Resources. The Executive Group acted as senior advisors to direct the analysis effort and present the Director's final recommendations to the Secretary of Defense. A BRAC Working Group was established under the direction of the Executive Group. The Working Group was comprised of four headquarters elements and two Investigations Control and Automation elements. Other specific elements of DIS technical areas were consulted as appropriate. The Working Group adapted the DoD process and procedures to the BRAC effort; collected and analyzed certified data; developed and evaluated recommendations for the Executive Group's consideration, and compiled documentation to support the final recommendation.

In October 1994, GAO began its review of the DIS BRAC 1995 process. The Chairman of the Working Group served as an audit liaison with the GAO representatives throughout the analysis process.

The Selection Process

The process followed the requirements of law and OSD policy guidance to ensure that all data were correctly collected and verified. DIS first developed and implemented a general plan and operating instructions that would guide the efforts of the Executive and Working Groups. An Internal Control Plan was developed to ensure that data was consistent and standardized, accurate and complete, certifiable, verifiable, auditable by external audit and inspection agencies, and replicable using documentation developed during data collection.

The selection process consisted of five steps to gather data and conduct analyses: 1) collect data, 2) analyze military value, 3) develop alternatives, 4) perform COBRA analyses, and 5) determine impacts.

Collect Data

Data elements were identified by the Working Group, and for the most part, collected by the Working Group.

Analyze Military Value

Military value criteria were given priority consideration. Since the DoD Selection Criteria were designed specifically with the Military Services in mind, the Executive Group developed more distinctive measures to assess the military value of DIS activities. The Measures of Merit used to develop military value were Mission Essentiality, Mission Suitability, Operational Efficiencies, and Expandability.

Develop Alternatives

The Working Group developed three alternatives regarding the DIS activity at Fort Holabird: 1) renovate the existing facility, 2) military construction on available land at Fort Meade, and 3) leased space. The cost and savings implications of these alternatives were then evaluated by COBRA.

Perform COBRA Analysis

DIS used the COBRA model to assess the relative costs, savings, and return on investment of the alternatives. Working Group members gathered the necessary data regarding personnel, construction and renovation.

Determine Impacts

The potential economic impact on communities was evaluated through use of the BRAC 95 Economic Impact Data Base. The ability of the potential losing and receiving locations infrastructure to support each alternative was evaluated by the Executive and Working Groups. Impacts were also evaluated in terms of readiness, effectiveness, and efficiency with regard to DIS' ability to support its customers. The analysis also considered potential environmental impacts at both the losing and gaining sites for each alternative.

COBRA results, community and environmental impacts and supporting rationale were presented to the Executive Group for consideration and selection of the Agency's final recommendation to the Secretary of Defense.

Defense Investigative Service (DIS)

Recommendations and Justifications

Investigations Control and Automation Directorate (IC&AD), Fort Holabird, Maryland

Recommendation: Relocate the Defense Investigative Service (DIS), Investigations Control and Automation Directorate (IC&AD) from Fort Holabird, Maryland, to a new facility to be built on Fort Meade, Maryland. This proposal is a revision to the 1988 Base Closure Commission's recommendation to retain the Defense Investigative Service at Fort Holabird. Once DIS vacates the building on Fort Holabird, the base will be vacant.

Justification: The IC&AD is located in Building 320, a Korean War-era building. The building is in disrepair and continues to deteriorate costing over \$0.3 million in repairs since FY 1991 in addition to the annual Interservice Support Agreement cost of approximately \$0.4 million. A recent Corps of Engineers (COE) Building Analysis indicated that the cost to bring the building up to code and to correct the environmental deficiencies would cost DIS approximately \$9.1 million based on current space requirements. A military construction project on Fort Meade based on 1998 DIS force structure is estimated to cost \$9.4 million.

Return on Investment: The total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$11 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a cost of \$0.7 million. Annual recurring savings after the implementation are \$0.5 million with a return on investment expected in six years. The net present value of costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$4 million.

Impacts: Relocating the IC&AD will have no negative impact on the local economy since it is an intra-area move. There is no significant environmental or community infrastructure impact resulting from this relocation.

Chapter 6

After Closure: Encouraging New Development

The Clinton Administration and the Department, with the cooperation of Congress, have significantly improved the process by which base closure properties are disposed and redeveloped into productive civilian uses. Rapid reuse is not only important to communities and workers impacted by the base closure, it is also essential in our efforts to cut costs.

Creating Community Jobs with an Improved Base Reuse Process

Since the Department began these most recent rounds of closures and realignments in 1988, we have learned that the faster bases are closed, the faster the Department saves money -- and the faster communities can begin creating new jobs.

We have reduced closure time from the nearly five years for bases on the 1988 list to approximately two years for bases on the 1993 list. Much of this improvement is attributable to new policies and procedures designed to expedite mission drawdown and help communities achieve rapid economic redevelopment. Communities are also acting more quickly in developing their reuse plans. We encourage cooperation between DoD and communities affected to explore privatization opportunities utilizing surplus facilities, some of which may involve DoD contracts. In BRAC 88, the average community took nearly two and a half years to create a reuse plan; in the 1993 round that time dropped to only a year.

When the BRAC 88 process began, the property disposal statute (the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949) allowed DoD to turn over property to communities or institutions at a discount or free only for public purposes such as aviation or recreation -- but not for job creation. Moreover, disposal of the land, buildings, and movable property on bases was bureaucratic and penny-pinching, primarily because the Act was written to maximize the return to the Federal Government from the disposal of such assets. Many business owners wanting to locate on a newly-closed base have been unable to get interim leases because of Pentagon red tape. Disputes over "fair market value" of military property resulted in the worst of both worlds: land and buildings that could support job creation sat idle, while DoD continued to maintain property it no longer needed. Another example was the Stewart B. McKinney Act which gave the homeless priority rights to excess Federal property without giving any consideration to community reuse. It became clear that the 1949 Act did not envision the magnitude of military base closures or the attendant economic disruption to communities.

Improving the Base Reuse Process

The Clinton Administration worked closely with Congress to address the reuse problem. In 1993, legislation was enacted to allow DoD to turn over property for economic development when community development plans meet a strict test for economic viability and job creation. To make property available for reuse as quickly as possible, the Administration is implementing a new job-centered property disposal process with the following key elements:

Economic Development Conveyances (EDC). Congress changed the law to enable DoD to transfer property at little or no cost for economic development purposes, when communities have a viable plan to create jobs. That legislation also allows for federal recoupment of a portion of eventual profits should the base be sold later.

Interim Leases. Even before base property is ready for sale or transfer, it can be used to create new jobs for the community. Interim leases, with temporary tenants, can be the key to rapid economic redevelopment. DoD encourages interim leases in a variety of ways, including arrangements that allow tenants to lease rent-free in exchange for maintaining the property. These arrangements can now be made with local base commanders who are most familiar with local needs and Service drawdown plans. This step can cut processing time by three months or more.

Screening of Property. The Federal Property Act required DoD to offer base property first to other federal agencies -- a process that took months and even years. The Military Departments are now meeting with community leaders and local planners to explain the screening process and to discuss the community's interest in specific parcels of land. This has shortened the screening process and DoD now looks to the community reuse plan to guide the disposition of base property when federal agencies seek portions of a base.

Related Personal Property. DoD had taken most of the movable property out of a closing base to meet other defense needs, although such property -- everything from furniture to fire trucks -- can be a significant inducement to a prospective tenant or owner. Changes to the property disposal law now make equipment not needed for specific military purposes available to the community when it can enhance the future uses of the real property being considered in its redevelopment plan. While defense needs remain important, local reuse needs receive greater visibility and priority in decisions to allocate such movable property at closing bases.

Revitalizing the Homeless Assistance Process

The Department was also successful in working with other Federal agencies and Congress to pass the Base Closure Community Redevelopment and Homeless Assistance Act of 1994. This law addresses local reuse needs by balancing homeless assistance needs with economic development needs. Under the new process, local communities work along with homeless providers to decide how best to address homeless needs. The old process permitted homeless providers to acquire property as an entitlement, directly from the Federal government, without regard to local community reuse plans. While in early stages of implementation, this new procedure is expected to significantly simplify the transition of communities affected by the 1995 base closure round.

Programs to Help People

The Federal Government not only has a responsibility to help create jobs in communities but also to assist affected military and civilian employees transition to new employment. Too often in the recent past, the Federal Government has only grudgingly played this role. The Clinton Administration's programs enable the Departments of Defense, Commerce and Labor, among other agencies, to play a more active role.

Military Transition Assistance

The uniformed force has been reduced by over 700,000 servicemembers since 1987. Careers have been ended prematurely despite recent military actions such as Desert Storm and Provide Comfort. DoD is making sure that those leaving military service and their families are treated fairly. The Department remains steadfast in its commitment to offer those leaving military service, as well as their family members, a wide range of transition services and benefits. The Department spent over \$1 billion on military transition program assistance in FY 1994. Transition support and services are vital parts of treating members right, even as they prepare to leave military service and embark upon new careers.

Civilian Transition Assistance

DoD benefits for civilian employees include voluntary separation incentives, counseling, and transition, job search and relocation assistance. We plan to spend \$2 billion cumulatively in FY94 through FY97 on such programs. Worker retraining and reemployment programs in the Department of Labor (DoL), which can be used to assist displaced defense workers, are estimated to be funded at \$710 million cumulatively for the same period. In October and November 1993, a DoL-led team of Federal and State economic

development and human resource specialists visited BRAC 93 bases; these teams provided employees and communities with information on the availability of job-search and retraining assistance. Similar outreach efforts are planned for BRAC 1995 bases.

Since September 1989, DoD has reduced its civilian end strength by about 220,000 or almost 20 percent. A substantial portion of this downsizing will be associated with BRAC actions. To minimize involuntary layoffs, the Department is aggressively implementing a separation-pay or buyout program. Under this program, DoD offers cash incentives, up to \$25,000, to employees who resign or retire. The buyout is available to employees where it will prevent an involuntary separation or create a vacancy for an employee who would otherwise be separated. To date, the Department has paid close to 55,000 incentives, avoiding significant reduction in force actions throughout the Department.

DoD has other highly effective programs to help civilians find new jobs. The most notable is the Priority Placement Program (PPP), an automated system that matches employees whose jobs are to be eliminated with vacant DoD positions for which they are qualified. Since its inception in 1965, PPP has placed over 120,000 employees. The Defense Outplacement Referral System (DORS) is another automated system that refers applicants to other Federal agencies and non-Federal employers. These options to involuntary separation will be increasingly important in the Department's efforts to close further installations while minimizing the adverse impact on individuals.

The National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1995 included a provision that allows the Department to establish a pilot program at closing and realigning bases. To encourage private-sector employers to hire DoD people, the Department will not only reimburse employers for retraining costs, but will also pay relocation expenses for employees who move to take a job with a non-Federal employer. These incentives, limited to \$10,000 per employee, will make DoD employees more valuable to civilian employers.

Homeowners Assistance Program

The Homeowners Assistance Program (HAP) assists eligible military and federal civilian homeowners who, through no fault of their own, face a financial loss when selling their homes in an area where real estate values have declined because of a base closure or realignment.

In general, HAP works in three ways. The Government helps eligible employees who cannot sell their homes within a reasonable time by either buying their homes for 75 percent of their value prior to the closure announcement, or reimbursing them for most lost equity should the homeowners sell the house for less than the pre-closure announcement value. The program also provides relief for displaced employees facing foreclosure.

To be eligible for HAP benefits, the applicant must be a military member (Coast Guard included), federal civilian or non-appropriated fund employee assigned or employed at or near the installation announced for closure or realignment, and be the owner-occupant on the announcement date. Eligibility is also extended under certain conditions to personnel on overseas tours or those ordered into on-base housing within a specified period prior to the closure or realignment announcement.

Tools to Help Commanders Close Bases

There are several tools available to help commanders close bases while assisting affected individuals in the transition.

Dual Compensation Restriction Waivers: The Office of the Secretary of Defense has the authority to waive dual compensation restrictions for retired military members or civilians hired at closing bases to fill critical transition positions.

Job Swaps: Job swaps allow commanders to staff critical jobs at closing bases and create placement opportunities for employees who would otherwise be separated. Job swaps are an exception to the Priority Placement Program. Employees at closing bases may swap jobs with employees at non-closing bases who are, or will soon be eligible for retirement. This provision may also be used to fill vacant critical positions at a closing installation.

Quality of Life (QoL) and the Base Closure Assistance Team (BCAT): As Services begin implementing BRAC decisions, commanders are challenged to sustain appropriate levels of quality of life for service members, civilians and family members, even as they face diminished resources, staffing shortages, and the turbulence associated with closure. The September 9, 1993, Deputy Secretary of Defense memo, "Closing Bases Right," refers to maintenance of QoL programs and states, "Expediently closing bases in a manner that balances community reuse needs and military operational requirements, while looking after the needs of our people, is our ultimate goal." The Base Closure Assistance Team initiative is one of the primary tasks outlined in the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness February 25, 1994, Base Closure Action Plan.

The Base Closure Assistance Team has been established in the Office of Family Policy to serve as the commanders' resource to address installation QoL issues. The team will provide training, consultation, and assistance on QoL programs, services, and standards. The intent is to support installation commanders with a planning process designed to raise issues and to recommend strategies for solution. In a climate of decreasing resources, the overall goal is to minimize the stress of closure by sustaining functions through innovation and community collaboration. For BCAT assistance or to obtain planning and resource guides, call the Office of Family Policy at (703) 696-5733, DSN 226-5733.

Exchange Service and Commissary Policies: The Department has issued a new policy concerning Exchange Service operations at closing and realigning installations. This policy permits the Exchange Services to continue to operate on closed or realigned installations under certain conditions.

The key to allowing continued exchange operations is that a Reserve component force remain as part of the patron base at the installation or in the immediate local area. The local community must support in writing the continuation of the exchange operation. Appropriated funds are not authorized to support such exchange operations, however host installations can provide common support as long as no additional costs are incurred. The remaining exchange operation must stay a sound business operation and require no new construction.

Commissary operations at closed and some realigned installations will cease due to current Department policy. Since commissaries use appropriated funds, when a base closes the commissary funds and manpower are eliminated.

Additional Information: DoD will hold a conference in July 1995 for commanders of BRAC 95 bases to provide training with respect to implementation, property disposal, base reuse, and lessons learned from previous BRAC rounds. The Military Departments also conduct Service-specific training for their respective installation commanders. DoD is also updating the "Commander's Guide to Closing Bases Right" which describes specific base closure issues, identifies relevant laws, policies and directives, and passes on lessons learned from commanders who closed bases with minimal amount of pain to individuals and communities.

Environmental Cleanup on Closing Bases

A key part of the Department's community reinvestment plan is devoted to the development of a common sense, fast-track approach to environmental cleanup. The Administration continues to be committed to a fundamental redesign of the cleanup process based on an approach that eliminates needless delays while protecting human health and the environment. It is an approach that emphasizes speedy assessment, teamwork among regulatory agencies, and responsiveness to the community. On September 9, 1993, the Department of Defense (DoD) issued implementing guidance on the following key elements of the fast-track cleanup initiative:

- Establish Base Cleanup Teams
- Conduct Bottom-up Reviews of Environmental Conditions
- Involve the Community in the Cleanup Process
- Make Clean Parcels Available Early
- Accelerate the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) Process

Environmental specialists from DoD, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, and state environmental agencies form cleanup teams at every major closing or realigning base where property will be available for transfer. Each team conducts a bottom-up review of base environmental programs and develops a cleanup plan that considers both risk to human health and the environment and community reuse interests. Clean parcels are identified early in the process and made available for reuse. Communities participate in the cleanup process through Restoration Advisory Boards.

Restoration Advisory Boards

The President's Fast-Track Cleanup Program emphasizes the need for effective public involvement in the cleanup process. DoD's September 9, 1993, Fast-Track Clean-Up Guidance requires closing bases to establish Restoration Advisory Boards (RABs) where property will be available for transfer to the community. RABs provide an opportunity for communities to have input to the cleanup process by serving as a forum for exchange of information between key players in the cleanup process -- the closing base, the Environmental Protection Agency, the state regulatory agency and members of the local community. The intent is to foster a partnership which will permit the cleanup process to proceed more smoothly, and result in the release of parcels which can be readily reused by the community. RABs work closely with local reuse committees to ensure that cleanup options being considered support future reuse.

National Environmental Policy Act

The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) applies to the disposal of closing base property and to the relocation of functions from a base being closed or realigned to a receiving base.

DoD intends to find areas where NEPA can be used in the planning process to speed the transition of installations from military to civilian use.

Economic Adjustment Assistance and Planning Grants for Communities

DoD's Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA) is the first contact that base closure communities have with the Federal government. OEA has over 30 years of experience and a good record in helping communities develop economic adjustment strategies and detailed base reuse plans. OEA project managers are assigned to communities and remain in constant contact with them throughout the entire reuse process. They walk local leaders through the base reuse and transition process, evaluate alternative proposals for base reuse (e.g., is a commercial airport viable?), develop a marketing strategy, and prepare management plans

and site layouts. OEA also awards planning grants and helps communities apply for a variety of assistance from other Federal agencies.

Other Federal agencies have programs and financial assistance available to help communities impacted by base closure. The Department of Commerce's Economic Development Administration (EDA) has \$500 million budgeted cumulatively for the period FY94 through FY97 for defense diversification activities. EDA funds are flexible and can be used to help communities with technical assistance, planning, or implementation of an adjustment strategy, including construction of public facilities or finding revolving loan funds. The Federal Aviation Administration spends \$40 million a year on a program to fund conversion of military airports to civilian use. The Small Business Administration offers guaranteed loans and the "Section 504" debt financing program.

In the past, OEA suffered from inadequate resources. The Clinton Administration is now giving OEA the resources and support it needs to do a better job -- to begin helping communities sooner; to provide larger grants; and to go beyond its traditional focus on planning, to actually helping communities get started on their redevelopment activities.

The sooner a community starts planning for local economic redevelopment, the sooner it is on the road to recovery. OEA has expedited the approval of initial planning grants. Once a community creates a local, representative organization to plan and manage the base reuse and adjustment process, OEA approves its grant within two weeks. These grants now average \$1 million per community over five years. For the hardest hit communities, usually those that have been host to a complex set of closing DoD facilities, OEA will provide up to \$3.5 million over the same period.

In the past, communities affected by base closings faced a tangle of government agencies and overlapping programs. In particular, DoD was too often unresponsive on issues relating to environmental cleanup and property disposition. Base Commanders lacked training or experience in closing bases, and the Services, focusing on their core missions, did not encourage commanders to take community needs into account.

To bring the transition to the community level, the Clinton Administration named a corps of on-site advocates to cut through such red tape and slash bureaucratic thickets. The Base Transition Coordinators (BTC's), most of them previous residents of their community, serve as full time community advocates and local points of contact with the Federal Government.

In the early stages of base closure planning, the Base Transition Coordinators work with their community to identify reuse needs -- e.g., which parcels of land to develop first and which facilities it would like to consider for interim use. These community needs can

then be accommodated, wherever possible, in DoD's plans for drawing-down and closing the base. The Base Transition Coordinators can also cut through DoD red tape to get interim leases issued quickly to businesses that want to locate on the base. In addition to advocating community needs within the DoD, the Base Transition Coordinators work with other Federal agencies to speed the screening and disposal of base property.

Base Transition Coordinators also work with Federal and State agencies to keep environmental cleanup on a fast-track. Among other things, these individuals ensure that information concerning the nature and extent of contamination is made available to community planners as early as possible, and they push for priority treatment of parcels of land with the potential for rapid redevelopment.

Every community with a base slated for closure or major realignment (including bases on the 1988 and 1991 lists) have been assigned a Base Transition Coordinator. Sixty-seven coordinators are currently in place, reporting directly to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Additional coordinators will be added for BRAC 95 bases.

Publications To Help Communities: A joint DoD-Department of Commerce center, called the Office of Economic Conversion Information, has been established to provide information needed to anticipate, plan for, and respond to defense downsizing. This clearinghouse provides information on all Federal transition assistance programs available to assist businesses, communities and people. It can be accessed via telephone at 1-800-345-1222 or via the Internet at ECIX.DOC.GOV.

For additional information, or to obtain publications on the base reuse process, call the Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA) at (703) 604-5690.

Conclusion

We are beginning to see the effects of these changes. Faster reuse benefits the Department as well as base closure communities, because only when a community begins to take responsibility for base property can DoD cease its security and maintenance expenses. In this context, our technical advice and planning grants -- if they speed up the process by even a few months -- begin to look like a very good investment.

The disposal and reuse process is not easy. Some communities have a tough time attracting new businesses, and sometimes doing so takes considerable time, but it does happen. For example, the Department has tracked nearly 100 closures, from 1961 through 1993. Although 90,000 civilian jobs were eliminated from these closures, *over 170,000 new jobs have been created -- almost twice as many!*

Appendices

- A Public Law 101-510, as amended
- B Section 2687, Title 10, United States Code
- C Department of Defense Policy Memoranda
- D Base Closure Summary
- E History of Base Closures
- F Areas of Commission Special Interest
- G Impacts by State

Appendix A

Public Law 101-510, as amended

PROVISIONS OF LAW RELATING TO BASE CLOSURES AND REALIGNMENTS

(as amended through P.L. 103-464)

1. NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1991

(P.L. 101-510, approved Nov. 5, 1990, 10 U.S.C. 2687 note)

TITLE XXIX - DEFENSE BASE CLOSURES AND REALIGNMENTS

PART A—DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

SEC. 2901. SHORT TITLE AND PURPOSE

(a) **SHORT TITLE.**—This part may be cited as the "Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990".

(b) **PURPOSE.**—The purpose of this part is to provide a fair process that will result in the timely closure and realignment of military installations inside the United States.

SEC. 2902. THE COMMISSION

(a) **ESTABLISHMENT.**—There is established an independent commission to be known as the "Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission".

(b) **DUTIES.**—The Commission shall carry out the duties specified for it in this part.

(c) **APPOINTMENT.**—(1)(A) The Commission shall be composed of eight members appointed by the President, by and with the advise and consent of the Senate.

(B) The President shall transmit to the Senate the nominations for appointment to the Commission—

(i) by no later than January 3, 1991, in the case of members of the Commission whose terms will expire at the end of the first session of the 102nd Congress;

(ii) by no later than January 25, 1993, in the case of members of the Commission whose terms will expire at the end of the first session of the 103rd Congress; and

(iii) by no later than January 3, 1995, in the case of members of the Commission whose terms will expire at the end of the first session of the 104th Congress.

(C) If the President does not transmit to Congress the nominations for appointment to the Commission on or before the date specified for 1993 in clause (ii) of subparagraph (B) or for 1995 in clause (iii) of such subparagraph, the process by which military installations may be selected for closure or realignment under this part with respect to that year shall be terminated.

(2) In selecting individuals for nominations for appointments to the Commission, the President should consult with—

(A) the Speaker of the House of Representatives concerning the appointment of two members;

(B) the majority leader of the Senate concerning the appointment of two members;

(C) the minority leader of the House of Representatives concerning the appointment of one member; and

(D) the minority leader of the Senate concerning the appointment of one member.

(3) At the time the President nominates individuals for appointment to the Commission for each session of Congress referred to in paragraph (1)(B), the President shall designate one such individual who shall serve as Chairman of the Commission.

(d) **TERMS.**—(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), each member of the Commission shall serve until the adjournment of Congress sine die for the session during which the member was appointed to the Commission.

(2) The Chairman of the Commission shall serve until the confirmation of a successor.

(e) **MEETINGS.**—(1) The Commission shall meet only during calendar years 1991, 1993, and 1995.

(2)(A) Each meeting of the Commission, other than meetings in which classified information is to be discussed, shall be open to the public.

(B) All the proceedings, information, and deliberations of the Commission shall be open, upon request, to the following:

(i) The Chairman and the ranking minority party member of the Subcommittee on Readiness, Sustainability, and Support of the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, or such other members of the Subcommittee designated by such Chairman or ranking minority party member.

(ii) The Chairman and the ranking minority party member of the Subcommittee on Military Installations and Facilities of the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives, or such other members of the Subcommittee designated by such Chairman or ranking minority party member.

(iii) The Chairmen and ranking minority party members of the Subcommittees on Military Construction of the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and of the House of Representatives, or such other members of the Subcommittees designated by such Chairmen or ranking minority party members.

(f) **VACANCIES.**—A vacancy in the Commission shall be filled in the same manner as the original appointment, but the individual appointed to fill the vacancy shall serve only for the unexpired portion of the term for which the individual's predecessor was appointed.

(g) **PAY AND TRAVEL EXPENSES.**—(1)(A) Each member, other than the Chairman, shall be paid at a rate equal to the daily equivalent of the minimum annual rate of basic pay payable for level IV of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of title 5, United States Code, for each day (including travel time) during which the member is engaged in the actual performance of duties vested in the Commission.

(B) The Chairman shall be paid for each day referred to in subparagraph (A) at a rate equal to the daily equivalent of the minimum annual rate of basic pay payable for level III of the Executive Schedule under section 5314 of title 5, United States Code.

(2) Members shall receive travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, in accordance with sections 5702 and 5703 of title 5, United States Code.

(h) **DIRECTOR OF STAFF.**—(1) The Commission shall, without regard to section 5311(b) of title 5, United States Code, appoint a Director who has not served on active duty in the Armed Forces or as a civilian employee of the Department of Defense during the one-year period preceding the date of such appointment.

(2) The Director shall be paid at the rate of basic pay payable for level IV of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of title 5, United States Code.

(i) **STAFF.**—(1) Subject to paragraphs (2) and (3), the Director, with the approval of the Commission, may appoint and fix the pay of additional personnel.

(2) The Director may make such appointments without regard to the provisions of title 5, United States Code, governing appointments in the competitive service, and any personnel so appointed may be paid without regard to the provisions of chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of that title relating to classification and General Schedule pay rates, except that an individual so appointed may not receive pay in excess of the annual rate of basic pay payable for GS-18 of the General Schedule.

(3)(A) Not more than one-third of the personnel employed by or detailed to the Commission may be on detail from the Department of Defense.

(B)(i) Not more than one-fifth of the professional analysts of the Commission staff may be persons detailed from the Department of Defense to the Commission.

(ii) No person detailed from the Department of Defense to the Commission may be assigned as the lead professional analyst with respect to a military department or defense agency.

(C) A person may not be detailed from the Department of Defense to the Commission if, within 12 months before the detail is to begin, that person participated personally and substantially in any matter within the Department of Defense concerning the preparation of recommendations for closures or realignments of military installations.

(D) No member of the Armed Forces, and no officer or employee of the Department of Defense, may—

(i) prepare any report concerning the effectiveness, fitness, or efficiency of the performance on the staff of the Commission of any person detailed

from the Department of Defense to that staff;

(ii) review the preparation of such a report; or

(iii) approve or disapprove such a report; and

(4) Upon request of the Director, the head of any Federal department or agency may detail any of the personnel of that department or agency to the Commission to assist the Commission in carrying out its duties under this part.

(5) The Comptroller General of the United States shall provide assistance, including the detailing of employees, to the Commission in accordance with an agreement entered into with the Commission.

(6) The following restrictions relating to the personnel of the Commission shall apply during 1992 and 1994:

(A) There may not be more than 15 persons on the staff at any one time.

(B) The staff may perform only such functions as are necessary to prepare for the transition to new membership on the Commission in the following year.

(C) No member of the Armed Forces and no employee of the Department of Defense may serve on the staff.

(j) **OTHER AUTHORITY.**—(1) The Commission may procure by contract, to the extent funds are available, the temporary or intermittent services of experts or consultants pursuant to section 3109 of title 5, United States Code.

(2) The Commission may lease space and acquire personal property to the extent funds are available.

(k) **FUNDING.**—(1) There are authorized to be appropriated to the Commission such funds as are necessary to carry out its duties under this part. Such funds shall remain available until expended.

(2) If no funds are appropriated to the Commission by the end of the second session of the 101st Congress, the Secretary of Defense may transfer, for fiscal year 1991, to the Commission funds from the Department of Defense Base Closure Account established by section 207 of Public Law 100-526. Such funds shall remain available until expended.

(l) **TERMINATION.**—The Commission shall terminate on December 31, 1995.

(m) **PROHIBITION AGAINST RESTRICTING COMMUNICATIONS.**—Section 1034 of title 10, United States Code, shall apply with respect to communications with the Commission.

SEC. 2903. PROCEDURE FOR MAKING RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BASE CLOSURES AND REALIGNMENTS

(a) **FORCE-STRUCTURE PLAN.**—(1) As part of the budget justification documents submitted to Congress in support of the budget for the Department of Defense for each of the fiscal years 1992, 1994, and 1996, the Secretary shall include a force-structure plan for the Armed Forces based on an assessment by the Secretary of the probable threats to the national security during the six-year period beginning with the fiscal year for which the budget request is made and of the anticipated levels of funding that will be available for national defense purposes during such period.

(2) Such plan shall include, without any reference (directly or indirectly) to military installations inside the United States that may be closed or realigned under such plan—

(A) a description of the assessment referred to in paragraph (1);

(B) a description (i) of the anticipated force structure during and at the end of such period for each military department (with specifications of the number and type of units in the active and reserve forces of each such department), and (ii) of the units that will need to be forward based (with a justification thereof) during and at the end of each such period; and

(C) a description of the anticipated implementation of such force-structure plan.

(3) The Secretary shall also transmit a copy of each such force-structure plan to the Commission.

(b) **SELECTION CRITERIA.**—(1) The Secretary shall, by no later than December 31, 1990, publish in the Federal Register and transmit to the congressional defense committees the criteria proposed to be used by the Department of Defense in making recommendations for the closure or realignment of military installations inside the United States under this part. The Secretary shall provide an opportunity for public comment on the proposed criteria for a period of at least 30 days and shall include notice of that opportunity in the publication required under the preceding sentence.

(2)(A) The Secretary shall, by no later than February 15, 1991, publish in the Federal Register and transmit to the congressional defense committees the final criteria to be used in making recommendations for the closure or realignment of military installations inside the United States under this part. Except as provided in subparagraph (B), such criteria shall be the final criteria to be used, making such recommendations unless disapproved by a joint resolution of Congress enacted on or before March 15, 1991.

(B) The Secretary may amend such criteria, but such amendments may not become effective until they have been published in the Federal Register, opened to public comment for at least 30 days, and then transmitted to the congressional defense committees in final form by no later than January 15 of the year concerned. Such amended criteria shall be the final criteria to be used, along with the force-structure plan referred to in subsection (a), in making such recommendations unless disapproved by a joint resolution of Congress enacted on or before February 15 of the year concerned.

(c) **DOD RECOMMENDATIONS.**—(1) The Secretary may, by no later than April 15, 1991, March 15, 1993 and March 1, 1995, publish in the Federal Register and transmit to the congressional defense committees and to the Commission a list of the military installations inside the United States that the Secretary recommends for closure or realignment on the basis of the force-structure plan and the final criteria referred to in subsection (b)(2) that are applicable to the year concerned.

(2) The Secretary shall include, with the list of recommendations published and transmitted pursuant to paragraph (1), a summary of the selection process that resulted in the recommendation for each installation, including a justification for each recommendation. The Secretary shall transmit the matters referred to in the preceding sentence not later than 7 days after the date of the transmittal to the congressional defense committees and the Commission of the list referred to in paragraph (1).

(3)(A) In considering military installations for closure or realignment, the Secretary shall consider all military installations inside the United States equally without regard to whether the installation has been previously considered or

proposed for closure or realignment by the Department.

(B) In considering military installations for closure or realignment, the Secretary may not take into account for any purpose any advance conversion planning undertaken by an affected community with respect to the anticipated closure or realignment of an installation.

(C) For purposes of subparagraph (B), in the case of a community anticipating the economic effects of a closure or realignment of a military installation, advance conversion planning—

(i) shall include community adjustment and economic diversification planning undertaken by the community before an anticipated selection of a military installation in or near the community for closure or realignment; and

(ii) may include the development of contingency redevelopment plans, plans for economic development and diversification, and plans for the joint use (including civilian and military use, public and private use, civilian dual use, and civilian shared use) of the property or facilities of the installation after the anticipated closure or realignment.

(4) In addition to making all information used by the Secretary to prepare the recommendations under this subsection available to Congress (including any committee or member of Congress), the Secretary shall also make such information available to the Commission and the Comptroller General of the United States.

(5)(A) Each person referred to in subparagraph (B), when submitting information to the Secretary of Defense or the Commission concerning the closure or realignment of a military installation, shall certify that such information is accurate and complete to the best of that person's knowledge and belief.

(B) Subparagraph (A) applies to the following persons:

(i) The Secretaries of the military departments.

(ii) The heads of the Defense Agencies.

(iii) Each person who is in a position the duties of which include personal and substantial involvement in the preparation and submission of information and recommendations concerning the closure or realignment of military installations, as designated in regulations which the Secretary of Defense shall prescribe, regulations which the Secretary of each military department shall prescribe for personnel within that military department, or regulations which the head of each Defense Agency shall prescribe for personnel within that Defense Agency.

(6) Any information provided to the Commission by a person described in paragraph (5)(B) shall also be submitted to the Senate and the House of Representatives to be made available to the Members of the House concerned in accordance with the rules of that House. The information shall be submitted to the Senate and the House of Representatives within 24 hours after the submission of the information to the Commission.

(d) REVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE COMMISSION.—(1) After receiving the recommendations from the Secretary pursuant to subsection (c) for any year, the Commission shall conduct public hearings on the recommendations. All testimony before the Commission at a public hearing conducted under this paragraph shall be presented under oath.

(2)(A) The Commission shall, by no later than July 1 of each year in which the Secretary transmits recommendations to it pursuant to subsection (c), transmit to the President a report containing the Commission's findings and conclusions based on

a review and analysis of the recommendations made by the Secretary, together with the Commission's recommendations for closures and realignments of military installations inside the United States.

(B) Subject to subparagraph (C), in making its recommendations, the Commission may make changes in any of the recommendations made by the Secretary if the Commission determines that the Secretary deviated substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria referred to in subsection (c)(1) in making recommendations.

(C) In the case of a change described in subparagraph (D) in the recommendations made by the Secretary, the Commission may make the change only if the Commission—

(i) makes the determination required by subparagraph (B);

(ii) determines that the change is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria referred to in subsection (c)(1);

(iii) publishes a notice of the proposed change in the Federal Register not less than 45 days before transmitting its recommendations to the President pursuant to paragraph (2); and

(iv) conducts public hearings on the proposed change.

(D) Subparagraph (C) shall apply to a change by the Commission in the Secretary's recommendations that would—

(i) add a military installation to the list of military installations recommended by the Secretary for closure;

(ii) add a military installation to the list of military installations recommended by the Secretary for realignment; or

(iii) increase the extent of a realignment of a particular military installation recommended by the Secretary.

(3) The Commission shall explain and justify in its report submitted to the President pursuant to paragraph (2) any recommendation made by the Commission that is different from the recommendations made by the Secretary pursuant to subsection (c). The Commission shall transmit a copy of such report to the congressional defense committees on the same date on which it transmits its recommendations to the President under paragraph (2).

(4) After July 1 of each year in which the Commission transmits recommendations to the President under this subsection, the Commission shall promptly provide, upon request, to any Member of Congress information used by the Commission in making its recommendations.

(5) The Comptroller General of the United States shall—

(A) assist the Commission, to the extent requested, in the Commission's review and analysis of the recommendations made by the Secretary pursuant to subsection (C); and

(B) by no later than April 15 of each year in which the Secretary makes such recommendations, transmit to the Congress and to the Commission a report containing a detailed analysis of the Secretary's recommendations and selection process.

(e) REVIEW BY THE PRESIDENT.—(1) The President shall, by no later than July 15 of each year in which the Commission makes recommendations under subsection (d), transmit to the Commission and to the Congress a report containing the President's approval or disapproval of the Commission's recommendations.

(2) If the President approves all the recommendations of the Commission, the

President shall transmit a copy of such recommendations to the Congress, together with a certification of such approval.

(3) If the President disapproves the recommendations of the Commission, in whole or in part, the President shall transmit to the Commission and the Congress the reasons for that disapproval. The Commission shall then transmit to the President, by no later than August 15 of the year concerned, a revised list of recommendations for the closure and realignment of military installations.

(4) If the President approves all of the revised recommendations of the Commission transmitted to the President under paragraph (3), the President shall transmit a copy of such revised recommendations to the Congress, together with a certification of such approval.

(5) If the President does not transmit to the Congress an approval and certification described in paragraph (2) or (4) by September 1 of any year in which the Commission has transmitted recommendations to the President under this part, the process by which military installations may be selected for closure or realignment under this part with respect to that year shall be terminated.

SEC. 2904. CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT OF MILITARY INSTALLATIONS

(a) IN GENERAL.—Subject to subsection (b), the Secretary shall—

(1) close all military installations recommended for closure by the Commission in each report transmitted to the Congress by the President pursuant to section 2903(e);

(2) realign all military installations recommended for realignment by such Commission in each such report;

(3) initiate all such closures and realignments no later than two years after the date on which the President transmits a report to the Congress pursuant to section 2903(e) containing the recommendations for such closures or realignments; and

(4) complete all such closures and realignments no later than the end of the six-year period beginning on the date on which the President transmits the report pursuant to section 2903(e) containing the recommendations for such closures or realignments.

(b) CONGRESSIONAL DISAPPROVAL.—(1) The Secretary may not carry out any closure or realignment recommended by the Commission in a report transmitted from the President pursuant to section 2903(e) if a joint resolution is enacted, in accordance with the provisions of section 2908, disapproving such recommendations of the Commission before the earlier of—

(A) the end of the 45-day period beginning on the date on which the President transmits such report; or

(B) the adjournment of Congress sine die for the session during which such report is transmitted.

(2) For purposes of paragraph (1) of this subsection and subsections (a) and (c) of section 2908, the days on which either House of Congress is not in session because of adjournment of more than three days to a day certain shall be excluded in the computation of a period.

SEC. 2905. IMPLEMENTATION

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—(1) In closing or realigning any military installation under this part, the Secretary may—

(A) take such actions as may be necessary to close or realign any military installation, including the acquisition of such land, the construction of such replacement facilities, the performance of such activities, and the conduct of such advance planning and design as may be required to transfer functions from a military installation being closed or realigned to another military installation, and may use for such purpose funds in the Account or funds appropriated to the Department of Defense for use in planning and design, minor construction, or operation and maintenance;

(B) provide—

(i) economic adjustment assistance to any community located near a military installation being closed or realigned, and

(ii) community planning assistance to any community located near a military installation to which functions will be transferred as a result of the closure or realignment of a military installation, if the Secretary of Defense determines that the financial resources available to the community (by grant or otherwise) for such purposes are inadequate, and may use for such purposes funds in the Account or funds appropriated to the Department of Defense for economic adjustment assistance or community planning assistance;

(C) carry out activities for the purposes of environmental restoration and mitigation at any such installation, and shall use for such purposes funds in the Account;

(D) provide outplacement assistance to civilian employees employed by the Department of Defense at military installations being closed or realigned, and may use for such purpose funds in the Account or funds appropriated to the Department of Defense for outplacement assistance to employees; and

(E) reimburse other Federal agencies for actions performed at the request of the Secretary with respect to any such closure or realignment, and may use for such purpose funds in the Account or funds appropriated to the Department of Defense and available for such purpose.

(2) In carrying out any closure or realignment under this part, the Secretary shall ensure that environmental restoration of any property made excess to the needs of the Department of Defense as a result of such closure or realignment be carried out as soon as possible with funds available for such purpose.

(b) **MANAGEMENT AND DISPOSAL OF PROPERTY.**—(1) The Administrator of General Services shall delegate to the Secretary of Defense, with respect to excess and surplus real property and facilities located at a military installation closed or realigned under this part—

(A) the authority of the Administrator to utilize excess property under section 202 of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 (40 U.S.C. 483);

(B) the authority of the Administrator to dispose of surplus property under section 203 of that Act (40 U.S.C. 484);

(C) the authority of the Administrator to grant approvals and make determinations under section 13(g) of the Surplus Property Act of 1944 (50 U.S.C. App. 1622(g)); and

(D) the authority of the Administrator to determine the availability of excess or surplus real property for wildlife conservation purposes in accordance with the Act of May 19, 1948 (16 U.S.C. 667b).

(2)(A) Subject to subparagraph (C) and paragraphs (3), (4), (5), and (6), the Secretary of Defense shall exercise the authority delegated to the Secretary pursuant to paragraph (1) in accordance with—

(i) all regulations in effect on the date of the enactment of this Act governing the utilization of excess property and the disposal of surplus property under the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949; and

(ii) all regulations in effect on the date of the enactment of this Act governing the conveyance and disposal of property under section 13(g) of the Surplus Property Act of 1944 (50 U.S.C. App. 1622(g)).

(B) The Secretary, after consulting with the Administrator of General Services, may issue regulations that are necessary to carry out the delegation of authority required by paragraph (1).

(C) The authority required to be delegated by paragraph (1) to the Secretary by the Administrator of General Services shall not include the authority to prescribe general policies and methods for utilizing excess property and disposing of surplus property.

(D) The Secretary of Defense may transfer real property or facilities located at a military installation to be closed or realigned under this part, with or without reimbursement, to a military department or other entity (including a nonappropriated fund instrumentality) within the Department of Defense or the Coast Guard.

(E) Before any action may be taken with respect to the disposal of any surplus real property or facility located at any military installation to be closed or realigned under this part, the Secretary of Defense shall consult with the Governor of the State and the heads of the local governments concerned for the purpose of considering any plan for the use of such property by the local community concerned.

(3)(A) Not later than 6 months after the date of approval of the closure of a military installation under this part, the Secretary, in consultation with the redevelopment authority with respect to the installations shall—

(i) inventory the personal property located at the installation; and

(ii) identify the items (or categories of items) of such personal property that the Secretary determines to be related to real property and anticipates will support the implementation of the redevelopment plan with respect to the installation.

(B) If not redevelopment authority referred to in subparagraph (A) exists with respect to an installation, the Secretary shall consult with—

(i) the local government in whose jurisdiction the installation is wholly located; or

(ii) a local government agency or State government agency designated for the purpose of such consultation by the chief executive officer of the State in which the installation is located.

(C)(i) Except as provided in subparagraphs (E) and (F), the Secretary may not carry out any of the activities referred to in clause (ii) with respect to an installation referred to in that clause until the earlier of—

(I) one week after the date on which the redevelopment plan for the installation is submitted to the Secretary;

(II) the date on which the redevelopment authority notifies the Secretary that it will not submit such a plan;

(III) twenty-four months after the date of approval of the closure of the installation; or

(IV) ninety days before the date of the closure of the installation.

(ii) The activities referred to in clause (i) are activities relating to the closure of an installation to be closed under this part as follows:

(I) The transfer from the installation of items of personal property at the installation identified in accordance with subparagraph (A).

(II) The reduction in maintenance and repair of facilities or equipment located at the installation below the minimum levels required to support the use of such facilities or equipment for nonmilitary purposes.

(D) Except as provided in paragraph (4), the Secretary may not transfer items of personal property located at an installation to be closed under this part to another installation, or dispose of such items, if such items are identified in the redevelopment plan for the installation as items essential to the reuse or redevelopment of the installation. In connection with the development of the redevelopment plan for the installation, the Secretary shall consult with the entity responsible for developing the redevelopment plan to identify the items of personal property located at the installation, if any, that the entity desires to be retained at the installation for reuse or redevelopment of the installation.

(E) This paragraph shall not apply to any personal property located at an installation to be closed under this part if the property—

(i) is required for the operation of a unit, function, component, weapon, or weapons system at another installation;

(ii) is uniquely military in character, and is likely to have no civilian use (other than use for its material content or as a source of commonly used components);

(iii) is not required for the reutilization or redevelopment of the installation (as jointly determined by the Secretary and the redevelopment authority);

(iv) is stored at the installation for purposes of distribution (including spare parts or stock items); or

(v)(I) meets known requirements of an authorized program of another Federal department or agency for which expenditures for similar property would be necessary, and (II) is the subject of a written request by the head of the department or agency.

(F) Notwithstanding subparagraphs (C)(i) and (D), the Secretary may carry out any activity referred to in subparagraph (C)(ii) or (D) if the Secretary determines that the carrying out of such activity is in the national security interest of the United States.

(4)(A) The Secretary may transfer real property and personal property at a military installation to be closed under this part to the redevelopment authority with respect to the installation.

(B)(i)(I) Except as provided in clause (ii), the transfer of property under subparagraph (A) may be for consideration at or below the estimated fair market value of the property transferred or without consideration. Such consideration may include consideration in kind (including goods and services), real property and improvements, or such other consideration as the Secretary considers appropriate. The Secretary shall determine the estimated fair market value of the property to be transferred under this subparagraph before carrying out such transfer.

(II) The Secretary shall prescribe regulations that set forth guidelines for determining the amount, if any, of consideration required for a transfer under this paragraph. Such regulations shall include a requirement that, in the case of each transfer under this paragraph for consideration below the estimated fair market value why the transfer is not for the estimated fair market value of the property to be transferred (including an explanation why the transfer cannot be carried out in accordance with the authority provided to the Secretary pursuant to paragraph (1) or (2)).

(ii) The transfer of property under subparagraph (A) shall be without consideration in the case of any installation located in a rural area whose closure under this part will have a substantial adverse impact (as determined by the Secretary) on the economy of the communities in the vicinity of the installation and on the prospect for the economic recovery of such communities from such closure. The Secretary shall prescribe in the regulations under clause (i)(II) the manner of determining whether communities are eligible for the transfer of property under this clause.

(iii) In the case of a transfer under subparagraph (A) for consideration below the fair market value of the property transferred, the Secretary may recoup from the transferee of such property such portion as the Secretary determines appropriate of the amount, if any, by which the sale or lease of such property by such transferee exceeds the amount of consideration paid to the Secretary for such property by such transferee. The Secretary shall prescribe regulations for determining the amount of recoupment under this clause.

(C)(i) The transfer of personal property under subparagraph (A) shall not be subject to the provisions of sections 202 and 203 of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 (40 U.S.C. 483, 484) if the Secretary determines that the transfer of such property is necessary for the effective implementation of a redevelopment plan with respect to the installation at which such property is located.

(ii) The Secretary may, in lieu of the transfer of property referred to in subparagraph (A), transfer property similar to such property (including property not located at the installation) if the Secretary determines that the transfer of such similar property is in the interest of the United States.

(D) The provisions of section 120(h) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (42 U.S.C. 9602(h)) shall apply to any transfer of real property under this paragraph.

(E) The Secretary may require any additional terms and condition in connection with a transfer under this paragraph as such Secretary considers appropriate to protect the interests of the United States.

(5)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the Secretary shall take such actions as the Secretary determines necessary to ensure that final determinations under paragraph (1) regarding whether another department or agency of the Federal

Government has identified a use for any portion of a military installations to be closed under this part, or will accept transfer of any portion of such installation, are made not later than 6 months after the date of approval of closure of that installation.

(B) The Secretary may, in consultation with the redevelopment authority with respect to an installation, postpone making the final determinations referred to in subparagraph (A) with respect to the installation for such period as the Secretary determines appropriate if the Secretary determines that such postponement is in the best interests of the communities affected by the closure of the installation.

(6)(A) Except as provided in this paragraph, nothing in this section shall limit or otherwise affect the application of the provisions of the Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 11301 et seq.) to military installations closed under this part. For procedures relating to the use to assist the homeless of buildings and property at installations closed under this part after the date of the enactment of this sentence, see paragraph (7).

(B)(i) Not later than the date on which the Secretary of Defense completes the determination under paragraph (5) of the transferability of any portion of an installation to be closed under this part, the Secretary shall—

(I) complete any determinations or surveys necessary to determine whether any building or property referred to in clause (ii) is excess property, surplus property, or unutilized or underutilized property for the purpose of the information referred to in section 501(a) of such Act (42 U.S.C. 11411(a)); and

(II) submit to the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development information on any building or property that is so determined.

(ii) The buildings and property referred to in clause (i) are any buildings or property located at an installation referred to in that clause for which no use is identified, or of which no Federal department or agency will accept transfer, pursuant to the determination of transferability referred to in that clause.

(C) Not later than 60 days after the date on which the Secretary of Defense submits information to the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development under subparagraph (B)(ii), the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development shall—

(i) identify the buildings and property described in such information that are suitable for use to assist the homeless;

(ii) notify the Secretary of Defense of the buildings and property that are so identified;

(iii) publish in the Federal Register a list of the buildings and property that are so identified, including with respect to each building or property the information referred to in section 501(c)(1)(B) of such Act; and

(iv) make available with respect to each building and property the information referred to in section 501(c)(1)(C) of such Act in accordance with such section 501(c)(1)(C).

(D) Any buildings and property included in a list published under subparagraph (C)(iii) shall be treated as property available for application for use to assist the homeless under section 501(d) of such Act.

(E) The Secretary of Defense shall make available in accordance with section 501(f) of such Act any buildings or property referred to in subparagraph (D) for which—

(i) a written notice of an intent to use such buildings or property to assist the homeless is received by the Secretary of Health and Human Services in accordance with section 501(d)(2) of such Act;

(ii) an application for use of such buildings or property for such purpose is submitted to the Secretary of Health and Human Services in accordance with section 501(d)(2) of such Act; and

(iii) The Secretary of Health and Human Services—

(I) completes all actions on the application in accordance with section 501(e)(3) of such Act; and

(II) approves the application under section 501(e) of such Act.

(F)(i) Subject to clause (ii), a redevelopment authority may express in writing an interest in using buildings and property referred to subparagraph (D), and buildings and property referred to in subparagraph (B)(ii) which have not been identified as suitable for use to assist the homeless under subparagraph (C), or use such buildings and property, in accordance with the redevelopment plan with respect to the installation at which such buildings and property are located as follows:

(I) If no written notice of an intent to use such buildings and property to assist the homeless is received by the Secretary of Health and Human Services in accordance with section 501(d)(2) of such Act during the 60-day period beginning on the date of publication of the buildings and property under subparagraph (C)(iii).

(II) In the case of buildings and property for which such notice is so received, if no application for use of the buildings or property for such purpose is received by the Secretary of Health and Human Services in accordance with section 501(d)(2) of such Act during the 90-day period beginning on the date of the receipt of such notice.

(III) In the case of buildings and property for which such application is so received, if the Secretary of Health and Human Services rejects the application under section (501)(e) of such Act.

(ii) Buildings and property shall be available only for the purpose of permitting a redevelopment authority to express in writing an interest in the use of such buildings and property, or to sue such buildings and property, under clause (i) as follows:

(I) In the case of buildings and property referred to in clause (i)(I), during the one-year period beginning on the first day after the 60-day period referred to in that clause.

(II) In the case of buildings and property referred to in clause (i)(II), during the one-year period beginning on the first day after the 90-day period referred to in that clause.

(III) In the case of buildings and property referred to in clause (i)(III), during the one-year period beginning on the date of rejection of the application referred to in that clause.

(iii) A redevelopment authority shall express an interest in the use of buildings and property under this subparagraph by notifying the Secretary of Defense, in writing, of such an interest.

(G)(i) Buildings and property available for a redevelopment authority under subparagraph (F) shall not be available for use to assist the homeless under section 501 of such Act while so available for a redevelopment authority.

(ii) If a redevelopment authority does not express an interest in the use of buildings or property, or commence the use of buildings or property, under subparagraph (F) within the applicable time periods specified in clause (ii) of such subparagraph, such buildings and property shall be treated as property available for use to assist the homeless under section 501(a) of such Act.

(7)(A) Determinations of the use to assist the homeless of buildings and property located at installations approved for closure under this part after the date of the enactment of this paragraph shall be determined under this paragraph rather than paragraph (6).

(B)(i) Not later than the date on which the Secretary of Defense completes the final determinations referred to in paragraph (5) relating to the use or transferability of any portion of an installation covered by this paragraph, the Secretary shall—

(I) identify the buildings and property at the installation for which the Department of Defense has a use, for which another department or agency of the Federal Government has identified a use, or of which another department or agency will accept a transfer;

(II) take such actions as are necessary to identify any building or property at the installation not identified under subclause (I) that is excess property or surplus property;

(III) submit to the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development and to the redevelopment authority for the installation (or the chief executive officer of the State in which the installation is located if there is no redevelopment authority for the installation at the completion of the determination described in the stem of this sentence) information on any building or property that is identified under subclause (II); and

(IV) publish in the Federal Register and in a newspaper of general circulation in the communities in the vicinity of the installation information on the buildings and property identified under subclause (II).

(ii) Upon the recognition of a redevelopment authority for an installation covered by this paragraph, the Secretary of Defense shall publish in the Federal Register and in a newspaper of general circulation in the communities in the vicinity of the installation information on the redevelopment authority.

(C)(i) State and local governments, representatives of the homeless, and other interested parties located in the communities in the vicinity of an installation covered by this paragraph shall submit to the redevelopment authority for the installation a notice of the interest, if any, of such governments, representatives, and parties in the buildings or property, or any portion thereof, at the installation that are identified under subparagraph (B)(i)(II). A notice of interest under this clause shall describe the need of the government, representative, or party concerned for the buildings or property covered by the notice.

(ii) The redevelopment authority for an installation shall assist the governments, representatives, and parties referred to in clause (i) in evaluating buildings and property at the installation for purposes of this subparagraph.

(iii) In providing assistance under clause (ii), a redevelopment authority shall—

(I) consult with representatives of the homeless in the communities in the vicinity of the installation concerned; and

(II) undertake outreach efforts to provide information on the buildings and property to representatives of the homeless, and to other persons or entities interested in assisting the homeless, in such communities.

(iv) It is the sense of Congress that redevelopment authorities should begin to conduct outreach efforts under clause (iii)(II) with respect to an installation as soon as is practicable after the date of approval of closure of the installation.

(D)(i) State and local governments, representatives of the homeless, and other interested parties shall submit a notice of interest to a redevelopment authority under subparagraph (C) not later than the date specified for such notice by the redevelopment authority.

(ii) The date specified under clause (i) shall be—

(I) in the case of an installation for which a redevelopment authority has been recognized as of the date of the completion of the determinations referred to in paragraph(5), not earlier than 3 months and not later than 6 months after that date; and

(II) in case of an installation for which a redevelopment authority is not recognized as of such date, not earlier than 3 months and not later than 6 months after the date of the recognition of a redevelopment authority for the installation.

(iii) Upon specifying a date for an installation under this subparagraph, the redevelopment authority for the installation shall—

(I) publish the date specified in a newspaper of general circulation in the communities in the vicinity of the installation concerned; and

(II) notify the Secretary of Defense of the date.

(E)(i) In submitting to a redevelopment authority under subparagraph (C) a notice of interest in the use of buildings or property at an installation to assist the homeless, a representative of the homeless shall submit the following:

(I) A description of the homeless assistance program that the representative proposes to carry out at the installation.

(II) An assessment of the need for the program.

(III) A description of the extent to which the program is or will be coordinated with other homeless assistance programs in the communities in the vicinity of the installation.

(IV) A description of the buildings and property at the installation that necessary in order to carry out the program.

(V) A description of the financial plan, the organization, and the organizational capacity of the representative to carry out the program.

(VI) An assessment of the time required in order to commence carrying out the program.

(ii) A redevelopment authority may not release to the public any information submitted to the redevelopment authority under clause (i)(V) without the consent of the representative of the homeless concerned unless such release is authorized under Federal law and under the law of the State and communities in which the installation concerned is located.

(F)(i) The redevelopment authority for each installation covered by this paragraph shall prepare a redevelopment plan for the installation. The redevelopment authority shall, in preparing the plan, consider the interests in the use

to assist the homeless of the buildings and property at the installation that are expressed in the notices submitted to the redevelopment authority under subparagraph (C).

(ii)(I) In connection with a redevelopment plan for an installation, a redevelopment adhered and representatives of the homeless shall prepare legally binding agreements that provide for the use to assist the homeless of buildings and property, resources, and agreements shall be contingent upon the approval of the redevelopment plan by the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development under subparagraph (H) or (J).

(II) Agreements under this clause shall provide for the reversion to the redevelopment authority concerned, or to such other entity or entities as the agreements shall provide, of buildings and property that are made available under this paragraph for use to assist the homeless in the event that such buildings and property cease being used for that purpose.

(iii) A redevelopment authority shall provide opportunity for public comment on a redevelopment plan before submission of the plan to the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development under subparagraph (G),

(iv) A redevelopment authority shall complete preparation of a redevelopment plan for an installation and submit the plan under subparagraph (G) not later than 9 months after the date specified by the redevelopment authority for the installation under subparagraph (D).

(G)(i) Upon completion of a redevelopment plan under subparagraph (F), a redevelopment authority shall submit an application containing the plan to the Secretary of Defense and to the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development.

(ii) A redevelopment authority shall include in an application under clause (i) the following:

(I) A copy of the redevelopment plan, including a summary of any public comments on the plan received by the redevelopment authority under subparagraph (F)(iii).

(II) A copy of each notice of interest of use of buildings and property to assist the homeless that was submitted to the redevelopment authority under subparagraph (C), together with a description of the manner, if any, in which the plan addresses the interest expressed in each such notice and, if the plan does not address such an interest, an explanation why the plan does not address the interest.

(III) A summary of the outreach undertaken by the redevelopment authority under subparagraph (C)(iii)(II) in preparing the plan.

(IV) A statement identifying the representative of the homeless and the homeless assistance planning boards, if any, with which the redevelopment authority consulted in preparing the plan, and the results of such consultations.

(V) An assessment of the manner in which the redevelopment plan balances the expressed needs of the need of the communities in the vicinity of the installation for economic redevelopment and other development.

(VI) Copies of the agreements that the redevelopment authority proposes to enter into under subparagraph (F)(ii).

(H)(i) Not later than 60 days after receiving a redevelopment plan under subparagraph (G), the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development shall complete

a review of the plan. The purpose of the review is to determine whether the plan, with respect to the expressed interest and requests of representatives of the homeless—

(I) takes into consideration the size and nature of the homeless population in the communities in the vicinity of the installation, the availability of existing services in such communities to meet the needs of the homeless in such communities, and the suitability of the buildings and property covered by the plan for the use and needs of the homeless in such communities;

(II) takes into consideration any economic impact of homeless assistance under the plan on the communities in the vicinity of the installation;

(III) balances in an appropriate manner the needs of the communities in the vicinity of the installation for economic redevelopment and other development with the needs of the homeless in such communities;

(IV) was developed in consultation with representatives of the homeless and the homeless assistance planning boards, if any, in the communities in the vicinity of the installation; and

(V) specifies the manner in which buildings and property, resources and assistance on or off the installation will be made available for homeless assistance proposes.

(ii) It is the sense of Congress that the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development shall, in completing the review of a plan under this subparagraph, take into consideration and be receptive to the predominant views on the plan of the communities in the vicinity of the installation covered by the plan.

(iii) The Secretary of Housing and Urban Development may engage in negotiations and consultation with a redevelopment authority before or during the course of a review under clause (i) with a view toward resolving any preliminary determination of the Secretary that the redevelopment plan does not meet a requirement set forth in that clause. The redevelopment authority may modify the redevelopment plan as a result of such negotiations and consultations.

(iv) Upon completion of a review of a redevelopment plan under clause (i), the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development shall notify the Secretary of Defense and the redevelopment authority concerned of the determination of the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development under that clause.

(v) If the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development determines as a result of such a review that a redevelopment plan does not meet the requirements set forth in clause (i), a notice under clause (iv) shall include—

(I) an explanation of that determination; and

(II) a statement of the actions that the redevelopment authority must undertake in order to address that determination.

(I)(i) Upon receipt of a notice under subparagraph (H)(iv) of a determination that a redevelopment plan does not meet a requirement set forth in subparagraph (H)(i), a redevelopment authority shall have the opportunity to—

(I) revise the plan in order to address the determination; and

(II) submit the revised plan to the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development.

(ii) A redevelopment authority shall submit a revised plan under this subparagraph to the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, if at all, not later than 90 days after the date on which the redevelopment authority receives the notice referred to in clause(i).

(J)(i) Not later than 30 days after receiving a revised redevelopment plan under subparagraph (I), the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development shall review the revised plan and determine if the plan meets the requirements set forth in subparagraph (H)(i).

(ii) The Secretary of Housing and Urban Development shall notify the Secretary of Defense and the redevelopment authority concerned of the determination of the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development under this subparagraph.

(K) Upon receipt of a notice under subparagraph (H)(vi) or (J)(ii) of the determination of the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development that a redevelopment plan for an installation meets the requirements set forth in subparagraph (H)(i), the Secretary of Defense shall dispose of the buildings and property located at the installation that are identified in the plan as available for use to assist the homeless in accordance with the provisions of the plan. The Secretary of Defense may dispose of such buildings or property directly to the representatives of the homeless concerned or to the redevelopment authority concerned. The Secretary of Defense shall dispose of the buildings and property under this subparagraph without consideration.

(L)(i) If the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development determines under subparagraph (J) that a revised redevelopment plan for an installation does not meet the requirements set forth in subparagraph (H)(i), or if no revised plan is so submitted, that Secretary shall—

(I) review the original redevelopment plan submitted to that Secretary under subparagraph (G), including the notice or notices of representatives of the homeless referred to in clause (ii)(II) of that subparagraph;

(II) consult with the representatives referred to in subclause(I), if any, for purposes of evaluating the continuing interest of such representatives in the use of buildings or property at the installation to assist the homeless;

(III) request that each such representative submit to that Secretary the items described in clause (ii); and

(IV) based on the actions of that Secretary under subclauses (I) and (II), and on any information obtained by that Secretary as a result of such actions, indicate to the Secretary of Defense the buildings and property at the installation that meet the requirements set forth in subparagraph (H)(i).

(ii) The Secretary of Housing and Urban Development may request under clause (i)(III) that a representative of the homeless submit to that Secretary the following:

(I) A description of the program of such representative to assist the homeless.

(II) A description of the manner in which the buildings and property that the representative proposes to use for such purpose will assist the homeless.

(III) Such information as that Secretary requires in order to determine the financial capacity of the representative to carry out the program and to ensure that the program will be carried out in compliance with Federal environmental law and Federal law against discrimination.

(IV) A certification that police services, fire protection services, and water and sewer services available in the communities in the vicinity of the installation concerned are adequate for the program.

(iii) The Secretary of Housing and Urban Development shall indicate to the

Secretary of Defense and to the redevelopment authority concerned that buildings and property at an installation under clause (i)(IV) to be disposed of not later than 90 days after the date of a receipt of a revised plan for the installation under subparagraph (J).

(iv) The Secretary of Defense shall dispose of the buildings and property at an installation referred to in clause (iii) to entities indicated by the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development or by transfer to the redevelopment authority concerned for transfer to such entities. Such disposal shall be in accordance with the indications of the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development under clause (i)(IV). Such disposal shall be without consideration.

(M)(I) In the event of the disposal of buildings and property of an installation pursuant to subparagraph (K), the redevelopment authority for the installation shall be responsible for the implementation of and compliance with agreements under the redevelopment plan described in that subparagraph for the installation.

(ii) If a building or property reverts to a redevelopment authority under such an agreement, the redevelopment authority shall take appropriate actions to secure, to the maximum extent practicable, the utilization of the building or property by other homeless representatives to assist the homeless. A redevelopment authority may not be required to utilize the building or property to assist the homeless.

(N) The Secretary of Defense may postpone or extend any deadline provided for under this paragraph in the case of an installation covered by this paragraph for such period as the Secretary considers appropriate if the Secretary determines that such postponement is in the interests of the communities affected by the closure of the installations. The Secretary shall make such determinations in consultation with the redevelopment authority concerned and, in the case of deadlines provided for under this paragraph with respect to the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development in consultation with the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development.

(O) For purposes of this paragraph, the term "communities in the vicinity of the installation", in the case of an installation, means the communities that constitute the political jurisdictions (other than the State in which the installation is located) that comprise the redevelopment authority for the installation.

(8)(A) Subject to subparagraph (C), the Secretary may contract with local governments for the provisions of police services, fire protection services, airfield operation services, or other community services by such governments at military installations that the provisions of such services under such contracts is in the best interests of the Department of Defense.

(B) The Secretary may exercise the authority provided under this paragraph without regard to the provisions of chapter 146 of title 10, United States Code.

(C) The Secretary may not exercise the authority under subparagraph (A) with respect to an installation earlier than 180 days before the date on which the installation is to be closed.

(D) The Secretary shall include in a contract for services entered into with a local government under this paragraph a clause that requires the use of professionals to furnish the services to the extent that professionals are available in the area under the jurisdiction of such government.

(c) APPLICABILITY OF NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT OF 1969.—(1) The provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.) shall not apply to the actions of the President, the Commission,

and, except as provided in paragraph (2), the Department of Defense in carrying out this part.

(2)(A) The provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 shall apply to actions of the Department of Defense under this part (i) during the process of property disposal, and (ii) during the process of relocating functions from a military installation being closed or realigned to another military installation after the receiving installation has been selected but before the functions are relocated.

(B) In applying the provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 to the processes referred to in subparagraph (A), the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the military departments concerned shall not have to consider—

- (i) the need for closing or realigning the military installation which has been recommended for closure or realignment by the Commission;
- (ii) the need for transferring functions to any military installation which has been selected as the receiving installation; or
- (iii) military installations alternative to those recommended or selected.

(3) A civil action for judicial review, with respect to any requirement of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 to the extent such Act is applicable under paragraph (2), of any act or failure to act by the Department of Defense during the closing, realigning, or relocating of functions referred to in clauses (i) and (ii) of paragraph (2)(A), may not be brought more than 60 days after the date of such act or failure to act.

(d) **WAIVER.**—The Secretary of Defense may close or realign military installations under this part without regard to—

- (1) any provision of law restricting the use of funds for closing or realigning military installations included in any appropriations or authorization Act; and

- (2) sections 2662 and 2687 of title 10, United States Code.

(e) **TRANSFER AUTHORITY IN CONNECTION WITH PAYMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REMEDIATION COSTS.**—(1)(A) Subject to paragraph (2) of this subsection and section 120(h) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (42 U.S.C. 9620(h)), the Secretary may enter into an agreement to transfer by deed real property or facilities referred to in subparagraph (B) with any person who agrees to perform all environmental restoration, waste management, and environmental compliance activities that are required for the property or facilities under Federal and State laws, administrative decisions, agreements (including schedules and milestones), and concurrences.

(B) The real property and facilities referred to in subparagraph (A) are the real property and facilities located at an installation closed or to be closed under this part that are available exclusively for the use, or expression of an interest in a use, of a redevelopment authority under subsection (b)(6)(F) during the period provided for that use, or expression of interest in use, under that subsection.

(C) The Secretary may require any additional terms and conditions in connection with an agreement authorized by subparagraph (A) as the Secretary considers appropriate to protect the interests of the United States.

(2) A transfer of real property or facilities may be made under paragraph (1) only if the Secretary certifies to Congress that—

(A) the costs of all environmental restoration, waste management, environmental compliance activities to be paid by the recipient of the property or facilities are equal to or greater than the fair market value of the property or facilities to be transferred, as determined by the Secretary; or

(B) if such costs are lower than the fair market value of the property or facilities, the recipient of the property or facilities agrees to pay the difference between the fair market value and such costs.

(3) As part of an agreement under paragraph (1), the Secretary shall disclose to the person to whom the property or facilities will be transferred any information of the Secretary regarding the environmental restoration, waste management, and environmental compliance activities described in paragraph (1) that relate to the property or facilities. The Secretary shall provide such information before entering into the agreement.

(4) Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to modify, alter, or amend the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (42 U.S.C. 9601 et seq.) or the Solid Waste Disposal Act (42 U.S.C. 6901 et seq.).

(5) Section 330 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993 (Public Law 102-484; 10 U.S.C. 22687 note) shall not apply to any transfer under this subsection to persons or entities described in subsection (a)(2) of such section 330.

(6) The Secretary may not enter into an agreement to transfer property or facilities under this subsection after the expiration of the five-year period beginning on the date of the enactment of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994.

SEC. 2906. ACCOUNT

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—(1) There is hereby established on the books of the Treasury an account to be known as the "Department of Defense Base Closure Account 1990" which shall be administered by the Secretary as a single account.

(2) There shall be deposited into the Account—

(A) funds authorized for and appropriated to the Account;

(B) any funds that the Secretary may, subject to approval in an appropriation Act, transfer to the Account from funds appropriated to the Department of Defense for any purpose, except that such funds may be transferred only after the date on which the Secretary transmits written notice of, and justification for, such transfer to the congressional defense committees; and

(C) except as provided in subsection (d), proceeds received from the transfer or disposal of any property at a military installation closed or realigned under this part; and

(D) proceeds received after September 30, 1995, from the transfer or disposal of any property at a military installation closed or realigned under title II of the Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act (Public Law 100-526; 10 U.S.C. 2687 note).

(b) **USE OF FUNDS.**—(1) The Secretary may use the funds in the Account only for the purposes described in section 2905 or, after September 30, 1995, for environmental restoration and property management and disposal at installations closed or realigned under title II of the Defense Authorization Amendments and

Base Closure and Realignment Act (Public Law 100-526; 10 U.S.C. 2687 note).

(2) When a decision is made to use funds in the Account to carry out a construction project under section 2905(a) and the cost of the project will exceed the maximum amount authorized by law for a minor military construction project, the Secretary shall notify in writing the congressional defense committees of the nature of, and justification for, the project and the amount of expenditures for such project. Any such construction project may be carried out without regard to section 2802(a) of title 10, United States Code.

(c) **REPORTS.**—(1)(A) No later than 60 days after the end of each fiscal year in which the Secretary carries out activities under this part, the Secretary shall transmit a report to the congressional defense committees of the amount and nature of the deposits into, and the expenditures from, the Account during such fiscal year and of the amount and nature of other expenditures made pursuant to section 2905(a) during such fiscal year.

(B) The report for a fiscal year shall include the following:

(i) The obligations and expenditures from the Account during the fiscal year, identified by subaccount, for each military department and Defense Agency.

(ii) The fiscal year in which appropriations for such expenditures were made and the fiscal year in which funds were obligated for such expenditures.

(iii) Each military construction project for which such obligations and expenditures were made, identified by installation and project title.

(iv) A description and explanation of the extent, if any, to which expenditures for military construction projects for the fiscal year differed from proposals for projects and funding levels that were included in the jurisdiction transmitted to Congress under section 2907(1), or otherwise, for the funding proposals for the Account for such fiscal year, including an explanation of—

(I) any failure to carry out military construction projects that were so proposed; and

(II) any expenditures for military construction projects that were not so proposed.

(2) Unobligated funds which remain in the Account after the termination of the authority of the Secretary to carry out a closure or realignment under this part shall be held in the Account until transferred by law after the congressional defense committees receive the report transmitted under paragraph (3).

(3) No later than 60 days after the termination of the authority of the Secretary to carry out a closure or realignment under this part, the Secretary shall transmit to the congressional defense committees a report containing an accounting of—

(A) all the funds deposited into and expended from the Account or otherwise expended under this part; and

(B) any amount remaining in the Account.

(d) **DISPOSAL OR TRANSFER OF COMMISSARY STORES AND PROPERTY PURCHASED WITH NONAPPROPRIATED FUNDS.**—(1) If any real property or facility acquired, constructed, or improved (in whole or in part) with commissary store funds or nonappropriated funds is transferred or disposed of in connection with the closure or realignment of a military installation under this part, a portion of the proceeds of the transfer or other disposal of property on that installation shall be deposited in the reserve account established under section 204(b)(4)(C) of the

Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act (10 U.S.C. 2687 note).

(2) The amount so deposited shall be equal to the depreciated value of the investment made with such funds in the acquisition, construction, or improvement of that particular real property or facility. The depreciated value of the investment shall be computed in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense.

(3) The Secretary may use amounts in the account (in such an aggregate amount as is provided in advance in appropriation Acts) for the purpose of acquiring, constructing, and improving—

(A) commissary stores; and

(B) real property and facilities for nonappropriated fund instrumentalities.

(4) As used in this subsection:

(A) The term "commissary store funds" means funds received from the adjustment of, or surcharge on, selling prices at commissary stores fixed under section 2685 of title 10, United States Code.

(B) The term "nonappropriated funds" means funds received from a nonappropriated fund instrumentality.

(C) The term "nonappropriated fund instrumentality" means an instrumentality of the United States under the jurisdiction of the Armed Forces (including the Army and Air Force Exchange Service, the Navy Resale and Services Support Office, and the Marine Corps exchanges) which is conducted for the comfort, pleasure, contentment, or physical or mental improvement of members of the Armed Forces.

(e) **ACCOUNT EXCLUSIVE SOURCE OF FUNDS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION PROJECTS.**—Except for funds deposited into the Account under subsection (a), funds appropriated to the Department of Defense may not be used for purposes described in section 2905(a)(1)(C). The prohibition in this subsection shall expire upon the termination of the authority of the Secretary to carry out a closure or realignment under this part.

SEC. 2907. REPORTS

As part of the budget request for fiscal year 1993 and for each fiscal year thereafter for the Department of Defense, the Secretary shall transmit to the congressional defense committees of Congress—

(1) a schedule of the closure and realignment actions to be carried out under this part in the fiscal year for which the request is made and an estimate of the total expenditures required and cost savings to be achieved by each such closure and realignment and of the time period in which these savings are to be achieved in each case, together with the Secretary's assessment of the environmental effects of such actions; and

(2) a description of the military installations, including those under construction and those planned for construction, to which functions are to be transferred as a result of such closures and realignments, together with the Secretary's assessment of the environmental effects of such transfers.

SEC. 2908. CONGRESSIONAL CONSIDERATION OF COMMISSION REPORT

(a) TERMS OF THE RESOLUTION.—For purposes of section 2904(b), the term "joint resolution" means only a joint resolution which is introduced within the 10-day period beginning on the date on which the President transmits the report to the Congress under section 2903(e), and—

- (1) which does not have a preamble;
- (2) the matter after the resolving clause of which is as follows: "That Congress disapproves the recommendations of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission as submitted by the President on ____", the blank space being filled in with the appropriate date; and
- (3) the title of which is as follows: "Joint resolution disapproving the recommendations of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission."

(b) REFERRAL.—A resolution described in subsection (a) that is introduced in the House of Representatives shall be referred to the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives. A resolution described in subsection (a) introduced in the Senate shall be referred to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate.

(c) DISCHARGE.—If the committee to which a resolution described in subsection (a) is referred has not reported such a resolution (or an identical resolution) by the end of the 20-day period beginning on the date on which the President transmits the report to the Congress under section 2903(e), such committee shall be, at the end of such period, discharged from further consideration of such resolution, and such resolution shall be placed on the appropriate calendar of the House involved.

(d) CONSIDERATION.—(1) On or after the third day after the date on which the committee to which such a resolution is referred has reported, or has been discharged (under subsection (c)) from further consideration of, such a resolution, it is in order (even though a previous motion to the same effect has been disagreed to) for any Member of the respective House to move to proceed to the consideration of the resolution. A member may make the motion only on the day after the calendar day on which the Member announces to the House concerned the Member's intention to make the motion, except that, in the case of the House of Representatives, the motion may be made without such prior announcement if the motion is made by direction of the committee to which the resolution was referred. All points of order against the resolution (and against consideration of the resolution) are waived. The motion is highly privileged in the House of Representatives and is privileged in the Senate and is not debatable. The motion is not subject to amendment, or to a motion to postpone, or to a motion to proceed to the consideration of other business. A motion to reconsider the vote by which the motion is agreed to or disagreed to shall not be in order. If a motion to proceed to the consideration of the resolution is agreed to, the respective House shall immediately proceed to consideration of the joint resolution without intervening motion, order, or other business, and the resolution shall remain the unfinished business of the respective House until disposed of.

(2) Debate on the resolution, and on all debatable motions and appeals in connection therewith, shall be limited to not more than 2 hours, which shall be divided equally between those favoring and those opposing the resolution. An

amendment to the resolution is not in order. A motion further to limit debate is in order and not debatable. A motion to postpone, or a motion to proceed to the consideration of other business, or a motion to recommit the resolution is not in order. A motion to reconsider the vote by which the resolution is agreed to or disagreed to is not in order.

(3) Immediately following the conclusion of the debate on a resolution described in subsection (a) and a single quorum call at the conclusion of the debate if requested in accordance with the rules of the appropriate House, the vote on final passage of the resolution shall occur.

(4) Appeals from the decisions of the Chair relating to the application of the rules of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, to the procedure relating to a resolution described in subsection (a) shall be decided without debate.

(e) **CONSIDERATION BY OTHER HOUSE.**—(1) If, before the passage by one House of a resolution of that House described in subsection (a), that House received from the other House a resolution described in subsection (a), then the following procedures shall apply:

(A) The resolution of the other House shall not be referred to a committee and may not be considered in the House receiving it except in the case of final passage as provided in subparagraph (B)(ii).

(B) With respect to a resolution described in subsection (a) of the House receiving the resolution—

(i) the procedure in that House shall be the same as if no resolution had been received from the other House; but

(ii) the vote on final passage shall be on the resolution of the other House.

(2) Upon disposition of the resolution received from the other House, it shall no longer be in order to consider the resolution that originated in the receiving House.

(f) **RULES OF THE SENATE AND HOUSE.**—This section is enacted by Congress—

(1) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the Senate and House of Representatives, respectively, and as such it is deemed a part of the rules of each House, respectively, but applicable only with respect to the procedure to be followed in that House in the case of a resolution described in subsection (a), and it supersedes other rules only to the extent that it is inconsistent with such rules; and

(2) with full recognition of the constitutional right of either House to change the rules (so far as relating to the procedure of that House) at any time, in the same manner, and to the same extent as in the case of any other rule of that House.

SEC. 2909. RESTRICTION ON OTHER BASE CLOSURE AUTHORITY

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—Except as provided in subsection (c), during the period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act and ending on December 31, 1995, this part shall be the exclusive authority for selecting for closure or realignment, or for carrying out any closure or realignment of, a military installation inside the United States.

(b) **RESTRICTION.**—Except as provided in subsection (c), none of the funds available to the Department of Defense may be used, other than under this part, during the period specified in subsection (a)—

(1) to identify, through any transmittal to the Congress or through any other public announcement or notification, any military installation inside the United States as an installation to be closed or realigned or as an installation under consideration for closure or realignment; or

(2) to carry out any closure or realignment of a military installation inside the United States.

(c) **EXCEPTION.**—Nothing in this part affects the authority of the Secretary to carry out—

(1) closures and realignments under title II of Public Law 100-526; and

(2) closures and realignments to which section 2687 of title 10, United States Code, is not applicable, including closures and realignments carried out for reasons of national security or a military emergency referred to in subsection (c) of such section.

SEC. 2910. DEFINITIONS

As used in this part:

(1) The term "Account" means the Department of Defense Base Closure Account 1990 established by section 2906(a)(1).

(2) The term "congressional defense committees" means the Committees on Armed Services and the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and of the House of Representatives.

(3) The term "Commission" means the Commission established by section 2902.

(4) The term "military installation" means a base, camp, post, station, yard, center, homeport facility for any ship, or other activity under the jurisdiction of the Department of Defense, including any leased facility. Such term does not include any facility used primarily for civil works, rivers and harbors projects, flood control, or other projects not under the primary jurisdiction or control of the Department of Defense.

(5) The term "realignment" includes any action which both reduces and relocates functions and civilian personnel positions but does not include a reduction in force resulting from workload adjustments, reduced personnel or funding levels, or skill imbalances.

(6) The term "Secretary" means the Secretary of Defense.

(7) The term "United States" means the 50 States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, the Virgin Islands, American Samoa, and any other commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United States.

(8) The term "date of approval", with respect to a closure or realignment of an installation, means the date on which the authority of Congress to disapprove a recommendation of closure or realignment, as the case may be, of such installation under this part expires.

(9) The term "redevelopment authority", in the case of an installation to be closed under this part, means any entity (including an entity established by a State or local government) recognized by the Secretary of Defense as the entity responsible for developing the redevelopment plan with respect to the

installation or for directing the implementation of such plan.

(10) The term "redevelopment plan" in the case of an installation to be closed under this part, means a plan that—

(A) is agreed to by the local redevelopment authority with respect to the installation; and

(B) provides for the reuse or redevelopment of the real property and personal property of the installation that is available for such reuse and redevelopment as a result of the closure of the installation.

(10) The term "representative of the homeless" has the meaning given such term in section 501(h)(4) of the Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 11411(h)(4)).

SEC. 2911. CLARIFYING AMENDMENT

Section 2687(e)(1) of title 10, United States Code, is amended—

(1) by inserting "homeport facility for any ship," after "center,"; and

(2) by striking out "under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of a military department" and inserting in lieu thereof "under the jurisdiction of the Department of Defense, including any leased facility,".

Part B—Other Provisions Relating to Defense Base Closures and Realignments

SEC. 2921. CLOSURE OF FOREIGN MILITARY INSTALLATIONS

(a) **SENSE OF CONGRESS.**— It is the sense of the Congress that—

(1) the termination of military operations by the United States at military installations outside the United States should be accomplished at the discretion of the Secretary of Defense at the earliest opportunity;

(2) in providing for such termination, the Secretary of Defense should take steps to ensure that the United States receives, through direct payment or otherwise, consideration equal to the fair market value of the improvements made by the United States at facilities that will be released to host countries;

(3) the Secretary of Defense, acting through the military component commands or the sub-unified commands to the combatant commands, should be the lead official in negotiations relating to determining and receiving such consideration; and

(4) the determination of the fair market value of such improvements released to host countries in whole or in part by the United States should be handled on a facility-by-facility basis.

(b) **RESIDUAL VALUE.**—(1) For each installation outside the United States at which military operations were being carried out by the United States on October 1, 1990, the Secretary of Defense shall transmit, by no later than June 1, 1991, an estimate of the fair market value, as of January 1, 1991, of the improvements made by the United States at facilities at each such installation.

(2) For purposes of this section:

(A) The term "fair market value of the improvements" means the value of improvements determined by the Secretary on the basis of their highest use.

(B) The term "improvements" includes new construction of facilities and all additions, improvements, modifications, or renovations made to existing facilities or to real property, without regard to whether they were carried out with appropriated or nonappropriated funds.

(c) **ESTABLISHMENT OF SPECIAL ACCOUNT.**—(1) There is established on the books of the Treasury a special account to be known as the "Department of Defense Overseas Military Facility Investment Recovery Account". Any amounts paid to the United States, pursuant to any treaty, status of forces agreement, or other international agreement to which the United States is a party, for the residual value of real property or improvements to real property used by civilian or military personnel of the Department of Defense shall be deposited into such account.

(2) Money deposited in the Department of Defense Overseas Military Facility Investment Recovery Account shall be available to the Secretary of Defense for payment, as provided in appropriation Acts, of costs incurred by the Department of Defense in connection with—

(A) facility maintenance and repair and environmental restoration at military installations in the United States; and

(B) facility maintenance and repair and compliance with applicable environmental laws at military installations outside the United States that the Secretary anticipates will be occupied by the Armed Forces for a long period.

(3) Funds in the Department of Defense Overseas Facility Investment Account shall remain available until expended.

(d) **AMOUNTS CORRESPONDING TO THE VALUE OF PROPERTY PURCHASED WITH NONAPPROPRIATED FUNDS.**—(1) In the case of a payment referred to in subsection (c)(1) for the residual value of real property or improvements at an overseas military facility, the portion of the payment that is equal to the depreciated value of the investment made with nonappropriated funds shall be deposited in the reserve account established under section 204(b)(4)(C) of the Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act. The Secretary may use amounts in the account (in such an aggregate amount as is provided in advance by appropriation Acts) for the purpose of acquiring, constructing, or improving commissary stores and nonappropriated fund instrumentalities.

(2) As used in this subsection:

(A) The term "nonappropriated funds" means funds received from—

(i) the adjustment of, or surcharge on, selling prices at commissary stores fixed under section 2685 of title 10, United States Code; or

(ii) a nonappropriated fund instrumentality.

(B) The term "nonappropriated fund instrumentality" means an instrumentality of the United States under the jurisdiction of the Armed Forces (including the Army and Air Force Exchange Service, the Navy Resale and Services Support Office, and the Marine Corps exchanges) which is conducted for the comfort, pleasure, contentment, or physical or mental improvement of members of the Armed Forces.

(e) **NEGOTIATIONS FOR PAYMENTS-IN-KIND.**— Before the Secretary of Defense enters into negotiations with a host country regarding the acceptance by the United States of any payment-in-kind in connection with the release to the host country of improvements made by the United States at military installations in the host country, the Secretary shall submit a written notice to the congressional defense committees containing a justification for entering into negotiations for payments-in-

kind with the host country and the types of benefit options to be pursued by the Secretary in the negotiations.

(f) REPORT ON STATUS AND USE OF SPECIAL ACCOUNT.— Not later than January 15 of each year, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on the operations of the Department of Defense Overseas Military Facility Investment Recovery Account during the preceding fiscal year and proposed uses of funds in the special account during the next fiscal year. The report shall include the following:

(1) The amount of each deposit in the account during the preceding fiscal year, and the source of the amount.

(2) The balance in the account at the end of that fiscal year.

(3) The amounts expended from the account by each military department during that fiscal year.

(4) With respect to each military installation for which money was deposited in the account as a result of the release of real property or improvements of the installation to a host country during that fiscal year—

(A) the total amount of the investment of the United States in the installation, expressed in terms of constant dollars of that fiscal year;

(B) the depreciated value (as determined by the Secretary of a military department under regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary of Defense) of the real property and improvements that were released; and

(C) the explanation of the Secretary for any difference between the benefits received by the United States for the real property and improvements and the depreciated value (as so determined) of that real property and improvements.

(5) A list identifying all military installations outside the United States for which the Secretary proposes to make expenditures from the Department of Defense Overseas Facility Investment Recovery Account under subsection (c)(2)(B) during the next fiscal year and specifying the amount of the proposed expenditures for each identified military installations.

(6) A description of the purposes for which the expenditures proposed under paragraph (5) will be made and the need for such expenditures.

(g) OMB REVIEW OF PROPOSED SETTLEMENTS.—(1) The Secretary of Defense may not enter into an agreement of settlement with a host country regarding the release to the host country of improvements made by the United States to facilities at an installation located in the host country until 30 days after the date on which the Secretary submits the proposed settlement to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget. The prohibition set forth in the preceding sentence shall apply only to agreements of settlement for improvements having a value in excess of \$10,000,000. The Director shall evaluate the overall equity of the proposed settlement. In evaluating the proposed settlement, the Director shall consider such factors as the extent of the United States capital investment in the improvements being released to the host country, the depreciation of the improvements, the condition of the improvements, and any applicable requirements for environmental remediation or restoration at the installation.

(2) Each year, the Secretary shall submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives a report on each proposed agreement of settlement that was not submitted by the Secretary to the Director of

the Office of Management and Budget in the previous year under paragraph (1) because the value of the improvements to be released pursuant to the proposed agreement did not exceed \$10,000,000.

(h) **CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF PAYMENTS-IN-KIND.**—(1) Not less than 30 days before concluding an agreement for acceptance of military construction or facility improvements as a payment-in-kind, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress a notification on the proposed agreement. Any such notification shall contain the following:

(A) A description of the military construction project or facility improvement project, as the case may be.

(B) A certification that the project is needed by United States forces.

(C) An explanation of how the project will aid in the achievement of the mission of those forces.

(D) A certification that, if the project were to be carried out by the Department of Defense, appropriations would be necessary for the project and it would be necessary to provide for the project in the next future-years defense program.

(2) Not less than 30 days before concluding an agreement for acceptance of host nation support or host nation payment of operating costs of United States forces as a payment-in-kind, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress a notification on the proposed agreement. Any such notification shall contain the following:

(A) A description of each activity to be covered by the payment-in-kind.

(B) A certification that the costs to be covered by the payment-in-kind are included in the budget of one or more of the military departments or that it will otherwise be necessary to provide for payment of such costs in a budget of one or more of the military departments.

(C) A certification that, unless the payment-in-kind is accepted or funds are appropriated for payment of such costs, the military mission of the United States forces with respect to the host nation concerned will be adversely affected.

SEC. 2922. MODIFICATION OF THE CONTENT OF BIENNIAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON ALTERNATIVE UTILIZATION OF MILITARY FACILITIES

(a) **USES OF FACILITIES.**—Section 2819(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1989 (Public Law 100-456; 102 Stat. 2119; 10 U.S.C. 2391 note) is amended—

(1) in paragraph (2), by striking out "minimum security facilities for nonviolent prisoners" and inserting in lieu thereof "Federal confinement or correctional facilities including shock incarceration facilities";

(2) by striking out "and" at the end of paragraph (3);

(3) by redesignating paragraph (4) as paragraph (5); and

(4) by inserting after paragraph (3) the following new paragraph (4):

"(4) identify those facilities, or parts of facilities, that could be effectively utilized or renovated to meet the needs of States and local jurisdictions for confinement or correctional facilities; and".

(b) **EFFECTIVE DATE.**—The amendments made by subsection (a) shall take effect with respect to the first report required to be submitted under section 2819 the National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1989, after September 30, 1990.

SEC. 2923. FUNDING FOR ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION AT MILITARY INSTALLATIONS SCHEDULED FOR CLOSURE INSIDE THE UNITED STATES

(a) **AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.**—There is hereby authorized to be appropriated to the Department of Defense Base Closure Account for fiscal year 1991, in addition to any other funds authorized to be appropriated to that account for that fiscal year, the sum of \$100,000,000. Amounts appropriated to that account pursuant to the preceding sentence shall be available only for activities for the purpose of environmental restoration at military installations closed or realigned under title II of Public Law 100-526, as authorized under section 204(a)(3) of that title.

(b) **EXCLUSIVE SOURCE OF FUNDING.**—(1) Section 207 of Public Law 100-526 is amended by adding at the end the following:

[See section 207, post at p. 1824]

(c) **TASK FORCE REPORT.**—(1) No later than 12 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress a report containing the findings and recommendations of the task force established under paragraph (2) concerning—

(A) ways to improve interagency coordination, within existing laws, regulations, and administrative policies, of environmental response actions at military installations (or portions of installations) that are being closed, or are scheduled to be closed, pursuant to title II of the Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act (Public Law 100-526); and

(B) ways to consolidate and streamline, within existing laws and regulations, the practices, policies, and administrative procedures of relevant Federal and State agencies with respect to such environmental response actions so as to enable those actions to be carried out more expeditiously.

(2) There is hereby established an environmental response task force to make the findings and recommendations, and to prepare the report, required by paragraph (1).

(1) The task force shall consist of the following (or their designees):

(A) The Secretary of Defense, who shall be chairman of the task force.

(B) The Attorney General.

(C) The Administrator of the General Services Administration.

(D) The Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency.

(E) The Chief of Engineers, Department of the Army.

(F) A representative of a State environmental protection agency, appointed by the head of the National Governors Association.

(G) A representative of a State Attorney general's office, appointed by the head of the National Association of Attorney Generals.

(H) A representative of a public-interest environmental organization, appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives.

**SEC. 2924. COMMUNITY PREFERENCE CONSIDERATION IN
CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT OF MILITARY
INSTALLATIONS**

In any process of selecting any military installation inside the United States for closure or realignment, the Secretary of Defense shall take such steps as are necessary to assure that special consideration and emphasis is given to any official statement from a unit of general local government adjacent to or within a military installation requesting the closure or realignment of such installation.

**SEC. 2925. RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE BASE CLOSURE
COMMISSION**

(a) **NORTON AIR FORCE BASE.**—(1) Consistent with the recommendations of the Commission on Base Realignment and Closure, the Secretary of the Air Force may not relocate, until after September 30, 1995, any of the functions that were being carried out at the ballistics missile office at Norton Air Force Base, California, on the date on which the Secretary of Defense transmitted a report to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives as described in section 202(a)(1) of Public Law 100-526.

(2) This subsection shall take effect as of the date on which the report referred to in subsection (a) was transmitted to such Committees.

(b) **GENERAL DIRECTIVE.**—Consistent with the requirements of section 201 of Public Law 100-526, the Secretary of Defense shall direct each of the Secretaries of the military departments to take all actions necessary to carry out the recommendations of the Commission on Base Realignment and Closure and to take no action that is inconsistent with such recommendations.

**SEC. 2926. CONTRACTS FOR CERTAIN ENVIRONMENTAL
RESTORATION ACTIVITIES**

(a) **ESTABLISHMENT OF MODEL PROGRAM.**—Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act [Nov 5, 1990], the Secretary of Defense shall establish a model program to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the base closure environmental restoration program.

(b) **ADMINISTRATOR OF PROGRAM.**—The Secretary shall designate the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Environment as the Administrator of the model program referred to in subsection (a). The Deputy Assistant Secretary shall report to the Secretary of Defense through the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition.

(c) **APPLICABILITY.**—This section shall apply to environmental restoration activities at installations selected by the Secretary pursuant to the provisions of subsection (d)(1).

(d) **PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS.**—In carrying out the model program, the Secretary of Defense shall:

(1) Designate for the model program two installations under his jurisdiction that have been designated for closure pursuant to the Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act (Public Law 100-526) and for which preliminary assessments, site inspections, and Environmental Impact Statements required by law or regulation have been completed. The Secretary shall designate only those installations which have satisfied the requirements of section 204 of the Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act (Public Law 100-526).

(2) Compile a prequalification list of prospective contractors for solicitation and negotiation in accordance with the procedures set forth in title IX of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act (Public Law 92-582; 40 U.S.C. 541 et seq., as amended). Such contractors shall satisfy all applicable statutory and regulatory requirements. In addition, the contractor selected for one of the two installations under this program shall indemnify the Federal Government against all liabilities, claims, penalties, costs, and damages caused by (A) the contractor's breach of any term or provision of the contract; and (B) any negligent or willful act or omission of the contractor, its employees, or its subcontractors in the performance of the contract.

(3) Within 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, solicit proposals from qualified contractors for response action (as defined under section 101 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (42 U.S.C. 9601)) at the installations designated under paragraph (1). Such solicitations and proposals shall include the following:

(A) Proposals to perform response action. Such proposals shall include provisions for receiving the necessary authorizations or approvals of the response action by appropriate Federal, State, or local agencies.

(B) To the maximum extent possible, provisions offered by single prime contractors to perform all phases of the response action, using performance specifications supplied by the Secretary of Defense and including any safeguards the Secretary deems essential to avoid conflict of interest.

(4) Evaluate bids on the basis of price and other evaluation criteria.

(5) Subject to the availability of authorized and appropriated funds to the Department of Defense, make contract awards for response action within 120 days after the solicitation of proposals pursuant to paragraph (3) for the response action, or within 120 days after receipt of the necessary authorizations or approvals of the response action by appropriate Federal, State, or local agencies, whichever is later.

(e) **APPLICATION OF SECTION 120 OF CERCLA.**—Activities of the model program shall be carried out subject to, and in a manner consistent with, section 120 (relating to Federal facilities) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (42 U.S.C. 9620).

(f) **EXPEDITED AGREEMENTS.**—The Secretary shall, with the concurrence of the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, assure compliance with all applicable Federal statutes and regulations and, in addition, take all reasonable and appropriate measures to expedite all necessary administrative decisions, agreements, and concurrences.

(g) **REPORT.**—The Secretary of Defense shall include a description of the progress made during the preceding fiscal year in implementing and accomplishing the goals of this section within the annual report to Congress required by section 2706 of title 10, United States Code.

(h) **APPLICABILITY OF EXISTING LAW.**—Nothing in this section affects or modifies, in any way, the obligations or liability of any person under other Federal or State law, including common law, with respect to the disposal or release of hazardous substances or pollutants or contaminants as defined under section 101 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (42 U.S.C. 9601).

Appendix B

Section 2687, Title 10, United States Code

§ 2687. Base closures and Realignments

- (a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no action may be taken to effect or implement—
- (1) the closure of any military installation at which at least 300 civilian personnel are authorized to be employed;
 - (2) any realignment with respect to any military installation referred to in paragraph (1) involving a reduction by more than 1,000 or by more than 50 percent, in the number of civilian personnel authorized to be employed at such military installation at the time the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of the military department concerned notifies the Congress under subsection (b) of the Secretary's plan to close or realign such installation; or
 - (3) any construction, conversion or rehabilitation at any military facility other than a military installation referred to in clause (1) or (2) which will or may be required as a result of the relocation of civilian personnel to such facility by reason of any closure or realignment to which clause (1) or (2) applies, unless and until the provisions of subsection (b) are complied with.
- (b) No action described in subsection (a) with respect to the closure of, or a realignment with respect to, any military installation referred to in such subsection may be taken unless and until—
- (1) The Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of the military department concerned notifies the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives, as part of an annual request for authorization of appropriations to such Committees, of the proposed closing or realignment and submits with the notification an evaluation of the fiscal, local economic, budgetary, environmental, strategic, and operational consequences of such closure or realignment; and
 - (2) a period of 30 legislative days or 60 calendar days, whichever is longer, expires following the day on which the notice and evaluation referred to in clause (1) have been submitted to such committees, during which period no irrevocable action may be taken to effect or implement the decision.
- (c) This section shall not apply to the closure of a military installation, or a realignment with respect to a military installation, if the President certifies to the Congress that such closure or realignment must be implemented for reasons of national security or a military emergency.
- (d)(1) After the expiration of the period of time provided for in subsection (b)(2) with respect to the closure or realignment of a military installation, funds which would otherwise be available to the Secretary to effect the closure or realignment of that installation may be used by him for such purpose.
- (2) Nothing in this section restricts the authority of the Secretary to obtain architectural and engineering services under section 2807 of this title.
- (e) In this section:
- (1) The term "military installation" means a base, camp, post, station, yard, center, homeport facility for any ship, or other activity under the jurisdiction of the Department of Defense, including any leased facility, which is located within any of the several States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, American Samoa, the Virgin Islands, or Guam. Such term does not include any facility used primarily for civil works, rivers and harbors projects, or flood control projects.
 - (2) The term "civilian personnel" means direct-hire, permanent civilian employees of the Department of Defense.
 - (3) The term "realignment" includes any action which both reduces and relocates functions and civilian personnel positions, but does not include a reduction in force resulting from workload adjustments, reduced personnel or funding levels, skill imbalances, or other similar causes.
 - (4) The term "legislative day" means a day on which either House of Congress is in session.

Appendix C

DoD Policy Memoranda

Index of Memoranda

- 1995 Base Realignments and Closures (BRAC 95) -- January 7, 1994
(Policy, Procedures, Authorities and Responsibilities)
- 1995 Base Realignments and Closures (BRAC 95) -- Policy Memorandum One, May 31, 1994
- 1995 Base Realignments and Closures (BRAC 95) -- October 19, 1994
(Redelegation of Authority)
- 1995 Base Closure and Realignment Selection Criteria, November 2, 1994
- 1995 Base Realignments and Closures (BRAC 95) -- Policy Memorandum Two -- Joint Cross-Service Group Functional Analysis Process, November 23, 1994
- 1995 Base Realignments and Closures (BRAC 95) -- Policy Memorandum Three



THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

7 JAN 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
COMPTROLLER
GENERAL COUNSEL
INSPECTOR GENERAL
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION
ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT
DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES

SUBJECT: 1995 Base Realignments and Closures (BRAC 95)

Reducing the Department's unneeded infrastructure through base closures and realignments is a top Defense priority. We have made good progress so far, but there are more reductions we can and must accomplish. The 1995 round of base realignments and closures (BRAC 95) is the last round of closures authorized under Public Law 101-510. Hence, our efforts to balance the DoD base and force structures, and preserve readiness through the elimination of unnecessary infrastructure, are critical. Consequently, we must begin the BRAC 95 process now.

I look to you, individually and collectively, to recommend further infrastructure reductions consistent with the Defense Guidance and DoD's planned force reductions. The Defense Guidance BRAC 95 goal of an overall 15% reduction in plant replacement value should be considered a minimum DoD-wide goal.

Significant reductions in infrastructure and overhead costs can only be achieved after careful studies address not only structural changes to the base structure, but also operational and organizational changes, with a strong emphasis on cross-service utilization of common support assets.

The attached guidance establishes policy, procedures, authorities and responsibilities for selecting bases for realignment or closure under Public Law 101-510, as amended by Public Law 102-190 and Public Law 103-160. This guidance supersedes Deputy Secretary of Defense memoranda of May 5, 1992, and all other Office of the Secretary of Defense guidance issued regarding making recommendations for the 1993 round of base realignments and closures.

Attachment

00178

C-3

*1995 Base Realignments and Closures (BRAC 95)
Policy, Procedures, Authorities and Responsibilities*

Purpose

Part A, Title XXIX of Public Law 101-510, as amended by Public Law 102-190 and Public Law 103-160, establishes the exclusive procedures under which the Secretary of Defense may pursue realignment or closure of military installations inside the United States, with certain exceptions. The law established independent Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commissions to review the Secretary of Defense's recommendations in calendar years 1991, 1993 and 1995.

The guidance herein establishes the policy, procedures, authorities and responsibilities for selecting bases for realignment or closure for submission to the 1995 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission (the 1995 Commission).

This guidance supersedes Deputy Secretary of Defense memoranda of May 5, 1992, and all other Office of the Secretary of Defense Guidance for the 1993 round of closures.

Goals

DoD Components must reduce their base structure capacity commensurate with approved roles and missions, planned force drawdowns and programmed workload reductions over the FYDP. For BRAC 95, the goal is to further reduce the overall DoD domestic base structure by a minimum of 15 percent of DoD-wide plant replacement value. Preserving readiness through the elimination of unnecessary infrastructure is critical to our national security.

It is DoD policy to make maximum use of common support assets. DoD Components should, throughout the BRAC 95 analysis process, look for cross-service or intra-service opportunities to share assets and look for opportunities to rely on a single Military Department for support.

Applicability

This guidance applies to those base realignment and closure recommendations which must, by law, be submitted to the 1995 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission (the 1995 Commission) for review. This guidance also applies to recommendations which are forwarded to the 1995 Commission for review, though not required to be forwarded under the law.

This guidance does not apply to implementing approved closures and realignments resulting from the recommendations of the 1991 and 1993 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commissions.

Public Law 101-510, Numerical Thresholds

Public Law 101-510 stipulates that no action be taken to close or realign an installation that exceeds the civilian personnel numerical thresholds set forth in the law, until those actions have obtained final approval pursuant to the law. The numerical thresholds established in the law require its application for the closure of installations with at least 300 authorized civilian personnel. For realignments, the law applies to actions at installations with at least 300 authorized civilian personnel which reduce and relocate 1000 civilians or 50% or more of the civilians authorized.

DoD Components must use a common date to determine whether Public Law 101-510 numerical thresholds will be met. For BRAC 95, the common date will be September 30, 1994. Nonappropriated fund employees are not direct hire, permanent civilian employees of the Department of Defense, as defined by Public Law 101-510, and therefore should not be considered in determining whether the numerical thresholds of the law will be met.

Exceptions

Public Law 101-510, as amended, does not apply to actions which:

- o Implement realignments or closures under Public Law 100-526, relating to the recommendations of the 1988 Defense Secretary's Commission on Base Realignment and Closure (the 1988 Commission);

- o Study or implement realignments or closures to which Section 2687 of Title 10, United States Code, is not applicable;

- o Reduce force structure. Reductions in force structure may be made under this exception even if the units involved were designated to relocate to a receiving base by the 1988, 1991, or 1993 Commission; or

- o Impact any facilities used primarily for civil works, rivers and harbor projects, flood control, or other projects not under the primary jurisdiction or control of the Department of Defense.

Activities in Leased Space

DoD Component activities located in leased space are subject to Public Law 101-510, as amended. Additional guidance on how to apply this requirement will be issued by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology.

Policy Guidance

Basis for Recommendations

Base realignment, closure or consolidation studies that could result in a recommendation to the 1995 Commission of a base closure or realignment must meet the following requirements:

- o The studies must have as their basis the Force Structure Plan required by Section 2903 of Public Law 101-510;
- o The studies must be based on the final criteria for selecting bases for closure and realignment required by Section 2903; and
- o The studies must be based on analyses of the base structure by like categories of bases using: objective measures for the selection criteria, where possible; the force structure plan; programmed workload over the FYDP; and military judgement in selecting bases for closure and realignment.
- o The studies must consider all military installations inside the United States (as defined in the law) on an equal footing, including bases recommended for partial closure, realignment, or designated to receive units or functions by the 1988, 1991 or 1993 Commissions.

Cross-Service Opportunities

DoD Components and BRAC 95 Joint Cross-Service Groups should, where operationally and cost effective, strive to: retain in only one Service militarily unique capabilities used by two or more Services; consolidate workload across the Services to reduce capacity; and assign operational units from more than one Service to a single base.

Changes to Previous Recommendations

DoD components may propose changes to previously approved designated receiving base recommendations of the 1988, 1991 and 1993 Commissions provided such changes are necessitated by revisions to force structure, mission or organization, or significant revisions to cost effectiveness that have occurred

since the relevant commission recommendation was made. Documentation for such changes must involve clear military value or significant savings, and be based on the final criteria, the force structure plan and the policy guidance for the BRAC 95 process.

Authorities

The BRAC 95 process must enhance opportunities for consideration of cross-service tradeoffs and multi-service use of the remaining infrastructure. Since BRAC 95 is the last round of closures authorized under Public Law 101-510, these efforts are critical to balancing the DoD base and force structures and to preserving readiness through the elimination of unnecessary infrastructure. Sharing authority among the Military Departments, Defense Agencies and the Office of the Secretary of Defense is essential to sound decision making and taking advantage of available cross-service asset sharing opportunities. The authorities of the DoD Components and the joint groups established by this policy guidance follow and are depicted in Appendix A.

BRAC 95 Review Group

The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology (USD(A&T)) will chair a senior level BRAC 95 Review Group to oversee the entire BRAC 95 process. The members of the BRAC 95 Review Group will be: a senior level representative from each Military Department; the chairperson of the BRAC 95 Steering Group; the chairperson(s) of each BRAC 95 Joint Cross-Service Group; senior representatives from the Joint Staff, DoD Comptroller (COMP), Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E), Reserve Affairs (RA), General Counsel (GC), Environmental Security and the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA); and such other members as the USD(A&T) considers appropriate. The BRAC 95 Review Group authorities include, but are not limited to: reviewing BRAC 95 analysis policies and procedures; reviewing excess capacity analyses; establishing closure or realignment alternatives and numerical excess capacity reduction targets for consideration by the DoD Components; reviewing BRAC 95 work products of the DoD Components and BRAC 95 Joint Cross-Service Groups; and making recommendations to the Secretary of Defense, including cross-service tradeoff recommendations and recommendations on submission of below-threshold actions to the 1995 Commission.

BRAC 95 Steering Group

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Economic Security (ASD(ES)) will chair a BRAC 95 Steering Group of study team leaders from: the Military Departments; DLA; each Joint Cross-Service Group; representatives from the Joint Staff, COMP, PA&E, RA, GC and Environmental Security; and such other members as the ASD(ES) considers appropriate. The purpose of the BRAC 95 Steering Group is to assist the BRAC 95 Review Group in exercising its authorities and to review DoD Component supplementary BRAC 95 guidance.

BRAC 95 Joint Cross-Service Groups

BRAC 95 Joint Cross-Service Groups are hereby established in six areas with significant potential for cross-service impacts in BRAC 95.

The purpose of the five functional area joint cross-service groups is: to determine the common support functions and bases to be addressed by each cross-service group; to establish the guidelines, standards, assumptions, measures of merit, data elements and milestone schedules for DoD Component conduct of cross-service analyses of common support functions; to oversee DoD Component cross-service analyses of these common support functions; to identify necessary outsourcing policies and make recommendations regarding those policies; to review excess capacity analyses; to develop closure or realignment alternatives and numerical excess capacity reduction targets for consideration in such analyses; and to analyze cross-service tradeoffs.

The purpose of the economic impact joint cross-service group is: to establish the guidelines for measuring economic impact and, if practicable, cumulative economic impact; to analyze DoD Component recommendations under those guidelines; and to develop a process for analyzing alternative closures or realignments necessitated by cumulative economic impact considerations, if necessary.

BRAC 95 Joint Cross-Service Groups shall complete the analytical design tasks above and issue guidance to the DoD Components, after review by the BRAC 95 Review Group, no later than March 31, 1994. The six BRAC 95 Joint Cross-Service Groups are:

- o Depot Maintenance: The group will be chaired by the Deputy Under Secretary Defense for Logistics (DUSD(L)) with members from each Military Department, the Joint Staff and DLA, and other offices as considered appropriate by the DUSD(L). The DASD(ER&BRAC) and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Production Resources will also serve as members.

o Test and Evaluation: The group will be jointly chaired by the Director, Test and Evaluation (D,T&E) and the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (D,OT&E) with members from each Military Department, Defense Research and Engineering (DR&E), and other offices as considered appropriate by the chairpersons. The DASD(ER&BRAC) will also serve as a member.

o Laboratories: The group will be chaired by the Director, Defense Research and Engineering (D,DR&E) with members from each Military Department, T&E, OT&E and other offices as considered appropriate by the D,DR&E. The DASD(ER&BRAC) will also serve as a member.

o Military Treatment Facilities including Graduate Medical Education: The group will be chaired by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs (ASD(HA)) with members from each Military Department and other offices as considered appropriate by ASD(HA). The DASD(ER&BRAC) will also serve as a member.

o Undergraduate Pilot Training: The group will be chaired by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (ASD(P&R)) with members from each Military Department and others as considered appropriate by the ASD(P&R). The DASD(ER&BRAC) will also serve as a member.

o Economic Impact: The group will be chaired by Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Economic Reinvestment and BRAC (DASD(ER&BRAC)) with members from each Military Department, the Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA) and other offices as considered appropriate by the DASD(ER&BRAC).

DoD Components

The Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Directors of the Defense Agencies, and the Heads of other DoD Components shall (without delegation) submit their recommendations for base realignments or closures under Public Law 101-510, as amended, to the Secretary of Defense. Recommendations and supporting documentation shall be delivered to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Economic Security for appropriate processing and forwarding to the Secretary of Defense.

Heads of DoD Components will designate the individuals to serve on the joint groups as described above.

Coordination

The joint groups and DoD Components, in pursuing their BRAC 95 work, should coordinate with each other and should take into account other analyses or studies external to the BRAC process which may impact their deliberations. For example, the Test and Evaluation joint group should consider input from the Test and Evaluation Executive Agent Board of Directors.

USD(A&T) -- Additional Guidance

The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology (USD(A&T)) may issue such instructions as may be necessary: to implement these policies, procedures, authorities and responsibilities; to ensure timely submission of work products to the BRAC 95 Review Group and Joint Cross-Service Groups, the Secretary of Defense and the 1995 Commission; and, to ensure consistency in application of selection criteria, methodology and reports to the Secretary of Defense, the 1995 Commission and the Congress. The authority and duty of the Secretary of Defense to issue regulations under Title XXIX of Public Law 101-510, as amended, is hereby delegated to the USD(A&T). The USD(A&T) should exercise this authority in coordination with other DoD officials as appropriate.

Responsibilities

Selection Criteria

The BRAC 95 Review Group, chaired by the USD(A&T), will make a recommendation to the Secretary of Defense on whether an amendment to the selection criteria is appropriate no later than January 31, 1994. If the recommendation is to amend the criteria, the recommendation will include the proposed amendment.

If the Secretary of Defense approves amending the criteria, USD(A&T) will publish the proposed amendment in the Federal Register by February 15, 1994, for a 30 day public comment period. The BRAC 95 Review Group will review the public comments received, incorporate appropriate comments and make a recommendation to the Secretary of Defense on the final criteria no later than March 31, 1994.

Force Structure Plan

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)), the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology (USD(A&T)), the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, General Counsel, DoD Comptroller, Director Program

Analysis and Evaluation, and such other officials as may be appropriate, shall develop the force structure plan in accordance with Public Law 101-510, as amended, and submit it to the Secretary of Defense for approval. Pending issuance of the final force structure plan by the Secretary of Defense, DoD Components shall use an interim force structure plan to be developed and issued in accordance with the above coordination procedures by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The interim force structure guidance shall be issued no later than January 31, 1994. Additional force structure guidance shall be issued as soon as practicable after the FY96-FY01 Program Review is completed in the Summer of 1994. The final force structure plan shall be issued as soon as possible after final force decisions are made during the preparation of the FY96 budget, but no later than December 15, 1994. The interim and final force structure plans must include guidance on overseas deployed forces.

Nominations

Public Law 101-510, as amended, requires that commissioners be nominated by the President no later than January 3, 1995, or the 1995 base closure process will be terminated. The Counselor to the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense will coordinate all matters relating to the Secretary's recommendations to the President for appointments to the 1995 Commission. All inquiries from individuals interested in serving on the Commission should be referred to the Counselor.

Commission Support

The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology (USD(A&T)), assisted by the Director of Administration and Management (D,A&M), will provide the Department's support to the 1995 Commission.

Primary Point of Contact

The USD(A&T) shall be the primary point of contact for the Department of Defense with the 1995 Commission and the General Accounting Office (GAO). Each DoD component shall designate to USD(A&T) one or more points of contact with the 1995 Commission and the GAO. The USD(A&T) shall establish procedures for interaction with the 1995 Commission and the GAO.

Internal Controls

The DoD Inspector General shall be available to assist the DoD Components in developing, implementing and evaluating internal control plans.

Depot Maintenance Outsourcing and Industrial Base Considerations

USD(A&T) is currently analyzing depot maintenance outsourcing considerations and is assessing public and private industrial base capabilities. Key policy decisions resulting from this review should be promulgated, if practicable, by March 1, 1994, in order to maximize possible efficiencies in maintenance depot infrastructure.

Procedures

Record Keeping

DoD Components and joint groups empowered by this memorandum to participate in the BRAC 95 analysis process shall, from the date of receipt of this memorandum, develop and keep:

- o Descriptions of how base realignment and closure policies, analyses and recommendations were made, including minutes of all deliberative meetings;
- o All policy, data, information and analyses considered in making base realignment and closure recommendations;
- o Descriptions of how DoD Component recommendations met the final selection criteria and were based on the final force structure plan; and
- o Documentation for each recommendation to the Secretary of Defense to realign or close a military installation under the law.

Internal Controls

DoD Components and joint groups empowered by this memorandum to participate in the BRAC 95 analysis process must develop and implement an internal control plan for base realignment, closure or consolidation studies to ensure the accuracy of data collection and analyses.

At a minimum, these internal control plans should include:

- o Uniform guidance defining data requirements and sources;
- o Systems for verifying the accuracy of data at all levels of command;

- o Documentation justifying changes made to data received from subordinate commands;
- o Procedures to check the accuracy of the analyses made from the data; and
- o An assessment by auditors of the adequacy of each internal control plan.

Data Certification

Public Law 101-510, as amended, requires specified DoD personnel to certify to the best of their knowledge and belief that information provided to the Secretary of Defense or the 1995 Commission concerning the closure or realignment of a military installation is accurate and complete.

DoD components shall establish procedures and designate appropriate personnel to certify that data and information collected for use in BRAC 95 analyses are accurate and complete to the best of that person's knowledge and belief. DoD Components' certification procedures should be incorporated with the required internal control plan. Both are subject to audit by the General Accounting Office.

Finally, Secretaries of the Military Departments, Directors of Defense Agencies, and heads of other DoD Components must certify to the Secretary of Defense that data and information used in making BRAC 95 recommendations to the Secretary are accurate and complete to the best of their knowledge and belief.

Criteria Measures/Factors

DoD Components and BRAC 95 Joint Cross-Service Groups must develop one or more measures/factors for applying each of the final criteria to base structure analyses. While objective measures/factors are desirable, they will not always be possible to develop. Measures/factors may also vary for different categories of bases. DoD Components and BRAC 95 Joint Cross-Service groups must document the measures/factors used for each of the final criteria.

Categories of Bases

One of the first steps in evaluating the base structure for potential closures or realignments must involve grouping installations with like missions, capabilities, or attributes into categories, and when appropriate, subcategories. Categorizing bases is the necessary link between the forces described in the Force Structure Plan, programmed workload, and the base structure. Determining categories of bases is a DoD

Component and BRAC 95 Joint Cross-Service Group responsibility. DoD Components and BRAC 95 Joint Cross-Service Groups should avoid over-categorization in order to maximize opportunities for cross-service or intra-service tradeoffs.

Reserve Component Impacts

Considerable overall DoD savings can be realized through maximizing the use of Reserve component enclaves and through joint use of facilities by the Reserve components. However, these overall DoD savings may not be identified during the BRAC 95 process. Consequently, DoD Components should look for opportunities to consolidate or relocate Reserve components onto active bases to be retained in the base structure and onto closing or realigning bases.

DoD Components must complete Reserve component recruiting demographic studies required by DoD Directive 1225.7 to ensure that the impact on the Reserve components of specific closures and realignments are considered.

Cost of Base Realignment Actions (COBRA) Cost Model

DoD Components must use the COBRA cost model to calculate the costs, savings and return on investment of proposed closures and realignments. The Army is executive agent for COBRA and model improvements are underway.

Community Preference

DoD Components must document the receipt of valid requests received from communities expressing a preference for the closure of a military installation under Section 2924 of Public Law 101-510. DoD components will also document the steps taken to give these requests special consideration. Such documentation is subject to review by the General Accounting Office, the Commission and the Congress.

Release of Information

Data and analyses used by the DoD Components to evaluate military installations for closure and realignment will not be released until the Secretary's recommendations have been forwarded to the 1995 Commission on March 1, 1995, unless specifically required by law. The 1995 Commission is required to hold public hearings on the recommendations.

The General Accounting Office (GAO), however, has a special role in assisting the Commission in its review and analysis of the Secretary's recommendations and must also prepare a report detailing the Department of Defense's selection process. As

such, the GAO will be provided, upon request, with as much information as possible without compromising the deliberative process. The DoD Components must keep records of all data provided to the GAO.


Dissemination of Guidance

DoD Components shall disseminate this guidance and subsequent policy memoranda as widely as possible throughout their organizations. The BRAC 95 Steering Group will review DoD Component supplementary guidance.

Timelines

The timelines described in this memorandum are depicted at Appendix B.


BRAC 95 Organization for Analysis



BRAC 95 Timeline

TASK

- Revise BRAC 95 Process
- BRAC 95 Kick-off Memo
- Stand-up Joint Groups*
- Mil Dept Processes (operating bases)*
- Interim Force Structure Plan*
- Review Selection Criteria*
- Non-BRAC Policy Development*
- Joint Group Policy for Cross-Service Analyses*
- Service Cross-Service Analyses*
- Joint Group Oversight*
- Selection of Commissioners
- Final Force Structure Plan*
- Cumulative Impact Working Group*
- Review of Recommendations by BRAC 95 Review Group
- SecDef Approval
- Commission Review



* Work products reviewed by BRAC 95 Review Group



ACQUISITION AND
TECHNOLOGY

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010



MAY 31 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
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DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT
DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES

SUBJECT: 1995 Base Realignments and Closures (BRAC 95) -- Policy
Memorandum One

Background

Deputy Secretary of Defense memorandum of January 7, 1994, (attached) established policy, procedures, authorities, and responsibilities for selecting bases for realignment or closure under Public Law (P.L.) 101-510, as amended, for the 1995 base closure process (BRAC 95). This memorandum is the first in a series of Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology (USD(A&T)) policy memoranda implementing the Deputy Secretary's BRAC 95 guidance.

Application of P.L. 101-510 Thresholds

This guideline amplifies the DepSecDef January 7, 1994, policy guidance on P.L. 101-510 numerical thresholds.

In determining whether the Act's numerical closure or realignment thresholds are met, independent actions that result in closures or realignments shall be considered separately. In other words, independent actions affecting an individual installation need not be aggregated to apply the numerical thresholds of the Act. However, closure or realignment actions shall not be broken into smaller increments for the purpose of avoiding application of the Act. Subject to the foregoing, independent closure or realignment actions that do not exceed the numerical thresholds set forth in the Act may proceed outside the established BRAC 95 process. Questions regarding whether or not proposed actions are independent should be referred to DoD Components' General Counsel.



Conversely, as the DoD Components review their base structure or conduct functional studies with base closure or realignment impacts, a determination must be made as to whether a comprehensive review or study impacting more than one installation should be considered a single action under P.L. 101-510. To be considered a single action, the review or study must:

- (1) Result in the closure or realignment of at least one installation which would trigger the numerical thresholds of P.L. 101-510; and
- (2) Involve inextricably linked elements, in that failure to proceed with any one element of the action would require reevaluation of the entire action.

Capacity/Military Value Analyses

An early step in BRAC 95 evaluations is determining whether a category/subcategory has potential excess capacity for the end state force levels contained in the Force Structure Plan. Should no excess capacity be found in a category/subcategory, there is no need to continue analyzing that portion of the base structure, unless there is a military value or other reason to continue the analysis (such as a cross-category opportunity to look at installations with similar capabilities, but in different categories). Bases in such categories/subcategories shall remain subject to joint cross-service review and remain available as potential receivers of missions or functions.

Conversely, if a DoD Component recommends a base for closure or realignment, the supporting analysis must have considered all bases within that category/subcategory, as well as cross-category opportunities. If, in applying the military value criteria, you find bases that are militarily/geographically unique or mission-essential (such that no other base could substitute for them) you may justify that fact and exclude these bases from further analysis. Bases so excluded shall remain subject to joint cross-service review and remain available as potential receivers of missions or functions.

Return on Investment (ROI)

Return on investment must be calculated, considered and reported with DoD Components' justifications for each recommended installation closure or realignment package. All costs and savings attributable over time to a closure or realignment package, subject to the below guidance, should be calculated, including costs or savings at receiving locations. Costs or savings elements that are identified, but determined to be insignificant, need not be calculated. However, DoD Component records should indicate that determination.

The Cost of Base Realignment Actions (COBRA) model calculates return on investment. DepSecDef's January 7, 1994, policy memorandum requires the DoD Components to use the most current COBRA version, in order to ensure consistency in methodology. Although the model does not produce budget quality data, it uses standard cost factors and algorithms to estimate costs and savings over time which permit a consistent comparison of bases in a functional or installation category.

We recognize that DoD Component planning and accounting mechanisms are sufficiently different to warrant some Department/Agency specific standard cost factors in the COBRA model. DoD Component documentation must justify the use of such cost factors, particularly when performing cross-service analysis.

Specific instructions follow for the calculation of discount and inflation rates, health care costs, Homeowners Assistance Program, and savings for input to the COBRA model.

- o Discount and Inflation Rates OMB Circular A-94 specifies the discount and inflation rates to be used in ROI calculations.

- o Health Care Costs

- oo CHAMPUS Costs Base closures and realignments can have an impact on CHAMPUS costs DoD-wide. These net cost impacts must be included in analysis of closures or realignments involving Military Treatment Facilities.

- o Homeowners Assistance Program (HAP) The Secretary of the Army will provide each DoD Component with a list of installations that have a reasonable probability of having a HAP program approved, should the installations be selected for closure or realignment. HAP costs will be included for each of the installations so identified by the Secretary of the Army.

- o Land Value Given existing law and practice regarding the disposal of real property, especially public benefit and economic development transfers, proceeds from the sale of land and facilities generally may not be realized. In cases where some proceeds can be expected, DoD Components must estimate the amount to be received for such real property. Estimated land and facility proceeds will generally be based on the anticipated reuse of the land and facilities, assuming appropriate zoning. Also, where an installation has unique contamination problems, a portion of the installation may have to be segregated from disposal so that community reuse may proceed on the balance. Estimated proceeds should be adjusted: for any such parceling, including discounting proceeds when sale of contaminated property is possible only after the cleanup remedy has been installed and

approved; for reduced prices where property is likely to be sold for restricted uses; or, when significant public benefit or economic development transfers are anticipated.

- o Force Structure Savings The savings associated with force structure drawdowns shall not be included in the return on investment calculations. While declining force structure, as depicted in the required Force Structure Plan, will often be the underlying reason for recommending base closures or realignments, the savings associated with closing bases should generally be founded on the elimination of base operating support (BOS), infrastructure and related costs.

- o Military Construction DoD Components will describe anticipated construction requirements (barracks square feet, etc.) to implement a BRAC recommendation and not actual projects. These requirements only become projects during the implementation phase after the 1995 Commission reports to the President and after installation site surveys are conducted and formal project documents (DD 1391s) are prepared.

- o Construction Cost Avoidances Closing and realigning bases can result in construction cost avoidances. Cost avoidances should include FY96-01 programmed military and family housing construction that can be avoided at the closing or realigning bases, other than new-mission construction.

COBRA Model Assumptions

The following statements clarify certain cost assumptions written into the COBRA model:

- o Local Moves Moves of less than 50 miles will not incur PCS moving costs.

- o Priority Placement System Costs. Sixty percent of all employees will be placed in other jobs through the DoD Priority Placement Program. Fifty percent of all employees placed in other jobs through the Program will be relocated at government expense. These percentages are based on historical data.

- o Employee Attrition and Turnover. Fifteen Percent of all employees will not need to be placed or severed due to normal attrition and turnover.

- o Retirement Factors. Fifteen percent of all employees are eligible for retirement. Five percent of those are eligible for normal retirement and ten percent are eligible for early retirement.

o Homeowner's Assistance Program (HAP). The HAP home value rate is 22.9 percent. The HAP receiving rate is 5 percent.

o Students For the purposes of return on investment calculations, relocation of students will only impact the COBRA model's calculation of overhead costs, and as appropriate, estimates of military construction requirements.

Receiving Bases

DoD Components must identify receiving bases for large units or activities, including tenants, which are to be relocated from closing or realigning bases. Such relocations must be included in DoD Component's recommendations to the Secretary of Defense. The COBRA model will calculate the costs for relocating such units or activities. DoD Components do not need to identify specific receiving bases for units or tenants with less than 100 civilian/military employees. Finding homes for these activities can be left to execution. However, DoD Components should establish a generic "base x" within the COBRA model to act as the surrogate receiving base for the aggregation of these smaller units or activities, in order to ensure completeness of cost and savings calculations.

Reserve Enclaves

This expands on the DepSecDef January 7, 1994, policy guidance on Reserve Component impacts.

On each base designated for closure or realignment, the future of guard and reserve units of all Military Departments residing on or receiving support from that base must be considered. Once a decision has been made to include an enclave or to relocate guard and reserve units, the affected unit identifications must be included in the DoD Components' recommendations to the Secretary of Defense. Military construction and repair costs of fitting out an enclave for reserve component or guard use will be estimated and included as part of the return on investment calculations.



R. Noel Longuemare
Principal Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense (Acquisition & Technology)



ACQUISITION AND
TECHNOLOGY

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010



OCT 19 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
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ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT
DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES

SUBJECT: 1995 Base Realignments and Closures (BRAC 95)

I hereby redelegate to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Economic Security the authority to issue instructions providing additional guidance to the DoD Components which was delegated to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology by Deputy Secretary of Defense memorandum of January 7, 1994, titled, "1995 Base Realignments and Closures (BRAC 95)."

The Assistant Secretary for Economic Security shall also act, on behalf of the Under Secretary, as the primary point of contact for the Department of Defense with the 1995 Commission and the General Accounting Office.

Paul G. Kaminski

Paul G. Kaminski





THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

2 NOV 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
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DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT
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SUBJECT: 1995 Base Closure and Realignment Selection Criteria

The attached 1995 Base Closure and Realignment (BRAC 95) Selection Criteria, required by Section 2903(b) of P.L. 101-510, form the basis, along with the force structure plan, of the base closure and realignment process. DoD components shall use these criteria in base structure analyses to nominate BRAC 95 closure or realignment candidates. The criteria will also be used by the 1995 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission in their review of the Department of Defense final recommendations. These criteria are identical to those used in BRAC 91 and BRAC 93.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "John H. Statch", is centered below the main text.

Attachment

21757

Department of Defense
Final Selection Criteria

In selecting military installations for closure or realignment, the Department of Defense, giving priority consideration to military value (the first four criteria below), will consider:

Military Value

1. The current and future mission requirements and the impact on operational readiness of the Department of Defense's total force.
2. The availability and condition of land, facilities and associated airspace at both the existing and potential receiving locations.
3. The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, and future total force requirements at both the existing and potential receiving locations.
4. The cost and manpower implications.

Return on Investment

5. The extent and timing of potential costs and savings, including the number of years, beginning with the date of completion of the closure or realignment, for the savings to exceed the costs.

Impacts

6. The economic impact on communities.
7. The ability of both the existing and potential receiving communities' infrastructure to support forces, missions and personnel.
8. The environmental impact.



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

**3300 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20301-3300**

November 23, 1994



**MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
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DIRECTOR, DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING
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DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT
DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES**

**SUBJECT: 1995 Base Realignments and Closures (BRAC 95) -- Policy Memorandum Two --
Joint Cross-Service Group Functional Analysis Process**

This memorandum summarizes the process, involving both Joint Cross-Service Groups (JCSGs) and the individual Military Departments, for developing BRAC alternatives in situations involving such common support functions as labs, depots, test & evaluation, undergraduate pilot training and medical facilities.

JCSGs will determine a functional value for each of the common support functions at each activity within their jurisdiction. These functional values will be independent of the military value of any installation, which is separately determined by the Military Departments. The assessments of functional value and assessments of functional capacity and requirements, using certified data, will then be incorporated into JCSG analyses of possible functional closure or realignment alternatives. The JCSG's (which include representatives from the Military Departments) will use their expertise and judgment to develop these functional closure or realignment alternatives.

To assist them as an analytic tool in this process, the JCSGs will use a linear programming optimization model (documentation attached) to the maximum extent possible. The model provides a basis for further analysis and the application of judgment in developing functional alternatives. While the model has value in assessing alternatives for relocations and consolidations of common support functions, it cannot by itself make recommendations regarding closures or realignments of installations. Those can be made only by the Military Departments or the BRAC 95 Review Group, reflecting judgment concerning the military value of installations, based on the final criteria and the six-year force structure plan.



Each JCSG is currently supported in its evaluations by a Joint Cross-Service Working Group (JCSWG), variously referred to as "sub-groups", "study teams" or "technical and support groups." JCSWGs will adapt the linear programming (optimization) model to assist each JCSG in its analysis and aid in developing alternatives. All JCSGs will be supported by a single Tri-Department BRAC Group consisting of representatives from each Military Department, which will execute runs of the linear programming (optimization) model, using certified data, according to the objective functions and policy imperatives provided by the JCSGs and the management controls required by the internal control plan. JCSG alternatives can be derived from any number of combinations of objective functions and policy imperatives as long as they have been previously approved by the Chairman of the BRAC 95 Steering Group.

The Military Departments will conduct their individual BRAC processes in parallel with the JCSG analyses, to determine the relative military value of their installations. JCSG products such as functional value may be used to assist in determining installation military value. If it is useful to a JCSG in developing its alternatives for analysis, a JCSG may solicit the guidance of the Military Departments concerning the military value of installations. It must be recognized that any such guidance must necessarily be preliminary and will not constitute a final determination of military value or of suitability for closure or realignment.

The JCSGs and the Military Departments will then review the sets of optimization model outputs. Working together, the JCSGs and the Military Departments will apply their collective judgment to develop feasible functional alternatives to facilitate cross-service actions that will strive to maximize infrastructure (overhead) reductions at minimal cost. This cooperative work by the JCSGs and the Military Departments should be completed in time for the BRAC 95 Review Group to consider any issues that may be appropriate and to leave sufficient time for the Military Departments to formulate their recommendations. The JCSGs and Military Departments will continue to interact during November and December as the Military Departments consider cross-service alternatives in their respective BRAC analytical processes.

The Military Departments will present their recommendations for closure and realignment to the Secretary of Defense no later than mid-February, 1995. The Military Departments will provide the Secretary of Defense a status report, to include all preliminary closure and realignment candidates, by January 3, 1995. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Economic Security will staff the Military Department recommendations within the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The BRAC 95 Review Group or OSD principals may solicit the opinion of or task the JCSG's during this period, if and as appropriate.

The process described above involves appropriate interaction between JCSG and Military Department analyses and permits consideration of joint functional alternatives to be incorporated within the existing BRAC process of the Military Departments. If you have questions concerning the process, please contact Mr. Robert Bayer, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Installations, 703-697-1771.



Joshua Gotbaum

Joint Cross-Service Analysis Tool User's Guide

Executive Summary

Background

The Deputy Secretary of Defense established policy for the Department of Defense 1995 base realignment and closure (BRAC 95) process with strong emphasis on cross-service opportunities. This document describes operations and capabilities of the common analytical tool to assist Joint Cross-Service Groups (users) in the development of cross-service alternatives as part of the ERAC process.

Analytical Tool

A standard tool often used to develop optimal solutions to complex allocation problems is the mixed-integer, linear program (MILP). The cross-service analysis of allocations of common support functional requirements to Military Department sites and activities is a complex allocation problem.

The MILP formulation described in this document can be used to develop cross-service functional alternatives. The data elements required for this tool are derived from the certified data available to the user. Policy imperatives and other constraints and considerations can be incorporated into the model to allow the tailoring of formulations to accommodate functional attributes and perspectives.

The tool provides the capability to vary the objective function for a formulation in order to obtain families of solutions. A solution defines a set of functional allocations and identification of sites or activities where cross-service functional workload could be assigned. An objective function that combines military value of sites and activities with functional values is discussed in this document. This particular objective function will tend to consolidate common support functions into high military value sites or activities. At the same time, this objective function will assign common support functions to sites having high functional values. The weighting between these two goals can be parameterized to obtain families of solutions for further consideration.

Second and third best alternatives for a given formulation can be obtained using methods described in this document. These alternatives may be considered as additions to the set for further review.

Other objective functions that the user may wish to consider in addition to the one mentioned above, include minimizing excess functional capacity, minimizing the total number of sites performing cross-service functions, and maximizing the sum of functional values. This tool will also allow the user to explore the sensitivity of the optimal solution for a given formulation to particular model inputs.

The MILP formulation described provides the basic analytical tool to generate cross-service functional alternatives.

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User's Guide Organization

This user's guide provides an overview of the analytical methodology in the next section. That section describes the products of the methodology and discusses terminology relating to what a *site or activity* is relative to a *function*.

Section 2 describes the basic data elements that are used in the methodology. Section 2 also discusses data elements in terms of what these elements are meant to represent.

The different optimization problem formulations that the user may choose to use to explore alternatives are discussed in section 3. These include finding a small set of high military value sites or activities that can perform the functional requirement, minimizing excess capacity, and minimizing the number of sites. All of these formulations are parameterized in such a way that the user can explore trade-offs between different factors, such as military value or excess capacity, and assignments of functional requirement based upon functional value. This section also discusses the incorporation of policy imperatives in the optimization problem formulations.

Section 4 demonstrates the application of each of these formulations to a notional set of data. Section 5 describes the methodology for obtaining the second and third best solutions to a given formulation. Finally, section 6 identifies the commercial software product that was used to solve the optimization example problems. Input files for this solver are included in the appendices.

1. Analytical Methodology Overview

The optimization formulations described in this document require a set of data elements as inputs. All of the formulations require a functional value and functional capacity for each site capable of performing that specific cross-service function. The DoD requirement for each cross-service function is needed. Some of the formulations will also require the military values for each site.

A preliminary formulation that allocates cross-service functional requirements based upon functional capacities and functional value will be conducted. The objective function of this formulation will assign the DoD requirement for each cross-service function to sites or activities having the highest functional value for each function. These assignments will only be constrained by the functional capacities at each site. This analysis will not require the military values for the sites.

The primary formulations optimize the assignment of cross-service functions based upon military values of sites, functional values, and capacities. These formulations are very flexible in that multiple objective functions and policy imperatives modeled as constraints may be used to explore different solutions.

A standard resource allocation tool comprises the core of this analytical approach. A standard tool used to find optimal solutions to complex allocation problems is the mixed-integer, linear program (MILP). Allocation of common support functional requirements to military department sites and activities subject to constraints is a complex allocation problem.


Process Products

The following table lists the various products of the analytical approach defined in this document.

Process products	Description
Capacity analyses	Develop methodology to measure the capacity of a site or activity to perform a function. Use data call responses to calculate capacities.
Requirements analyses	For each function, develop methodology to estimate the out-year DoD requirement to perform the function. Calculate the required capacity and identify excess capacity reduction goals.
Functional value (FV) assessments	Develop measures and weights for assessing the value of performing a function at a site or an activity based upon data call responses. Provide FV for all appropriate functions and site/activity combinations.
Optimize functional requirement allocations (preliminary formulation)	Find the best allocation of functional requirements to sites or activities based solely upon functional capacities and functional values.
Optimize allocations of functional requirements to high military value sites or activities (primary formulations)	Develop solutions based upon the first three products, above, and policy imperatives. Solutions will be developed using the optimization formulations described later in this document as a tool to explore alternatives.

Hierarchical Structure

The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the departments, and other groups all use different terms to describe the various components of infrastructure that are to be considered by the users. In this document a *site* refers to an installation, base, or station. An *activity* refers to a component of the site such as depot or test facility residing on the site. A site may have one or more activities. A *function* is the capability to perform a particular support action or produce a particular commodity. A common support function is a function. An activity includes a collection of functions. For example, a depot (an activity) may repair engines and airframes. These would be two functions performed at this activity. A function may be further broken down into subfunctions or facilities required to perform functions, but the approach described here does not consider the subfunctions or facilities. Subfunctions or facilities can be incorporated into the process described here if the appropriate data is available. The following diagram illustrates this hierarchical structure.



2. Data Elements

The analytical approach assumes that the following data will be available for all of the sites and functions:

Data Elements	Description
mv_s	Military value of site s expressed as 3 (high), 2 (medium), or 1 (low).
fv_{sf}	Functional value for performing function f at site/activity s expressed as a number from 0 (low) to 100 (high).
cap_{sf}	Capacity of site/activity s to perform function f .
req_f	The total DoD requirement or goal to perform function f .

The military value of a site, mv_s , should measure the overall value of the site.

The fv_{sf} functional value for performing function f at site (or activity) s measures the capability and quality of performing work of type f at site (or activity) s . Capacity to perform a specialized subfunction that is not one of the functions called out in the formulation can be considered in calculating functional value.

3. Optimization Formulations

The mixed integer linear programming (MILP) model formulations, that are described below, serve as the basic analytical tools to assist users in the development of cross-service alternatives, allow for modification of formulations, and incorporation of policy imperatives.¹

¹A *policy imperative* is a statement that restricts the solutions that are acceptable and that can be modeled as a constraint in the formulation. An example of a policy imperative is included in one of the examples.

Preliminary Formulation.

The preliminary formulation of the optimization problem will be solved once the initial data (fv_{sf} , cap_{sf} , req_f) are available. This formulation, called **MAXFV** will maximize the functional values weighted by the assigned workload and normalized by the functional requirement. No constraints other than the functional capacities at each site and the requirement to meet the DoD requirement for each cross-service function are included in this formulation. This solution will serve as a baseline of what is possible if no other factors, such as military values of sites or costs, are considered.

For each function, this formulation will load as much of the functional DoD requirement as it can into the site or activity having the highest functional value for that function. If that site or activity does not have the capacity to accommodate the full requirement, the site or activity having the next highest functional value will be allocated any remaining requirement up to its capacity, and so on.

The mathematical description of this formulation follows:

$$\text{Maximize } \sum_{s \in S} \sum_{f \in F} l_{sf} \times fv_{sf} / req_f$$

subject to :

$$\sum_{s \in S} l_{sf} = req_f : \text{ for all functions } f \in F,$$

$$l_{sf} \leq k_{sf} \times cap_{sf} : \text{ for all sites } s \in S \text{ and } f \in F,$$

$$o_s \leq \sum_{f \in F} k_{sf} : \text{ for all sites } s \in S,$$

$$k_{sf} \leq o_s : \text{ for all sites } s \in S \text{ and } f \in F,$$

$$k_{sf} \leq \frac{l_{sf}}{\alpha \times cap_{sf}} : \text{ for all functions } f \in F \text{ and sites } s \in S,$$

$$0 \leq o_s \leq 1, \text{ integer} : \text{ for all sites } s \in S,$$

$$0 \leq k_{sf} \leq 1, \text{ integer} : \text{ for all sites } s \in S \text{ and functions } f \in F;$$

where

$S =$ The set of all sites under consideration by joint cross-service groups;

$F =$ The set of all functions under consideration by joint cross-service groups;

$o_s =$ 1 if any functional requirement is assigned to the site, and 0 otherwise;

$\alpha =$ 0.01. No assignment of less than one percent of capacity will be allowed.

Decision variable

$l_{sf} =$ amount of the DoD requirement for function f to be assigned to site s .

$k_{sf} =$ 1 if any amount of function f is assigned to site s , 0 otherwise.

The o_s variables are included in this formulation only to keep count of the number of sites that actually have some functional requirement assigned to them. Their inclusion in the model does not affect the assignment of the functional requirement to sites or activities. The two constraints involving the o_s variables are used to ensure that these variables are set to the correct values.

The k_{sf} variables that are structural variables that indicate whether or not any functional workload of type f has been assigned to site s . The α parameter can be used to prevent small functional workload assignments. If α is set to 0.01, then the minimum workload assignment of a function to a site, given that any functional workload for this function is made to this site, would be one percent of that site's capacity to perform that function. The α parameter may be adjusted as required to meet the requirements of the particular user.

Primary Formulations

These formulations explore potential cross-service functional alternatives. The basic formulation is shown below. Specification of the objective function, $f(o_s, l_{sf}, k_{sf})$, will create a different optimization problem.

Minimize $f(o_s, l_{sf}, k_{sf})$

o_s, l_{sf}, k_{sf}

subject to

$$\sum_{s \in S} l_{sf} = req_f : \text{for all functions } f \in F,$$

$$o_s \leq \sum_{f \in F} k_{sf} : \text{for all sites } s \in S,$$

$$0 \leq l_{sf} \leq k_{sf} \times cap_{sf} : \text{for all functions } f \in F \text{ and sites } s \in S,$$

$$k_{sf} \leq o_s : \text{for all sites } s \in S \text{ and } f \in F,$$

$$k_{sf} \leq \frac{l_{sf}}{\alpha \times cap_{sf}} : \text{for all functions } f \in F \text{ and sites } s \in S,$$

$$0 \leq o_s \leq 1, \text{ integer} : \text{for all sites } s \in S,$$

$$0 \leq k_{sf} \leq 1, \text{ integer} : \text{for all sites } s \in S \text{ and functions } f \in F,$$

where

$S =$ The set of all sites under consideration by joint cross-service groups;

$F =$ The set of all functions under consideration by joint cross-service groups;

$\alpha =$ 0.01. No assignment of less than one percent of capacity will be allowed.

Decision variables

$o_s =$ 1 if any cross-service functional requirements are assigned to the site or activity, 0 otherwise;

$l_{sf} =$ amount of the DoD requirement for function f to be assigned to site or activity s .

$k_{sf} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if any DoD requirement for function } f \text{ is to be assigned to site } s, \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$

Three different optimization formulations that vary only in the specification of the objective function are discussed next.

The MINNMV Formulation. This formulation will find a small number of sites having the highest military value that can accommodate the DoD required workload. In addition, it will assign the DoD requirement for each cross-service function to the retained sites (or activities) having the highest functional value for that function. The purpose of this formulation is to assign, to the extent possible, the cross-service functional requirements to sites or activities having high military value and high functional values. The rationale for this approach is that sites having high military value are the ones most likely to be retained by the military departments. The objective function for this formulation is as follows:

$$\text{Minimize } f(o_s, l_{ig}, k_{sf}) = \left(\frac{w}{u_1} \right) \times \sum_{s \in S} o_s \times nmv_s - \left(\frac{100-w}{u_2} \right) \times \sum_{i \in S} \sum_{g \in F} l_{ig} \times fv_{ig}/req_g$$

o_s, l_{ig}

where

$0 \leq w \leq 100$ Weight parameter used to vary the emphasis between military value and functional value,

$u_1 \geq 0, u_2 \geq 0$ $u_1 = \sum_{s \in S} (4 - mv_s), u_2 = \sum_{f \in F} \max_{s \in S} fv_{sf}$

$nmv_s = 4 - mv_s.$

This formulation will be referred to as the MINNMV model since it minimizes the sum of $4 - mv_s$ for retained sites or activities. Site or activities having a high military value (3) will have 1 as their value. Site or activities with low military value (1) will have 3 as their value.

The parameters u_1 and u_2 are used to scale the two components of the objective function. Scaling the components of the objective function enhances the ability of the solver to find a solution. Apart from the weight parameters, these scaling parameters will scale the components of the objective function to values near 1.0.

The weight parameter, w , can be varied to change the emphasis the formulation gives to military value versus functional value. If $w = 0$, this formulation matches the preliminary formulation (MAXFV) as site military value would have zero weight. Conversely, if w is set to a large value ($w = 99$), functional value would have little weight. The MAXFV and MINNMV formulations are the same formulation, only differing in the parameter w . Varying w in the formulation allows the model to be used to create a family of solutions. These points are illustrated by an example in the next section.

The component of the objective function that addresses military value of sites, $\sum_{s \in S} o_s \times nmv_s = \sum_{s \in S} o_s \times (4 - mv_s)$, affects the optimal solution as follows. (For this discussion we will ignore the functional value component of the objective function, $-\sum_{i \in S} \sum_{g \in F} l_{ig} \times fv_{ig}/req_g$.) If there were no constraints in the formulation, i.e., satisfy the DoD requirement, the minimum value of the objective function would be achieved by setting

$o_i = 0$ for all sites since $4 - mv_i \geq 1$ for all sites. Given that some sites have to be open, all else being equal, it is better to open a site with $mv_i = 3$ because it increases the objective function by the least amount.

The MINXCAP Formulation. If the parameter w is set to a large value ($w = 99$), this problem formulation will find the set of retained sites having the smallest total functional capacity but still able to perform the DoD functional requirement. Depending on w , functional assignments are also optimized. The objective function for this formulation is:

$$\text{Minimize } f(o_i, l_{ig}, k_{uh}) = \left(\frac{w}{u_1} \right) \times \sum_{i \in S} o_i \times \left(\sum_{f \in F} \text{cap}_{if} / \text{req}_f \right) - \left(\frac{100-w}{u_2} \right) \times \sum_{i \in S} \sum_{g \in F} l_{ig} \times f v_{ig} / \text{req}_g$$

o_i, l_{ig}, k_{uh}

If $w = 0$, this formulation, like the MINNMV formulation, is also equivalent to the MAXFV formulation. If w is set to a large value, excess capacity is reduced as much as possible without regard to functional values. As in the MINNMV formulation, u_1 and u_2 are used to scale the components of the objective function. For this formulation $u_1 = \sum_{i \in S} \sum_{f \in F} \text{cap}_{if} / \text{req}_f$. The other scale parameter u_2 is set to the same value for all formulations.

The MINSITES Formulation. This formulation, depending on the value of w , will find the minimum-sized set of site or activities that can perform the DoD functional requirement. As in the previous formulations, if $w = 0$, this formulation is also equivalent to MAXFV. The objective function for this formulation is given by:

$$\text{Minimize } f(o_i, l_{ig}, k_{uh}) = \left(\frac{w}{u_1} \right) \times \sum_{i \in S} o_i - \left(\frac{100-w}{u_2} \right) \times \sum_{i \in S} \sum_{g \in F} l_{ig} \times f v_{ig} / \text{req}_g$$

o_i, l_{ig}, k_{uh}

If w is set to a large value, the cross-service functional workload is assigned to the smallest possible number of sites regardless of functional values. For this formulation $u_1 = |S|$, the number of sites in the set S .

The MAXSFV formulation. This formulation maximizes the sum of the functional values for all of the retained sites. The objective function for this formulation is given by:

$$\text{Maximize } f(o_i, l_{ig}, k_{uh}) = \left(\frac{w}{u_1} \right) \times \sum_{i \in S} (o_i \times \sum_{f \in F} f v_{if}) + \left(\frac{100-w}{u_2} \right) \times \sum_{i \in S} \sum_{g \in F} l_{ig} \times f v_{ig} / \text{req}_g$$

o_i, l_{ig}, k_{uh}

For this formulation $u_1 = \sum_{f \in F} \sum_{i \in S} f v_{if}$. If the number of sites to be retained is not constrained, all of the sites will be retained in the solution since the objective function is maximized when $o_i = 1$ for all sites. Obtaining meaningful results with this formulation, therefore, requires a constraint on the number of sites retained.

Policy Imperatives

A policy imperative is any statement that can be formulated as a constraint in the model. The model described here is very flexible in its capacity to handle imperatives. Examples of imperatives that can be modeled include:

- assigning functions in groups,
- increasing the average DoD military value of the sites assigned any cross-service functional workload,
- requiring the weighted functional value for a given common support function to be at least as great as some value,
- limiting the number of sites that have any cross-service functional workload assigned to them,
- requiring that each department's average military value is not allowed to go below some level,
- requiring a certain number of sites in a geographic area to remain open, and
- requiring the distribution of functional workload to follow a certain pattern, e.g., in one department, in one location, or on both coasts.

This is not an exhaustive list of the possibilities for policy imperatives. An example of a policy imperative added to the **MINNMV** formulation is given in the following section.

Consistent Alternatives

The functional data and constraints from all of the users may be combined into a single formulation. In the event that two users obtain solutions that are inconsistent (e.g., the solutions have a site or activity receiving cross-service functional workload in one, and losing all of its cross-service functional workload in the other) this capability can be used to resolve the inconsistency.

4. Optimization Examples

The following examples use representative, notional data to demonstrate the formulations. Three different departments, X, Y, and Z, each have 5 sites (A, B, C, D, and E). Six functions are considered: air vehicles, munitions, electronic combat, fixed-wing avionics, conventional missiles and rockets, and satellites. Table 1 shows the basic data for these sites. Table 1 also shows the DoD requirement by function and the percent of excess capacity. Percent excess capacity is calculated as

$$100 \times \left(\frac{\sum_{j \in S} cap_{ij}}{req_i} - 1 \right).$$

Preliminary Formulation (MAXFV).

Results for the **MAXFV** formulation are shown in table 2. If there is no functional requirement assigned to a site, the capacity for that function is shown as zero at that site even if the site has requirements for other functions assigned. Notice that, for this solution, *all sites have some cross-service functional workload assigned*.

The column in table 2 labeled *Wgt FV* shows the weighted functional value for each function. *Wgt FV* for function $f \in F = \frac{\sum_{j \in S} f_{ij} \times req_{ij}}{\sum_{j \in S} req_{ij}}$. *Wgt FV* is an indicator of the quality of the cross-service allocation of the functional requirement across all sites and activities. The average *FV*, the weighted average *FV*, and the weighted percent excess capacity are also shown in the table. These three numbers are gross measures of the quality of the solution.

Primary Formulation (MINNMV).

Table 3 shows the data for the optimal solution to the **MINNMV** formulation with $w = 99$. The number of sites having cross-service functional workload assigned has been reduced from 15 to six. Excess capacity is greatly reduced. The weighted percent excess capacity is only 31 percent compared to 60 for the **MAXFV** formulation. The DoD military value average is increased by 28.8 percent. The military value averages for the two departments with any sites retained have both been increased. The weighted functional value scores are not as good as the scores obtained from the **MAXFV** formulation. The average *FV* score is almost 14 points lower than for the **MAXFV** formulation.

Primary Formulation (MINNMV) with Policy Imperative

As an example of a policy imperative, consider the following. Suppose the user responsible for the missile function determines that only two sites should perform the conventional missiles and rockets function. The optimal solution to the original **MINNMV** formulation assigned the missile function to four different sites. Modifying the **MINNMV** formulation such that only two sites are allowed to perform the missile function results in the solution shown in table 4. The optimal solution still requires only six sites to perform the cross-service functions, but the sites are different. Only four of the sites are common to both solutions. Since the model has an additional constraint, the average military value has decreased compared to the original **MINNMV** formulation.

Parameterization of the MINNMV Formulation

Table 5 summarizes the results of varying the parameter w in the **MINNMV** formulation over the values 0, 2, 3, 5, 10, 20, 30, 40, 60, and 99. As is to be expected, the number of sites and activities with cross-service functional workload assigned and weighted functional value decrease as w increases. The average military value generally increases as w increases. Though these results pertain only to this particular example, they clearly illustrate qualitative differences between the **MAXFV** and **MINNMV** formulations. The optimal solutions to the formulation do not change as w varies over the range of 60 to 99.

This example illustrates how the parameter w can be used to generate a family of cross-service functional solutions. For instance, a user with table 5 before him could decide that from this family of solutions, the solution obtained by setting $w = 20$ is worth exploring further since the weighted functional values are very close to the best values obtained in the **MAXFV** formulation and the weighted average percent excess capacity has been reduced from 60 to 17 percent. Table 6 displays the full output from this formulation.

Figure 1 displays this information in graphical form. The figure shows the sharp decrease in the average functional value for conventional missiles and rockets when w is changed from 20 to 30. The figure also displays the increase in average military value that is achieved by using the MINNMV formulation.

Primary Formulation (MINXCAP)

Table 7 shows the output of the MINXCAP formulation with $w = 99$. As would be expected, this formulation produces a solution that greatly reduces excess capacity, but the weighted functional values have suffered. The weighted average percent excess capacity has been reduced to almost 6 percent.

Primary Formulation (MINSITES)

The results of using the MINSITES formulation with $w = 99$ are given in table 8. The optimal solution retains only six sites. The sites are different than the sites retained in the MINNMV solution.

Primary Formulation (MAXSFV)

The results of using the MAXSFV formulation with the number of retained sites constrained to be no more than six are displayed in table 9.

Summary of Formulation Results

The following table summarizes the basic statistics for the five formulations.

Statistics	MAXFV	MINNMV	MINXCAP	MINSITES	MAXSFV
Sites retained	15	6	7	6	6
Weighted avg. percent excess capacity	60.37	31.39	6.11	12.14	24.1
Weighted average FV	84.7	73.9	74.2	76.5	62.9
Average military value	2.2	2.83	2	2.67	2.67

5. Generating Alternatives

Alternative solutions, in terms of the retained sites or activities, may be obtained by excluding a set of retained or open sites from a formulation. For example, the optimal solution obtained from the MINNMV formulation (see table 3) retains sites XA, XC, XD, ZA, ZB, and ZD. To find another optimal solution with the same objective function value or the next best solution, we define the set $\Delta_1 = \{XA, XC, XD, ZA, ZB, ZD\}$ and add the following constraints to the MINNMV formulation:

$$\sum_{s \in \Delta_1} o_s \leq |\Delta_1| - \alpha \text{ (condition 1)}$$

$$\sum_{s \in S - \Delta_1} o_s \geq \beta \text{ (condition 2)}$$

$$\alpha + \beta \geq 1$$

$$\alpha = 0, 1 \text{ and } \beta = 0, 1.$$

A solution that satisfies either condition 1 ($\alpha = 1$) or condition 2 ($\beta = 1$) will be different from the original optimal solution. The formulation given above guarantees that at least one of these two conditions will hold at the optimal solution. The second best solution to the MINNMV formulation is given in table 10. The second-best solution retains sites XC, XD, YC, ZA, ZB, ZD. This solution actually has weighted functional values that are superior to those of the original optimal solution for some of the functions. Comparing values in tables 3 and 10, it would be difficult to argue that the optimal solution is clearly superior to the solution given in table 10.

If we define the set $\Delta_2 = \{XC, XD, YC, ZA, ZB, ZD\}$, then the following formulation can be used to find the third best solution:

$$\sum_{s \in \Delta_1 \cap \Delta_2} o_s \leq |\Delta_1 \cap \Delta_2| - \alpha \text{ (condition 1)}$$

$$\sum_{s \in \Delta_1 \cap \Delta_2} o_s \geq \beta \text{ (condition 2)}$$

$$\left. \begin{array}{l} \sum_{s \in \Delta_1 - \Delta_2} o_s \geq \gamma \\ \sum_{s \in \Delta_2 - \Delta_1} o_s \geq \gamma \end{array} \right\} \text{ (condition 3)}$$

$$\alpha + \beta + \gamma \geq 1$$

$$\alpha = 0, 1, \beta = 0, 1, \text{ and } \gamma = 0, 1.$$

Any solution that satisfies any one of the three conditions will be different from the first two solutions. Table 11 shows the third best solution. Comparing table 11 to tables 3 and 10 results in a less compelling case for the strength of the third best alternative. Based upon this type of comparison, the first two solutions would be subjected to further analysis before selecting one as a recommendation.

6. Optimization Software

The solutions to these optimization problems were obtained using the commercially-available, IBM Optimization Subroutine Library (OSL)² interfaced with AMPL³. The text file describing these formulations in the AMPL format is contained in appendix A. Note that all of the different objective functions are defined in this single text file. This file contains the code required to generate the second and third best alternatives. The AMPL-format data file for the

²Optimization with OSL by Ming S. Hung, Walter O. Rom, and Allan D. Waren, published by The Scientific Press.

³AMPL: A Modeling Language for Mathematical Programming by Robert Fourer, David M. Gay, and Brian Kernighan, published by The Scientific Press, 1993.

example is given in appendix B. These files are processed by the AMPL/OSL package to produce the outputs discussed in the examples section of this document.

Table 1. Joint Cross-Service Analysis Example
Basic Data

Function	Department														
	X					Y					Z				
	A	B	C	D	E	A	B	C	D	E	A	B	C	D	E
Capacities															
Air vehicles	450	7000	2500	0	0	5000	500	0	0	0	3000	1200	0	2857	0
Munitions	850	200	4500	0	0	300	0	2000	0	0	1000	0	1000	0	0
Electronic combat	3000	0	0	0	0	1000	0	0	0	0	2000	0	0	1543	20
Fixed-wing avionics	0	0	250	3500	0	0	0	400	3500	0	1000	4000	0	2000	500
Conv. missiles/rockets	0	0	200	0	3000	0	0	200	100	2000	3000	700	200	300	200
Satellites	0	0	300	4000	0	0	0	500	0	0	250	50	0	300	2200
Totals															
22,507															
9,850															
7,563															
15,150															
9,900															
7,600															
Function FV Scores															
Air vehicles	50	70	68	0	0	57	72	0	0	0	81	92	0	86	0
Munitions	88	71	58	0	0	54	0	88	0	0	72	0	75	0	0
Electronic combat	67	0	0	0	0	91	0	0	0	0	52	0	0	78	77
Fixed-wing avionics	0	0	92	94	0	0	0	78	69	0	72	93	0	66	71
Conv. missiles/rockets	0	0	62	0	89	0	0	59	93	92	56	59	50	65	91
Satellites	0	0	71	58	0	0	0	64	0	0	85	61	0	73	93
Department Military Value															
3	3	3	3	2	1	2	1	3	2	1	3	3	2	3	1

Function	DoD req.	Pct. excess
Air vehicles	9,463	137.8
Munitions	5,503	79.0
Electronic combat	3,234	133.9
Fixed-wing avionics	3,775	301.3
Conv. missiles/rockets	3,743	164.5
Satellites	2,480	206.5

Table 2. MAXFV Model Output

Function	Department																Retained totals
	X					Y					Z						
	A	B	C	D	E	A	B	C	D	E	A	B	C	D	E		
Retain=1, Close=0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	15
Department Mil. Val.	3	3	3	2	1	2	1	3	2	1	3	3	2	3	1		
Capacities	0	7000	0	0	0	0	500	0	0	0	3000	1200	0	2857	0	14557	53.8
Air vehicles	850	200	4500	0	0	0	0	2000	0	0	1000	0	1000	0	0	9550	73.5
Munitions	3000	0	0	0	0	1000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1543	20	5563	72.0
Electronic combat	0	0	0	3500	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4000	0	0	0	7500	98.7
Fixed-wing avionics	0	0	0	0	3000	0	0	0	100	2000	0	0	0	0	200	5300	41.6
Conv. missiles/rockets	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	250	0	0	300	2200	2750	10.9
Satellites																	60.37
Workload assigned																	
Air vehicles	0	1908	0	0	0	0	500	0	0	0	3000	1200	0	2857	0	Totals	
Munitions	850	200	453	0	0	0	0	2000	0	0	1000	0	1000	0	0	9463	
Electronic combat	671	0	0	0	0	1000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1543	20	5503	
Fixed-wing avionics	0	0	0	3500	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	275	0	0	0	3234	
Conv. missiles/rockets	0	0	0	0	1443	0	0	0	100	2000	0	0	0	0	200	3775	
Satellites	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	250	0	0	30	2200	3743	
Department avg. MV			2.4					1.8						2.4		2480	
Percent change			-0.0					0.0						-0.0			

DoD average MV
Percent change

2.20
0.0

DoD weighted FVs		Wgt FV
Function		
Air vehicles	81.2	
Munitions	79.6	
Electronic combat	79.7	
Fixed-wing avionics	93.9	
Conv. missiles/rockets	90.8	
Satellites	92.0	
Average FV	86.2	
Weighted avg. FV	84.7	

Function	Department																		Retained totals
	X						Y						Z						
	A	B	C	D	E		A	B	C	D	E		A	B	C	D	E		
Retain=1, Close=0	1	0	1	1	0		0	0	0	0	0		1	1	0	1	0	6	
Department Mil. Val.	3	3	3	2	1		2	1	3	2	1		3	3	2	3	1		
Capacities																			
Air vehicles	0	0	2500	0	0		0	0	0	0	0		0	3000	1200	0	2857	0	
Munitions	850	0	4500	0	0		0	0	0	0	0		0	1000	0	0	0	9557	
Electronic combat	3000	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	1543	0	
Fixed-wing avionics	0	0	0	3500	0		0	0	0	0	0		0	0	4000	0	0	0	
Conv. missiles/rockets	0	0	200	0	0		0	0	0	0	0		0	3000	700	0	300	0	
Satellites	0	0	300	4000	0		0	0	0	0	0		0	250	50	0	300	0	
																		Percent excess	
																		1.0	
																		15.4	
																		40.5	
																		98.7	
																		12.2	
																		97.6	
																		31.39	
																		Wgt. avg.	
Workload assigned																			
Air vehicles	0	0	2406	0	0		0	0	0	0	0		0	3000	1200	0	2857	0	
Munitions	850	0	3653	0	0		0	0	0	0	0		0	1000	0	0	0	9463	
Electronic combat	1691	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	1543	0	
Fixed-wing avionics	0	0	0	3500	0		0	0	0	0	0		0	0	275	0	0	3775	
Conv. missiles/rockets	0	0	200	0	0		0	0	0	0	0		0	2543	700	0	300	0	
Satellites	0	0	300	1580	0		0	0	0	0	0		0	250	50	0	300	0	
Department avg. MV			2.7						0.0									3.0	
Percent change			11.1						-100.0									25.0	

DoD weighted FVs		Wgt FV
Function		
Air vehicles		80.6
Munitions		65.2
Electronic combat		72.2
Fixed-wing avionics		93.9
Conv. missiles/rockets		57.6
Satellites		64.2
Average FV		72.3
Weighted avg. FV		73.9

Table 4. MINNMV Model with Policy Iterative Output


[illegible]

DoD weighted FVs		Wgt FV
Function		
Air vehicles		78.3
Munitions		61.0
Electronic combat		64.4
Fixed-wing avionics		93.7
Conv. missiles/rockets		82.4
Satellites		64.1
Average FV		74.0
Weighted avg. FV		74.7

Table 5. Parameterization of the MINNMV Model

Sites/activities open	Percent of weight on FV										MINNMV
	0	2	3	5	10	20	30	40	60	99	
MAXFV	15	13	12	11	9	8	7	6	6	6	
Percent excess											
Air vehicles	53.8	48.5	48.5	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0
Munitions	73.5	73.5	73.5	69.9	51.7	51.7	51.7	15.4	15.4	15.4	15.4
Electronic combat	72.0	72.0	72.0	72.0	72.0	41.1	41.1	41.1	40.5	40.5	40.5
Fixed-wing avionics	98.7	98.7	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	98.7	98.7	98.7
Conv. missiles/rockets	41.6	38.9	38.9	38.9	4.2	4.2	22.9	17.6	12.2	12.2	12.2
Satellites	10.9	10.9	10.9	10.9	10.9	10.9	10.9	10.9	97.6	97.6	97.6
Wgt. avg. % excess	60.37	58.24	45.83	29.16	21.00	17.46	19.94	12.14	31.39	31.39	31.39
Weighted FV											
Air vehicles	81.2	81.1	81.1	80.6	80.6	80.6	80.6	80.6	80.6	80.6	80.6
Munitions	79.6	79.6	79.6	79.2	76.1	76.1	76.1	65.2	65.2	65.2	65.2
Electronic combat	79.7	79.7	79.7	79.7	79.7	72.3	72.3	72.3	72.2	72.2	72.2
Fixed-wing avionics	93.9	93.9	93.0	93.0	93.0	93.0	93.0	93.0	93.9	93.9	93.9
Conv. missiles/rockets	90.8	90.7	90.7	90.7	85.4	85.4	59.6	59.5	57.6	57.6	57.6
Satellites	92.0	92.0	92.0	92.0	92.0	92.0	92.0	92.0	64.2	64.2	64.2
Average FV	86.2	86.2	86.0	85.9	84.5	83.2	78.9	77.1	72.3	72.3	72.3
Weighted avg. FV	84.7	84.6	84.5	84.2	82.9	82.1	78.6	76.5	73.9	73.9	73.9
DoD average MV	2.20	2.31	2.33	2.27	2.44	2.50	2.71	2.67	2.83	2.83	2.83

Figure 1. Parameterization of MINNMV



Number of sites open are shown as labels on the excess capacity plot.

- ▲ Avg. percent excess capacity ● Average military value
- × Average FV × Missile/rocket FV

Table 6. MINNMV Model Output with Weight = 20

Function	Department																Retained totals
	X					Y					Z						
	A	B	C	D	E	A	B	C	D	E	A	B	C	D	E		
Retain=1, Close=0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	8	
Department Mil. Val.	3	3	3	2	1	2	1	3	2	1	3	3	2	3	1		
Capacities																	
Air vehicles	0	0	2500	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3000	1200	0	2857	0	9557	
Munitions	850	0	4500	0	0	0	0	2000	0	0	1000	0	0	0	0	8350	
Electronic combat	3000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1543	20	4563	
Fixed-wing avionics	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4000	0	0	0	4000	
Conv. missiles/rockets	0	0	200	0	3000	0	0	200	0	0	0	0	0	300	200	3900	
Satellites	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	250	0	0	300	2200	2750	
																Wgt. avg.	
																17.46	
Workload assigned																	
Air vehicles	0	0	2408	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3000	1200	0	2857	0	Totals	
Munitions	850	0	1653	0	0	0	0	2000	0	0	1000	0	0	0	0	9463	
Electronic combat	1671	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1543	20	5503	
Fixed-wing avionics	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3234	
Conv. missiles/rockets	0	0	200	0	3000	0	0	0	0	0	0	3775	0	0	0	3775	
Satellites	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	43	0	0	0	0	0	300	200	3743	
											250	0	0	30	2200	2480	
Department avg. MV			2.3					3.0								2.5	
Percent change			-2.8					68.7								4.2	

DoD average MV
Percent change

2.50
13.6

DoD weighted FVs		Wgt FV
Function		
Air vehicles	80.6	
Munitions	76.1	
Electronic combat	72.3	
Fixed-wing avionics	93.0	
Conv. missiles/rockets	85.4	
Satellites	92.0	
Average FV	83.2	
Weighted avg. FV	82.1	

Table 7. MINXCAP Model Output

Function	Department																Retained totals
	X					Y					Z						
	A	B	C	D	E	A	B	C	D	E	A	B	C	D	E		
Retain=1, Close=0	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	7	
Department Mil. Val.	3	3	3	2	1	2	1	3	2	1	3	3	2	3	1		
Capacities																	
Air vehicles	450	0	2500	0	0	5000	500	0	0	0	0	1200	0	0	0	9850	
Munitions	850	0	4500	0	0	300	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5650	
Electronic combat	3000	0	0	0	0	1000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	20	4020	
Fixed-wing avionics	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4000	0	0	0	4000	
Conv. missiles/rockets	0	0	200	0	3000	0	0	0	0	0	0	700	0	0	200	4100	
Satellites	0	0	300	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2200	2500	
																Wgt. avg. 6.11	
Workload assigned																	
Air vehicles	263	0	2500	0	0	5000	500	0	0	0	0	1200	0	0	0	Totals 9463	
Munitions	850	0	4500	0	0	153	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5503	
Electronic combat	2214	0	0	0	0	1000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	20	3234	
Fixed-wing avionics	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3775	0	0	0	3775	
Conv. missiles/rockets	0	0	200	0	3000	0	0	0	0	0	0	343	0	0	200	3743	
Satellites	0	0	280	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2200	2480	
Department avg. MV			2.3					1.5							2.0		
Percent change			-2.8					-16.7							-16.7		

Percent excess

2.0
2.7
24.3
6.0
9.5
0.8

Wgt. avg.

Totals
9463
5503
3234
3775
3743
2480

DoD weighted FVs		Wgt FV
Function		
Air vehicles		64.9
Munitions		62.5
Electronic combat		74.5
Fixed-wing avionics		93.0
Conv. missiles/rockets		84.9
Satellites		90.5
Average FV		78.4
Weighted avg. FV		74.2

Table 8. MINSITES Model Output

Function	Department																Retained totals
	X					Y					Z						
	A	B	C	D	E	A	B	C	D	E	A	B	C	D	E		
Retain=1, Close=0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	6	
Department Mil. Val.	3	3	3	2	1	2	1	3	2	1	3	3	2	3	1		
Capacities																	
Air vehicles	0	0	2500	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3000	1200	0	2857	0	9557	
Munitions	850	0	4500	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1000	0	0	0	0	6350	
Electronic combat	3000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1543	20	4563	
Fixed-wing avionics	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4000	0	0	0	4000	
Conv. missiles/rockets	0	0	200	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3000	700	0	300	200	4400	
Satellites	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	250	0	0	300	2200	2750	
																Wgt. avg. 12.14	
Workload assigned																	
Air vehicles	0	0	2406	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3000	1200	0	2857	0	Totals 9463	
Munitions	850	0	3653	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1000	0	0	0	0	5503	
Electronic combat	1671	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1543	20	3234	
Fixed-wing avionics	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3775	0	0	0	3775	
Conv. missiles/rockets	0	0	200	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2343	700	0	300	200	3743	
Satellites	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	250	0	0	30	2200	2480	
Department avg. MV			3.0													2.5	
Percent change			25.0													4.2	
								0.0									
								-100.0									

DoD average MV
Percent change

2.67
21.2

DoD weighted FVs		Wgt FV
Function		
Air vehicles	80.6	
Munitions	65.2	
Electronic combat	72.3	
Fixed-wing avionics	93.0	
Conv. missiles/rockets	59.5	
Satellites	92.0	
Average FV	77.1	
Weighted avg. FV	76.5	

Table 9. MAXSFV Model Output

Function	Department																		Retained totals
	X						Y						Z						
	A	B	C	D	E		A	B	C	D	E		A	B	C	D	E		
Retain=1, Close=0	0	0	1	1	0		1	0	0	0	0		1	1	0	1	0	6	
Department Mil. Val.	3	3	3	2	1		2	1	3	2	1		3	3	2	3	1		
Capacities																			
Air vehicles	0	0	2500	0	0		5000	0	0	0	0		3000	0	0	0	0	10500	
Munitions	0	0	4500	0	0		300	0	0	0	0		1000	0	0	0	0	5800	
Electronic combat	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0		2000	0	0	1543	0	3543	
Fixed-wing avionics	0	0	250	0	0		0	0	0	0	0		1000	4000	0	2000	0	7250	
Conv. missiles/rockets	0	0	200	0	0		0	0	0	0	0		3000	700	0	0	0	3900	
Satellites	0	0	0	4000	0		0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0	4000	
																		Percent excess	
																		11.0	
																		5.4	
																		9.6	
																		92.1	
																		4.2	
																		61.3	
																		24.10	
Workload assigned																			
Air vehicles	0	0	2500	0	0		5000	0	0	0	0		1963	0	0	0	0	Totals	
Munitions	0	0	4500	0	0		300	0	0	0	0		703	0	0	0	0	9463	
Electronic combat	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0		2000	0	0	1234	0	5503	
Fixed-wing avionics	0	0	250	0	0		0	0	0	0	0		1000	525	0	2000	0	3234	
Conv. missiles/rockets	0	0	43	0	0		0	0	0	0	0		3000	700	0	0	0	3775	
Satellites	0	0	0	2480	0		0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0	3743	
Department avg. MV			2.5						2.0								3.0		
Percent change			4.2						11.1								25.0		

DoD average MV	2.67
Percent change	21.2

DoD weighted FVs		Wgt FV
Function		
Air vehicles		64.9
Munitions		59.6
Electronic combat		61.9
Fixed-wing avionics		73.1
Conv. missiles/rockets		56.6
Satellites		58.0
Average FV		62.3
Weighted avg. FV		62.9

Table 10. MINNMV Model Output: Alternative 1

Function	Department															Retained totals
	X					Y					Z					
	A	B	C	D	E	A	B	C	D	E	A	B	C	D	E	
Retain=1, Close=0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	6
Department Mil. Val.	3	3	3	2	1	2	1	3	2	1	3	3	2	3	1	
Capacities																
Air vehicles	0	0	2500	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3000	1200	0	2857	0	9557
Munitions	0	0	4500	0	0	0	0	2000	0	0	1000	0	0	0	0	7500
Electronic combat	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2000	0	0	1543	0	3543
Fixed-wing avionics	0	0	0	3500	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4000	0	0	0	7500
Conv. missiles/rockets	0	0	200	0	0	0	0	200	0	0	3000	700	0	300	0	4400
Satellites	0	0	300	4000	0	0	0	500	0	0	250	50	0	300	0	5400
																Wgt. avg. 34.41
Workload assigned																
Air vehicles	0	0	2406	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3000	1200	0	2857	0	Totals 9463
Munitions	0	0	2503	0	0	0	0	2000	0	0	1000	0	0	0	0	5503
Electronic combat	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1691	0	0	1543	0	3234
Fixed-wing avionics	0	0	0	3500	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	275	0	0	0	3775
Conv. missiles/rockets	0	0	200	0	0	0	0	200	0	0	2343	700	0	300	0	3743
Satellites	0	0	300	1080	0	0	0	500	0	0	250	50	0	300	0	2480
Department avg. MV			2.5					3.0					3.0			
Percent change			4.2					66.7					25.0			

Percent
excess
1.0
36.3
9.6
98.7
17.6
117.7
34.41

DoD weighted FVs		Wgt FV
Function		
Air vehicles	80.6	
Munitions	71.4	
Electronic combat	64.4	
Fixed-wing avionics	93.9	
Conv. missiles/rockets	57.8	
Satellites	65.4	
Average FV	72.3	
Weighted avg. FV	74.4	

Table 11. MINNMV Model Output: Alternative 2

Function	Department															Retained totals
	X					Y					Z					
	A	B	C	D	E	A	B	C	D	E	A	B	C	D	E	
Retain=1, Close=0	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	6
Department Mil. Val.	3	3	3	2	1	2	1	3	2	1	3	3	2	3	1	
Capacities																
Air vehicles	0	7000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3000	1200	0	0	0	11200
Munitions	850	200	4500	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1000	0	0	0	0	6550
Electronic combat	3000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2000	0	0	0	0	5000
Fixed-wing avionics	0	0	0	3500	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4000	0	0	0	7500
Conv. missiles/rockets	0	0	200	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3000	700	0	0	0	3900
Satellites	0	0	300	4000	0	0	0	0	0	0	250	50	0	0	0	4600
																Wgt. avg. 37.42
Workload assigned																
Air vehicles	0	5263	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3000	1200	0	0	0	Totals 9463
Munitions	850	200	3453	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1000	0	0	0	0	5503
Electronic combat	3000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	234	0	0	0	0	3234
Fixed-wing avionics	0	0	0	3500	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	275	0	0	0	3775
Conv. missiles/rockets	0	0	200	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2843	700	0	0	0	3743
Satellites	0	0	300	1880	0	0	0	0	0	0	250	50	0	0	0	2480
Department avg. MV			2.8													
Percent change			14.6													
								0.0							3.0	
								-100.0							25.0	

DoD average MV
Percent change

2.83
28.8

DoD weighted FVs		Wgt FV
Function		
Air vehicles	76.3	
Munitions	65.7	
Electronic combat	65.9	
Fixed-wing avionics	93.9	
Conv. missiles/rockets	56.9	
Satellites	62.4	
Average FV	70.2	
Weighted avg. FV	71.6	

Appendix A

AMPL Model Input File

```

# JCSG Model Example

# Ronald H. Nickel, Ph.D.
# LTC Roy Rice, USAF

# 8-3-94

set X_sites;          # The set of Department X sites.
set Y_sites;          # The set of Department Y sites.
set Z_sites;          # The set of Department Z sites.

set SITE := X_sites union {Y_sites union Z_sites};
                # The set of all labs and T&E sites.

set EXCLD1 within SITE default {}; # A solution to be excluded.

set EXCLD2 within SITE default {}; # A solution to be excluded.

set EXCLD_INTER := if card(EXCLD2) > 0 then (EXCLD1 inter EXCLD2)
                else EXCLD1;

set EXCLD_1DIFF2 := EXCLD1 diff EXCLD2; # Sites in EXCLD1 but not
                # in EXCLD2.

set EXCLD_2DIFF1 := EXCLD2 diff EXCLD1; # Sites in EXCLD2 but not
                # in EXCLD1.

set EXCLD_COMPLEMENT := SITE diff (EXCLD1 union EXCLD2);
                # The set of sites not in EXCLD1 or EXCLD2.

param excld_num := max(0, card(EXCLD_INTER)-1);

set FUNC;            # The set of functions.

set SITE_CAP within {SITE, FUNC} ; # The set of site/function
                # combinations that are
                # meaningful.

param CAPAC {SITE_CAP}; # The functional capacity at each site for each
                # meaningful site/function combination.

param no_func := card(FUNC); # The number of function types.

# Define the set performing missile functions.

set MISSILE_FUNC within {FUNC};

param missile_sites >= 0, default 15;
                # Number of sites allowed to perform the
                # missile function. Used in the policy
                # imperative example (missile_sites = 3).

param max_sites >= 0, default card(SITE);
                # Number of open sites allowed in the
                # solution.

param REQ {FUNC}; # The DoD requirement for each function.

```

```

param MV {SITE};      # Military value for each site.

param NMV {s in SITE} := 4 - MV[s]; # Negative MV scoring.

param FV {SITE_CAP} >= 0.0; # Functional value by site and function.

param min_assign default 0.001; # Cannot assign less than
                                # min_assign * CAPAC[s,f] of
                                # function f to site s.

#
# Calculate upper bounds for the objective function components.
#

param MINNMV_UB := sum {s in SITE} NMV[s];

param MINSITES_UB := card(SITE);

param MINXCAP_UB := sum {(s,f) in SITE_CAP} CAPAC[s,f]/REQ[f];

param MAXSFV_UB := sum {(s,f) in SITE_CAP} FV[s,f];

param MAXFV_UB := sum {f in FUNC} max {(s,f) in SITE_CAP} FV[s,f];

#
# Use WGT_PCT to weight the functional value and non-functional value
# components of the objective functions.
#

param WGT_PCT >= 0, <= 100, default 99; # Percent of weight to put on
                                # non-functional-value portion of the objective function.

param WGT1 := WGT_PCT; # Weight for non-FV portion of the objective
                        # functions.

param WGT2 := 100-WGT1; # Weight for FV portion of the objective functions.

#
# Decision variables
#

var OPEN {SITE} binary >= 0;      # Open or closed decision variable for
                                # each site.

var SITE_LOAD {(s,f) in SITE_CAP} >= 0.0, <= CAPAC[s,f];
                                # Amount of the requirement for function f to
                                # be assigned to site s . Amount assigned
                                # is limited by capacity of site s to perform
                                # function f.

var SITE_FUNC {(s,f) in SITE_CAP} binary;
                                # 1 if any assignment of workload for function
                                # f is made to site s; 0 otherwise.

# The following variables, ALPHA, BETA, and GAMMA, are used to find
# alternative solutions.

```

```

var ALPHA binary; # At least one site from the intersection is excluded
                  # from the solution.

var BETA binary; # At least one site from the complement of the union
                # is included is included in the solution.

var GAMMA binary; # At least one site from
                  # EXCLD1 - (EXCLD1 intersect EXCLD2)
                  # and at least one site from
                  # EXCLD2 - (EXCLD1 intersect EXCLD2)
                  # are included in the solution.

#
# Objective Functions.
#

# Minimize total open site negative military value and
# maximize the normalized FV-weighted assignment of functional workload
# to sites.

minimize MINNMV:
    (WGT1/MINNMV_UB) * sum {s in SITE} OPEN[s]*NMV[s]
    - (WGT2/MAXFV_UB) * sum {(t,g) in SITE_CAP} FV[t,g]
    * (SITE_LOAD[t,g]/REQ[g]);

# Minimize the number of open sites and maximize the normalized
# FV-weighted assignment of functional workload to sites.

minimize MINSITES:
    (WGT1/MINSITES_UB) * sum {s in SITE} OPEN[s]
    - (WGT2/MAXFV_UB) * sum {(t,g) in SITE_CAP} FV[t,g]
    * (SITE_LOAD[t,g]/REQ[g]);

# Minimize total capacity and maximize the normalized FV-weighted
# assignment of functional workload to sites.

minimize MINXCAP:
    (WGT1/MINXCAP_UB) * sum {s in SITE} OPEN[s] *
        (sum {(s,f) in SITE_CAP} CAPAC[s,f]/REQ[f])
    - (WGT2/MAXFV_UB) * sum {(t,g) in SITE_CAP} FV[t,g]
    * (SITE_LOAD[t,g]/REQ[g]);

# Maximize functional value without workload assignment weightings
# and maximize the normalized FV-weighted assignment of functional
# workload to sites.

maximize MAXSFV:
    (WGT1/MAXSFV_UB) * sum {(s,f) in SITE_CAP} FV[s,f]
    - (WGT2/MAXFV_UB) * sum {(t,g) in SITE_CAP} FV[t,g]
    * (SITE_LOAD[t,g]/REQ[g]);

#
# Constraints
#

# The requirement for each function has to be met.

```



```

subject to func_assgn {f in FUNC}:
    sum {(s,f) in SITE_CAP} SITE_LOAD[s,f] = REQ[f];

# Cannot assign functional workload to a site unless
# the site is open for assignment of that function.

subject to func_open {(s,f) in SITE_CAP}:
    SITE_LOAD[s,f] <= SITE_FUNC[s,f]*CAPAC[s,f];

# Sites with no functional requirement assigned
# are closed.

subject to site_closed {s in SITE}:
    OPEN[s] <= sum {(s,f) in SITE_CAP} SITE_FUNC[s,f];

# Allocation of functional requirements cannot be made
# to sites that are not open.

subject to site_open {s in SITE}:
    sum {(s,f) in SITE_CAP} SITE_FUNC[s,f] <= OPEN[s] * no_func;

# SITE_FUNC variables are set to 0 if little or no functional
# workload is assigned to a site.

subject to site_func_0 {(s,f) in SITE_CAP}:
    SITE_FUNC[s,f] <= SITE_LOAD[s,f]/(min_assign * CAPAC[s,f]);

# This constraint is an example of a policy imperative.
# Constrain the number of sites doing munitions work.
# This constraint only constrains the model if
#
# missile_sites < card(SITE).

subject to missile_2 {f in MISSLE_FUNC}:
    sum {(s,f) in SITE_CAP} SITE_FUNC[s,f] <= missile_sites;

# This constraint is used to constrain the number of
# open sites in a solution. max_sites has a default
# value equal to card(SITE), i.e., it does not constrain
# the solution unless max_sites is set to a lower value.

subject to no_sites:
    sum {s in SITE} OPEN[s] <= max_sites;

#
# Exclude solutions defined by the sets EXCLD1 and EXCLD2.
#

subject to alt_opt_cond_1:
    sum {s in EXCLD_INTER} OPEN[s] <= excld_num + 1 - ALPHA;

subject to alt_opt_cond_2:
    sum {s in EXCLD_COMPLEMENT} OPEN[s] >= BETA;

subject to alt_opt_cond_3a:
    sum {s in EXCLD_1DIFF2} OPEN[s] >= GAMMA;

```

```
subject to alt_opt_cond_3b:  
    sum {s in EXCLD_2DIFF1} OPEN[s] >= GAMMA;  
  
subject to alt_opt_cond_123:  
    ALPHA + BETA + GAMMA >= 1;
```

Appendix B

AMPL Data Input File

Data file for JCSG optimization examples.

Ron Nickel

7-6-94

set X_sites :=

X_A
X_B
X_C
X_D
X_E;

set Y_sites :=

Y_A
Y_B
Y_C
Y_D
Y_E;

set Z_sites :=

Z_A
Z_B
Z_C
Z_D
Z_E;

set EXCLD1 := X_A X_C X_D Z_A Z_B Z_D;

set EXCLD2 := X_C X_D Y_C Z_A Z_B Z_D;

set FUNC :=

Air_Veh
Mun
E_Cmbt
Avion
Mis
Sat;

set SITE_CAP : Air_Veh Mun E_Cmbt Avion Mis Sat :=

X_A	+		+	+	-	-
X_B	+		+	-	-	-
X_C	+		+	-	+	+
X_D	-		-	-	+	-
X_E	-		-	-	-	+
Y_A	+		+	+	-	-
Y_B	+		-	-	-	-
Y_C	-		+	-	+	+
Y_D	-		-	-	+	+
Y_E	-		-	-	-	+
Z_A	+		+	+	+	+
Z_B	+		-	-	+	+
Z_C	-		+	-	-	+
Z_D	+		-	+	+	+
Z_E	-		-	+	+	+

Used to model the policy imperative.

```
set MISSLE_FUNC := Mis;
```

```
param CAPAC:      Air_Veh Mun      E_Cmbt  Avion  Mis      Sat :=
    X_A      450      850      3000      .      .      .
    X_B      7000      200      .      .      .      .
    X_C      2500      4500      .      250      200      300
    X_D      .      .      .      3500      .      4000
    X_E      .      .      .      .      3000      .
    Y_A      5000      300      1000      .      .      .
    Y_B      500      .      .      .      .      .
    Y_C      .      2000      .      400      200      500
    Y_D      .      .      .      3500      100      .
    Y_E      .      .      .      .      2000      .
    Z_A      3000      1000      2000      1000      3000      250
    Z_B      1200      .      .      4000      700      50
    Z_C      .      1000      .      .      200      .
    Z_D      2857      .      1543      2000      300      300
    Z_E      .      .      20      500      200      2200;
```

```
param FV:      Air_Veh Mun      E_Cmbt  Avion  Mis      Sat :=
    X_A      50      88      67      .      .      .
    X_B      70      71      .      .      .      .
    X_C      68      58      .      92      62      71
    X_D      .      .      .      94      .      58
    X_E      .      .      .      .      89      .
    Y_A      57      54      91      .      .      .
    Y_B      72      .      .      .      .      .
    Y_C      .      88      .      78      59      64
    Y_D      .      .      .      69      93      .
    Y_E      .      .      .      .      92      .
    Z_A      81      72      52      72      56      85
    Z_B      92      .      .      93      59      61
    Z_C      .      75      .      .      50      .
    Z_D      86      .      78      66      65      73
    Z_E      .      .      77      71      91      93;
```

```
param REQ :=
    Air_Veh 9463
    Mun      5503
    E_Cmbt  3234
    Avion    3775
    Mis      3743
    Sat      2480;
```

```
# Banded military values for each site.
# 3 is good, 1 is bad.
```

```
param MV :=
    X_A      3
    X_B      3
    X_C      3
    X_D      2
    X_E      1
    Y_A      2
    Y_B      1
    Y_C      3
    Y_D      2
```


Y_E	1
Z_A	3
Z_B	3
Z_C	2
Z_D	3
Z_E	1;



ECONOMIC
SECURITY

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3300 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20301-3300



29 DEC 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION
ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT
DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES

SUBJECT: 1995 Base Realignments and Closures (BRAC 95) -- Policy
Memorandum Three

Background

This memorandum is the third in a series of additional policy guidance implementing the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-510), as amended, and the Deputy Secretary's 1995 Base Realignments and Closures (BRAC 95) guidance of January 7, 1994.

Final Selection Criteria

The 1995 Base Closure and Realignment (BRAC 95) Selection Criteria at attachment one, required by Section 2903(b) of Public Law 101-510, form the basis, along with the force structure plan, of the base closure and realignment process. These criteria were provided by the Deputy Secretary's November 2, 1994, memorandum. DoD components shall use these criteria in the base structure analysis to nominate BRAC 95 closure or realignment candidates. The criteria will also be used by the 1995 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission in their review of the Department of Defense final recommendations.

Activities in Leased Space

This expands on the policy guidance contained in the DepSecDef January 7, 1994, BRAC 95 memorandum.

DoD Component organizations located in leased space are subject to Public Law 101-510. Civilian personnel authorizations of organizations in leased space, which are part of an organization located on a nearby military installation or one within the same metropolitan statistical area (MSA), shall be considered part of the civilian personnel authorization of that



installation. Certain military activities performed in leased facilities constitute an installation because of common mission, permanently authorized personnel, and separate support structure. Each DoD component should aggregate the remaining civilian personnel authorizations of their organizations in leased space within a MSA and consider the aggregate to be a single installation for applying the numerical thresholds of Public Law 101-510. In aggregating leased space activities in the National Capital Region (NCR), the NCR, as defined by the National Capital Planning Act (40 USC 71), will be used as the MSA.

Return on Investment (ROI)

This expands on the policy guidance contained in the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology) memorandum of May 31, 1994 (Policy Memorandum One).

- o Medicare Costs Medicare Costs will not be included in DOD Component cost analyses. The Medicare program consists of part A (hospital and related costs) and Part B (supplemental costs). Part A is financed by Medicare payroll taxes. The only appropriated funds used to support Medicare are those portions of the Part B costs that exceed the monthly premiums paid by the members/beneficiaries. Therefore, total Medicare appropriations will not significantly change return on investment calculations.
- o Unemployment Costs The Military Departments and Defense Agencies annually budget unemployment contributions to the Federal Employees Compensation Account for DoD military and civilian employees. DoD Components should include the contributions to this account attributable to closures and realignments in their cost calculations. However, state unemployment costs will not be included in DoD component cost analyses since such costs result only indirectly from BRAC actions and would not be borne by DoD.
- o Costs to other Federal Agencies and State and Local Governments In general, DoD components need not consider costs or savings to other federal agencies and state and local governments in their calculations of BRAC 95 costs and savings.

There are, however, a limited number of circumstances when DoD components should include the costs of BRAC 95 actions to other Federal Agencies in their cost calculations. Costs to other Federal Agencies should be included only when they are measurable, identifiable costs that DoD would incur as a **direct** result of BRAC-related actions. The key distinguishing features of costs to other federal agencies that should be included is (1) DoD is unambiguously responsible for paying such costs and (2) such costs would be incurred as a direct, rather than indirect, result of BRAC actions.

For example, if a BRAC-related action would result in early termination of a lease agreement with the General Services Administration, and the lease agreement contains a provision that requires DoD to pay a penalty for breaking the lease, then the amount of the penalty should be included in cost calculations. Similarly, DoD components should include unemployment insurance costs for which they are liable. Both of these are costs **to DoD** that result **directly** from BRAC actions. In contrast, DoD components need not consider cost impacts that BRAC actions could have on Federal programs such as Medicare because (1) such costs would not be borne by DoD and (2) they result only indirectly from BRAC actions, or (3) result from base reuse activities, which cannot be known during BRAC decision-making processes.

COBRA Analyses of Cross-Service/Agency Scenarios

The Military Departments and Defense Agencies will use the following procedure for developing COBRA runs for closure and realignment scenarios involving more than one Military Department or Defense Agency:

- o Military Departments or Defense Agencies having cognizance over a losing base in a cross-service scenario will identify the Departments or Agencies which have cognizance for the gaining bases in the scenario. The losing base Military Department will then task these Military Departments and Agencies to collect the necessary gaining base COBRA data.
- o Each losing base Department or Agency will then prepare a COBRA analysis. Savings associated with eliminated billets/positions, overhead and mission costs should be identified under the Losing Base in the scenario. In scenarios where more than one Department or Agency has a losing base, these separate COBRA runs can then be combined by using a new summarization function of the COBRA model, the Adder.

Interaction among the Departments and Agencies will be necessary to coordinate scenario-specific data elements such as equipment transfers, MILCON requirements, consolidation savings, etc.

DoD-wide Standard Factors for COBRA Analyses

As noted in Policy Memorandum One, some standard factors used in the Cost of Base Realignment Actions (COBRA) are sufficiently different to warrant DoD Component-specific cost factors. However, most of the standard factors used in COBRA algorithms reflect standard rates which should be applied consistently in all DoD closure/realignment scenarios. Attachment two contains the DoD-wide COBRA standard factors which should be used in all COBRA analyses.

Environmental Restoration Costs

Environmental Restoration costs at closing bases are not to be considered in cost of closure calculations. DoD has a legal obligation for environmental restoration regardless of whether a base is closed or realigned. Where closing or realigning installations have known, unique contamination problems requiring environmental restoration, these will be considered as a potential limitation on near-term community reuse of the installation.

Environmental Compliance Costs

Environmental compliance costs can be a factor in a base closure or realignment decision. Costs associated with bringing existing practices into compliance with environmental rules and regulations can potentially be avoided when the base closes. Environmental compliance costs may be incurred at receiving locations also, and therefore will be estimated.

Environmental Impacts

For environmental impact considerations, there is no need to undertake new environmental studies. DoD Components may use all available environmental information regardless of when, how or for what purpose it was collected. If a DoD Component should choose to undertake a new environmental study, the study must collect the same information from all bases in the DoD Component's base structure, unless the study is designed to fill gaps in information so that all bases can be treated equally. Attachment three provides a sample of the reporting format used to summarize the environmental consequences of closure or realignment of an installation.

Economic Impact Calculations


DoD Components shall measure the economic impact on communities of BRAC 95 alternatives and recommendations using (1) the total potential job change in the economic area and (2) the total potential job change as a percent of economic area employment. These measures highlight the potential impact on economic area and also take into account the size of the economic area. In accomplishing this task, Components will follow the detailed guidance at attachment four.

Base Realignment and Closure Definitions

In order to ensure consistent terminology, DoD Components will use the definitions at attachment five to describe their recommendations.

Reporting Formats

Attachments six and seven describe general reporting formats for: (1) the anticipated DoD report to the 1995 Commission, and (2) Military Department and Defense Agency justification for their March 1, 1995, closure and realignment recommendations.


for

Joshua Gotbaum

Attachments

Department of Defense
Final Selection Criteria

In selecting military installations for closure or realignment, the Department of Defense, giving priority consideration to military value (the first four criteria below), will consider:

Military Value

1. The current and future mission requirements and the impact on operational readiness of the Department of Defense's total force.
2. The availability and condition of land, facilities and associated airspace at both the existing and potential receiving locations.
3. The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, and future total force requirements at both the existing and potential receiving locations.
4. The cost and manpower implications.

Return on Investment

5. The extent and timing of potential costs and savings, including the number of years, beginning with the date of completion of the closure or realignment, for the savings to exceed the costs.

Impacts

6. The economic impact on communities.
7. The ability of both the existing and potential receiving communities' infrastructure to support forces, missions and personnel.
8. The environmental impact.

COBRA Standard Cost Factor Table

The attached table is a listing of standard cost factors for use in COBRA analyses. These factors, defined below, are categorized as Joint Factors, Joint Methods and Unique Factors, further identified as applicable to gaining or losing bases. Those factors not identified as a gaining or losing factor should be applied consistently in all closure and realignment scenarios.

Joint Factors: Joint Factors are a reflection of standard DoD-wide rates which should be applied consistently in all DoD closure and realignment scenarios. The value for each joint factor is provided in the table.

Joint Methods: These are cost factors that are arrived at in a similar manner by all DoD Components, but the actual value may differ by Component.

Unique Factors: Unique Factors are the result of differing policies and methodologies between the Components.

Gaining: Factors applicable to a gaining (receiving) base in a closure or realignment scenario.

Losing: Factors applicable to a losing base in a closure or realignment scenario.

	STANDARD FACTOR	TYPE FACTOR	VALUE	LOSING/ GAINING BASE
1	Officers Married	JOINT METHOD		LOSING
2	Enlisted Married	JOINT METHOD		LOSING
3	Enlisted Housing Milcon	JOINT METHOD		GAINING
4	Officer Salary	JOINT METHOD		LOSING
5	Officer BAQ w/Dependents	JOINT METHOD		LOSING
6	Enlisted Salary	JOINT METHOD		LOSING
7	Enlisted BAQ w/Dependents	JOINT METHOD		LOSING
8	Average Unemployment Costs	JOINT FACTOR	\$174	
9	Unemployment Eligible	JOINT FACTOR	18	
10	Civilian Salary	JOINT METHOD		LOSING
11	Civilian Turnover	JOINT FACTOR	15%	
12	Civilian Early Retirement	JOINT FACTOR	10%	
13	Civilians Reg Retirement	JOINT FACTOR	5%	
14	Civilian RIF Pay Factor	JOINT FACTOR	39%	
15	Civilian Retirement Pay Factor	JOINT FACTOR	9%	
16	Priority Placement	JOINT FACTOR	60%	
17	PPS Involving PCS	JOINT FACTOR	50%	
18	Civilian PCS Cost	JOINT FACTOR	\$28,800	
19	New Hire Cost	UNIQUE		GAINING
20	National Median Home Price	JOINT FACTOR	\$114.6k	
21	Home Sale Reimburse Rate	JOINT FACTOR	10%	
22	Max Home Sale Reimbursement	JOINT FACTOR	\$22,385	
23	Home Purchase Reimburse Rate	JOINT FACTOR	5%	
24	Max Home Purc Reimburse Rate	JOINT FACTOR	11,191	
25	Civilian Homeowning Rate	JOINT FACTOR	64%	
26	HAP Home Value Rate	JOINT FACTOR	22.9%	
27	HAP Homeowner Rec Rate	JOINT FACTOR	5%	
28	RSE Home Value Reimbures	UNIQUE		LOSING
29	RSE Homeowner Rec Rate	UNIQUE		LOSING
30	RPMA Buildings Index	JOINT FACTOR	.93	
31	BOS Index (Population)	JOINT FACTOR	.54	
32	Program Management	JOINT FACTOR	10%	
33	Caretaker Admin Space	JOINT FACTOR	162SF	
34	Mothball Cost	JOINT FACTOR	\$1.25/SF	
35	Avg Bach Qtrs Size	UNIQUE		GAINING

	STANDARD FACTOR	TYPE FACTOR	VALUE	LOSING/ GAINING BASE
36	Avg Fam Qtrs Size	UNIQUE		GAINING
37	REHAB vs NEW	UNIQUE		GAINING
38	Info Management Account	UNIQUE		GAINING
39	Design Percent	UNIQUE		GAINING
40	SIOH	UNIQUE		GAINING
41	Cntingency	UNIQUE		GAINING
42	Site Prep	UNIQUE		GAINING
43	Discount Rate	JOINT FACTOR	2.75%	
44	Inflation Rate	JOINT FACTOR	0%	
45	APPDET Report Rates	JOINT FACOTRS	2.9,3.0	
46	Material Per Assigned Person	JOINT FACTOR	710LBS	
47	Officer HHG Weight	JOINT FACTOR	14,500	
48	Enlisted HHG Weight	JOINT FACTOR	9,000	
49	Military HHG Weight	JOINT FACTOR	6,400	
50	Civilian HHG Weight	JOINT FACTOR	18,000	
51	HHG Packing Cost	JOINT FACTOR	35\$/CWT	
52	Equipment Packing and Crating	JOINT FACTOR	284\$/TON	
53	Military Lt Vehicle Cost	UNIQUE		LOSING
54	Heavy/Special Vehicle Cost	UNIQUE		LOSING
55	POV Reimbursement Cost	JOINT FACTOR	.18\$/MILE	
56	Air Transport Cost	JOINT FACTOR	.20\$/MILE	
57	Miscellaneous Expenses	JOINT FACTOR	\$700	
58	Average Military Tour Length	UNIQUE		LOSING
59	Routine PCS Costs	UNIQUE		LOSING
60	One-time PCS Costs- Off	UNIQUE		LOSING
61	One-time PCS Costs- Enl	UNIQUE		LOSING
	CONSTRUCTION FACTORS:	UNIQUE		GAINING

STATIC FACTOR		TYPE FACTOR	VALUE	
1	Civilians Not Willing to Move	JOINT FACTOR	6%	
2	Frieght Cost Per Ton-Mile	JOINT FACTOR	\$.07	

Environmental Impact Considerations

SUMMARY OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES

RESULTING FROM CLOSURE/REALIGNMENT ACTION AT:

Installation Name

Location

(Provide a summary statement and status for the following environmental attributes at each installation affected by the closure/realignment action, including receiving installations. These key environmental attributes are not meant to be all inclusive. Others may be added as appropriate.)

- o Threatened/Endangered Species
- o Sensitive Habitats and Wetlands
- o Cultural/Historic Resources
- o Land and Air Space Use
- o Pollution Control (Air Emissions, Compliance Issues)
- o Hazardous Materials/Waste (Clean-up
Implications/Asbestos, LBPs, PCBs, USTs, Radon)
- o Programmed Environmental Costs/Cost Avoidances

GUIDANCE FOR APPLYING THE ECONOMIC IMPACT CRITERION IN THE 1995 BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE (BRAC 95) PROCESS

PURPOSE

The purpose of this attachment is to provide guidance for applying the economic impact criterion in decision making processes for the Department of Defense's 1995 recommendations to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission. The goal of this guidance is to apply the economic impact criterion in a reasonable, fair, consistent, and auditable manner that complies with statutory and regulatory requirements. This guidance supersedes the guidance issued on April 4, 1994, by the Chairman of the Joint Cross-Service Group on Economic Impact.

BACKGROUND

The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act (PL 101-510, as amended) states that the recommendations of the Secretary of Defense for closure or realignment of installations must be based on a force-structure plan and final selection criteria. "The economic impact on communities" is the sixth final selection criterion.

The Joint Cross-Service Group on Economic Impact, which was established by the Deputy Secretary of Defense (January 7, 1994, memorandum on 1995 Base Realignments and Closures (BRAC 95)), was tasked to provide guidance to DoD Components on how to calculate economic impact. The Deputy Secretary of Defense directed the Joint Cross-Service Group on Economic Impact:

"to establish the guidelines for measuring economic impact and, if practicable, cumulative economic impact; to analyze DoD Component recommendations under those guidelines; and to develop a process for analyzing alternative closures or realignments necessitated by cumulative economic impact considerations, if necessary."

APPLICATION OF THE ECONOMIC IMPACT CRITERION

In developing recommendations for BRAC 95 closures and realignments, DoD Components shall consider the economic impact, to include the cumulative economic impact, on communities. The final selection criteria, however, state that priority consideration will be given to military value--the first four final selection criteria.

MEASURES OF BRAC 95 ECONOMIC IMPACT

DoD Components shall measure the economic impact on communities of BRAC 95 alternatives and recommendations using (1) the total potential job change in the economic area and (2) total potential job change as a percent of total--military and civilian--jobs in the economic area. These measures highlight the potential economic impact on economic areas and also take into account the size of each economic area.

Definition of Economic Area

The Joint Cross-Service Group on Economic Impact shall review and approve DoD Component assignments of each military installation to a particular economic area. For installations located in metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs), as defined by the Office of Management and Budget, the economic area is generally the MSA. For installations located in nonmetropolitan areas, the economic area is generally the county in which the installation is located. In some cases, the economic area is defined as a multi-county, non-MSA area. The criteria listed at Annex A to this attachment shall be used to guide the assignment of installations to economic areas. These definitions of economic area take into account the area where most of the installation's employees live and most of the labor-market impacts and economic adjustment will occur. (This guidance uses the term "economic area." In earlier BRAC rounds, this concept was also referred to as "region of influence.")

DoD Components will have the opportunity to identify, based on certified data, changes in the assignment of installations to economic areas. Such changes will be reviewed and approved by the Joint Cross-Service Group on Economic Impact.

Calculation

For each economic area where a BRAC 95 closure or realignment is considered, DoD Components shall identify the total potential job change in the economic area and calculate the total potential job change percentage by dividing total potential job changes by total--military and civilian--jobs in the economic area.

Total potential job change shall be defined as the sum of direct and indirect potential job changes for each BRAC 95 closure or realignment alternative or recommendation.

Direct job changes shall be defined as the sum of the net addition or loss of jobs for each of the following categories of personnel:

- **Military Personnel.** Permanent authorizations for officer and enlisted personnel. Trainees shall be included on an annual average basis. For example, members of the Guard and Reserve who serve full time (i.e., AGRs, TARs, etc.) should be included. Members of the Guard and Reserve who serve part time (during weekends, during two-weeks a year for active duty training, etc.) should not be included.

- DoD civilian employees. Permanent authorizations for appropriated fund DoD civilian employees are to be included as direct jobs. Direct jobs do not include non-appropriated fund activities, which are treated under indirect jobs.
- On-Base Contractors. Contractors that work on the installation in direct support of the installation's key military missions. These estimates should reflect an annual estimate on a full-time equivalency basis.

As described in the section entitled "Responsibilities" below, the Military Departments and the Defense Agencies will be responsible for providing direct job changes. Only job changes directly associated with base closures and realignments are to be included as direct job changes. Direct job changes shall not reflect job changes that result from planned force structure changes.

Indirect job changes shall be defined as the net addition or loss of jobs in each affected economic area that could potentially occur as a result of direct job changes. As described in the section entitled "Responsibilities" below, the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Installations shall provide factors (multipliers) that, when multiplied by the direct job changes, will provide potential indirect job changes.

Authoritative sources shall be used to determine total--military and civilian--jobs in economic areas.

MEASURES OF CUMULATIVE ECONOMIC IMPACT

During BRAC 95, DoD components shall consider the cumulative economic impact on communities for recommended installation closures and realignments as part of the economic impact on communities criterion. Cumulative economic impact shall be considered only as part of the economic impact criterion, which is one of the eight selection criteria.

Cumulative economic impact on a community shall be defined in two different ways:

- First, the cumulative economic impact on an economic area of a DoD Component's BRAC 95 recommendations, plus the future economic impacts (i.e., economic impacts that have not yet been realized) of decisions of all DoD Components from DoD-wide BRAC 88, BRAC 91, and BRAC 93 rounds (hereafter "prior BRAC rounds"); and
- Second, the cumulative economic impact on economic areas when more than one DoD component recommends a BRAC 95 closure or realignment in that economic area, plus the future economic impacts of decisions from prior BRAC rounds.

These calculations will account for circumstances in which basing decisions in one BRAC round have been changed in a subsequent BRAC round.

The cumulative economic impact of actions that have already taken place as a result of prior BRAC rounds (i.e., have already affected economic area employment) will be considered under "Historic Economic Data" discussed below.

Cumulative Economic Impact: Prior BRAC Rounds

DoD Components shall include in their consideration of recommendations the cumulative future economic impact of prior BRAC rounds.

When BRAC 95 alternatives occur in the same economic areas that have BRAC-related actions from the prior BRAC rounds, DoD Components shall review their recommendations by taking into account the cumulative future economic impact of prior BRAC rounds. The cumulative economic impact of actions that have already occurred from prior BRAC rounds (i.e., have already affected economic area employment) will be considered in the "Historic Economic Data" section below.

DoD Components shall consider the cumulative economic impacts of prior BRAC rounds that have not yet taken place by ensuring that the measures for economic impact (total potential job change in the economic area and total potential job change as a percent of total--military and civilian--jobs in the economic area) include total potential job changes that have not yet taken place from prior BRAC rounds DoD-wide.

Cumulative economic impact will be considered within the overall context of the approved selection criteria. Such a review shall be conducted so that the cumulative economic impact of prior BRAC rounds will be considered only as part of the economic impact criterion, which shall in turn be considered as part of the eight selection criteria.

The fact that prior BRAC rounds affect an economic area shall not, by itself, cause a recommendation to be changed.

Cumulative Economic Impact: Multiple BRAC 95 Recommendations

The Joint Cross-Service Group on Economic Impact will review the BRAC 95 recommendations submitted by the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Directors of the Defense Agencies to the Secretary of Defense. During this review, the Joint Cross-Service Group shall identify economic areas with multiple proposed BRAC 95 actions.

The Joint Cross-Service Group on Economic Impact shall direct the appropriate DoD Components to review their recommendations submitted to the Secretary of Defense when there are multiple BRAC 95 recommendations in the same economic area that were not considered in the development of their recommendations.

DoD Components will then reassess their BRAC 95 recommendations by taking into account the cumulative economic impact of these multiple BRAC 95 recommendations and by ensuring that the measures for economic impact for the economic area (the total potential job change in the economic area and the total potential job change as a percent of total--military and civilian--jobs in the economic area) include the cumulative economic impact of multiple BRAC 95 recommendations, as well as the cumulative future economic impact of prior BRAC rounds.

Such a review shall be conducted so that the cumulative economic impact of multiple BRAC 95 recommendations will be considered as part of the economic impact criterion, which shall in turn be considered as part of the eight selection criteria. DoD Components will complete such reviews expeditiously in order to facilitate compliance with statutory deadlines for BRAC actions.

DoD Components may consider alternative closures and realignments, or mitigating actions, during this review. After the review is complete, DoD Components will report back to the Joint Cross-Service Group on Economic Impact, with a recommendation as to whether or not to change their initial recommendations.

The existence of multiple BRAC 95 recommendations in an economic area shall not, by itself, cause a recommendation to be changed.

HISTORIC ECONOMIC DATA

DoD Components shall consider the measures described above, viewed in the context of historic economic data, in applying the economic impact criterion. Historic data will, among other things, allow for consideration of the cumulative economic impacts that have already occurred (i.e., have already affected economic area employment) as a result of prior BRAC actions. Because communities' economies are so complex, it is difficult to separate the effects of prior BRAC actions from the effects of other economic factors. To address this analytical difficulty, DoD Components shall use historic data to consider the general conditions of communities' economies. Considering the general conditions of communities' economies will take into account the cumulative economic impacts that have already occurred due to prior BRAC actions, as well as the economic impact of other factors unrelated to BRAC actions.

Historic economic data shall be defined to include the following:

- Economic area civilian employment (1984 to 1993)
- Annualized change in economic area civilian employment, absolute and percent (1984 to 1993),
- Economic area per capita personal income (1984 to 1992)
- Annualized change in economic area per capita personal income, absolute and percent (1984 to 1992), and
- Economic area unemployment rates (1984 to 1993).

The Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Installations will provide historic data, from authoritative sources, to the Military Departments and Defense Agencies.

USING MEASURES AND HISTORIC ECONOMIC DATA

This guidance does not establish threshold values for measures and historic economic data. Rather, DoD components will use the measures and historic economic data for relative comparisons of the economic impacts and cumulative economic impacts of recommendations.

RESPONSIBILITIES

Joint Cross-Service Group on Economic Impact

The Joint Cross-Service Group on Economic Impact shall analyze DoD Component recommendations and preliminary candidates to ensure that they are developed in accordance with this guidance, and shall monitor implementation of this and any additional guidance on economic impact that may be issued. The Joint Cross-Service Group on Economic Impact shall also carry out other analyses requested by the BRAC 95 Review Group or Steering Group.

The Joint Cross-Service Group will work closely with DoD Components to resolve issues. Issues that the Joint Cross-Service Group and DoD components cannot resolve will be referred to the BRAC 95 Steering Group.

Office of the DASD (Installations)

The office of the DASD (Installations) shall provide to the Military Departments and Defense Agencies a BRAC 95 Economic Impact Database tool that will contain the following:

- A listing of DoD installations
- The economic area to which each installation has been assigned
- Factors (multipliers) to estimate potential indirect job changes
- Historic economic data to include:
 - Economic area civilian employment (1984 to 1993)
 - Annualized change in economic area civilian employment, absolute and percent (1984 to 1993)
 - Economic area per capita personal income (1984 to 1992)
 - Annualized change in economic area per capita personal income, absolute and percent (1984 to 1992), and
 - Economic area unemployment rates (1984 to 1993)

- The capability to calculate the measures for economic impact and cumulative economic impact described in this guidance based on the information provided by the Military Departments and Defense Agencies

Military Departments and the Defense Agencies

The Military Departments and the Defense Agencies shall provide and enter into the DoD BRAC 95 Economic Impact Database:

- **Current Base Personnel:** As discussed above on page 3, this data will reflect projected billets and positions as of the start of FY 1996 for Officers, Enlisted, Military Students, Civilians, and Contractors, net of planned force structure changes.
- **Job Changes (Out):** the number of authorizations for DoD civilian, military (in training status), military (not in training status), and on-base contractor jobs to be relocated and/or disestablished under each alternative and recommendation, by installation, as a result of BRAC actions, both for DoD Component proposed BRAC 95 actions and for actions yet to be realized (i.e., future) from prior BRAC rounds, by fiscal year, from 1994 through 2001;
- **Job Changes (In):** the number of authorizations for civilian, military (in training status), military (not in training status) and on-base contractor jobs being gained under each alternative and recommendation, by installation, as a result of BRAC actions, both for all proposed BRAC 95 actions and for actions yet to be realized (i.e., future) from prior BRAC rounds, by fiscal year, from 1994 through 2001.

Because of the difficulty of obtaining accurate estimates, contractor job outs and ins may be aggregated into a single year.

DoD Components will provide the projected job changes from prior BRAC rounds and current personnel data to the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Installations. In identifying projected job changes associated with prior BRAC actions, the DoD Components shall use plans that are consistent with the President's Fiscal Year 1995 Budget.

The Military Departments and the Defense Agencies shall collect information as necessary for the computer-based tool. Such data shall be collected and handled in accordance with the Internal Control Plan of the Joint Cross-Service Group on Economic Impact and the respective Internal Control Plans of each Military Department and the Defense Agencies.

Shortly after submitting recommendations and preliminary candidates to the Secretary of Defense, the Military Departments and Defense Agencies shall provide to the Joint Cross-Service Group on Economic Impact computer files from the Economic Impact Database for their BRAC 95 recommendations and preliminary candidates.

DETERMINATION OF ECONOMIC AREAS

In response to changes by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in metropolitan area definitions related to the 1990 Census, and a review of earlier BRAC economic area definitions, the Joint Cross-Service Group on Economic Impact has established the following rules to guide the assignment of installations to economic areas for BRAC 95:

1. The economic area should include residences of the majority of the military and civilian employees at the activity.
2. An economic area is generally defined as a metropolitan statistical area (MSA) or a non-MSA county(s) unless there is evidence to support some other definition.
3. In those cases where OMB's 1993 redefinition of an MSA added counties which increased the MSA population by 10 percent or more, then continue to use the old MSA definition unless certified residency data shows that the new MSA definition is more appropriate.
4. An economic area should only be expanded to include an additional county if the resulting percentage increase in the number of employee residences included in the expanded economic area is greater than the resulting percentage increase in the total employment of the expanded economic area.
5. Installations in the same county should be in the same economic area.
6. If the economic area was previously defined (in prior BRAC rounds) as a non-MSA county(s), it should continue to be that county, even if that county has now been incorporated into an MSA.

Base Realignment and Closure Definitions

Close

All missions of the base will cease or be relocated. All personnel (military, civilian and contractor) will either be eliminated or relocated. The entire base will be excessed and the property disposed. Note: A caretaker workforce is possible to bridge between closure (missions ceasing or relocating) and property disposal which are separate actions under Public Law 101-510.

Close, Except

The vast majority of the missions will cease or be relocated. Over 95 percent of the military, civilian and contractor personnel will either be eliminated or relocated. All but a small portion of the base will be excessed and the property disposed. The small portion retained will often be facilities in an enclave for use by the reserve component. Generally, active component management of the base will cease. Outlying, unmanned ranges or training areas retained for reserve component use do not count against the "small portion retained". Again, closure (missions ceasing or relocating) and property disposal are separate actions under Public Law 101-510.

Realign

Some missions of the base will cease or be relocated, but others will remain. The active component will still be host of the remaining portion of the base. Only a portion of the base will be excessed and the property disposed, with realignment (missions ceasing or relocating) and property disposal being separate actions under Public Law 101-510. In cases where the base is both gaining and losing missions, the base is being realigned if it will experience a net reduction of DoD civilian personnel. In such situations, it is possible that no property will be excessed.

Relocate

The term used to describe the movement of missions, units or activities from a closing or realigning base to another base. Units do not realign from a closing or a realigning base to another base, they relocate.

Receiving Base

A base which receives missions, units or activities relocating from a closing or realigning base. In cases where the base is both gaining and losing missions, the base is a receiving base if it will experience a net increase of DoD civilian personnel.

Mothball, Layaway

Terms used when retention of facilities and real estate at a closing or realigning base are necessary to meet the mobilization or contingency needs of Defense. Bases or portions of bases "mothballed" will not be excessed and disposed. It is possible they could be leased for interim economic uses.

Inactivate, Disestablish

Terms used to describe planned actions which directly affect missions, units or activities. Fighter wings are inactivated, bases are closed.

**Department of Defense (DoD)
Base Closure and Realignment
Report to the Commission**

DoD Base Closure and Realignment Report (DoD Vol. I)

OASD(ES)

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NAME OF RECOMMENDATION
(e.g., Name of Activity/Facility/Installation, [State])

Recommendation: Describe what is to be closed and/or realigned; functions, activities, units, or organizations that will be eliminated or relocated; identify the receiving installations, if applicable; and describe functions, activities, units, or organizations that will remain on the installation, if applicable.

Justification: Explain the reasons for the recommendation: i.e., force structure reductions; mission transfer, consolidation, collocation, or elimination; excess capacity; cross-servicing; etc., as applicable.

Return on Investment: Include the total estimated one-time costs of implementing the recommendation, expected total one-time savings during the implementation period, expected annual recurring savings after implementation with return on investment years, and the net present value of costs and savings over a twenty year period. Express costs and savings in FY 1996 constant dollars.

Impact: Describe the impact the recommendation could have on the local community's economy in terms of total potential job change (direct and indirect) in absolute terms and as a percentage of employment in the economic area. Describe the impact the recommendation could have on the environment.

Appendix D

DoD Base Structure - Summary of Domestic and Overseas Reductions

TABLE 1A - MAJOR DOMESTIC CLOSURES

	Major U.S. Bases	BRAC 88	BRAC 91	BRAC 93	BRAC 95	Major Bases Remaining	Reduction in Facility Capacity
Army	109	-7	-4	-1	-12	85	22%
Navy/USMC	168	-4	-9	-20	-10	125	26%
Air Force	206	-5	-13	-6	-9	173	16%
Defense Agencies	<u>12</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>-1</u>	<u>-2</u>	<u>9</u>	25%
Totals	495	-16	-26	-28	-33	392	21%

TABLE 1B - MAJOR DOMESTIC REALIGNMENTS

	BRAC 88	BRAC 91	BRAC 93	BRAC 95	Bases Affected
Army	10	5	5	12	32
Navy/USMC	1	12	5	4	22
Air Force	0	2	3	10	15
Defense Agencies	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
Total	11	19	13	26	69

**TABLE 1C - SUMMARY OF DOMESTIC PLANT REPLACEMENT VALUE (PRV)
REDUCTIONS
(FY 95 \$BILLIONS)**

	<u>FY91</u>	<u>BRAC 88/91</u>	<u>BRAC 93</u>	<u>BRAC 95</u>	PRV <u>Remaining</u>	<u>Reduction</u>
Army	160.5	-15.7	-3.9	-15.6	125.3	22%
Navy/USMC	180.4	-11.3	-18.8	-10.3	140.0	22%
Air Force	<u>169.6</u>	<u>-20.3</u>	<u>-8.0</u>	<u>-5.3</u>	<u>136.0</u>	20%
Totals	510.5 ¹	-47.3	-30.7	-31.2	401.3	21%

Note: Plant replacement value is what it would cost to replace all the buildings, pavements, and utilities at a base. DoD measures progress in terms of plant replacement value because it is a better measure of the magnitude of reductions in infrastructure than simply counting large bases and small bases equally.

¹Since DoD Agencies do not hold real estate, the plant reductions realized by the Defense Logistics Agency, Defense Investigative Service, and others are included in the totals of the Military Departments.

**TABLE 2A - BASE STRUCTURE - SUMMARY OF ACTIONS TO END OR REDUCE
OPERATIONS OVERSEAS
(NUMBER OF SITES)**

	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>Announced to Date</u>	<u>Remaining</u>	<u>Site Reduction</u>
<i>Europe</i>				
Army	847	617	230	73%
Navy/USMC	85	29	56	34%
Air Force	470	233	237	50%
<i>Pacific/East Asia</i>				
Army	112	29	83	26%
Navy/USMC	26	11	15	42%
Air Force	79	9	70	11%
<i>Western Hemisphere/ Misc. Locations</i>				
Army	15	13	2	87%
Navy/USMC	10	8	2	80%
Air Force	<u>25</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>23</u>	8%
Totals	1,669	951	718	57%

**TABLE 2B - BASE STRUCTURE - SUMMARY OF OVERSEAS REDUCTIONS BY
PLANT REPLACEMENT VALUE (PRV)
(FY 95 \$BILLIONS)**

	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>Announced to Date</u>	<u>Planned Thru FY 99</u>	<u>Total Reduction</u>	<u>PRV Reduction</u>
Army	57.0	28.6	2.0	30.6	54%
Navy/USMC	27.9	10.2	0.0	10.2	37%
Air Force	<u>63.6</u>	<u>22.4</u>	<u>0.0</u>	<u>22.4</u>	35%
Totals	148.5	61.2	2.0	63.2	43%

Appendix E

History of Base Closures

Background

In the early 1960s, President Kennedy directed Secretary of Defense McNamara to develop and implement an extensive base realignment and closure program to reduce the Department's base structure developed during World War II and the Korean conflict. Hundreds of bases were closed and realigned during this period. More than 60 major bases were closed, making it the largest base closure in U.S. history. Criteria governing selection of bases for closure were established primarily within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, with minimal consultation with the Military Departments or Congress.

Congress did not anticipate the broad extent of these actions. The cumulative political and economic impact was substantial and, with few exceptions, the closures were viewed negatively by Congress.

Legislative History of Section 2687

In 1965, Congress passed legislation setting up reporting requirements designed to involve itself in any DoD base closure program. The legislation was vetoed by President Johnson and the confrontation between the Executive and Legislative branches of government grew. Despite this situation, the DoD completed base realignments and closures routinely throughout the 1960s.

In the early 1970s, DoD found it increasingly difficult to realign or close installations because Congress regulated the base closure process and limited or denied base closure funding. In 1976, the Military Construction Authorization Bill contained a provision prohibiting any base closure or reduction of more than 250 civilian employees until DoD had notified Congress of the proposed actions, assessed the personnel and economic impacts, followed the analysis provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), and waited nine months. This bill was vetoed by President Ford and a Congressional veto override effort failed.

In 1977, however, President Carter approved legislation requiring DoD to notify Congress when a base is a candidate for reduction or closure; prepare reports on the strategic, environmental and local economic consequences of such actions; and wait 60 days for Congress' response. The legislation was codified as Section 2687, Title 10, U.S. Code (see Appendix B). Section 2687, coupled with the requirements of NEPA, effectively brought base closures to a halt, in part because the required studies took one to two years to complete.

The Next Decade

Throughout the next decade, after passage of Section 2687, all attempts to close major installations failed. Department proposals to initiate studies were thwarted by Congressional opposition, occasionally in specific prohibitions of funding authority to close or even study the closure of specific installations.

The President's Private Sector Survey on Cost Control (The Grace Commission) included in its 1983 report a finding that economies could be made in the base structure. It recommended that a non-partisan, independent commission be established to study the issue and submit a list of closures. Nothing came of these early efforts. Finally, at the end of the second Reagan term, the Administration recognized a window in which to address this political stalemate.

The 1988 Base Closure Commission

In 1988, Secretary of Defense Carlucci recognized the need to close excess bases and the political possibility of gaining Congressional support. By that time, even though the Cold War had no signs of ending, the defense budget had already been declining for three straight years from the 1985 peak, and it was predicted to decline further.

On May 3, 1988, Secretary Carlucci chartered the Defense Secretary's Commission on Base Realignment and Closure to recommend military bases within the United States for realignment and closure. Legislation that was subsequently enacted (Public Law 100-526) provided a statutory basis for this one-time approach and also provided relief from certain statutory impediments to the completion of base closures. These included a partial waiver of NEPA requirements; a delegation of property disposal authority to the DoD, and an expedited process of Congressional review of BRAC recommendations.

Enactment of this legislation constituted recognition between the Legislative and the Executive Branches that improvement in the military basing structure could be a means of realizing savings in the defense budget, while not impairing the ability of the armed forces to carry out their missions. It was also a compact which carefully balanced the prerogatives of the two branches of government.

The 1988 Commission's Recommendations

The 1988 Base Closure Commission issued its report in December of that year. It recommended closing 86 military installations and realigning 13 others. An additional 46

installations were designated for increases because units and activities were relocated as a result of the recommended closures and realignments. A recap of the major 1988 base closures and realignments is at Table 1 of this Appendix.

The 1988 Commission was required to base its recommendations on the force structure anticipated in 1988, which was essentially a stable, Cold War force. Even so, it recommended closing about three percent of the domestic base structure.

Implementing the 1988 Commission's Recommendations

Secretary Carlucci was required by Public Law 100-526 to accept or reject the 1988 Commission's recommendations in their entirety. In January of 1989, he accepted all of the recommendations. The law provided Congress with the same opportunity and by May of 1989, the Congressional review period expired without the enactment of a joint resolution of disapproval. The Commission's 1988 recommendations have the force of law.

DoD's planning, budgeting and implementation of the 1988 recommendations are on track. The closures and realignments were required to begin by January of 1990 and must be completed by October of 1995. As of February 1995, 14 of the 16 major installations have been closed or reduced to a caretaker status pending property disposal.

The January 1990 List of Candidates

By the end of 1989, as DoD was preparing to send its revised FY 1991 Budget to the Congress, the world political landscape began changing dramatically. The Berlin Wall had fallen, the Warsaw Pact was weakening, democracy was spreading throughout the region, and U.S.-Soviet relations were improving.

It became clear that DoD's force structure and budget would decline over the next several years, in response to reduced tensions and threats. While the long-term force structure requirements of the post-Cold War were not yet known, base closures and realignments became part of each Military Department's budget strategy for balancing their base structure with their declining force structure.

Since it would take one to two years to complete the required base closure and environmental impact studies under the old Section 2687 procedures, then-Secretary of Defense Cheney decided to get started. DoD could only have some studies completed in time to submit a final list of closures and realignments to Congress with DoD's FY 1992/1993 budget in January of 1991, if it announced a list of candidates for closure or realignment in January of 1990, and began the required one to two year study process.

Public Law 101-510

Most of the January 1990 studies were never completed. In November of 1990 Congress passed and the President signed Public Law 101-510 (see Appendix A). The law required DoD to begin its review of the base structure anew, without regard for the January 1990 list of candidates except when the study was below the numerical thresholds established by Public Law 101-510. Working from the 1988 BRAC experience and lessons learned, the new law authorized independent Presidential BRAC Commissions in 1991, 1993 and 1995 to review the Secretary of Defense's recommendations for base closures and realignments in those years. The law also established initial direction to follow as DoD began implementing closures and realignments.

The 1991 Base Closure Process

The first of the three Commissions to operate under the new law received Secretary of Defense Cheney's recommendations for base closures and realignments on April 12, 1991. Those recommendations were based on approved final selection criteria and a six year force structure plan as required by law. By April of 1991, the Warsaw Pact had disintegrated and DoD was planning on significant force reductions.

Consequently, the Secretary of Defense recommended a significant base structure drawdown involving 31 major base closures and 48 realignments. The 1991 Commission accepted approximately 90 percent of those recommendations and in its report to the President, recommended the closure of 26 major bases and the realignment of 48 others. These approved closures represent a reduction of about 5.4 percent of the domestic base structure. A recap of the major 1991 base closures and realignments is at Table 1 of this Appendix.

Implementing the 1991 Commission's Recommendations

The President accepted all of the Commission's recommendations on July 11, 1991, and forwarded the Commission's report with his approval to the Congress. The Congressional review period established by P.L. 101-510 expired without enactment of a joint resolution of disapproval. Recommendations of the 1991 Commission now have the force of law.

DoD's planning, budgeting and implementation of the 1991 recommendations are on track. The closures and realignments were required to begin by July of 1993 and must be completed by July of 1997. As of February 1995, 19 of the 26 major installations have been closed and two more are scheduled for closure by the end of FY 1995.

The 1993 Base Closure Process

The second of the three Commissions to operate under P.L. 101-510, as now amended, received Secretary of Defense Aspin's recommendations for base closures and realignments on March 12, 1993. Those recommendations were based on the approved final selection criteria and a six year force structure plan (President Bush's "base force").

Secretary of Defense Aspin recommended substantial base structure reductions, based on the planned force structure drawdown, involving 31 major base closures and 12 major realignments. The 1993 Commission accepted approximately 95 percent of those recommendations and in its report to the President of July 1993, recommended the closure of 28 major bases and the realignment of 13 others. These approved closures and realignments represent a further reduction of about 6.2 percent of the domestic base structure. A recap of the major 1993 base closures and realignments is at Table 1 of this Appendix.

Implementing the 1993 Commission's Recommendations

The President accepted all of the Commission's recommendations on July 2, 1993, and forwarded the Commission's report with his approval to the Congress. The Congressional review period established by P.L. 101-510 expired without enactment of a joint resolution of disapproval. Consequently, the recommendations of the 1993 Commission now have the force of law.

DoD's planning, budgeting and implementation of the 1993 recommendations are on track. The closures and realignments are required to begin by July of 1995 and must be completed by July of 1999. As the DoD learned how to close bases faster, it began to accelerate savings. As of February 1995, three of the 1993 major closures have occurred, and another five are scheduled for closure by the end of FY 1995.

The Need To Expedite Mission Drawdown - A Brief History of Base Closure Implementation

Because the 1988 BRAC round was driven by consolidation of a stable force, rather than a force drawdown, implementation was expensive and slow. Usually, extensive facilities needed to be constructed at consolidation sites before closures and realignments could actually occur. Closures took five to six years from the date of announcement. By 1991, the situation had changed and DoD was downsizing in earnest. Rather than consolidating a stable force, DoD simply eliminated forces when bases were closed.

This change was mirrored in the impacted communities as well. In the 1988 round, the actual closure date was so far in the future that communities were not convinced that the closure would actually occur. Communities rarely had a sense of urgency in planning reuse, and generally did not get organized for six months to a year after announcement. By 1991, it was clear that downsizing was in earnest and that DoD bases would be closed. Communities realized they had to act sooner and take the early initiative to start a reuse plan, especially in light of the recessionary economic climate of the early 1990's. On average, communities were forming reuse organizations within two months after the closures were announced, instead of six months to a year.

Likewise, in 1988, conversion of property was neither quick nor simple. Communities struggled to understand complex Federal and State laws and regulations that were never developed for land reuse transactions as massive as those resulting from base closures. In instances where property disposal was not part of the process, the pace of base closing has been dramatic. For example, DoD closed 32 percent of its foreign installations in just four years despite the intervening turbulence of the Iraq War.

After three rounds of domestic base realignment and closures, only about 15 percent of the base capacity has been selected for closure. While military missions are terminating more quickly, most of these bases have yet to be fully closed and turned over to other activities. Several factors such as the need to construct new facilities at receiving bases, the environmental condition of closing bases, and cumbersome property disposal procedures contribute to the delay in closing a base. While funding of the BRAC program has received sustained Congressional support, a \$500 million rescission of FY 1994 funds in early 1994 did slow the pace of some closures.

Despite these impediments, DoD is closing domestic bases faster than in the past. DoD has reduced closure time from nearly five years for the bases on the 1988 list to approximately two years for bases on the 1993 list. Much of this improvement is attributable to statutory streamlining which Congress has often initiated, and the procedural and policy improvements DoD has made to assist communities in achieving rapid economic reinvestment.

The 1995 Base Closure Process

The 1995 base closure process is described in detail in the body of this report.

Table 1 - MAJOR BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT RECAP

Baseline: Base Structure Report (495-U.S. includes 10 territories and possessions)

1988 Commission

16 Closures

Chanute AFB, IL
Mather AFB, CA
Pease AFB, NH
George AFB, CA
Norton AFB, CA
Naval Station Brooklyn, NY

Phila Naval Hosp, PA
Naval Station Galveston, TX
Naval Station Lake Charles, LA
Presidio of San Francisco, CA
Fort Sheridan, IL

Jefferson Proving Ground, IN
Lexington Army Depot, KY
Army Material Tech Lab, MA
Fort Douglas, UT
Cameron Station, VA

11 Realignments

Naval Station Puget Sound, WA
Pueblo Army Depot, CO
Umatilla Army Depot, OR
Fort Dix, NJ

Fort Bliss, TX
Fort Meade, MD
Fort Monmouth, NJ
Fort Huachuca, AZ

Fort Holabird, MD
Fort Devens, MA
Fort McPherson, GA

1991 Commission

26 Closures

Fort Ben Harrison, IN
Fort Devens, MA
Fort Ord, CA
Sacramento Army Depot, CA
Hunters Point Annex, CA
Tustin MCAS, CA
Chase Field NAS, TX
Moffett NAS, CA
Naval Station Long Beach, CA

Naval Station Philadelphia, PA
Philadelphia Naval Shipyard, PA
Naval Station Puget Sound, WA
NAV ELEC SYS ENGR CTR,
San Diego, CA
Bergstrom AFB, TX
Carswell AFB, TX
Eaker AFB, AR
England AFB, LA

Grissom AFB, IN
Loring AFB, ME
Lowry AFB, CO
Myrtle Beach AFB, SC
Richards-Gebaur ARS, MO
Rickenbacker AGB, OH
Williams AFB, AZ
Wurtsmith AFB, MI
Castle AFB, CA

19 Realignments

MacDill AFB, FL
Beale AFB, CA
AVSCOM/TROSCOM, MO
Fort Chaffee, AR
Fort Polk, LA
Letterkenny Army Depot, PA
Rock Island Arsenal, IL

NAVAIR Eng Ctr, Lakehurst, NJ
NAVAIR Devel Ctr, Warminster, PA
NAVAIR Propul Ctr, Trenton, NJ
NAV ORD STA, Indian Head, MD
NAV Avionics Ctr, Indianapolis, IN
NAV Coastal Sys Ctr, Panama City, FL
NAV ORD STA, Louisville, KY

NAV Surf Wpns Ctr, White Oak, MD
NAV Undsea Warfre Eng Sta,
Keyport, WA
NAV Wpns Ctr, China Lake, CA
NAV Wpns Sup Ctr, Crane, IN
Pac Missile Tst Ctr, Point Mugu, CA

1993 Commission

28 Closures

Vint Hill Farms, VA	Naval Station Mobile, AL	Mare Island Naval Shipyard, CA
MCAS El Toro, CA	Naval Air Station Alameda, CA	Naval Aviation Depot Alameda, CA
Naval Hospital Oakland, CA	Naval Station Treasure Island, CA	Naval Training Center San Diego, CA
Naval Air Station Cecil Field, FL	Naval Aviation Depot Pensacola, FL	Naval Training Center Orlando, FL
Naval Air Station Agana, Guam	Naval Air Station Barbers Point, HI	Naval Air Station Glenview, IL
NESEC, St. Inigoes, MD	Naval Station Staten Island, NY	Charleston Naval Shipyard, SC
Naval Station Charleston, SC	Naval Air Station Dallas, TX	Naval Aviation Depot Norfolk, VA
Homestead Air Force Base, FL	O'Hare IAP ARS, IL	K.I. Sawyer Air Force Base, MI
Plattsburgh Air Force Base, NY	Gentile Air Force Station, OH (DESC)	Newark Air Force Base, OH
Defense Personnel Support Center, PA		

13 Realignments

Anniston Army Depot, AL	Fort Monmouth, NJ	Letterkenny Army Depot, PA
Tooele Army Depot, UT	Fort Belvoir, VA	MCLB Barstow, CA
NWS Seal Beach, CA	NSWC (Dahlgren) White Oak Det,	NETC, Newport, RI
Naval Air Station Memphis, TN	White Oak, Maryland	March Air Force Base, CA
Griffiss Air Force Base, NY	Hill Air Force Base ALC, UT	

Table 2 - DoD RECOMMENDATIONS REJECTED BY PREVIOUS COMMISSIONS

1988 Commission

Because the 1988 Commission was the sole authority for recommending closure and realignments to the Secretary of Defense there were no recommendations made that were not accepted by the Secretary of Defense.

1991 Commission

<u>Installation</u>	<u>Recommended Action</u>	<u>Commission Action</u>
<u>Army</u>		
Fort McClellan, AL	Close	Open
Fort Dix, NJ	Close	Realign
Fort Chaffee, AR	Close	Realign
Army Corps of Engineers	None	Realign

Navy

Naval Air Station Whidbey Island, WA	Close	Open
Naval Training Center Orlando, FL	Close	Open
RDT&E & Fleet Support Activities	Close 10/Realign 16	Close 7/Realign 17

Air Force

Moody AFB, GA	Close	Open
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1993 Commission

Army

Fort McClellan, AL	Close	Open
Letterkenny Army Depot, PA	Realign	Open
Presidio of Monterey Annex, CA	None	Realign

Changes to Previously Approved 88/91 Recommendations Affecting Army

Presidio of San Francisco, CA	Send 6th Army to Ft Carson	Keep 6th Army at Presidio of SF
Letterkenny Army Depot, PA	Send functions to Rock Island	Realign Keep Functions at Letterkenny

Navy

Naval Air Station Agana, Guam	None	Close
Naval Air Facility Martinsburg, WV	None	Close
Naval Air Facility Johnstown, PA	None	Close
Naval Hospital, Charleston, SC	Close	Open
Naval Air Station Meridian, MS	Close	Open
Naval Air Station South Weymouth, MA	Close	Open
Naval Supply Center Charleston, SC	Disestablish	Realign
Naval Supply Center Oakland, CA	Close	Open
Naval Submarine Base New London, CA	Realign	Open
Aviation Supply Office, PA	Close	Open
Naval Air Technical Services Facility, Philadelphia, PA	Close	Open
Naval Electronic Security Systems Engineering Center, Charleston, SC	Disestablish	Open
Naval Electronic Systems Engineering Center, Portsmouth, VA	Receive	Close
Naval Surface Warfare Center-Carderock, Annapolis Detachment, Annapolis, MD	Disestablish	Open
Navy and Marine Corps Reserve Center, Lawrence, MA	None	Close
Naval Reserve Center, Chicopee, MA	None	Close
Naval Reserve Center, Quincy, MA	None	Close

Appendix E
History of Base Closures

Changes to Previously Approved BRAC 88/91 Recommendations

Marine Corps Air Station, Tustin, CA	None	Realign
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Air Force

Plattsburgh AFB, NY	None	Close
Homestead AFB, FL	Close	Realign
McGuire AFB, NJ	Realign	Open

Changes to Previously Approved BRAC 88/91 Recommendations

Bergstrom AFB, TX	Redirect	Open
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Defense Logistics Agency

Defense Industrial Supply Center, PA	Relocate	Open
Defense Reutilization & Marketing Service, MI	Disestablish	Open

Appendix F

Areas of Commission Special Interest

Introduction

The 1993 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission expressed several concerns in the "Issues for Further Consideration" chapter of its report. The Commission shared its concerns about several issues on which they had gained valuable insights through review of the Defense Secretary's closure and realignment recommendations. DoD carefully examined the 1993 Commission's concerns and the following discussion provides the results of that review.

Interservicing

The 1993 Commission highlighted interservicing, depot capacity and private sector capability as areas within depot maintenance that deserved particular attention. The Commission suggested completion of an exhaustive review of depot maintenance for BRAC 95, and strongly supported a joint organization responsible for assigning workload to DoD's depots.

In 1993, the Secretary of Defense directed DoD to complete a comprehensive study of the depot maintenance management structure. The study, entitled "Integrated Management of Department of Defense Depot Maintenance Activities" considered several alternatives for managing depots. These alternatives included a Joint Depot Maintenance Command, a Defense Depot Maintenance Agency, an Executive Service and an empowered Defense Depot Maintenance Council (DDMC). Of its alternatives, the study recommended an empowered DDMC. The Deputy Secretary of Defense subsequently approved that recommendation.

In 1994, Congress directed the Secretary of Defense to establish a Joint Government/Industry task force to study depot maintenance. Based upon an in-depth study, the task force endorsed DDMC oversight for workloading and interservicing within maintenance depots as the preferred method for management of DoD depot maintenance.

DoD believes that a large central depot maintenance organization, separate and apart from the Services, and responsible for all of DoD's organic and contract depot maintenance is not the best way to provide timely support for the warfighters. The maintenance structure in each of the Services is designed to reinforce and back-up the intermediate and organizational levels of maintenance. The Services must have the authority and resources to maintain peak readiness of their weapon systems and flexibility to meet the rapidly changing conditions

inherent in war. Good maintenance is at the very heart of weapon systems' readiness. To effectively achieve this, it is necessary to leave the management of maintenance depots in the hands of the Services. DoD should only provide DoD policy making and oversight authority.

For BRAC 95, the Deputy Secretary of Defense established five functional Joint Cross-Service Groups to enhance opportunities for cross-servicing and multi-service use of the remaining infrastructure. One of these groups, the Joint Cross-Service Group for Depot Maintenance (JCSG-DM) was chaired by the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Logistics) and included senior logisticians from each of the Services, Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) and the Joint Staff. The group conducted an in-depth analysis on a commodity/site basis, DoD-wide. As a result, the group was able to provide alternatives for closure, realignment and consolidation to the Military Departments for further analysis and use in the development of their recommendations. The DDMC will analyze the remaining interservicing candidates to determine the feasibility of implementing them after the BRAC 95 process ends.

Depot Capacity

The Commission recognized that excess DoD depot capacity would remain even after BRAC 93 reductions. It, therefore, recommended a moratorium on further depot construction until after the Secretary's Bottom-Up Review had determined capacity requirements.

DoD requires that each budget request for a depot maintenance construction project be fully considered for interservicing alternatives by the Joint Military Construction Review Board. This review prevents duplication of facilities within DoD Components. Since 1993, most of the military construction in the DoD maintenance depots has been environmental or necessary to implement BRAC 93 requirements.

Therefore, a moratorium would only have prevented necessary construction for environmental projects or projects to implement BRAC 93 recommendations. Our military construction in this area has not exacerbated the Department's over capacity in the depot maintenance area.

Private Sector Capability

The Commission also felt that the BRAC 93 recommendations did not address private sector capability.

In the memorandum issued by the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Logistics) on November 15, 1993, DoD established a definitive policy for maintaining only its "core" capabilities. For BRAC 95 analysis purposes, the Joint Cross-Service Group for Depot Maintenance directed the Military Departments to "size to core." Only core capabilities

should be maintained within the organic Defense depots to meet the readiness and sustainability requirements of weapon systems that support contingency scenarios directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to minimize operational risks and guarantee required readiness. Core depot maintenance capabilities will comprise only the minimum facilities, equipment and skilled personnel necessary to ensure a ready and controlled source of required technical competence.

The remaining "above core" depot maintenance workloads will then be available for performance in the private sector. Within this policy, not all mission essential weapon systems, equipment or components would be maintained in DoD depots. When a Service Secretary determines that a sufficiently assured source of repair exists in the private sector to negate specific weapon system-related risk, that weapon system may be maintained by private industry. This policy also provided the methodology to size to core the Department's workload.

By downsizing DoD's in-house maintenance capability to the minimum necessary, operational requirements may be met in the most cost effective manner through a mix of public and private industrial support.

Implementation of the Commission's Recommendations

The Commission reported that despite DoD assistance, environmental study and cleanup requirements have resulted in a slowdown in the disposal process, causing delays in reuse. The Commission also endorsed recommendations received from affected communities and some reuse groups that would establish a "reuse czar" to oversee property disposal and establish a "community friendly" disposal process. The Commission also suggested that the Army and Navy replicate the Air Force's Base Conversion Agency to facilitate and expedite disposal.

The Department has thoroughly revamped the way it disposes of its base closure property and the way it works with communities to foster economic conversion and reuse. The entire process, with all its changes, is outlined in Chapter Six of this report.

Leases

The Commission found that DoD spends a significant amount of operation and maintenance funds on leased space. Since downsizing should create excess capacity to eliminate much of this dependence, the Commission suggested that a separate category for leased facilities be established for BRAC 95. The Commission also found that DoD appeared to be paying premium rates to GSA for space that could be leased commercially in like areas at lower rates.

While DoD did not preclude establishing a leased space category, it could not mandate establishing one. Instead, DoD gave the Services and Agencies the latitude to categorize their activities in any way they deem appropriate. Without exception, each Service and the DLA established categories based upon mission. This is the only way that total excess capacity could be evaluated. DoD has, however, strived to consolidate onto government-owned space wherever possible. Each of the Services and the DLA have initiatives to relocate and consolidate their activities from leased space. However, it is important to evaluate the full cost of government ownership, including maintenance and repair, in any comparison with leased space options.

Defense Finance and Accounting Service

DoD has been planning for several years to consolidate nearly 300 Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) offices. In 1993, DoD invited communities to submit proposals to become consolidated DFAS facility locations. The primary criterion used, in the nationwide site selection process called the Opportunity for Economic Growth (OEG), was the extent to which local communities were willing to subsidize the cost of DFAS facilities and operations, thereby resulting in savings to DoD.

Prior to the release of his 1993 BRAC Report, the Secretary of Defense rejected the DFAS site selection process because he was not convinced that it was sound public policy. The OEG was viewed as an auction for public service jobs that did not consider important criteria, such as the disruption of service that could result from transferring DFAS facilities. Many viewed the process as an unfair effort to place the cost burden of providing for a strong national defense on local communities rather than sharing the costs across the nation. This was fundamentally inconsistent with the President's community reinvestment initiatives.

While the 1993 Commission accepted this decision, it recommended the Secretary of Defense consider the significant investment of time and resources that the top 20 contenders made in submitting proposals to become DFAS center locations.

As a result of the 1993 Commission's recommendation, a new DFAS site selection process began. The new process was based on cost to the government, maintenance of customer service, use of defense assets made redundant by the end of the Cold War, and a good labor supply. The review process began with a full consideration of the 20 communities that were under consideration during the final phase of the previous process.

On May 3, 1994, DoD announced the results of the DFAS consolidation site selection process. Twenty-five locations, including several that were considered during the previous process, were selected.

Medical Treatment Facilities

The 1993 Commission's Report recommended the Department of Defense improve health care operations and cost effectiveness, ensure that accessible health care is available to remaining beneficiaries at closure and realignment sites, take an active role in identifying medical facility consolidations or closures, and continue pursuing formalized sharing agreements with the Veterans Administration (VA) and private sector hospitals. The Commission made five specific recommendations: (1) consolidate resources across Military Departments and specified geographic areas; (2) close military treatment facilities that are not cost-effective; (3) move assets across Military Departments and into other Service facilities to increase capabilities; (4) create health care programs that operate on a competitive basis, and (5) upgrade substandard facilities that are still required.

In response to dynamic changes in health care delivery, DoD developed a comprehensive managed care program called TRICARE. TRICARE is a regional managed care program that brings together the health care delivery systems of the military services, as well as the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS). The program is designed to improve beneficiary access, assure affordable and high quality care, provide choice and contain overall DoD costs.

Twelve TRICARE regions are identified across the United States. Each is administered by a Lead Agent responsible for planning and coordinating the regional delivery of health care in that area. Individual medical commanders retain complete command and control of their health care programs, and with assistance from the Lead Agent, can refer patients to other DoD and designated specialty referral centers. Lead Agents also oversee regional contracts with civilian managed care companies.

The Department's actions to lessen any adverse medical impact at base realignment and closure sites include transition health care programs, managed care initiatives, retail pharmacy networks and meetings with beneficiaries. A retail pharmacy benefit is also included at each location where a provider network is developed. This program for CHAMPUS-eligible personnel will also be available to military Medicare-eligible beneficiaries residing within former BRAC catchment areas, when no other military medical pharmacy is present.

In addition, the Department has begun to test a mail-order pharmacy service in several states. As with the retail pharmacy benefit program, the mail-order pharmacy demonstration is also available to Medicare-eligible beneficiaries residing within former BRAC catchment areas, when no other military medical pharmacy is present.

DoD already shares thousands of services with the VA and has entered into numerous joint ventures. DoD is pursuing new opportunities with the VA while taking a sound management approach to furthering the VA/DoD Health Care Resources Sharing Program as the Military Health Services System (MHSS) moves into the TRICARE managed care arena. Individual sharing agreements are part of each of the comprehensive regional plans. Guidelines to military facility commanders will encourage the military services to evaluate the possibility and feasibility of using Federal capabilities, where and when it is mutually cost effective. Additionally, the Departments are in the process of signing a Memorandum of Understanding, implementing legislation that allows VA to establish a contractual health care provider relationship with DoD Managed Care contractors.

The Deputy Secretary's BRAC guidance memorandum of January 7, 1994, provided the authority for establishment of the Joint Cross-Service Group for Military Treatment Facilities (MTFs) and Graduate Medical Education (GME). The MTF and GME group developed criteria, data sources, and measurements consistent with the BRAC criteria. Through quantitative and qualitative analysis, DoD identified closure and consolidation alternatives for Service consideration. The alternatives would reduce excess capacity in the MHSS while ensuring required infrastructure for wartime missions. The Services evaluated the alternatives in consonance with their overall basing studies and analyses. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) and the Services are also pursuing physical plant efficiencies through the DoD Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System process.

DoD has moved conscientiously toward bringing the Military Department's healthcare facilities into compliance with governing life and fire safety codes to ensure that appropriate, quality health care delivery is achieved in a safe and efficient setting. Revitalizing the physical plant resources supporting our health care delivery system is paramount in providing necessary, cost-effective, care to eligible beneficiaries while supporting the medical readiness mission.

Cumulative Economic Impact

The 1993 Commission made two key recommendations regarding cumulative economic impact. First, the Commission recommended that "the Secretary of Defense make clear that cumulative economic impact alone is an insufficient cause for removing a base with inadequate military value from consideration for closure or realignment. Economic impact should be given weight only when analyzing candidate bases with comparable, sufficient military value." Guidance issued by the Joint Cross-Service Group on Economic Impact specifically addressed this issue by directing DoD components to consider cumulative economic impact as part of the economic impact criterion and within the context of all eight final selection criteria. Second, the Commission recommended "clarifying and standardizing

geographic areas of measurement." The Joint Cross-Service Group on Economic Impact addressed this concern by establishing clearly defined rules for assigning installations to BRAC economic areas.

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

Concerned that sufficient emphasis was not being placed on the Corps of Engineers reorganization, the Commission encouraged the Secretary of Defense to promptly approve a reorganization plan so that significant savings could be realized and unnecessary facilities closed.

In November 1993, President Clinton directed the Secretary of Defense to develop a new reorganization plan. The Secretary of the Army began this process with assistance from the Acting Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works. To that end, the Secretary of the Army approved a new Civil Works Roles Matrix for the Corps of Engineers in October 1994. Several task forces are currently refining the details for implementing new roles for various office levels within the Corps of Engineers. At this time, planning is proceeding under the assumption that no division or district offices will close.

Classified Programs

The 1993 Commission was concerned that several bases recommended for closure in 1991 and 1993 conducted classified missions. While the Commission recognized that the merits of these programs were not issues for its cognizance, it felt that it was important to keep an audit trail of discussions conducted during the recommendation process and that the appropriate agencies and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (ASD(C3I)) participate in the process.

It was important to DoD's BRAC 95 process to assess classified missions. In particular, the Test and Evaluation Joint Cross-Service Group reviewed facilities in their area of consideration and the Services' processes also took these kinds of programs into account. Additionally, a representative of the ASD (C3I) participated in BRAC 95 Steering Group meetings and the ASD(C3I) personally provided his formal coordination of the Military Department and Defense Agency recommendations before the Secretary of Defense approved them.

Measures of Merit

The Commission suggested that, overall, DoD tended to measure results rather than capacity. Specifically, they stated that facility capacity would be a better representation of assessing overall excess capacity within the DoD Depot system. The Commission suggested

that DoD use facility cost of performance or a similar measure because that would be more reflective of merit or productivity. The Commission said there were several instances of data errors submitted to the Commission and that to preclude this, base commanders and field respondents providing raw data and information to higher headquarters should be allowed to review the overall input in its final format before it is sent to the Commission.

In regard to measures of merit in the depot area, capacity was the most significant factor in the Department's analysis. Moreover, the Commission's suggestion that DoD use the cost of performance was not feasible because, in the depot area in particular, the diversity of work performed precluded this kind of comparison between most facilities. Cost accounting practices of the Military Departments were too diverse to make meaningful comparisons at the commodity level without further leveling. Therefore, the JCSG-DM depended on Military Department COBRA analysis as a cost feasibility test for the JCSG-DM developed alternatives.

Finally, in regard to data errors, DoD's certification process coupled with Military Department, DoD Inspector General and General Accounting Office auditors provides the process with a system that far exceeds any others in regard to the number of people responsible for checking data accuracy. Adding additional requirements for data accuracy would not provide additional accuracy and would only serve to slow the process.

Community Preference Consideration

The Commission highlighted the importance of following the Base Closure Act's requirement to give special consideration to any community's request to close or realign a facility. The Commission cited the case of the Borough of Marcus Hook, Pennsylvania. The residents of Marcus Hook petitioned the Army in both BRAC 91 and BRAC 93 to close a reserve center located in their community, to no avail. The Commission urged the Department to negotiate in good faith to transfer the Marcus Hook reserve center activities to the Philadelphia Navy Yard.

DoD, in fact, does place a strong emphasis on community preference requests for closures or realignments. However, in this instance, relocating this reserve center would not be cost effective. The most recent study conducted by the Army at the request of Congress, surveyed potential sites to re-station Detachment 1, 949th Transportation Company (Float Craft), currently located in Marcus Hook. The study encompassed eleven sites within a 100-mile radius of Marcus Hook, including two sites at the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard. Once again, the Marcus Hook location was found to be the most cost effective.

Environmental Cleanup Cost

The Commission stated that new laws require accelerated cleanup at closing bases. They also stated that there is a potential requirement for a level of environmental restoration at closing bases exceeding that which would be necessary if the bases were to remain open. The Commission cited these factors in requesting the Secretary of Defense to consider incremental environmental restoration costs in his recommendations to the 1995 Commission.

In BRAC 95, DoD considered environmental restoration consistent with prior rounds. That is, since the Department is legally bound to restore this property, it is not a factor in deciding to select any installation for closure or realignment.

Unexploded Ordnance at Fort Monroe, Virginia

The Commission expressed concern that unexploded ordnance impeded the closure of Fort Monroe as well as other Army facilities. Since 1993, the Army has conducted a comprehensive investigation of the extent and level of threat due to unexploded ordnance at Fort Monroe. New technology has provided significantly greater accuracy in locating and identifying subsurface objects that were previously considered to be potential unexploded ordnance. Using this new technology, the Army thoroughly surveyed 283 acres of Fort Monroe to locate and identify all potential hazards. The survey included the excavation of a sample of potential unexploded ordnance sites identified for further detailed examination. The sample resulted in the Army finding 581 "anomalies" which could be potential unexploded ordnance. These were selected for excavation and further investigation; seven anomalies were confirmed as unexploded ordnance -- all were cannon balls and none were live unexploded ordnance. Extrapolating data, the probable number of unexploded ordnance on Fort Monroe is 1,309. The Army has determined that the likelihood of encountering unexploded ordnance is minimal; hence, there is a minimal risk to the public health and environment if identified sites are left undisturbed by intrusive excavation activities associated with construction or land development. Hence, the reuse of Fort Monroe would be limited, should it be recommended for closure, given the estimated cost to safely remove all hazards to a ten foot depth is approximately \$20 million.

Rightsizing DoD - Service Initiatives

The Commission noted that initiatives of the individual Services to independently close, realign or transfer facilities that do not break the threshold of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act were proceeding and successful. The Commission applauded these efforts and charged the Secretary of Defense to continue to encourage the Services in their ongoing efforts in this area. The Department agrees completely and will strive to maintain only that infrastructure necessary for our defense.

Appendix G

Impacts by State

BRAC 95 Closure and Realignment Recommendation Costs and Savings

(FY 96 \$Millions)

Service/Agency			Closure	FY96-01 Net	Annual	Total
Installation	State	Action	Cost	Cost (Savings)	Savings	Savings *

Net Personnel Gains and (Losses)	
Mil	Civ

Alabama

Army

Ft McClellan	Close	259	122	45	316	(6,095)	(2,441)
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Navy

NRC Huntsville	Close	0	(3)	1	7	(11)	(8)
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Personnel Increases at Other Bases

229 3,380

Total Alabama Personnel Impact

(5,877) 931

Alaska

Army

Ft Greely	Realign	23	(43)	19	225	(438)	(286)
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Navy

NAF Adak	Close	9	(108)	26	355	(540)	(138)
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Personnel Increases at Other Bases

205 56

Total Alaska Personnel Impact

(773) (368)

Arizona

Air Force

Williams AFB	Redirect	0	(18)	0	21	0	0
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Personnel Increases at Other Bases

147 184

Total Arizona Personnel Impact

147 184

Arkansas

Army

Ft Chaffee	Close	10	(39)	13	167	(40)	(207)
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Personnel Increases at Other Bases

0 0

Total Arkansas Personnel Impact

(40) (207)

California

Army

Branch US Disciplinary Barracks	Close	0	0	0	0	0	0
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East Ft Baker	Close	8	1	2	15	(47)	(50)
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Ft Hunter-Liggett	Realign	6	(12)	5	64	(393)	(85)
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Rio Vista Army Reserve Center	Close	0	(1)	0	2	0	0
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Sierra Army Depot	Realign	14	(55)	29	333	(53)	(539)
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Navy

MCAS El Toro/Tustin	Redirect	90	(293)	7	347	0	0
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NAS Alameda	Redirect	Costs/Savings included in NAS Meridian closure				0	0
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Naval Health Research Ctr San Diego	Disestablish	6	2	1	11	(17)	(137)
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NAVPERS R&D Ctr San Diego	Disestablish	8	4	2	15	(17)	(202)
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NISE West San Diego	Disestablish	2	(19)	4	60	0	(58)
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NRC Pomona	Close	0	(2)	0	5	(7)	(3)
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NRC Santa Anna (Irvine)	Close	0	(3)	1	8	(12)	(2)
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NRC Stockton	Close	0	(2)	0	5	(7)	0
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NSY Long Beach	Close	75	(726)	131	1,949	(263)	(3,766)
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Recruiting District San Diego	Redirect	0	0	0	0	0	0
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SUPSHIP Long Beach	Disestablish	0	(1)	0	3	(11)	(8)
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Air Force

Moffett Federal Airport AGS	Close	15	(4)	5	50	(88)	(230)
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North Highlands Air Guard Station	Close	1	1	0	2	0	0
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Onizuka AS	Realign	124	126	30	182	(673)	(1,202)
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Ontario IAP AGS	Close	1	0	0	1	0	0
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* Twenty Year Net Present Value at 2.75%

BRAC 95 Closure and Realignment Recommendation Costs and Savings

(FY 96 \$Millions)							Net Personnel Gains and (Losses)		
Service/Agency	Installation	State	Action	Closure Cost	FY96-01 Net Cost (Savings)	Annual Savings	Total Savings *	Mil	Civ
Sacramento ALC (McClellan AFB)			Realign	Costs/Savings included in AF ALC Realignment (See San An				0	0
Defense Logistics Agency									
Defense Contract Management District West			Redirect	10	(11)	4	51	0	0
Personnel Increases at Other Bases								2,190	2,294
Total California Personnel Impact								602	(3,988)
Colorado									
Army									
Fitzsimons Army Medical Center			Close	142	39	34	299	(1,291)	(1,612)
Air Force									
Lowry AFB			Redirect	2	(11)	3	39	(78)	(11)
Personnel Increases at Other Bases								528	303
Total Colorado Personnel Impact								(841)	(1,320)
Connecticut									
Army									
Stratford Army Engine Plant			Close	2	(24)	6	80	(2)	0
Navy									
NUWC Det New London			Disestablish	23	(14)	8	91	(5)	(622)
Personnel Increases at Other Bases								20	13
Total Connecticut Personnel Impact								13	(609)
District of Columbia									
Navy									
Recruiting Command Wash. D.C.			Redirect	7	(1)	0	1	0	0
Security Group Det Potomac			Redirect	0	0	0	0	0	0
Personnel Increases at Other Bases								225	0
Total District of Columbia Personnel Impact								225	0
Florida									
Army									
Big Coppett Key			Close	0	0	0	0	0	0
Navy									
NADEP Pensacola			Redirect	2	(2)	0	4	0	0
NAS Cecil Field			Redirect	67	(335)	12	438	0	0
NAS Key West			Realign	0	(8)	2	26	(19)	(1)
NRL Underwater Sound Det Orlando			Disestablish	8	(4)	3	30	0	(109)
NTC Orlando/San Diego			Redirect	6	(25)	0	26	0	0
Nuclear Power Propulsion Tng Ctr, Orlando			Redirect	148	(20)	5	71	0	0
Air Force									
Eglin AFB			Realign	2	(6)	3	31	420	299
Homestead AFB (301 ARS)			Redirect	5	(2)	2	15	(61)	(153)
Homestead AFB (726 ACS)			Redirect	7	(2)	0	5	0	0
MacDill AFB			Redirect	Costs/Savings included in Malmstrom AFB action				0	0
Personnel Increases at Other Bases								3,414	643
Total Florida Personnel Impact								3,754	679
Georgia									
Air Force									
Warner-Robins ALC (Robins AFB)			Realign	Costs/Savings included in AF ALC Realignment (See San Antonio ALC)				(8)	(526)

* Twenty Year Net Present Value at 2.75%

BRAC 95 Closure and Realignment Recommendation Costs and Savings

(FY 96 \$Millions)

Service/Agency			Closure	FY96-01 Net	Annual	Total
Installation	State	Action	Cost	Cost (Savings)	Savings	Savings *

Net Personnel	
Gains and (Losses)	
Mil	Civ

Defense Logistics Agency

Defense Contract Management District South	Disestablish	4	(18)	6	76	(5)	(164)
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Personnel Increases at Other Bases

804 77

Total Georgia Personnel Impact

791 (613)

Guam

Navy

FISC Guam	Disestablish	18	(143)	31	437	(73)	(340)
NAS Agana	Redirect	44	(214)	22	418	(1,272)	0
Naval Activities Guam	Realign	93	(66)	43	474	(737)	(1,684)
SRF Guam	Close	8	(172)	38	529	(22)	(641)

Personnel Increases at Other Bases

0 0

Total Guam Personnel Impact

(2,104) (2,665)

Hawaii

Navy

NAS Barbers Point	Redirect	0	(18)	0	18	0	0
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Personnel Increases at Other Bases

995 773

Total Hawaii Personnel Impact

995 773

Idaho

Personnel Increases at Other Bases

123 3

Total Idaho Personnel Impact

123 3

Illinois

Army

Price Support Center, IL	Close	4	(35)	9	116	(25)	(200)
Savanna Army Depot Activity	Close	38	12	13	112	(57)	(393)

Personnel Increases at Other Bases

10 5

Total Illinois Personnel Impact

(72) (588)

Indiana

Navy

NAWC-AD Indianapolis	Close	180	27	68	640	(36)	(2,805)
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Personnel Increases at Other Bases

13 1,778

Total Indiana Personnel Impact

(23) (1,027)

Kansas

Navy

NARC Olathe	Close	0	(4)	1	11	(10)	(4)
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Personnel Increases at Other Bases

0 0

Total Kansas Personnel Impact

(10) (4)

* Twenty Year Net Present Value at 2.75%

BRAC 95 Closure and Realignment Recommendation Costs and Savings

(FY 96 \$Millions)

Service/Agency			Closure	FY96-01 Net	Annual	Total
Installation	State	Action	Cost	Cost (Savings)	Savings	Savings *

Net Personnel Gains and (Losses)	
Mil	Civ

Kentucky

Navy

NSWC Louisville	Close	Costs/Savings included in NAWC Indianapolis action				(15)	(1,449)
Personnel Increases at Other Bases						1,416	54
Total Kentucky Personnel Impact						1,401	(1,395)

Louisiana

Navy

Naval Bio Dynamics Lab New Orleans	Close	1	(14)	3	42	(15)	(39)
NR Readiness Cmd 10 New Orleans	Close	1	(6)	2	24	(24)	(23)
Personnel Increases at Other Bases						0	2
Total Louisiana Personnel Impact						(39)	(60)

Maine

Personnel Increases at Other Bases						215	5
Total Maine Personnel Impact						215	5

Maryland

Army

Army Bio-Medical Research Lab, Ft Detrick	Redirect	0	(4)	0	4	0	0
Army Publications Distribution Center	Relocate	6	(3)	3	35	(2)	(129)
Concepts Analysis Agency	Relocate	4	0	1	7	0	0
Ft Meade (Kimbrough Hospital)	Realign	2	(16)	4	50	(55)	(74)
Ft Ritchie	Close	93	(83)	65	712	(1,011)	(1,333)

Navy

Naval Medical Research Inst. Bethesda	Close	3	(19)	10	111	(91)	(55)
NSWC Det Annapolis	Close	25	(37)	15	175	(2)	(520)
NSWC Det White Oak	Close	3	(29)	6	86	(1)	(201)

Defense Investigative Service

IC&AD, Ft. Holabird	Relocate	11	1	0	4	0	0
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Personnel Increases at Other Bases						681	1,101
Total Maryland Personnel Impact						(481)	(1,211)

Massachusetts

Navy

NAS South Weymouth	Close	17	(51)	27	315	(637)	(299)
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Army

Hingham Cohasset	Close	0	(1)	0	2	0	0
Sudbury Training Annex	Close	1	0	0	1	0	(13)

Personnel Increases at Other Bases						9	765
Total Massachusetts Personnel Impact						(628)	453

Michigan

Army

Detroit Arsenal	Realign	1	(8)	3	38	0	0
Selfridge Army Garrison	Close	5	(47)	10	140	(54)	(555)

Navy

NAF Detroit	Redirect	0	(9)	0	9	0	0
NRC Cadillac	Close	0	(2)	0	5	(8)	0

Personnel Increases at Other Bases						62	275
Total Michigan Personnel Impact						0	(280)

BRAC 95 Closure and Realignment Recommendation Costs and Savings

(FY 96 \$Millions)

Service/Agency		Closure	FY96-01 Net	Annual	Total
Installation	State	Action	Cost	Cost (Savings)	Savings
					Savings *

Net Personnel	
Gains and (Losses)	
Mil	Civ

Mississippi

Navy

NAS Meridian	Close	83	(159)	33	471	(1,643)	(947)
NITC Meridian	Close	Costs/Savings Included in NAS Meridian action					

Personnel Increases at Other Bases

115 237

Total Mississippi Personnel Impact

(1,519) (710)

Missouri

Army

Aviation-Troop Command	Disestablish	146	(9)	46	453	(247)	(4,484)
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Personnel Increases at Other Bases

1,411 382

Total Missouri Personnel Impact

1,164 (4,102)

Montana

Army

Ft Missoula	Close	0	(1)	0	2	0	0
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Air Force

Malmstrom AFB	Realign	17	(5)	5	54	(719)	(60)
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Personnel Increases at Other Bases

0 0

Total Montana Personnel

(719) (60)

Nevada

Personnel Increases at Other Bases

87 85

Total Nevada Personnel Impact

87 85

New Jersey

Army

Bayonne Military Ocean Terminal	Close	44	8	10	90	(100)	(1,267)
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Camp Kilmer	Close	0	(1)	0	3	0	0
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Camp Pedricktown	Close	0	(2)	0	5	0	0
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Caven Point Army Reserve Center	Close	Cost/Savings included in Ft Hamilton action				(3)	0
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Ft Dix	Realign	19	(112)	38	478	(310)	(429)
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Navy

NAWC Lakehurst	Close	97	5	37	359	(380)	(1,383)
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Personnel Increases at Other Bases

35 1,213

Total New Jersey Personnel Impact

(758) (1,866)

New Mexico

Air Force

Kirtland AFB	Realign	278	159	62	465	(4,556)	(2,294)
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Personnel Increases at Other Bases

1,368 344

Total New Mexico Personnel Impact

(3,188) (1,950)

New York

Army

Bellmore Logistics Activity	Close	0	(2)	0	5	0	0
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Ft Hamilton	Realign	2	(3)	7	74	3	(52)
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Ft Totten	Close	4	0	2	17	(11)	(32)
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* Twenty Year Net Present Value at 2.75%

BRAC 95 Closure and Realignment Recommendation Costs and Savings

(FY 96 \$Millions)

Service/Agency Installation	State	Action	Closure Cost	FY96-01 Net Cost (Savings)	Annual Savings	Total Savings *	Net Personnel Gains and (Losses)	
							Mil	Civ
Seneca Army Depot		Close	15	(34)	21	242	(9)	(316)
Navy								
NRC Staten Island		Close	0	(4)	1	10	(12)	(2)
Air Force								
Griffiss AFB (485th EIG)		Redirect	1	(27)	3	54	0	0
Griffiss AFB (Airfield Support)		Redirect	51	13	12	111	0	(150)
REDCAP Activity, Buffalo		Disestablish	2	(2)	1	11	(2)	(1)
Rome Laboratories		Close	53	15	12	98	(10)	(1,057)
Roslyn AGS		Close	2	(1)	1	8	(8)	(36)
Personnel Increases at Other Bases							8	231
Total New York Personnel Impact							(41)	(1,415)
North Carolina								
Army								
Recreation Center # 2 Fayetteville		Close	0	0	0	0	0	0
Personnel Increases at Other Bases							703	0
Total North Carolina Personnel Impact							703	0
North Dakota								
Air Force								
Grand Forks AFB		Realign	12	(112)	35	447	(1,506)	(119)
Personnel Increases at Other Bases							0	0
Total North Dakota Personnel Impact							(1,506)	(119)
Ohio								
Air Force								
Springfield-Beckley MAP AGS		Close	23	6	4	35	0	0
Defense Logistics Agency								
Defense Contract Mgmt Command International		Realign	3	(9)	3	39	0	0
Defense Distribution Depot Columbus		Realign	8	(51)	12	161	(2)	(721)
Personnel Increases at Other Bases							1,315	1,233
Total Ohio Personnel Impact							1,313	512
Oklahoma								
Air Force								
Oklahoma City ALC (Tinker AFB)		Realign	Costs/Savings included in AF ALC Realignments (See San Antonio ALC)				127	(831)
Personnel Increases at Other Bases							1,743	452
Total Oklahoma Personnel Impact							1,870	(379)
Pennsylvania								
Army								
Ft Indiantown Gap		Close	13	(67)	23	285	(136)	(385)
Kelly Support Center, PA		Realign	36	22	5	28	0	(121)
Letterkenny Army Depot		Realign	50	(207)	78	952	(35)	(2,055)
Navy								
NAESU Philadelphia		Close	3	(6)	3	30	(10)	(80)
NATSF Philadelphia		Close	6	(1)	2	23	(4)	(223)
NAWC-AD Open Water Test Facility Orelan		Close	0	0	0	0	0	0
NAWC-AD Warminster		Close	8	(33)	8	105	(16)	(332)
NCCOSC R&D Det Warminster		Close	Costs/Savings included in NAWC-AD Warminster action				0	0

BRAC 95 Closure and Realignment Recommendation Costs and Savings

(FY 96 \$Millions)

Service/Agency		Action	Closure Cost	FY96-01 Net Cost (Savings)	Annual Savings	Total Savings *	Net Personnel Gains and (Losses)	
Installation	State						Mil	Civ
Pennsylvania								
NSY Philadelphia-Norfolk Det		Redirect	0	(52)	9	135	0	0
Air Force								
Greater Pittsburgh IAP ARS		Close	22	(36)	13	161	0	(387)
Defense Logistics Agency								
Defense Distribution Depot Letterkenny		Disestablish	45	21	12	102	(4)	(374)
Defense Industrial Supply Center, PA		Disestablish	17	(59)	18	237	(16)	(369)
Personnel Increases at Other Bases							0	947
Total Pennsylvania Personnel Impact							(221)	(3,379)
Puerto Rico								
Army								
Ft Buchanan		Realign	74	50	10	45	(59)	(123)
Personnel Increases at Other Bases							0	0
Total Puerto Rico Personnel Impact							(59)	(123)
Rhode Island								
Personnel Increases at Other Bases							522	572
Total Rhode Island Personnel Impact							522	572
South Carolina								
Navy								
FISC Charleston		Close	2	(2)	1	11	(2)	(6)
NR Readiness Cmd 7 Charleston		Close	1	(14)	3	40	(30)	(16)
Personnel Increases at Other Bases							4,601	53
Total South Carolina Personnel Impact							4,569	31
Tennessee								
Defense Logistics Agency								
Defense Distribution Depot Memphis		Close	86	(15)	24	244	(11)	(1,289)
Personnel Increases at Other Bases							233	293
Total Tennessee Personnel Impact							222	(996)
Texas								
Army								
Red River Army Depot		Close	60	(313)	123	1,497	(14)	(2,887)
Navy								
NAS Corpus Christi		Realign	Costs/Savings included in NAS Meridian closure				252	(394)
NRF Laredo		Close	0	(1)	0	4	(6)	0
Air Force								
AF Electronic Warfare Simulator Activity, Ft. Worth		Disestablish	6	3	1	6	(4)	(1)
Bergstrom Air Reserve Base		Close	13	(93)	21	291	0	(585)
Brooks AFB		Close	186	139	27	142	(1,820)	(1,939)
Reese AFB		Close	37	(52)	22	257	(900)	(1,183)
San Antonio ALC (Kelly AFB)		Realign	183	(139)	89	991	364	(143)
Defense Logistics Agency								
Defense Distribution Depot Red River		Disestablish	59	1	19	186	(1)	(820)
Personnel Increases at Other Bases							1,754	1,346
Total Texas Personnel Impact							(375)	(6,606)

* Twenty Year Net Present Value at 2.75%

BRAC 95 Closure and Realignment Recommendation Costs and Savings

(FY 96 \$Millions)

Service/Agency		Action	Closure Cost	FY96-01 Net Cost (Savings)	Annual Savings	Total Savings *	Net Personnel Gains and (Losses)						
Installation	State						Mil	Civ					
Utah													
Army													
Dugway Proving Ground		Realign	25	(61)	26	307	(165)	(931)					
Air Force													
Ogden ALC (Hill AFB)		Realign	Costs/Savings included in AF ALC Realignments (See San Antonio ALC)				0	0					
Hill AFB (Including Utah Test and Training Range)		Realign	3	(62)	12	180	0	147					
Defense Logistics Agency													
Defense Distribution Depot Ogden		Close	111	28	21	181	(8)	(1,105)					
Personnel Increases at Other Bases							0	0					
Total Utah Personnel Impact							(173)	(1,889)					
Virginia													
Army													
Ft Lee (Kenner Hospital)		Realign	2	(16)	4	51	(99)	(106)					
Ft Pickett		Close	25	(41)	21	241	(9)	(245)					
Information Systems Software Command		Relocate	6	2	1	8	0	0					
Navy													
Info Systems Mgt Ctr Arlington		Relocate	0	0	0	2	0	0					
Naval Mgt Systems Spt Office Chesapeake		Disestablish	2	(9)	3	35	(6)	(15)					
NAVSEA Crystal City		Redirect	160	(48)	9	144	0	0					
NISE Det Norfolk		Close	5	0	2	20	0	0					
Office of Naval Research Arlington		Redirect	0	0	0	0	0	0					
SPAWAR Arlington		Redirect	24	(120)	25	360	(201)	(932)					
Personnel Increases at Other Bases							4,669	787					
Total Virginia Personnel Impact							4,354	(511)					
Washington													
Army													
Camp Bonneville		Close	0	(1)	0	2	0	0					
Navy													
NUWC Keyport		Realign	2	(10)	2	30	0	(28)					
Personnel Increases at Other Bases							780	28					
Total Washington Personnel Impact							780	0					
West Virginia													
Army													
Valley Grove Area Maintenance Spt Activity, WV		Close	Costs/Savings included in Kelly Support Center action				0	(7)					
Personnel Increases at Other Bases							0	0					
Total West Virginia Personnel Impact							0	(7)					
Wisconsin													
Navy													
NRC Sheboygan		Close	0	(1)	0	4	(6)	0					
Personnel Increases at Other Bases							0	0					
Total Wisconsin Personnel Impact							(6)	0					

Department of Defense Recommended BRAC 95 Job Changes by State

(Military includes average student load; civilian includes on-base contractor personnel)

State Installation	Action	Out		In		Net Gain/(Loss)	
		Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ
ALABAMA							
ANNISTON ARMY DEPOT	RECEIVE	0	0	28	473	28	473
DEFENSE DISTRIBUTION DEPOT ANNISTON	RECEIVE	0	0	0	539	0	539
FORT MCCLELLAN	CLOSE	(6,095)	(2,441)	0	0	(6,095)	(2,441)
NRC HUNTSVILLE	CLOSE	(11)	(8)	0	0	(11)	(8)
REDSTONE ARSENAL	RECEIVE	0	0	201	2,368	201	2,368
	Total	(6,106)	(2,449)	229	3,380	(5,877)	931
ALASKA							
FORT GREELY	REALIGN	(438)	(286)	0	0	(438)	(286)
FORT WAINWRIGHT	RECEIVE	0	0	205	56	205	56
NAF ADAK	CLOSE	(540)	(138)	0	0	(540)	(138)
	Total	(978)	(424)	205	56	(773)	(368)
ARIZONA							
FORT HUACHUCA	RECEIVE	0	0	108	166	108	166
YUMA PROVING GROUND	RECEIVE	0	0	39	18	39	18
	Total	0	0	147	184	147	184
ARKANSAS							
FORT CHAFFEE	CLOSE	(40)	(207)	0	0	(40)	(207)
	Total	(40)	(207)	0	0	(40)	(207)
CALIFORNIA							
CBC PORT HUENEME	RECEIVE	0	0	0	2	0	2
DEFENSE CONTRACT MANAGEMENT DISTRICT WEST	RECEIVE	0	0	2	20	2	20
DEFENSE DISTRIBUTION DEPOT SAN JOAQUIN	RECEIVE	0	0	0	213	0	213
DEFENSE DISTRIBUTION REGION WEST	REDIRECT	0	0	2	289	2	289
EAST FT BAKER	CLOSE	(47)	(50)	0	0	(47)	(50)
EDWARDS AFB	RECEIVE	0	0	3	0	3	0
FISC SAN DIEGO	RECEIVE	0	0	0	18	0	18
FORT HUNTER LIGGETT	REALIGN	(393)	(85)	0	0	(393)	(85)
MCCLELLAN AFB	RECEIVE	0	0	134	245	134	245
MOFFETT FEDERAL AIRPORT AGS	CLOSE	(88)	(230)	0	0	(88)	(230)
NADEP NORTH ISLAND	RECEIVE	0	0	6	213	6	213
NAS NORTH ISLAND	RECEIVE	0	0	1,529	54	1,529	54
NAVAL HEALTH RESEARCH CENTER, SAN DIEGO	CLOSE	(17)	(137)	0	0	(17)	(137)
NAVAL PERSONNEL R&D CENTER, SAN DIEGO	DISESTABLISH	(17)	(203)	0	0	(17)	(203)
NAVAL STATION SAN DIEGO	RECEIVE	0	0	175	22	175	22
NAVAL WEAPONS STATION SEAL BEACH	RECEIVE	0	0	51	126	51	126
NAVMEDCEN SAN DIEGO	RECEIVE	0	0	102	35	102	35
NAWC CHINA LAKE	RECEIVE	0	0	18	284	18	284
NCCOSC RDT&E SAN DIEGO	RECEIVE	0	0	154	666	154	666
NISE WEST SAN DIEGO	DISESTABLISH	0	(58)	0	0	0	(58)
NORTH HIGHLANDS AIR GUARD STATION	CLOSE	0	0	0	0	0	0
NRC POMONA	CLOSE	(7)	(3)	0	0	(7)	(3)
NRC SANTA ANA (IRVINE)	CLOSE	(12)	(2)	0	0	(12)	(2)
NRC STOCKTON	CLOSE	(7)	0	0	0	(7)	0
NSWC PORT HUENEME	RECEIVE	0	0	0	107	0	107
NSY LONG BEACH	CLOSE	(263)	(3,766)	0	0	(263)	(3,766)
ONIZUKA AS	REALIGN	(673)	(1,202)	0	0	(673)	(1,202)
SIERRA ARMY DEPOT	REALIGN	(53)	(539)	0	0	(53)	(539)
SUPSHIP LONG BEACH	DISESTABLISH	(11)	(8)	0	0	(11)	(8)
TRAVIS AFB	RECEIVE	0	0	14	1	14	1
	Total	(1,588)	(6,283)	2,190	2,295	602	(3,988)
COLORADO							
FALCON AFB	RECEIVE	0	0	287	234	287	234
FITZSIMONS ARMY MEDICAL CENTER	CLOSE	(1,291)	(1,612)	0	0	(1,291)	(1,612)
FORT CARSON	RECEIVE	0	0	231	0	231	0
LOWRY AFB	REDIRECT	(78)	(11)	0	0	(78)	(11)
PETERSON AFB	RECEIVE	0	0	10	69	10	69
	Total	(1,369)	(1,623)	528	303	(841)	(1,320)

Department of Defense Recommended BRAC 95 Job Changes by State

(Military includes average student load; civilian includes on-base contractor personnel)

State Installation	Action	Out		In		Net Gain/(Loss)	
		Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ
CONNECTICUT							
NUWC DET NEW LONDON	DISESTABLISH	(5)	(622)	0	0	(5)	(622)
STRATFORD ARMY ENGINE PLANT	CLOSE	(2)	0	0	0	(2)	0
SUBASE NEW LONDON	RECEIVE	0	0	20	13	20	13
	Total	(7)	(622)	20	13	13	(609)
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA							
NAVAL RESEARCH LABORATORY	RECEIVE	0	0	32	0	32	0
WALTER REED ARMY MEDICAL CENTER	RECEIVE	0	0	193	0	193	0
	Total	0	0	225	0	225	0
FLORIDA							
EGLIN AFB	RECEIVE	(27)	(25)	447	324	420	299
HOMESTEAD AFB	REDIRECT	(61)	(153)	0	0	(61)	(153)
MACDILL AFB	RECEIVE	0	0	687	57	687	57
NADEP JACKSONVILLE	RECEIVE	0	0	0	40	0	40
NAS JACKSONVILLE	RECEIVE	0	0	1,901	27	1,901	27
NAS KEY WEST	REALIGN	(19)	(1)	0	0	(19)	(1)
NAS PENSACOLA	RECEIVE	0	0	399	94	399	94
NAS WHITING FIELD	RECEIVE	0	0	327	5	327	5
NAWC TRNG SYS DIV ORLANDO	RECEIVE	0	0	5	48	5	48
NRL UNDERWATER SOUND DET ORLANDO	DISESTABLISH	0	(109)	0	0	0	(109)
NSWC PANAMA CITY	RECEIVE	0	0	42	28	42	28
TYNDALL AFB	RECEIVE	0	0	53	344	53	344
	Total	(107)	(288)	3,861	967	3,754	679
GEORGIA							
DEFENSE CONTRACT MANAGEMENT DISTRICT SOUTH	DISESTABLISH	(5)	(164)	0	0	(5)	(164)
DOBBINS ARB	RECEIVE	0	0	0	58	0	58
FORT GORDON	RECEIVE	0	0	94	0	94	0
NAS ATLANTA	RECEIVE	0	0	319	7	319	7
NAVSCSOL ATHENS	RECEIVE	0	0	391	12	391	12
WARNER-ROBINS ALC (ROBINS AFB)	REALIGN	(8)	(526)	0	0	(8)	(526)
	Total	(13)	(690)	804	77	791	(613)
GUAM							
FISC GUAM	DISESTABLISH	(73)	(340)	0	0	(73)	(340)
NAS AGANA	REDIRECT	(1,272)	0	0	0	(1,272)	0
NAVAL ACTIVITIES GUAM	REALIGN	(737)	(1,684)	0	0	(737)	(1,684)
SRF GUAM	CLOSE	(22)	(641)	0	0	(22)	(641)
	Total	(2,104)	(2,665)	0	0	(2,104)	(2,665)
HAWAII							
FORT SHAFTER	RECEIVE	0	0	102	0	102	0
MCB KANEHOE BAY	RECEIVE	0	0	546	0	546	0
NAVMAG LUALUALEI	RECEIVE	0	0	80	246	80	246
NAVSTA PEARL HARBOR	RECEIVE	0	0	267	527	267	527
	Total	0	0	995	773	995	773
IDAHO							
MOUNTAIN HOME AFB	RECEIVE	0	0	123	3	123	3
	Total	0	0	123	3	123	3
ILLINOIS							
NTC GREAT LAKES	RECEIVE	0	0	10	5	10	5
PRICE SUPPORT CENTER, IL	CLOSE	(25)	(200)	0	0	(25)	(200)
SAVANNA ARMY DEPOT ACTIVITY	CLOSE	(57)	(393)	0	0	(57)	(393)
	Total	(82)	(593)	10	5	(72)	(588)
INDIANA							
NAWC-AD INDIANAPOLIS	CLOSE	(36)	(2,805)	0	0	(36)	(2,805)
NSWC CRANE	RECEIVE	0	0	13	1,778	13	1,778
	Total	(36)	(2,805)	13	1,778	(23)	(1,027)
KANSAS							
NARC OLATHE	CLOSE	(10)	(4)	0	0	(10)	(4)
	Total	(10)	(4)	0	0	(10)	(4)

Department of Defense Recommended BRAC 95 Job Changes by State

(Military includes average student load; civilian includes on-base contractor personnel)

State Installation	Action	Out		In		Net Gain/(Loss)	
		Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ
KENTUCKY							
FORT KNOX	RECEIVE	0	0	1,416	54	1,416	54
NSWC LOUISVILLE	CLOSE	(15)	(1,449)	0	0	(15)	(1,449)
	Total	(15)	(1,449)	1,416	54	1,401	(1,395)
LOUISIANA							
NAS NEW ORLEANS	RECEIVE	0	0	0	2	0	2
NAVAL BIO DYNAMICS LAB NEW ORLEANS	CLOSE	(15)	(39)	0	0	(15)	(39)
NR READINESS CMD 10 NEW ORLEANS	CLOSE	(24)	(23)	0	0	(24)	(23)
	Total	(39)	(62)	0	2	(39)	(60)
MAINE							
NAS BRUNSWICK	RECEIVE	0	0	215	5	215	5
	Total	0	0	215	5	215	5
MARYLAND							
ABERDEEN PROVING GROUND	RECEIVE	0	0	11	108	11	108
ARMY PUBLICATIONS DISTRIBUTION CENTER	RELOCATE	(2)	(129)	0	0	(2)	(129)
FORT DETRICK	RECEIVE	0	(9)	602	334	602	325
FORT MEADE (KIMBROUGH HOSPITAL)	REALIGN	(55)	(74)	0	0	(55)	(74)
FORT RITCHIE	CLOSE	(1,011)	(1,333)	0	0	(1,011)	(1,333)
NAVAL MEDICAL RESEARCH INST. BETHESDA	CLOSE	(91)	(55)	0	0	(91)	(55)
NAWC-AD PATUXENT RIVER	RECEIVE	0	0	67	649	67	649
NSWC CARDEROCK	RECEIVE	0	0	1	19	1	19
NSWC DET ANNAPOLIS	CLOSE	(2)	(520)	0	0	(2)	(520)
NSWC DET WHITE OAK	CLOSE	(1)	(201)	0	0	(1)	(201)
	Total	(1,162)	(2,321)	681	1,110	(481)	(1,211)
MASSACHUSETTS							
DEFENSE CONTRACT MGT. DISTRICT NORTHEAST	RECEIVE	0	0	1	20	1	20
HANSCOM AFB	RECEIVE	0	0	6	585	6	585
NAS SOUTH WEYMOUTH	CLOSE	(637)	(299)	0	0	(637)	(299)
NATICK RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT CENTER	RECEIVE	0	0	2	160	2	160
SUDBURY TRAINING ANNEX	CLOSE	0	(13)	0	0	0	(13)
	Total	(637)	(312)	9	765	(628)	453
MICHIGAN							
DEFENSE REUTILIZATION AND MARKETING SERVICE (HQ)	RECEIVE	0	0	0	97	0	97
DETROIT ARSENAL	RECEIVE	0	0	8	178	8	178
DETROIT ARSENAL TANK PLANT	CLOSE	0	0	0	0	0	0
NRC CADILLAC	CLOSE	(8)	0	0	0	(8)	0
SELFRIDGE AGB	RECEIVE	0	0	54	0	54	0
SELFRIDGE ARMY GARRISON	CLOSE	(54)	(555)	0	0	(54)	(555)
	Total	(62)	(555)	62	275	0	(280)
MISSISSIPPI							
COLUMBUS AFB	RECEIVE	0	0	115	201	115	201
NAS MERIDIAN	CLOSE	(1,634)	(947)	0	0	(1,634)	(947)
NAVOCEANO	RECEIVE	0	0	0	36	0	36
	Total	(1,634)	(947)	115	237	(1,519)	(710)
MISSOURI							
AVIATION-TROOP COMMAND	DISESTABLISH	(247)	(4,484)	0	0	(247)	(4,484)
FORT LEONARD WOOD	RECEIVE	(4,139)	(90)	5,548	432	1,409	342
ST LOUIS PUBS	RECEIVE	0	0	2	40	2	40
	Total	(4,386)	(4,574)	5,550	472	1,164	(4,102)
MONTANA							
MALMSTROM AFB	REALIGN	(719)	(60)	0	0	(719)	(60)
	Total	(719)	(60)	0	0	(719)	(60)
NEVADA							
NELLIS AFB	RECEIVE	0	0	87	85	87	85
	Total	0	0	87	85	87	85
NEW JERSEY							
BAYONNE MILITARY OCEAN TERMINAL	CLOSE	(100)	(1,267)	0	0	(100)	(1,267)
CAVEN POINT RESERVE CENTER	CLOSE	(3)	0	0	0	(3)	0
FORT DIX	REALIGN	(310)	(429)	0	0	(310)	(429)

Department of Defense Recommended BRAC 95 Job Changes by State

(Military includes average student load; civilian includes on-base contractor personnel)

State Installation	Action	Out		In		Net Gain/(Loss)	
		Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ
FORT MONMOUTH	RECEIVE	0	0	35	1,188	35	1,188
NAVY WPNSTA EARLE	RECEIVE	0	0	0	25	0	25
NAWC LAKEHURST	CLOSE	(380)	(1,383)	0	0	(380)	(1,383)
Total		(793)	(3,079)	35	1,213	(758)	(1,866)
NEW MEXICO							
HOLLOMAN AFB	RECEIVE	0	0	1,368	344	1,368	344
KIRTLAND AFB	REALIGN	(4,556)	(2,964)	0	670	(4,556)	(2,294)
Total		(4,556)	(2,964)	1,368	1,014	(3,188)	(1,950)
NEW YORK							
FORT DRUM	RECEIVE	0	0	0	180	0	180
FORT HAMILTON RESEERVE CENTER	REALIGN	0	(52)	3	0	3	(52)
FORT TOTTEN	CLOSE	(11)	(32)	0	0	(11)	(32)
GRIFFISS AIR GUARD	REDIRECT	0	(150)	0	0	0	(150)
NRC STATEN ISLAND	CLOSE	(12)	(2)	0	0	(12)	(2)
REDCAP ACTIVITY, BUFFALO	DISESTABLISH	(2)	(1)	0	0	(2)	(1)
ROME LABORATORIES	CLOSE	(10)	(1,057)	0	0	(10)	(1,057)
ROSLYN AGS	CLOSE	(8)	(36)	0	0	(8)	(36)
SENECA ARMY DEPOT	CLOSE	(9)	(316)	0	0	(9)	(316)
STEWART IAP AGS	RECEIVE	0	0	8	36	8	36
WATERVLIET ARSENAL	RECEIVE	0	0	0	15	0	15
Total		(52)	(1,646)	11	231	(41)	(1,415)
NORTH CAROLINA							
MCAS NEW RIVER	RECEIVE	0	0	703	0	703	0
Total		0	0	703	0	703	0
NORTH DAKOTA							
GRAND FORKS AFB	REALIGN	(1,506)	(119)	0	0	(1,506)	(119)
Total		(1,506)	(119)	0	0	(1,506)	(119)
OHIO							
DEFENSE DISTRIBUTION DEPOT COLUMBUS	REALIGN	(2)	(721)	0	0	(2)	(721)
SPRINGFIELD BECKLEY MAP AGS	CLOSE	0	0	0	0	0	0
WRIGHT-PATTERSON AFB	RECEIVE	0	0	1,315	1,233	1,315	1,233
Total		(2)	(721)	1,315	1,233	1,313	512
OKLAHOMA							
FORT SILL	RECEIVE	0	0	1,575	32	1,575	32
MCALISTER ARMY AMMUNITION PLANT	RECEIVE	0	0	53	219	53	219
TINKER AFB (INCL. OKLAHOMA CITY ALC)	REALIGN	(19)	(1,161)	146	330	127	(831)
VANCE AFB	RECEIVE	0	0	115	201	115	201
Total		(19)	(1,161)	1,889	782	1,870	(379)
PENNSYLVANIA							
DEFENSE DISTRIBUTION DEPOT LETTERKENNY	DISESTABLISH	(4)	(374)	0	0	(4)	(374)
DEFENSE DISTRIBUTION DEPOT SUSQUEHANNA	RECEIVE	0	0	0	297	0	297
DEFENSE DISTRIBUTION REGION EAST	RECEIVE	0	0	0	89	0	89
DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL SUPPLY CENTER	REALIGN	(16)	(369)	0	0	(16)	(369)
FORT INDIANTOWN GAP	CLOSE	(136)	(385)	0	0	(136)	(385)
GREATER PITTSBURGH IAP ARS	CLOSE	0	(387)	0	0	0	(387)
KELLY SUPPORT CENTER	REALIGN	0	(128)	0	7	0	(121)
LETTERKENNY ARMY DEPOT	REALIGN	(35)	(2,055)	0	0	(35)	(2,055)
NAESU PHILADELPHIA	CLOSE	(10)	(80)	0	0	(10)	(80)
NATSF PHILADELPHIA	CLOSE	(4)	(223)	0	0	(4)	(223)
NAWC-AD & NCCOSC DET WARMINSTER WARMINSTER	CLOSE	(16)	(332)	0	0	(16)	(332)
NAWC-AD OPEN WATER TEST FACILITY ORELAND	CLOSE	0	0	0	0	0	0
NSWC PHILADELPHIA	RECEIVE	0	0	0	261	0	261
NSY PHILADELPHIA-NORFOLK DET	REDIRECT	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOBYHANNA ARMY DEPOT	RECEIVE	0	0	0	300	0	300
Total		(221)	(4,333)	0	954	(221)	(3,379)
PUERTO RICO							
FORT BUCHANAN	REALIGN	(59)	(123)	0	0	(59)	(123)
Total		(59)	(123)	0	0	(59)	(123)

Department of Defense Recommended BRAC 95 Job Changes by State

(Military includes average student load; civilian includes on-base contractor personnel)

State Installation	Action	Out		In		Net Gain/(Loss)	
		Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ
RHODE ISLAND							
NETC NEWPORT	RECEIVE	0	0	522	10	522	10
NUWC NEWPORT	RECEIVE	0	0	0	562	0	562
	Total	0	0	522	572	522	572
SOUTH CAROLINA							
FISC CHARLESTON	CLOSE	(2)	(6)	0	0	(2)	(6)
FORT JACKSON	RECEIVE	0	0	1,404	51	1,404	51
MCAS BEAUFORT	RECEIVE	0	0	540	5	540	5
NAVAL READINESS CMD 7 CHARLESTON	CLOSE	(30)	(16)	0	0	(30)	(16)
NAVY WPNSTA CHARLESTON	RECEIVE	0	0	2,780	0	2,780	0
SHAW AFB (726 ACS, HOMESTEAD AFB)	REDIRECT	(123)	(3)	0	0	(123)	(3)
	Total	(155)	(25)	4,724	56	4,569	31
TENNESSEE							
BUREAU OF PERSONNEL (IN)	RECEIVE	0	0	233	293	233	293
DEFENSE DISTRIBUTION DEPOT MEMPHIS	DISESTABLISH	(11)	(1,289)	0	0	(11)	(1,289)
	Total	(11)	(1,289)	233	293	222	(996)
TEXAS							
AF ELEC. WARFARE SIMULATOR ACT., FT. WORTH	DISESTABLISH	(4)	(1)	0	0	(4)	(1)
BERGSTROM AIR RESERVE BASE	CLOSE	0	(585)	0	0	0	(585)
BROOKS AFB	CLOSE	(1,820)	(1,939)	0	0	(1,820)	(1,939)
DEFENSE DISTRIBUTION DEPOT RED RIVER	DISESTABLISH	(1)	(820)	0	0	(1)	(820)
FORT BLISS	RECEIVE	0	0	470	62	470	62
FORT SAM HOUSTON	RECEIVE	0	0	414	27	414	27
JRB FT WORTH	RECEIVE	0	0	2	5	2	5
KELLY AFB (INCL. SAN ANTONIO ALC)	REALIGN	(44)	(511)	408	368	364	(143)
LACKLAND AFB	RECEIVE	0	0	240	26	240	26
LAUGHLIN AFB	RECEIVE	0	0	129	523	129	523
LONE STAR ARMY AMMUNITION PLANT	RECEIVE	0	0	0	510	0	510
NAS CORPUS CHRISTI	REALIGN	(722)	(394)	974	0	252	(394)
NAS KINGSVILLE	RECEIVE	0	0	418	50	418	50
NRF LAREDO	CLOSE	(6)	0	0	0	(6)	0
RED RIVER ARMY DEPOT	CLOSE	(14)	(2,887)	0	0	(14)	(2,887)
REESE AFB	CLOSE	(900)	(1,183)	0	0	(900)	(1,183)
SHEPPARD AFB	RECEIVE	0	0	81	143	81	143
	Total	(3,511)	(8,320)	3,136	1,714	(375)	(6,606)
UTAH							
DEFENSE DISTRIBUTION DEPOT OGDEN	DISESTABLISH	(8)	(1,105)	0	0	(8)	(1,105)
DUGWAY PROVING GROUND	REALIGN	(165)	(931)	0	0	(165)	(931)
HILL AFB (INCL. UTAH TEST AND TRNG RANGE)	RECEIVE	0	(104)	0	251	0	147
	Total	(173)	(2,140)	0	251	(173)	(1,889)
VIRGINIA							
CG MCCDC QUANTICO	RECEIVE	0	0	12	0	12	0
DEFENSE CONTRACT MANAGEMENT COMMAND	RECEIVE	0	0	11	41	11	41
DEFENSE GENERAL SUPPLY CENTER	RECEIVE	0	0	12	347	12	347
FORT LEE (KENNER HOSPITAL)	REALIGN	(99)	(106)	0	0	(99)	(106)
FORT PICKETT	CLOSE	(9)	(245)	0	0	(9)	(245)
NAS NORFOLK	REALIGN	(551)	0	0	0	(551)	0
NAS OCEANA	RECEIVE	0	0	5,185	145	5,185	145
NAVAL MGT SYSTEMS SPT OFFICE CHESAPEAKE	DISESTABLISH	(6)	(15)	0	0	(6)	(15)
NSWC DAHLGREN	RECEIVE	0	0	0	24	0	24
NSY NORFOLK	RECEIVE	0	0	0	230	0	230
SPAWAR ARLINGTON	REDIRECT	(201)	(932)	0	0	(201)	(932)
	Total	(866)	(1,298)	5,220	787	4,354	(511)
WASHINGTON							
FORT LEWIS	RECEIVE	0	0	137	0	137	0
NAS WHIDBEY ISLAND	RECEIVE	0	0	510	0	510	0
NSY PUGET SOUND	RECEIVE	0	0	41	28	41	28
NUWC KEYPORT	RECEIVE	0	(28)	92	0	92	(28)
	Total	0	(28)	780	28	780	0

Department of Defense Recommended BRAC 95 Job Changes by State

(Military includes average student load; civilian includes on-base contractor personnel)

State Installation	Action	Out		In		Net Gain/(Loss)	
		Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ
WEST VIRGINIA							
VALLEY GROVE AREA MAINT SUP ACT (AMSA)	CLOSE	0	(7)	0	0	0	(7)
	Total	0	(7)	0	0	0	(7)
WISCONSIN							
NRC SHEBOYGAN	CLOSE	(6)	0	0	0	(6)	0
	Total	(6)	0	0	0	(6)	0

NOTE: This table excludes relocations "out" for BRAC 95 recommendations to change prior BRAC decisions that have not yet been implemented.

Selected Recommended Changes to Prior Round BRAC Decisions

(Personnel that have not yet relocated.)

A Prior BRAC Decision Requires Personnel To Relocate:

A BRAC 95 Recommendation Would Change the Destination To:

From	To	New Location	Personnel In	
			Military	Civilian
NAS Alameda, CA	NAS North Island, CA	NAS Corpus Christi, TX	423	0
NAS Cecil Field, FL	MCAS Cherry Point, NC	NAS Oceana, VA	3,288	111
	MCAS Beaufort, SC	MCAS Beaufort, SC	540	5
	NAS Oceana, VA	NAS Atlanta, GA	319	7
		NAS Jacksonville, FL	1,889	22
NAF Detroit, MI	Marine Corps Res. Ctr., Twin Cities, MN	Selfridge AGB, MI	54	0
MCAS El Toro and MCAS Tustin, CA	NAS Lemoore, CA	NAS Oceana, VA	1,897	34
		NAS North Island, CA	1,271	54
		NAS Jacksonville, FL	12	5
MCAS El Toro and MCAS Tustin, CA	NAS Miramar, CA	MCAS New River, NC	703	0
		MCAS Kaneohe Bay, HI	128	0
Naval Nuclear Training, Orlando, FL	SUBASE New London, CT	Weapons Station Charleston, SC	2,780	0
NTC Orlando & NTC San Diego, CA	NAS Pensacola, FL NTC Great Lakes, MI	Lackland AFB, TX	193	0
		NUWC Keyport, WA	92	0
		FTC San Diego, CA	127	0
Naval Recruiting Command, Washington, DC	NTC Great Lakes, MI	Bureau of Personnel, Memphis, TN	216	135
Naval Security Group Command Detachment Potomac, MD	Fort Meade, MD	Naval Research Laboratory, MD	32	0
Williams Air Force Base, AZ	Orlando, FL	Williams Air Force Base, AZ	0	38
Griffiss AFB, NY 485th Engineering Installation Group	Hill AFB, UT	Unit Inactivates		

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